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Introduction
ton van haaften,  henrike jansen,  
jaap de jong and willem koetsenruijter
The field of rhetoric – from both a practical and a theoretical perspective –
is highly relevant, not only for conducting debates in the public domain,
but for analyzing and evaluating them as well. The idea of democracy is,
after all, closely intertwined with the ideal of making transparent decisions
based on high quality open discussions in the public domain. Pericles dis-
cusses this close relationship as early as the middle of the 5th century bc in
his famous funeral oration and panegyric of Athens and the Athenians:
Here each individual is interested not only in his own affairs but in the affairs of
the state as well: even those who are mostly occupied with their own business are
extremely well-informed on general politics – this is a peculiarity of ours: we do
not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own
business; we say that he has no business here at all. We Athenians, in our own per-
sons, take our decisions on policy or submit them to proper discussions: for we do
not think that there is an incompatibility between words and deeds; the worst
thing is to rush into action before the consequences have been properly debated.1
From classical antiquity until the present time, much attention has been
paid to questions like: how should public debate be organized and conducted
so that it contributes to decision making? And how – in that light – can
public speakers effectively construe their message in order to persuade an au-
dience or – in other words – bend its opinion?
Nowadays, research on rhetoric and its relationship to discussions in
the public domain has developed into an important area of interdiscipli-
nary scholarship. Theories, methodologies and insights from different aca-
demic disciplines are confronted and combined: fields such as classical
[  9 ]
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studies, argumentation theory, philosophy, logic, linguistics, history, law,
sociology, political science, public administration, criminology, psychology
and media studies. The objective of this current collection of essays on per-
suasion in the public domain is to give an overview of the state of the art
in this field of interdisciplinary scholarship and of the different approaches
and methodologies that it contains, explained and illustrated with relevant
examples and compelling case studies.
The book is divided in five parts, each with a specific theme: Fundamen-
tals of rhetoric (Part i), The rhetoric of verbal presentation (Part ii), Rhet-
oric and the media (Part iii), Rhetoric and politics (Part iv) and The rhetoric
of topoi (Part v).  The themes are overlapping rather than mutually exclu-
sive which means that the various chapters are organized according to their
main perspective, but also that all five themes are – to varying degrees –
addressed in every chapter. 
Fundamentals of rhetoric
The first part of the book focuses on fundamental aspects of the relation-
ship between persuasion and public debate from both historical and theo-
retical perspectives. 
In Chapter 1, Ineke Sluiter explores the metaphor of the ‘marketplace
of ideas’ in debates about freedom of speech and political deliberation. Start-
ing from a study of the legal case against the controversial Dutch politician
Geert Wilders, Sluiter takes a look at the archaeology of the concept in an-
cient Greece, fast-forwards to the United States at the beginning of the 20th
century, analyses the nature of the frame of the ‘marketplace’ and examines
three subsequent theories that take their lead from this metaphor: (i) mar-
ketplace mechanisms as a way of eliciting information from a group in order
to make the deliberative process more effective, (ii) the analysis of the
metaphor as a vehicle of social criticism and (iii) the consequences of more
recent insights into the functioning of the actual economy for ideas about
freedom of speech. After a brief return to the Wilders case and the ‘rhetoric
of free speech’, the chapter ends by briefly proposing an alternative model
for thinking about free speech: an evolutionary theory of rhetoric.
In Chapter 2, Manfred Kraus studies the relationship between rhetor-
ical exercises and a society’s value system. It is argued that class room exer-
cises in rhetoric have always been used, at the same time, for conveying
[  1 0 ]
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moral, social, religious and/or political values which may either be in ac-
cordance or at variance with a society’s prevailing value system. An interest-
ing case is rhetorical education in late antiquity which, although embedded
in the environment of a highly centralist and monarchic form of govern-
ment, still exhibited a strong classicizing trait, praising the democratic and
egalitarian values of classical Athens. Using as an example the 4th century
Progymnasmata, a textbook of rhetorical exercises compiled by the Anti-
ochian sophist Aphthonius, which takes a decidedly liberal, democratic,
anti-monarchic and legalistic stance in a monarchic society, and a pagan if
not entirely secular stance in a basically Christian environment, the chap-
ter poses the question as to how these exercises were implemented in the
classroom and what impact they had on society. In comparison with me-
dieval and early modern parallels, raising this question also highlights the
contemporary problem of how one chooses appropriate topics for rhetori-
cal exercise in an age of political correctness.
In Chapter 3, Marie Formarier discusses the musical quality of
speeches. Rhetoric was extremely powerful in Antiquity as speeches were
the only media hat gave information about politics. Consequently ancient
speakers such as Aristotle or Cicero knew very well how to be persuasive, to
attract and keep people’s attention; in other words to communicate effi-
ciently. In fact, they were very well aware of the persuasive power of the
musical quality of speeches. This chapter elucidates the fundamental prin-
ciples that determined the use of melody and rhythm in ancient political
discourse and clarifies the formal characteristics that were commonly ex-
ploited in both musical and rhetorical melodies and rhythms through a
complex mimetic process. Ancient theorists used to believe that rhythm
and melody could have an impact on the hearer’s feelings, beliefs and deci-
sions. This interaction between emotions and political decision-making ob-
viously raises deep ethical concerns as – even today – it can result in political
manipulation. Finally, inspired by these ancient rhetorical theories on
melody and rhythm, the chapter opens perspectives for oratory analysis. 
In Chapter 4, Christian Kock  presents a practical reinterpretation of
ancient stasis (status) theories which defined the available strategies, or lines
of argument, for criminal cases. Central were the three status rationales: the
conjectural, the definitional, and the qualitative, equivalent to the ques-
tions: What are the facts? How are the facts to be categorized? What par-
ticular circumstances characterize them? While these questions problematize
[  1 1 ]
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the facts at issue, another main component of stasis thinking concerned the
status legales, i.e., the questions which problematized the laws by which the
facts were to be judged. Some theorists also offered lists of strategies for ‘prac-
tical issues’, i.e., political debates. Kock suggests a way of generalizing and
integrating these strategies into one scheme which maps out all the strategies
which are available in any kind of social disagreement. More importantly, the
scheme may also help clarify, for everyone involved, what a disagreement is
about, and what it is not about.
Part i concludes with J. Antony Blair’s discussion, in Chapter 5, of the
relationship between rhetoric and argumentation. Blair describes four ways
in which rhetoric and argument, or argumentation, were thought to have
been related, after which he comments on some of the implications of these
conceptions. The fact that different theorists understand rhetoric, argument
and argumentation differently has to be taken into account. In some views all
argument is rhetorical, but not all rhetoric concerns argument. In others, ar-
gument and rhetoric overlap but neither one completely encompasses the
other. In a third view, the rhetorical is just one perspective to take on argu-
ment, among others (namely logic and dialectic). In the fourth understand-
ing of the relationship, rhetoric is the enhancement of argument, sometimes
legitimately and sometimes not. In the discussion, problems are found with
all four views. The first has a too narrow conception of logic; the second, a
conception of the domain of rhetorical argument that is too limited; the third,
a tendency to reduce to the fourth; and the fourth, too restricted a concep-
tion of rhetoric. The principal culprit behind some of these flaws is said to be
an insufficiently expansive understanding of rhetoric’s internal commitment
to reasonableness.
The rhetoric of verbal presentation
The second part consists of chapters 6 to 10 and focuses on the relationship
between a message’s form and its persuasiveness. It is concerned with stylis-
tic choices regarding the formulation of a message and the use of tropes and
other rhetorical devices.
In Chapter 6, Daniel J. O’Keefe discusses the relative persuasiveness of
alternative message forms. Social-scientific experiments that address this mat-
ter focus on establishing well-founded generalizations about persuasive ef-
fects; generalizations such as these naturally provide corresponding principles
of effective rhetorical design. O’Keefe focuses on research examining the rel-
[  1 2 ]
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ative persuasiveness of gain-framed messages (which emphasize the advan-
tages of compliance with the communicator’s recommendation) and loss-
framed messages (which emphasize the disadvantages of noncompliance).
There has been considerable speculation about whether these two appeal
forms differ in relative persuasiveness, either in general or for particular kinds
of advocacy topics. And although a great deal of experimental evidence has
accumulated on these matters, it has not been systematically retrieved or an-
alyzed – until recently, in a series of meta-analytic reviews. The findings from
these reviews turn out to be instructive, not only about the persuasive effects
of gain-loss message variations, but also more generally about how experi-
mental social-scientific research concerning persuasion should be performed,
reported and interpreted. In particular, the history of gain-loss message fram-
ing research illustrates the continuing challenges embodied in the task of de-
veloping dependable generalizations about effective message design.
In Chapter 7, A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans investigates what role the
stylistic device of praeteritio can play in arguers’ attempts to reconcile their
rhetorical with their dialectical aims in the argumentation stage of a discus-
sion by maneuvering strategically. In her discussion of praeteritio she thus
makes use of the theoretical framework of the Extended Pragma-Dialectical
approach to argumentation that Frans van Eemeren and Peter Houtlosser de-
veloped over the last ten years, which consists of an integration of rhetorical
insights in the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation. First, she pays
attention to the ways in which praeteritio can be realized in discourse. Next,
she gives an analysis of the general effects that the use of praeteritio may have
due to the presentational means that are employed. Finally she focuses on the
argumentation stage and discusses the ways in which praeteritio may con-
tribute to arguers’ dialectical and rhetorical aims when presenting and criti-
cizing arguments. 
In Chapter 8, Henrike Jansen, Marianne Dingemanse and Ingrid Per-
soon argue that the order of information presented in the antecedent and the
consequent of an argument’s inference license determines whether an argu-
ment is interpreted as either a causal or symptomatic one. This conclusion is
drawn on the basis of a reformulation of examples of reductio ad absurdum ar-
guments as arguments presented in the ‘standard’ way. Arguments which ap-
pear causal when they are presented as reductio ad absurdum arguments appear
symptomatic when they are reformulated as arguments presented in the stan-
dard way. That is not to say that these arguments are, or become, causal or
[  1 3 ]
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symptomatic in essence, but only that their presentation affects the initial
perception of an argument type. However, there is a limit to the reformula-
tion of arguments. It is shown that causal arguments that were originally pre-
sented in a standard way cannot be reformulated as reductio ad absurdum
arguments. A subjunctive if…then-clause cannot contain an information
structure which starts with the later event (in the if-part) and is then followed
by the earlier event (in the then-part). The same holds for some examples of
symptomatic argumentation which also contain a temporal difference in the
antecedent and consequent of the inference license.
In Chapter 9, Jaap de Jong and Bas Andeweg discuss some rhetorical
developments which have taken place in the way that speeches of Ministers
and State Secretaries are written in the Netherlands. Every Dutch Minister
and  State Secretary presents dozens of speeches every year. Fifteen years ago,
most of these speeches were written by civil servants, the policy experts of
the departments; over the past ten years, however, all the governmental de-
partments have expanded and now include an agency of specialist speech-
writers. What are the main rhetorical differences between the speeches written
by the civil servants and the speeches written today? An analysis of 66
speeches reveals the following: the speeches became richer, stylistically spoken,
and shorter; they contained more humor, comparisons, anecdotes and ex-
amples, and the style became more personal. The introductions of the
speeches became longer and the closings fulfilled more rhetorical functions.
All these differences indicate more rhetorical care and growing craftsmanship
in this type of Dutch speech writing.
In the last chapter of Part ii, Chapter 10, Hilde van Belle discusses style
and argument in the genre of newspaper columns. Columns are a popular
genre, yet it is hard to sum up their basic features. In order to explore this phe-
nomenon, Van Belle first tracks down the intense correlation between style
and argument in the history of columns. Second, she looks at old and new
theories about rhetorical figures and their argumentative function. Finally,
she combines these lines of enquiry in a proposal about the actual function
of columns and concludes that they make up for the (necessary) blind spot
in journalism, i.e., the fact that transparency (neutrality, normality) is the ef-
fect of a very strict and traditional low style of writing. Columns are not so
much free spaces for political ideas, it is argued, but rather, they are free spaces
away from the very strict style prescriptions and traditions employed in the
rest of the paper.
[  1 4 ]
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Rhetoric and the media
Part iii consists of chapters 11 to 14 and focuses on public debates in, and per-
suasion through, the media. With regard to bending opinion and the use of
rhetorical techniques and devices, the role of the media can hardly be over-
estimated, especially with respect to public debates on social problems. 
In Chapter 11, Joel Best discusses the rhetorical construction of a spe-
cific type of social problems: future problems. He shows that attempts to
draw attention to future social problems are inevitably vulnerable to chal-
lenge – how can one claim to know what the future holds? He argues that four
issues shape the rhetoric of future claims: prediction (what will occur?); mag-
nitude (how big will the problem be?); probability (how likely is it?); and
timing (when will it happen?) and that claims regarding each of these issues
can be contested. Uncertainty about what the future holds – as well as the
competition for public attention – encourage an adoption of rhetoric that
makes the future problem seem as serious as possible.
In Chapter 12, Peter Burger and Lotte Anemaet explore the controver-
sial issue of ‘drink spiking’: is it a genuine crime problem or an urban leg-
end? They illustrate that most of the online discussions of this topic feature
personal accounts of alleged victims. How do these victims establish ethos
in the face of widespread skepticism? Conversely, what rhetorical devices
do debunkers use to dismantle the victims’ credibility? Most previous re-
search efforts in this field were carried out by folklorists and social psy-
chologists who did not employ a rhetorical framework, with the notable
exception of Oring. Burger and Anemaet seek to expand Oring’s ‘rhetoric
of truth’: an enumeration of credibility-enhancing techniques, gleaned from
a collection of orally communicated legends. Their model aims to further
the understanding of the way extraordinary experiences are constructed in
online environments.
In Chapter 13, Willem Koetsenruijter and Gabry Vanderveen examine
the way media construct stereotypical images of victims and offenders by
using established sets of characteristics. They call these sets ‘frames’. Media use
these frames as a rhetorical device to convince the public of the guilt or in-
nocence of the parties involved. By using a series of content analyses, the au-
thors provide empirical evidence for ideas which are then developed in
analytical and qualitative research about stereotypical victims and offenders.
The case they use to achieve this is the story about the missing American girl
Natalee Holloway and her (presumed) offender, the Dutch adolescent Joran
[  1 5 ]
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van der Sloot, published in June 2005. The research reported in this chapter
is part of a broader multimedia research project about the way in which
Dutch media presented the Van der Sloot/Holloway case visually and ver-
bally. In this chapter the authors focus their attention on the photographs
which were published in newspapers, magazines and tabloids.
Part iii concludes with Susan Hogben’s discussion, in Chapter 14,
about how environmental ethos can be built. Demonstrating environmen-
tal credentials or being ‘green’ can accrue important financial and reputa-
tional advantages for corporations. Building such an image as this is often
a rhetorical matter. Environmental ethos can be built on the judicious and
accurate use of practical wisdom, a display of shared virtues or virtuous
character, and by demonstrating goodwill. Corporations are routinely using
brand and product advertizements to do this. Recently, attention is being
drawn to assertions that appear to overstate the environmental benefits
claimed by corporations. These address both linguistic and visual argument.
However, adjudications by the UK advertising regulatory authority do not
treat the text and image with rhetorical equity. On the basis of the analysis
of a corpus of complaint-generating advertizements, Hogben reveals that
low modality linguistic claims such as ‘ecological’ or ‘low emissions’ are con-
sistently rejected as misrepresentative. However, low modality images such
as sketches or cartoons are either ignored or deemed to be merely fictions
and thus not misrepresentations of alleged environmental impact. Only
high modality images, deemed to represent reality, attract critical re-ap-
praisal. Attributing different truth-values to images in this way means – the
author argues – that corporations can exploit visual modality to build en-
vironmental ethos without rebuke.
Rhetoric and politics
In Part iv, which consists of chapters 15 to 18, the focus is on several aspects
of the most notable type of public discussion: the political debate. How
does it work, how is it conducted and how do politicians try to persuade
whom?
In Chapter 15, Cezar M. Ornatowski proposes a rhetorical framework
for examining collective identity formation and transformation in terms of
seven constitutive dimensions: membership (who are we?), origin and history
(how did we become who we are?), location (where are we?), internal rela-
tions (how are we organized?; how do we relate to each other?), external re-
[  1 6 ]
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lations (who are our others?), shared values (what things do we hold in com-
mon?) and shared purpose (what are we striving for?). These dimensions
represent topoi of collective identity in the rhetorical sense of loci commu-
nis, places of argument (analogous to Kenneth Burke’s Pentad of Act,
Agent, Agency, Scene and Purpose) within which collective identities are
constituted, debated and transformed through a variety of discourses and
practices.
In Chapter 16, Bart van Klink, Olivier Lembcke and Pablo Leandro
Ciocchini start off from the observation that, in their fight against terrorism,
modern states seem to install a permanent state of exception. They focus on
the role that the notions connected to the Rule of Law play in key speeches
delivered by two political leaders who had to defend exceptional measures
which were taken in reaction to terrorist actions and threats: the former
British Prime Minister Tony Blair and the current Prime Minister of Spain,
Jose Luis Zapatero. The central research questions they address are: How are
the anti-terrorist measures justified in the speeches at hand? Are they, legally
speaking, created “from nowhere”, or are they still related in some way to
positive law?
In Chapter 17, Janet Takens, Anita van Hoof, Jan Kleinnijenhuis and
Wouter Atteveldt discuss so-called ‘populist rhetoric’. New political parties,
which have recently gained extensive popular support in the Netherlands,
employ a communication style that attracts media attention. In this chap-
ter, the authors focus on three of the characteristics of this communication
style, namely the emphasis on party leaders (personalization), the narrow
issue agenda and the use of populist rhetoric. They study the rhetoric used
by new parties, while taking into account who is voicing this rhetoric, and
which issues they are discussing. Election coverage of two Dutch news
broadcasts and five national newspapers in the three months preceding the
1998, 2002, 2003, and 2006 Dutch national elections were analysed by using
a Semantic Network Analysis. The results indicate that the media depict
new parties as voicing rhetoric through their party leaders, while employ-
ing a narrow issue agenda, and the established parties as adjusting to that
communication style when new parties gain popularity.
In the last chapter of Part iv, Chapter 18, Ton van Haaften discusses
the influence of political culture on the way that parliamentary debate is
conducted. Contrary to what one sees in, for example, the British or French
parliament, the debate in the Dutch parliament can be described as a rather
[  1 7 ]
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formal and clinical discussion which, in ideal form, consists of the rational
exchange of arguments. Rhetorical techniques are only used in moderation
and are generally not appreciated very much by Dutch members of parlia-
ment. Within the framework of the Extended Pragma-Dialectical Argu-
mentation Theory and, on the basis of results of political-historical research,
Van Haaften attempts to characterize the nature of Dutch parliamentary
debate as a culturally determined, specific type of communicative activity.
To achieve this he examines a debate on ‘Islamic activism’ which was held
in the Dutch Lower Chamber in 2007 and, using this case, the author il-
lustrates how the debating style of the controversial Dutch anti-Islam politi-
cian Geert Wilders challenges the dominant debate culture in the Dutch
Parliament.
The rhetoric of topoi
The fifth and last part of this book consists of Chapters 19 to 22 and focuses
on topoi as places to find arguments and as techniques of argumentation, for
example, the techniques for framing an audience or the types of argument
used in a legal discussion. What role do topoi play in public debate and
how can they be used persuasively? 
In Chapter 19, Baldwin van Gorp and Margot van der Goot investigate
how citizens respond to persuasive messages about sustainability. Sustainable
agriculture and food production present a complex field in which stakehold-
ers need to look for the most effective arguments to communicate that their
production methods, in particular, are sustainable. To study this persuasive
communication framing theory, a constructionist perspective is used. From
a previous study conducted by the authors, six frames are identified that stake-
holders use in their communication about sustainable food and agriculture.
In this current study, four focus groups were conducted in Belgium to iden-
tify how participants respond to texts that used these six frames. The analy-
sis leads to four main findings about how frames work with respect to the
abstract issue of sustainability in the agriculture and food system: simplifica-
tion, figurative analogy, causation and cultural resonance.
In Chapter 20, Anders Horsbøl challenges the view that attitudes to-
wards genetically modified (gm) crops in agriculture are ‘utterly resistant to
persuasion’, as is suggested in a review of the literature. Methodologically,
this is achieved by studying opinions as they emerge in situated interaction,
in this case in focus groups interviews with both gm experts and laypersons
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without specific knowledge of gm crops. In this chapter, Horsbøl analyses
the laypersons’ responses to persuasive expert utterances as inventive con-
tributions to the discussion, not just as reactions showing either support or
rejection. More specifically, he analyses the topoi in the sense of argumen-
tative ‘places’ which are realized by the laypersons in dealing with, and mak-
ing sense of, the new knowledge presented by the experts.
In Chapter 21, Lisa Storm Villadsen introduces the notion of ‘rhetor-
ical citizenship’ and discusses its relevance to rhetorical studies through a
reading of a contemporary case of political discourse. An examination of
critical reactions to two controversial statements illustrates how disap-
pointed expectations to leading figures’ public statements led to criticism of
their enactment of citizenship and a questioning of their rhetorical agency.
The overall claim is that the case suggests that an underdeveloped under-
standing and appreciation of rhetoric’s role in public deliberation can have
detrimental effects to such deliberation, including an active or more indi-
rect exclusion of particular points of view, a deferral of certain discussions,
and a less tolerant debate culture. It is suggested that public, political debate
would benefit from increased attention to, and tolerance of, various mani-
festations of rhetorical practice, e.g., by combating essentializing argumen-
tation which equates dissent with otherness and embracing a view of debate
as productive, not destabilizing for the community.
Part v, and the book itself, conclude with Eveline Feteris’ discussion
in Chapter 22 of strategic maneuvering in legal discussions. Participants in
a legal process often use linguistic arguments to support their claim. In lin-
guistic argument it is argued that the proposed interpretation of a rule is
based on the meaning of the words used in the rule in ordinary or techni-
cal language. The reason why linguistic arguments are chosen as supports
for a legal claim is that they are considered to have a preferred status in jus-
tifying a legal decision and, for this reason, in rhetorical terms, constitute
a topos in legal discourse. However, this preferred status can also be misused
for rhetorical reasons. In this chapter, the author analyses and evaluates two
examples of a form of strategic maneuvering with linguistic arguments that
often occurs in discussions about the application of legal rules and explains
how the strategic maneuvering derails. It becomes clear that the strategic
maneuvering with linguistic arguments in these cases consists of a complex
form of strategic maneuvering that constitutes a combination of two ma-
neuvers.
[  1 9 ]
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The ideas expressed in the chapters of this book were presented earlier at the
second ‘Rhetoric in Society’ conference, held in January 2009, at Leiden
University in the Netherlands.2 We would like to thank Inge van der Bijl,
Karin Geurtsen, Maarten van Leeuwen, Kathryn Sedman and Yvonne Twisk
for their help and support in preparing this book.
Leiden 2011
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2 For the proceedings of this conference, see: Haaften, T. van, H. Jansen, J. de Jong and 
W. Koetsenruijter (Eds.) (2009). Rhetoric in Society. Papers Second Conference (CD). Leiden:
Rhetoric in Society. The first ‘Rhetoric in Society’ conference took place at Aalborg Uni-
versity, Denmark, in November 2006. For a collection of papers that arose from this con-
ference, see: Dam, L., L. Holmgreen and J. Strunck (Eds.) (2008). Rhetorical Aspects of Dis-
courses in Present-Day Society. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
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1 Deliberation, Free Speech and 
the Marketplace of Ideas
ineke sluiter
1.1  Introduction
The controversial Dutch politician Geert Wilders is the leader of a political
party running on a single-issue ticket: the self-proclaimed battle against Islam.
In the process, one of his main selling points is his self-presentation and self-
fashioning as a (or maybe “the only”) champion of free speech. Freedom of
speech is central in the whole discussion surrounding this politician. Wilders
himself defends his more extreme statements with an appeal to the right to
freedom of speech, while at the same time blandly denying that right to Mus-
lims: in his view, the Qu’ran should be prohibited and banished. He remains
perfectly undisturbed by opponents pointing out the inconsistency of this
rhetorical strategy, which so far seems to have worked for him. Wilders’ op-
ponents, too, appeal to constitutional issues of freedom of speech: they claim
that Wilders engages in hate speech and that he incites to violence. At the mo-
ment, Wilders is on trial on these charges.1
One issue that keeps surfacing in Wilders’ views on freedom of speech
is the appeal to the “American model”, although obviously the legal playing
field is constrained by European legislation. Since at least the beginning of the
20th century, the (more permissive) American model was dominated by one
metaphor: the marketplace of ideas. That metaphor has traditionally been
used in defences of non-intervention, while recent experiences with the “real”
marketplace have accustomed us over the past two years to massive state in-
tervention even in capitalist societies with a strong belief in the free market.
How should we see the relationship between the marketplace as a rhetorical
frame and the real marketplace?
[  2 5 ]
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to prosecute. However, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal ordered that the case should go to
trial (LJN: BH0496, Gerechtshof Amsterdam).
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In this chapter, I would like to cast my net wide, by first exploring the
archaeology of the relationship between free speech, political deliberation
and the market in ancient Greece (section 1.2), and then fast-forward to the
United States at the beginning of the 20th century (section 1.3). Obviously, I
will not claim that there is a historical continuity between those periods, but
the differences and similarities that emerge may be illuminating. I will then
proceed to analyse the “frame” of the market (section 1.4), and discuss some
of the ramifications of the market metaphor in recent scholarship (sections
1.5-1.7). In section 1.7, I will also briefly return to the Wilders case, and argue
that the contributions of New Institutional Economics to theorizing free
speech issues offer us a new basis in theory to understand why politicians
should have a special responsibility for protecting access to public debate for
all. In section 1.8 I discuss the rhetorical phenomenon of the “rhetoric of
embattled free speech”. In the final section, I will offer a hint to an alterna-
tive, not primarily economic, model for thinking about free speech: an evo-
lutionary theory of rhetoric.
1.2 Deliberation and the marketplace of ideas in Athens
There is an ongoing academic debate over the role of “economy” and “market
thinking” in classical antiquity. For us, “the economy” is part of our social
imaginary, as Charles Taylor calls it (Taylor 2004): it is one of the frames, con-
cepts or metaphors, through which we conceive of political society. A “social
imaginary”, as distinct from a social theory, is defined as (Taylor 2004, p. 22):
the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how
things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met,
and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations.
Even though there are good arguments to assume that a form of economic
thinking emerged in classical Athens (Cohen 1992), “marketplace economy”
did not play the same role in the ancient social imaginary as in our present
time.2 However, verbal exchanges in the marketplace did have a symbolic
value. They were associated with openness, as opposed to subversive and clan-
destine dealings; they stood for an interest in the common good, as opposed
to the “quietism”, the withdrawal from public affairs of which Athenian ide-
ology did not approve (Carter 1986, e.g., p. 39, Manville 1996, p. 381); their
goal was truth-finding through the testing and exchanging of ideas; there
[  2 6 ]
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were definite links, both positive and negative, to the political arena; and in-
tellectuals also thought about the form and underlying norms in these ex-
changes. In this respect, the archaeology of the concept of the marketplace of
ideas is relevant. Let us look at these aspects in some more depth.
The Athenian marketplace, the public space known as the agora, was
a favourite hang-out of Socrates because of its unique opportunities for so-
cial engagement. After Socrates had been sentenced to death and executed, his
defenders use the fact that he operated in the marketplace to emphasize the
openness, the public nature, of that interaction, and the absence of deceit or
subversiveness (see, for example, Xenophon).3 It is on the agora that he could
best test the truth of Apollo’s famous oracle stating that no man was wiser
than Socrates.4 For Socrates, this process is inextricably connected with truth-
finding, particularly about moral issues, such as the essence of virtue. That,
rather than political deliberation, is the point of his philosophical conversa-
tions.5 Socrates is highly sceptical about the possibility that the masses will
have the necessary expert knowledge to know the good of the city. Arguably,
for Socrates the things about which it is possible to find the truth in the mar-
ketplace are all connected with the expert technical knowledge of, for in-
stance, a shoemaker. The market will discover quickly enough whether
somebody is good at that or not: if the shoes that were handed in for cobbling
turn out to be falling apart when you pick them up, the cobbler won’t last a
month, he will lose clientele and starve.6
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2 The most famous defender of the idea that ancient Greece had no real concepts of com-
merce and markets is Finley (19992). See Manville (1996) on ancient versus modern concep-
tualizations of citizenship, especially 1996, p. 391 on “economic” versus “non-economic”
democratic organizations. Cole (1986, p. 893), points out that the Greek version of the ago-
ra-marketplace (as a place of exchange, without all the economic overtones) may be useful
to overcome some of the conceptual weaknesses in the applications of the notion of the
marketplace of ideas by the US Supreme Court. See section 3 below.
3 Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.1.10; in Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.1.2 the same point is made
about Socratic religion, cf. Gigon (1953), ad loc.
4 Plato, Apologia 17c8; cf. Gorgias 447a8, with the ingenious reading in Doyle (2006). Test-
ing people in the agora: Plato, Apologia 20b8ff.
5 Cf. the Pseudo-Platonic dialogue Sisyphus, which deals with “deliberation”.
6 Plato, Meno 91d-e. The Socrates character in Plato is not opposed to the market as such:
his sketch for an ideal state leaves room for merchants.
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In the same period, however, there are also people for whom there ex-
ists a real marketplace of ideas in Athens, people who literally sell their knowl-
edge and thoughts to anyone who would like to listen. These travelling
professors are the sophists, the first professional teachers of rhetoric, and the
first to link their rhetorical expertise, for sale on a marketplace of ideas, to ex-
pertise in political deliberation. In the same passage in Plato in which Socrates
professes his faith in the market to discover bad merchandise, he ironically
says that surely if somebody like Protagoras has been on this market selling
his lessons for over forty years with his reputation intact, he cannot have been
sending his students away in a worse moral condition than he found them.
Elsewhere, the sophists are repeatedly called merchants, traders, and retailers
(emporoi and kapêloi).7 In fact, this turns into a very important point in the
self-presentation of Socrates, who makes a great effort to distinguish himself
from the sophists (although the sophists otherwise share quite a few of his
own intellectual interests). The most obvious difference is that Socrates insists
that he never received any money for his teaching, in fact, that he would have
had nothing to sell since he does not claim to have any particular kind of
knowledge. However that is, the sophists are definitely “in the marketplace
of ideas”. 
Although Plato’s treatment of the sophists is hostile, and, moreover,
has almost completely overwhelmed any independent evidence about them,
it is precisely in their circles that one should look for early theory on the re-
lationship between deliberation and rhetoric – and slightly more indirectly
democracy. In Plato’s dialogue Protagoras, Socrates and Protagoras engage in
a lengthy exchange that ultimately revolves around a complex of questions:
can we teach “sound deliberation”, “the art of good citizenship” or, in So-
cratic terms, “virtue”? At some point, Socrates wonders why the Athenians
allow only experts to speak in the assembly when the issue is, for example,
building houses or ships, whereas anyone can take the floor if the topic of
deliberation is the common good of the polis. Protagoras couches his expla-
nation in a famous myth about the origins of human civilization (Plato, Pro-
tagoras 320d-322d). 
The myth tells us that once upon a time, when human beings had first
been created and were about to be sent forth over the earth, all abilities and
gifts were distributed over the living creatures. However, through a terrible
[  2 8 ]
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mistake in the distribution process, humans alone were left naked and help-
less, without any means to defend themselves, or keep warm. Then
Prometheus came to the rescue: he stole fire from the gods, and gave mankind
technical skill – but not political skill, since he would have needed to steal that
from Zeus himself. Technique is not useless: with its help man invented reli-
gion, speech, housing, clothes, and food. They lived by themselves, rather
than in cities, which had the unfortunate effect that they kept being killed by
animals. Their protection should lie in forming communities, but whenever
they tried that, they would treat each other unjustly, for they lacked political
skill, the skill to form poleis or “political communities”, that Prometheus had
been unable to steal for them: as a result they would disperse again, and once
again be eaten by animals. Finally, Zeus took mercy and ordered Hermes to
distribute two vital qualities to all human beings, justice, and a sense of re-
spect, of social inhibition. All human beings received a part of those, and that
is why all human beings may have a vote and a voice when deliberating about
justice, and about political virtue.
This myth may count as a justification of deliberative democracy,
whether Protagoras intended it as such or not. By nature, human beings have
a moral orientation, a sense of justice (dikê), which makes it possible for them
to contribute meaningfully to the political decisions of their community. For
discussions about freedom of speech, however, the other divine gift may be
even more important: aidôs, a sense of “shame”, as it is traditionally translated,
or maybe rather of the mutual “respect” that keeps people from harming oth-
ers (cf. Cairns 1993). It is the social skill that makes actual social interaction,
on the basis of a shared sense of justice (the other gift), possible. Aidôs does
not incite someone to action; it is an emotion that functions as a restraint
only. Interestingly, while this emotion is useful and may even be necessary in
social interaction (as opposed to our modern view of provocation, shock and
offence as possible and permissible side effects of the exercise of freedom of
speech), Socrates values it negatively in philosophical exchanges. Instead he
advocates, not bashful inhibition, but brash shamelessness in order to get to
the bottom of any philosophical problem (van Raalte 2004). In that connec-
tion he uses the term parrhêsia, the ancient concept of “free speech”: not a
right, as in our time, but a highly valued attribute of the good friend, the
earnest philosopher, and the responsible citizen (Sluiter and Rosen 2004).
So Protagoras introduces a normative concept of social interaction for
the purpose of deliberation. He is also associated with two other slogans that
[  2 9 ]
deliberation,  free speech and the marketplace of ideas
LUP Bending Opinion Boek_Layout 2  27-01-11  14:46  Pagina 29
are relevant in the context of deliberation: the claim that there are two logoi,
two arguments, to be associated with any cause; and the promise that he could
make the weaker logos, the weaker argument, stronger. Traditionally, and in
line with the hostile approach by Plato, both phrases have been interpreted
as indicative of a lack of morality, and of an approach to rhetoric as a ruth-
less winner-take-all discipline, with the sophist or intellectual as the devil’s ad-
vocate. However, two recent papers have argued just the opposite, stating
that Protagoras’ principles are either morally neutral, or even conducive to op-
timal decision-making. Jane Day (2007) considers the “two logoi” principle
the precursor to a highly valuable liberal principle. And Paul Woodruff (2008)
has argued convincingly that “making the weaker argument stronger” should
be read as a formal strategy to improve political decision-making: before tak-
ing a decision, the counterargument to one’s own position should be allowed
to appear at maximum strength – making the weaker argument stronger, or
as strong as possible – so that the final decision is a result of genuine eubou-
lia, “good judgment”, “being well-advised”, “having taken good counsel”.
“Making the weaker argument stronger” is a rhetorical strategy of using po-
larized and starkly competing views in the service of deliberative political de-
cision making (Woodruff 2008).
Between Socrates and Protagoras we have already encountered a num-
ber of the issues that will play a role in the metaphor of the “marketplace of
ideas”: in Socrates’ case, the notions of openness, public process, truth-find-
ing, and the investigation of ideas and their testing; in Protagoras’ case, the
relation between morality and political rhetoric through the concept of aidôs,
a notion rejected by Socrates in a context of a philosophical search for truth.
Protagoras also adds the important formal notion of, not just alternative ideas
in a common search for truth, but of opposing and competing ideas, presented
in a polarized way and at maximum strength, to improve the quality of po-
litical decision-making. For us as students of rhetoric, the other issue that is
important in this very early marketplace of ideas, is that Socrates is at least
nominally, and notwithstanding the highly rhetorical presentation of his own
ideas, virulently opposed to rhetoric, which as a technique lacks the ground-
ing in knowledge that would make it morally acceptable to him (since for
Socrates virtue is knowledge). Protagoras and his colleagues, on the other
hand, are the champions of rhetoric, and Protagoras is much more optimistic
than Socrates about the reliability of decisions taken by large assemblies.
[  3 0 ]
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1.3 The US Supreme Court
After this quick archaeological exploration, we must move on to an equally
quick investigation of the metaphor of the marketplace of ideas in our own
times, particularly in the United States, where it is the foundational metaphor
and conceptual frame for thinking about the First Amendment, the part of
the American Constitution that safeguards freedom of expression.
Obviously, political thought in the United States developed in dia-
logue and debate with the British tradition. Precursors to the marketplace
of ideas have been identified in John Milton’s Areopagitica of 1644, dealing
with liberty of thought and expression, and in John Stuart Mill’s 1859 clas-
sic On Liberty (Cole 1986, pp. 876-877). Both start from the notion of a
search for truth. According to Stuart Mill, there are three risks when you
suppress any opinion: for one thing, it may have been true; second, it may
have contained a portion of the truth, which in combination with other
available opinions might have led to the discovery of the whole truth; and
third, if the suppressed opinion was false, we may have missed a chance of
preventing truth from turning into dogma (since there is no need to argue
for it any more).
In the United States, the tradition of the metaphor of the market-
place of ideas starts in 1919, when in the wake of wwi four anti-war cases
were heard by the Supreme Court, all resulting from the Espionage Act of
1917: the Espionage Act was a piece of legislature curtailing speech that
could damage the interests of a nation at war. Maybe the most famous Jus-
tice in the history of the Supreme Court, Oliver Wendell Holmes, wrote a
dissenting opinion in the fourth of these cases, Abrams v. United States,8 in
which, interestingly, he not only dissented from his colleagues on the
Supreme Court in that particular case, but also from himself in the unani-
mous opinions penned by Holmes himself in the previous three cases of
protests against the war.9 In the three previous cases the Supreme Court had
upheld the preceding convictions in lower courts, on the basis of the test of
‘clear and present danger’: sometimes the speech under discussion brings
with it a clear and present danger of an immediate and violent disruption
of the deliberative process (for instance because it is so incendiary that no
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9 For Abrams as an instantiation of dissent, see the analysis by Cole (1986, pp. 885-887). For
war as the ultimate test of free speech issues, see Stone (2004).
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one is going to be willing to hear out any opposing views). If such clear and
present danger is at issue, that was considered a legitimate reason to suspend
an individual’s right to freedom of expression. 
In Abrams, the defendants were five people who had pro-Russian lean-
ings and who had printed and distributed 5000 leaflets protesting US policy
towards Russia and calling for a general strike, in particular among muni-
tions workers (see Cole 1986, p. 883). The charge, of which they had been
found guilty, was an intention to “incite, provoke and encourage resistance
to the United States in [the war with Germany]”. The Supreme Court again
upheld the conviction, but in his dissent Oliver Wendell Holmes pleads for
a more laissez-faire approach. Here is the famous peroration to that dissent (at
630), which starts with a very daring move: in complete irony, Holmes states
exactly the opposite of what he means to say (Cole 1986, p. 885):
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you have
no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your
heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition.
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own con-
duct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas – that the best
test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the mar-
ket, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all
life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation
upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge.
“Free trade in ideas”, “the power of thought to get itself accepted in the com-
petition of the market”: these ideas were taken up later, expanded upon and
reinterpreted in that specific combination of reverence for precedence and
creativity in the light of new societal developments that is typical for legal
thinking (Cole 1986). The actual phrase “the marketplace of ideas” is first
found in a concurring opinion by Justice Brennan in 1965,10 who defends not
only the right of free expression of individuals, but also the right of the pub-
lic to receive ideas. This is what he says: 
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The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees
are not free to receive and consider them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas
that had only sellers and no buyers.11
In the meantime, a different strand of First Amendment thinking also emerges,
which I will introduce here because it is also of vital importance in theories
about deliberative democracy. Justice Brandeis introduces the phrase “the free-
dom to think as you will and to speak as you think” (Dutch readers may have
been inclined to attribute these words to exuberant politician Pim Fortuyn –
but in fact the formulation dates back over seventy years to 1927).12 Brandeis
moved the focus of his reading of the First Amendment from quasi-economic
truth-finding to political considerations of individual freedom and communal
political deliberation13 – I will return to this later. 
1.4  Framing free speech in the Supreme Court
As students of rhetoric, we recognize clearly that the metaphor of the mar-
ketplace of ideas functions as a frame. It directs and helps focus thought about
whatever concrete example of free expression is before the court. This par-
ticular frame, moreover, is usually invoked in support of authorizing free
speech. It is well worth investigating the characteristics of the frame somewhat
more precisely. 
The model of the marketplace that Holmes had in mind is basically
that of neoclassical economics; it assumes a laissez-faire economy, in which in-
dividual actors, all pursuing their own rational self-interest, have a free, equal
and unimpeded access to the common market on which they compete. Their
transactions are supposed to be completely efficient and cost-free – this mar-
ket knows no friction. And there is the notion of the “invisible hand” that will
miraculously promote the common good, although the individual actors act
out of purely personal self-interest. Holmes explicitly introduced “truth” as
that common good: in his view, as in the tradition of Locke, truth is the goal
of this economy.
Now obviously, it is not hard to think of some problems connected
with this interpretation of the frame in view of more recent economic in-
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12 Concurring opinion in Whitney v. California 274 U.S. 357, 372-380 (1927).
13 Cole (1986, p. 888).
LUP Bending Opinion Boek_Layout 2  27-01-11  14:46  Pagina 33
sights – in fact, all aspects of the model can be fairly criticized. If that was still
necessary, we were effectively disabused of our trust in the laissez-faire econ-
omy and cost-free transactions by the massive state interventions necessitated
by the recent economic crisis, and by the disastrous results for small investors
of poor access to relevant information. Free, equal and unimpeded access to
the market for all? Rational behavior? None of it fits our recent experiences.
In fact, as Paul Brietzke had already put it (1997, pp. 962-963): the model
seems to ignore “a host of factors that make us human” (and he proceeds to
mention altruism, habit, bigotry, panic, genius, luck and peer pressures: “we
are after all a social animal”).14
So, the frame is not realistic, but that never stopped the Supreme Court
from using it, in fact the frequency of its use increased. However, the defini-
tions of “the marketplace of ideas” shifted considerably over time, and in fact
the Supreme Court does not work with a monolithic concept of the market-
place, but acknowledges many different smaller and larger “marketplaces”
(Hopkins 1996, pp. 40-41). 
But quite apart from its actual use in the judiciary, the frame was also
reconsidered by theorists for a number of different purposes. In the next sec-
tion, we will successively look at a proposal to take the market model liter-
ally in order to improve the deliberative decision-making process (Sunstein
2006), and at two critiques of the model; one as a vehicle for social criticism
(Ingber 1984), the other a revision of the model in light of recent economic
insights, and an attempt to rethink their implications for free speech issues
(Blocher 2007-2008).
1.5  Markets and democratic deliberation
Thinking with the frame of the marketplace of ideas has led to further
thought on how market mechanisms can be made productive for political
deliberation. In an interesting recent book that appeared right before the
2007 global market crisis, Cass Sunstein takes a fresh look at the decision-
making process (Sunstein 2006): does deliberation really lead to the best pos-
sible decisions, maybe even to “truth”? Or does it just legitimize the
democratic process, because it leads to consensus, even though the decision
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that can carry over to the frame of the marketplace of ideas.
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itself may be “wrong”?15 Under what circumstances does deliberation produce
the best results, rather than just forms of group-think? 
According to Sunstein it is crucial that the knowledge dispersed in any
group be elicited efficiently, because in that case groups spectacularly out-
perform individuals – something Aristotle also believed.16 It has been demon-
strated that majority decisions are significantly more reliable than individual
decisions, even if taken by experts, as long as the group is big enough and as
long as there is a higher statistic probability for each member of the group that
they will be right than wrong. Under such conditions, the probability that the
group as a whole is right increases steeply, a very important piece of infor-
mation also for the functioning of juries.17 So, for example, if each individ-
ual has a 51% chance of being right, the statistical chance of a group verdict
being right may quickly rise to over 70 %. Of course, the downside is that if
the probability that the individual is wrong exceeds the probability that they
are right, the probability of a correct group decision falls rapidly to just about
zero. This means that eliciting and sharing knowledge is crucial for a well-
functioning democracy. 
The system recommended by Sunstein to reach this goal of increased
availability of knowledge within a group is in fact the price system: follow-
ing Hayek (1973), he considers prices a superb instrument for aggregating in-
formation. Prices are the result of a complex interaction between individual
actors and all kinds of factors influencing the market as a whole. Sunstein
proposes to use a market system that will allow people to put their money
on certain outcomes of political processes. In fact, a number of websites op-
erating on this principle already exist, for example: the Austrian Political
Stock market, predicting outcomes of Austrian elections; or the British celeb-
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15 Cf. the theory of deliberative democracy as formulated by Gutman and Thompson
(2004), who speak about an “Economy of moral disagreement” (2004, p. 7).
16 Aristotle, Politics 3.11: 1281a42-b10, 3.15: 1286a22-b22, cf. Manville (1996, p. 382); the as-
sumption that the dêmos will make wiser decisions than any individual is also found in the
Attic orators, see Ober (1989, pp. 163-165); Hesk (2000, p. 55 n. 107).
17 Sunstein (2006, pp. 25-43) on the so-called “Condorcet Jury Theorem”. The same princi-
ple explains the winning strategy of allowing a game-show candidate to consult the audi-
ence in the popular TV show “Who Wants To Be A Millionaire?”, recently featured in the
movie “Slumdog Millionaire”: given the nature of the questions, the majority is highly like-
ly to get the answer right.
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daq, where investors use virtual money to trade shares in celebrities, with
amounts paid on the basis of the level of press coverage; or the Hollywood
Stock exchange, where one can bet, again with virtual money, on box office
successes of actors and movies, an instrument highly valued by movie mak-
ers; or the Tech buzz game, in which players can predict the success of new
technologies. It is Sunstein’s contention that such information markets will
encourage people to translate their sometimes hidden knowledge into mar-
ket activity, and that this will increase the knowledge base of political delib-
eration. “How many minds produce knowledge” is the subtitle of the book,
which we may read as a very literal application of the notion of the market-
place of ideas. Sunstein was aware of the risk of bubbles and manipulation
of the information market even before their fatal manifestation in 2007;
however, that most recent market failure obviously does not inspire full con-
fidence in his proposal.
1.6 Social critique based on the marketplace of ideas
One of the presuppositions of Holmes’ marketplace of ideas is that of equal-
ity of access and opportunity. Again, a comparison with real markets suggests
that not only is this quite an unrealistic feature to attribute to real markets,
it does not go for the “marketplace of ideas”, the arena for free expression, ei-
ther. Again, then, this is a case where a better look at the real market suggests
that this may still be an apposite comparison for the marketplace of ideas,
but that expectations about both types of market should be tempered and
made more realistic. Not surprisingly given the academic climate at the time,
social scientists in the 1980s pointed out that the marketplace of ideas was
overwhelmingly biased in favour of establishment point of views. The whole
socialization process of the young, mass communication technology, unequal
allocation of resources: all such factors privilege ideas that support “an en-
trenched power structure or ideology” (Ingber 1984, p. 17). Dissenting ideas
should, according to this view, almost be allowed a greater than equal access,
given the confirmation bias of most people: most of us are more open to in-
formation that confirms what we already think than to what denies or op-
poses it, and most of us are happier when we can safely agree with the
majority (see below, section 1.8). 
Stanley Ingber (1984) uses this analysis of the relationship between the
“real market” and the “marketplace of ideas” to suggest a completely differ-
ent function for the frame: the marketplace of ideas has the status of a myth
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that serves to legitimize our political system. The kind of conflict that the
marketplace of ideas will accommodate does not, according to Ingber,
threaten the core values of our society – if it does, those dissident ideas are re-
moved from the marketplace of ideas, for instance by putting them on the
other side of the divide between words and action. The “clear and present
danger” test is an example of that strategy according to Ingber: as soon as dis-
senting words have a radically persuasive effect and encourage people to take
action, they are no longer protected speech. So, according to Ingber, “free
speech is a device by which established interests may both refine their minor
differences and promote their commonly held assumptions of truth; it is not
a device to change society” (1984, p. 76). In this way, the doctrine of free
speech also creates a relatively safe and well-circumscribed role for dissidents:
their dissent is part of a societal script.
What Ingber does is to appropriate a familiar aspect of political dis-
course and deconstruct it as a rhetorical ploy, thus turning the frame of the
marketplace of ideas into a vehicle for societal critique.
1.7 Tinkering with the model: a New Institutional Economics (nie)
approach to the Wilders case
Clearly, the notion of a self-regulating non-interventionist marketplace of
ideas is contradicted by our real-world experience with actual markets. If one
wished to bring the two marketplaces into closer proximity, one could in fact
argue that market failures in either market should bring about state inter-
vention. Hate speech, it can be argued, creates a market failure, because it is
aimed at shutting up the other party rather than at opening up a discussion.
Could this warrant its suppression?
As we saw, one other aspect of the traditional marketplace frame that
has come under criticism is that clearly not all individuals and groups have
equal access either to the marketplace of ideas, or to the real market. It is not
the case that real markets are effortlessly efficient and cost-free. In fact, trans-
actions in the real market come with all kinds of transaction costs, the costs
of finding relevant information, evaluating that information, the decision-
making process, effectuation of the deal etc. But there are also factors in so-
cieties that influence those transaction costs, and systematically lower them:
a well-functioning press, for instance, makes it easier to get reliable informa-
tion, and thereby lowers transaction costs. These are economic insights de-
riving from a line of economic thinking called nie, or New Institutional
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Economics, of which 1991 Nobel Prize winner Robert Coase was a pioneer.
The term “institutional” refers to all the hard and soft norms, rules, regula-
tions and laws of a society: these are the social constructs here called institu-
tions. The press, broadcasting media, and academia are also institutions. But
Leiden University, cnn, or the New York Times are called “organizations”. 
Now, transaction costs can not only be increased or decreased on the
real market, but also on the marketplace of ideas. A society that promotes
the institution of free accessibility of information lowers transaction costs in
its economy. Ancient historian Josiah Ober has argued in a recent book and
paper that such economic factors as these, the desired and desirable lowering
of transaction costs, may even produce or promote certain values in a society:
free speech could be one of those. A society that adopts a principle of free
speech thereby structurally lowers transaction costs, and it is therefore in the
economic interest of a nation to promote it (Ober 2009 and f.c.).
A recent paper on First Amendment theory by Joseph Blocher (2007-
2008) argued for an “Institutional First Amendment”, which theorizes the
special status under the First Amendment of certain institutions, e.g., uni-
versities, schools, the press. Since these all have the effect of lowering trans-
action costs, they make it possible for more people to effectively use their
First Amendment right to free expression.18 Paradoxically, that means that or-
ganizations under these institutions (for example individual specific schools
or newspapers) should answer to higher standards, and face higher barriers
when they wish to restrict certain kinds of speech, for example by removing
a certain book from the school library.19 Since schools have a special respon-
sibility as a transaction-cost-lowering institution both in the promotion of
free speech and the marketplace of ideas, their own handling of free speech
issues should be especially sensitive. 
This latter way of rethinking the relationship between the economic
market and the marketplace of ideas gives us a means to theorize an issue that
came to the fore in the Wilders case. According to European jurisdiction,
politicians occupy a special position in free speech cases. On the one hand,
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18 Hofstadter and Metzger (1955, p. 61 and pp. 403-407) discuss the objection to academic
tenure that claims that tenure is an undue protection against market effects resulting from
unpopular utterances, since it far exceeds the constitutional protection of other citizens.
Within an nie approach, a defence for this state of affairs can easily be formulated.
19 Blocher (2007-2008).
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their freedom to address issues in ways that others may find provocative,
shocking or disturbing is greater than that of the general public, given the
political nature of their contribution and the special role they have in public
debate and democratic deliberation. On the other hand, the European Court
has stated repeatedly that they also carry a special responsibility to protect
and enable the exercise of the freedoms of others. We are now in a better po-
sition to understand that latter requirement: Parliament is a transaction-cost-
lowering institution. Its members have a particular responsibility to protect
the open character of democratic society and not to exclude others from the
legitimate exercise of their right. Hate speech, or the call to banish books,
constitute violations of this special responsibility by the purposeful and cul-
pable creation of market failures. In this way, we can reconcile recent Amer-
ican First Amendment thinking with the European jurisprudence.
1.8 The rhetoric of embattled free speech
So far, we have pursued a strand in First Amendment Theory that took its in-
spiration from the line of thinking of Justice Holmes. This is the moment to re-
call that second strand in First Amendment Theory, the one not directly related
to market thinking, but connected to Justice Brandeis’ formulation of “the free-
dom to think as you will and to speak as you think”. What this formulation
emphasizes about the importance of free speech is not so much the aspect of
truth-finding, or benefit to society as a whole (a more instrumental approach
to free speech, that makes it a condition for the functioning of democracy), but
rather individual autonomy and self-realization, the right of an individual to
express himself or herself. Since being autonomous and independent from the
masses and having an opinion of one’s own are usually held to be attractive
and important character traits that require courage and independence, this
view of free speech makes it an appealing topos in political rhetoric. 
We may again invoke a comparison with classical Antiquity. In Athens
in the fifth and fourth centuries bce, we see a phenomenon that has been la-
beled “the rhetoric of rhetoric”, or better: the rhetoric of anti-rhetoric, a phe-
nomenon very well analysed by Jon Hesk (2000, pp. 208ff.). The term
“rhetoric of anti-rhetoric” refers to the fact that many public speakers, in pol-
itics and law courts, self-consciously distance themselves from perverse uses
of deceitful rhetoric, while presenting themselves as courageous truth-tellers.
They use this topos in their self-presentation to align themselves squarely
with public interest, and that would obviously give them an edge in a com-
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petitive environment. Speakers demonstrate in this way that they are aware
of the importance of speeches as a vehicle for deliberation and of the dangers
posed by deceptive communication (ibid. pp. 4-5). The topos not only func-
tions as a “strategic act of self-authorisation”, it is also inherently antagonis-
tic in that one distances oneself from one’s adversaries, who are, it is implied,
likely to engage in illicit rhetorical maneuvering (ibid. pp.169, 208). The
speaker thus sets up a contrast between truth and sincerity in serving the
democratic community versus self-serving deceitfulness. Obviously, this par-
ticular rhetoric, as a form of meta-discourse, also plays a genuine role in pro-
moting mass vigilance (ibid. p. 241).
If we look at the use of the notion of freedom of expression in mod-
ern public discourse, we may perceive something similar. Nobody invokes
his or her right to freedom of speech when making an uncontroversial point,
or a point shared by the majority. Freedom of speech is at issue, precisely
when an individual stands out from the group, and when his or her contri-
bution has the potential of being disruptive, shocking, provocative or offen-
sive (to use the language of the European Court of Human Rights). And this
is a very uncomfortable position for a speaker to be in: all research, both in
evolutionary psychology and modern brain research, indicates that we are
hard-wired to be conformists. Our brain gives off frantic error signals when-
ever we discover that we are in disagreement with the majority, and will flash
the warning “social mistake! social mistake!” at us. We experience discomfort
and think that we must have been “wrong”, when we find out that we are
alone in our views, and if given the chance we will quickly “correct” our opin-
ion (Klucharev and others 2009). And yet, our society claims to value inde-
pendent critical thinking. 
The “rhetoric of embattled free speech” helps such dissenting individu-
als in framing this dilemma. Whenever we hold a point of view that is poten-
tially shocking, provocative or controversial, apart from all intrinsic merits both
of free speech itself and of the viewpoints it is supposed to allow, a “rhetoric of
free speech”, or rather a “rhetoric of embattled free speech” can be a valuable
asset in the self-presentation of the speaker, enhancing his or her personal pres-
tige in a competitive environment. From classical antiquity to the present “em-
battled free speech” carries strong associations with courage (Sluiter and Rosen
2004). Therefore, when speakers present themselves as champions of free
speech, as defending a threatened right to free expression, we are at the very
least also dealing with a “strategic act of self-authorisation” (Hesk 2000, p. 169).
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This position firmly puts the speaker on the side of democracy and delibera-
tion, and rhetorically, if not in fact, creates the image of a more powerful (or
at least more numerous) opponent with whom the speaker does not just dis-
agree, but who threatens the very basis of democratic deliberation. The exer-
cise of free speech is itself performative: democracy, as an egalitarian way of
conflict resolution and a system for managing political disagreement, is irrev-
ocably bound up with the use of language. Debating, voting, demonstrating,
pronouncing verdict, interpreting the law, legislating: vital functions of democ-
racy consist in the performance of speech acts. The rhetoric of free speech is a
performance of democratic behaviour, and it self-reflexively aligns the speaker
with this basic aspect of democracy, while it also stimulates mass vigilance over
the same issue, as did the “rhetoric of anti-rhetoric” (Hesk 2000, p. 241). 
In Dutch politics we have witnessed a number of debates in recent
years, in which issues, which arguably were not, or not primarily “about”
speech, were framed as free speech issues by the participants. I am thinking
notably of the debate about the position of Islam. Time and again, politi-
cians like Hirsi Ali and Geert Wilders invoked their right to free speech in
their statements. Whatever the merits of their positions, this had the addi-
tional effect of a self-presentation as beleaguered champions of core values of
democracy, but also of automatically framing Islam, their opponent, as in-
herently anti-democratic; it also often successfully persuaded their political ri-
vals to accept their framing of the debate. When the affair of the Danish
Muhammad cartoons was at its peak, and Ayaan Hirsi Ali had invoked a
“right to offend” in a speech in Berlin, the Dutch Minister of the Interior at
the time, Alexander Pechtold told a group of young liberals that there are
limits to freedom of speech, as when somebody incites to hatred or discrim-
ination, and he proceeded as follows:20
In the Netherlands the court will judge that. Fortunately, we do not know an ab-
solute “free marketplace of ideas” here, as a free haven for insults and extreme state-
ments with “the last idea standing” as the victor. The court will judge when
something goes too far, and that is the way it should be! The exclamation mark es-
pecially goes for Ms Hirsi Ali.
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2006. Source: http://www.minbzk.nl/actueel/toespraken?popup=t...&ActItmIdt=80797,
consulted 19 Jan. 2009.
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Notice how Pechtold’s acceptance of this free speech frame forces him to take
a negative view of the marketplace of ideas. The current trial against Geert
Wilders in many ways plays into his hands: he is consistently speaking about
a “political trial” that is intended to infringe his right to freedom of speech.
Once again, he can pose as the champion of free speech before a court that
he accuses of political motives.
The indignation that is apparent in Pechtold’s view of the marketplace
of ideas as a market with no moral boundaries points out a problem in “mar-
kets” and “rhetoric”: they are morally blind. Rhetoric (and free speech) is
theoretically a morally neutral instrument that can be used for good and bad
purposes; the market blindly sorts out competing ideas. However, as soon as
we find ourselves in the rhetoric of anti-rhetoric, or the rhetoric of embat-
tled free speech, we are dealing with defences of an allegedly morally re-
sponsible use of speech. This issue had worried rhetoricians from the very
inception of rhetorical theory, and ancient theory had therefore built in
moral safeguards. This is true, for example, of the text that was foundational
in rhetorical teaching throughout Roman antiquity and the Western Mid-
dle Ages: Cicero’s On invention. On invention opens with the then 19-year-
old Cicero wondering whether eloquence has brought mankind more harm
or more blessings and he comes to the conclusion that wisdom without elo-
quence is ineffective, but that eloquence without wisdom is positively dan-
gerous. The real orator will need both. Cicero then, like Protagoras, relates
his own myth of origin, an origin of mankind and of the emergence of
human community and political organization out of an animal-like prehis-
tory. Irrational strength ruled the day. Then, one day a great and wonderful
man lifted his fellow-humans out of their state of misery, and taught them
culture through a mixture of reason, wisdom and eloquence. They found a
political community, but ruthless men of middling ability, but with elo-
quence, corrupt the young state. They bring disaster on the human com-
munity and give eloquence a bad name. As a result, eloquence was ignored
by the best, noblest and most talented – wrongly, says Cicero, for they should
have put up resistance (in words) and taken better care of their fatherland:
their good words should have been used to drive out the bad ones. Cicero
ends by pleading earnestly for the study of eloquence as a defence against
badness. This founding myth decisively couples morality with the pursuit of
eloquence: speech is pitted against speech – not unlike what happens in the
marketplace of ideas. It is the responsibility of good individuals to put their
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moral eloquent speech in opposition to the bad speech of ruthless characters
pursuing their own self-interest.
There is no ancient rhetorical theory that is not at the same time a the-
ory of ethics. And yet, if there is one aspect that traditionally could hardly be
covered in modern legislation about free speech, it is this: laying down the law
on moral speech entails risking the direst censorship. But the metaphor of
the morally neutral economic market will help no longer: in analyses of the
most recent economic crisis, the factors that are mentioned most are only
partially market-related; moral condemnation is prominent. Vermeend
(2008), for instance, lists as factors, among other things, first of all, neocon-
servative laissez-faire economics, with maximum freedom for the financial
sector without adequate oversight – where clearly laissez-faire has lost its neo-
classical lustre. Second, the sub-prime mortgages, related to irresponsible be-
haviour of American bankers; third, the rating agencies that knowingly gave
triple-A ratings to sub-prime investment products; and fourth, incompetence
of the boards of trustees of different banks, and the perverse bonus system that
determined their actions. The list is not finished, but clearly, the problem
was a moral one, and it was called “avarice” and “greed”. Marketplaces, of
products and ideas, need moral responsibility. And in spite of everything, the
least regulation possible (Butler 1997).
1.9 An evolutionary theory of rhetoric
One last point we need to consider in thinking about the marketplace of ideas,
and that is, obviously, whether we should not simply reject and abandon, or
rather transcend, the frame. For why would we accept an economic frame if
economy is maybe no longer the most powerful explanatory framework for
human behaviour available? Admittedly, the economy is still a foundational
element in our social imaginary. The attractions of the economic frame are its
claims to relate individual behaviour to social interaction on the group level,
and the impersonal nature of its explanatory system. As we have already seen,
the frame is least popular with those, like Brandeis, who see free speech mostly
as the realization of the autonomy of the individual. Others see free speech as
a condition for democratic deliberation, as part of the democratic process.
There are also combinations of these views. If deliberation may not always
work to find truth, it at least legitimizes the democratic process and the deci-
sions punctuating the deliberative process itself, however provisional and open
to revision such decisions may be. I have argued that democracy should also be
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considered a performative process: together the citizens produce democracy by
the performance of various speech acts and other behaviours (e.g., the absten-
tion of public violence). The question is whether the characteristics of the mar-
ket are the best explanation for these forms of group interaction, or whether
features of the market may themselves be an instantiation of group behaviour
that is best explained at an even higher level of abstraction. 
Such a higher level of abstraction is on offer now in the theory of evo-
lution. As David Sloan Wilson, the evolutionary biologist, puts it (2007): all
roads lead to evolution. As did the marketplace metaphor, evolutionary biol-
ogy works with a strong notion of scarcity and hence competition, which is
after all what explains the need for selection. The question is: what is being se-
lected? Gene? Individual? Group? An increasingly strong case is being made
for group selection, a point of view again staunchly defended by David Sloan
Wilson, who points out that an individual, one organism, can in fact also be
regarded as a group of lower-level entities, that have temporarily solved the
problem of within-group conflict. But if the individual develops cancer, for
instance, we can see clearly that it is not one whole, but that there is now con-
flict between groups (healthy cells versus cancer cells) within the group that
constitutes the individual. The most convincing theory available at present ar-
gues against a forced choice between gene, individual, or group, and for ac-
cepting the principle of multiple-level selection (Sloan Wilson & Wilson 2007).
The differential survival and success of individuals in groups and
groups in the larger population may be influenced by factors such as coop-
eration, equality, exchange, fairness, and reciprocity.21 In human beings,
speech can play different roles in group selection. Various speech mechanisms,
such as gossip, criticism, or ridicule form defences against subversion from
within. And, unlikely as it seems at first sight, it may be argued that some
cherished concepts, such as the concept of free speech, have a similar regula-
tory function. “Free speech” and particularly the “rhetoric of embattled free
speech” helps police and guard the speech practices that are important to
maintain an economy of moral disagreement, and hence contribute to the
success of the group.22
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weakness in Gutman and Thompson (2004, p. 18): in fact, however, it anchors their theory
to evolutionary insights.
22 Ibid. p. 7.
LUP Bending Opinion Boek_Layout 2  27-01-11  14:46  Pagina 44
In other words, concepts that we used to associate with the economic model,
are in fact concepts of evolutionary theory that will be visible in various lower-
level theories: in economy, psychology and the explanation of the function of
literature (see Boyd 2009). It is hardly a daring prediction that in the next
couple of years, we will increasingly witness a movement within the study of
rhetoric, as we already see within the study of language at large, that may be
called an evolutionary theory of rhetoric, or even simply “evolutionary rhet-
oric”, which tries to take into account the discoveries made within the strong
paradigm of evolutionary theory for our understanding of the societal func-
tioning of rhetoric, deliberation, free speech and the self-reflexive discussion
of those issues as a form of meta-rhetoric. The study of rhetoric will be able
to profit from this new framing, and to understand that that is what it is.
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2 Rhetoric, Classicism and Democracy:
The Conveyance of Moral and 




It is a standard commonplace in rhetoric that perfect eloquence cannot be
learned from books alone. Detailed theoretical and technical advice may help
to a certain extent, but nothing will ever really be achieved without practical
exercise in any of its basic manifestations, be it in reading, writing or speak-
ing. For this reason, at all times, practical exercises have played a vital part in
rhetorical education. All ancient handbooks unanimously bear testimony to
this truism. The anonymous author of the so-called Rhetoric to Herennius,
for instance, makes “exercise” literally the last word of his entire treatise (4.69),
and he frequently refers to the importance of exercise throughout his work
(e.g., 1.1; 1.3; 1.12-13; 2.7; 2.12; 3.14; 3.20; 3.27; 3.34; 3.39-40; 4.7; 4.27; 4.58).
Unsurprisingly, then, as soon as rhetoric became a major subject in
the ancient educational system, it developed a detailed program of classroom
exercises. An elaborate curriculum of exercises was established in Greek
rhetorical schools during the Hellenistic period, i.e., in the last two centuries
before the Christian era (Marrou 1955, pp. 252-57 and 297-303, Bonner 1977,
pp. 250-51), a program that was also soon adopted by the Romans (Gwynn
1926, pp. 34-41). The pivotal type of exercise was, of course, the so-called
declamation, a fully fledged speech on an imaginary subject assigned by the
teacher and elaborated and delivered orally by the student (see Russell 1983).
But additionally, as a preparation for this developed stage, and in order to
provide a smooth transition from education in grammar to the teaching of
rhetoric proper, preliminary exercises were devised called progymnasmata
(Clark 1957, pp. 178-212, Bonner 1977, pp. 250-76, Kennedy 1983, pp. 54-73,
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Pernot 2005, pp. 146-51). While declamation was oral, these were essentially
written exercises, which students could use to exercise themselves in individ-
ual parts, elements or features of an oration, before they eventually ventured
on the declamations proper.
2.2 Rhetorical exercises and moral education
Yet rhetoric, as the art of speech, clearly cannot be practised in an abstract and
purely formal way, devoid of any specific content. Even a moot speech or de-
bate needs to have a definite subject or topic to develop. The typical subject
matter of rhetoric, however, as Aristotle already knew, is the field of human
action and behaviour, and thus of ethics and politics which, in Aristotle’s eyes,
are the disciplines most closely related to rhetoric (cf. Rhetoric 1.4-8).
Consequently, rhetorical exercises too, if they are supposed to prepare
students for true oratorical practice, cannot help dealing in some way with
moral or political matters, even if this is only on an imaginary or fictitious
level. If the topics assigned were drawn from some remote myth or legend,
or were completely fictitious, as was in fact more often than not the case in
ancient declamations and related exercises, even then the arguments employed
would nonetheless have to be grounded in the experience of real life, and
would have to comply with general moral or political values.
By the same token, both in ancient education and way beyond,
rhetorical exercises have always been used deliberately not only for teaching
students the formal skills of oratory, but also for conveying to their minds the
general values of ethics, politics or even religion, in order to prepare them for
their future roles in society. However, these values may, in any particular case,
be either in accordance or at variance with the value system prevailing in the
relevant society. In the former case, their effect will be an affirmative one and
confirm the dominant ideas and values of that society. In the latter case, by
contrast, the ideas underlying the argumentation can be subversive as well.
The reasons for such subversive tendencies may be manifold. In certain cases,
they may result from a deliberate and aggressive seditious or anarchical dis-
position adopted by a teacher or textbook author. Yet more often than not,
the reasons will be much simpler and more straightforward than that. At
times, an extreme conservatism will simply have refused to realize that things
in the real world have changed over time, and that the prevalent values of a
culture or society have also changed. Just imagine the possible case of a pres-
ent-day reprint of a textbook dating from the fifties or sixties, which still im-
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plicitly takes racial segregation for granted in the choice of topics for its ex-
ercises, or considers single mothers and fathers a social anomaly rather than
an everyday phenomenon. Since textbooks usually live to see a number of
student generations, but society and its values keep changing at an accelerat-
ing pace, these are increasingly common experiences nowadays.
In former times, the pace of social and political change may certainly
have been less rapid than it is today. Yet nonetheless, changes did occur. In this
chapter I intend to focus on a particularly conspicuous historical case of such
a change in society and the political and religious setting which brought about
an obvious divergence between the values conveyed in classroom education in
rhetoric and those from the reality of that society. The case I have in mind con-
cerns the period of late antiquity. I will first try to outline the special histori-
cal circumstances which characterized that particular period, and the special
conditions under which rhetorical education was practised in those days; I will
then substantiate and document this by a particular case study, using as an ex-
ample a popular classroom textbook of rhetorical exercises from the late fourth
century ce. A brief comparison of the results with the very different appearance
of corresponding medieval and early modern practices will finally lead to re-
flections on the present-day problem of how to choose appropriate assignments
for rhetorical exercises in an age dominated by political correctness.
Late antiquity (according to the most popular definition ranging
roughly from the second to the fifth or sixth century ce) was a period which
saw not only the transformation of the Roman Empire into a truly absolute
monarchy, but also the rise of Christianity from a marginalized, suppressed
and persecuted sect to the status of official state religion, to name only the two
most fundamental and distinctive changes that took place within that pe-
riod. Compared to these fundamental changes of a society, however, late an-
cient rhetorical education, which undoubtedly was the most dominant
educational factor in that society, was a thoroughly conservative enterprise
and persisted in practically unchanged form for nearly half a millennium.
The main reason for this amazing constancy and persistence was arguably
the petrifying effect of a stern conservatism and classicism. What kind of clas-
sicism was this, and what reasons motivated it?
2.3.  Rhetorical education and classicism
Everything started with a purely linguistic or stylistic phenomenon. As early
as the first century bce, rhetoricians such as Dionysius of Halicarnassus,
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driven by an open dissatisfaction with the Hellenistic koiné style of the
Greek of their times, called for a return to the Greek of the classical period
of the fifth and fourth centuries bce (see Gelzer 1978). They wanted to get
back to the plain and sober Attic style which orators such as Lysias, Isocrates
or Demosthenes had used, authors who were therefore to be imitated on all
accounts.
This movement of Atticism, as it was called, was associated with the
predominantly Greek movement known as the Second Sophistic, which had
its heyday in the second and third centuries ce (see Anderson 1993 and 2007,
Whitmarsh 2005). It was, however, not confined to style only. Stylistic imi-
tation presupposed some close reading of those old Attic authors, and, by
way of this process, a natural absorption of the contents and the ideas of their
writings and speeches, which thus re-emerged and gained new value. In this
way linguistic Atticism resulted in the more general concept of cultural Atti-
cism. In declamations, for instance, topics related to the orator Demosthenes
and his fight against King Philip of Macedon were among the most popular.
Other popular topics related to the Persian Wars or the Peloponnesian War,
in both of which Athens played a decisive role (see Bowie 2004, pp. 70-72 and
82-83). Moreover, themes from Greek myth, mostly taken from Attic tragedy
or from the Homeric epics, were frequently used in rhetorical training as well.
This obsession with the grand Attic past even infected the Romans, who also
developed a certain preference for the same kinds of themes in their own
rhetorical schools.
Yet the real world of those times was far different from this idealistic
picture. Greece was dominated by Rome, and the Roman Empire was steadily
developing into a centralistic and increasingly oppressive system of absolute
monarchy. Nonetheless, in their classrooms, the rhetors and sophists of the
imperial period continued to glorify the political and moral ideals of classi-
cal Athens, such as democracy vs. monarchy, independence vs. subservience,
provincialism vs. centralism and the rule of law vs. tyrannic despotism. This
repertoire of topics for rhetorical education did not change much through-
out the entire imperial period. We find it in Hermogenes of Tarsus in the
second century and in Libanius and Aphthonius in the fourth century.
This obvious discrepancy between the idealistic world of the class-
room and the hard facts of the real world outside cannot have gone unnoticed
by teachers nor by students. It is thus surprising that it seems not to have
been theoretically reflected in any way. We do hear complaints from Roman
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authors (such as Quintilian or Tacitus) about the lack of realism in classroom
rhetoric, but this is mainly concerned about the employment of completely
unrealistic laws in declamations and the fanciful fictitious stories about pirates
and raped virgins, war heroes and tyrant slayers, prodigal sons and miserly fa-
thers, jealous stepmothers and covetous doters that were so popular in judi-
cial declamations (the so-called controversiae, as opposed to the more
historically-oriented deliberative declamations, known as suasoriae).
The Greeks, on the other hand, apparently relished this rhetorical
classicism as a matter of national pride in a situation of political oppression.
Atticism was enhanced, if not triggered by the need of the Greeks to define
their own identity within the context of the Roman Empire (see Bowie 1970,
Swain 1996, Goldhill 2001). It provided them with a kind of cultural identity
(“Greekness”) that had little to do with ethnicity, but was mainly a construct
established by means of rhetoric (see Whitmarsh 2005, pp. 32-37 and 52-54).
Yet, amazingly, we do not hear much about any particular impact that this
constant inculcation of political and social ideals from a glorious, but distant
past would have had on late antique society, although the entire contempo-
rary political and administrative elite must necessarily have passed through
this educational process as it provided the essential gateway to prestige and
power (see Schmitz 1997).
2.4  A model case in point: Aphthonius’ Progymnasmata
A particularly instructive example of this classicizing attitude from a very late
stage within late antiquity is the short, but highly influential textbook of
rhetorical exercises entitled Progymnasmata, written by an author called Aph-
thonius. Towards the end of the fourth century ce, Aphthonius lived and
worked as a rhetor or teacher of rhetoric in the Syrian town of Antioch, which
is now Antakya in Southern Turkey, close to the present-day Syrian border.
He was a student of the famous rhetor Libanius, who ran a well-established
rhetorical school in Antioch (see Cribiore 2007). Aphthonius’ writings would
seem to adhere fairly closely to the teachings he found in Libanius’ school.
The fourth century was a particularly interesting period, since it is
that very century which saw the rise of Christianity from its toleration within
the Roman Empire by Constantine in 313 to the position of official state re-
ligion under Theodosius in 391 (see MacMullen 1984). Moreover, the official
political separation of the Eastern and Western parts of the Roman Empire
in the year 395 also took place at the very time that Aphthonius most proba-
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bly wrote his little handbook. Furthermore, in that period, Antioch was also
a hot spot of religious dissension and debate. By the late fourth century, the
town was already about eighty percent Christianized and the see of an im-
portant Patriarchate which, according to church tradition, was founded by the
Apostle Saint Peter himself (see Sandwell 2007). Antiochian theologians (such
as Eustathius of Antioch, Diodorus of Tarsus, Theodore of Mopsuestia,
Theodoretus of Cyrus, Ibas of Edessa, and later of Nestorius) battled with
their Alexandrian opponents over the divine and human nature of Christ.
Yet in the midst of all this, the rhetorical school in particular continued to be
a stronghold of Greek pagan culture (see Norman 2000). Libanius himself
was a pagan and a close friend and admirer of the last non-Christian emperor
Julian the Apostate. Nonetheless he had many Christian students (such as
John Chrysostom or Theodore of Mopsuestia) as well as pagan students, one
of whom was Aphthonius.
Aphthonius’ textbook of progymnasmata was a short primer of fourteen
basic rhetorical exercises (viz. fable, narration, chreia, maxim, refutation, con-
firmation, commonplace, encomium, vituperation, comparison, ethopoeia,
description, thesis, and proposal of a law), for each of which he not only pro-
vided detailed theoretical instructions, but he also offered an elaborated
model example. It is predominantly in these examples (which, by the way,
were most probably the main reason for the booklet’s popularity) that a very
specific set of moral values and political opinions clearly emerges.
As his own example for the exercise of Commonplace, for instance,
which is basically an amplificatory, vituperative elaboration on some morally
depraved stock character (such as, for instance, a parricide, a traitor, an adul-
terer, a murderer etc.), Aphthonius chooses the figure of the tyrant (Kennedy
2003, pp. 106-08). Throughout the exercise the stock character of the tyrant
is persistently described in opposition to, and against the background of, the
ideal of Athenian democracy and the rule of law. The tyrant’s disdain for and
rescission of the laws is addressed repeatedly, most clearly so in the
prooemium: “Since laws have been established and courts of justice are part
of our government, let one seeking to annul the laws be subject to the laws
for punishment” (Kennedy 2003, p. 106). His thoughts are described as fol-
lows: “I shall seize the acropolis and put aside the laws, curse them, and thus
I shall be a law to the many, not the many to me” (ibid. p. 107). One major
argument against tyranny is that it is unconstitutional (at least with respect
to the Athenian constitution). For: “As a benefit to us [our ancestors] in-
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vented a constitution free of domination, and quite rightly so” (ibid. p. 106).
Most strikingly, however, the tyrant is never contrasted, as one might also
have expected, with the character of the wise and benevolent king, so that
this vituperative accusation could well be interpreted as a critique of monar-
chy in general. This becomes even more obvious when, in the more individ-
ualized assignment of Vituperation, it is King Philip of Macedon who is
chosen as the model example (ibid. pp. 112-13). Here again, the king is clearly
described as the stereotype of the barbarian and the tyrant, and he is for his
part also depicted – even if less explicitly so – in strong contrast to the ideals
of Athenian democracy and freedom, which he was to suppress and annihi-
late long before the Romans ever appeared on the Greek stage. The basic idea
of this model piece, which draws heavily on various motifs from speeches by
Demosthenes (see ibid. pp. 112-13, footnotes 66 and 68) is, of course, per-
fectly in line with the general tendency of classicism and Athenocentrism that
was so prominent in imperial Greek rhetorical training.
The corresponding model example for the exercise of Encomium is
– and very fittingly so – a praise of the Athenian historian Thucydides (ibid.
pp. 108-10). Not only does this again strike the right note of Athenian classi-
cism (in the theoretical instructions, Demosthenes is explicitly named as the
other principal option and, to distinguish collective from individual praise,
Aphthonius refers to the example of a collective encomium of all Athenians
vs. an individual encomium of one particular Athenian (ibid. p. 108); but it
also, once more, offers ample opportunity for praising the institutions and
benefits of Attic democracy in its finest days, as for instance when Thucy-
dides is said to have been endowed with “the double benefit of a strong an-
cestry and a democratic constitution,” to have been “prevented from being
rich unjustly by the equality of law,” or to have been “nurtured under a con-
stitution and laws that are by their nature better than others” (ibid. p. 109).
Nor does the author miss the opportunity to glorify the great deeds of the
Athenians in the Peloponnesian War (ibid. pp. 109-10). Besides these out-
standing examples, there are also various other passages scattered all through
Aphthonius’ Progymnasmata, which contain hidden or open critiques of
monarchy and praise democracy as the better of all constitutions.
Aphthonius’ unswerving partisanship for the rule of law without any
restrictions is most obvious in the example he devises for the exercise of Pro-
posal of a Law, in which he attacks a proposed law that prescribes that an
adulterer may be killed on the spot by the deceived husband (ibid. pp. 124-
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27). In this piece Aphthonius repeatedly states that the law must stand above
all other things, that nobody can be exempt from it, and that it must be the
prerogative of judges and juries, and no-one else, to administer justice.
Considering that Aphthonius lived and worked in a predominantly
Christian community and environment, it is also worth remarking that all his
examples are exclusively pagan in character. Narratives of pagan myths are
his favourite choices for the illustration of assignments such as Narration
(Aphrodite and Adonis, ibid. p. 97), Refutation and Confirmation (Daphne
and Apollo, ibid. pp. 101-03 and 104-05), or Ethopoeia (Niobe, ibid. pp. 116-
17). But most noticeable of all, for the exercise of Description, he offers a de-
tailed description of the magnificent pagan temple and precinct of the god
Sarapis, once situated on the “acropolis” of the city of Alexandria (ibid. pp.
118-20), which, however, in Aphthonius’ own lifetime, in the year 391, was
burnt down and razed during a riot triggered by the Christian faction in
town, at the instigation of the patriarch Theophilus, and with tacit consent
of the Christian emperor Theodosius (cf. Eunapius, Lives of the Philosophers
and Sophists 472; Sozomenus, Ecclesiastical History 7.15). The temple was a
miracle to visitors, and an imposing example of pagan culture in Alexandria
(see McKenzie, Gibson and Reyes 2004). Its selection as a model example in
a school textbook is therefore certainly not accidental, but can be interpreted
as a deliberate act of assertion of Greek pagan culture and as a protest against
its wilful vandalization by a Christian mob. In passages such as this, Aph-
thonius, like his teacher Libanius, takes an unmistakably pagan stance in the
midst of a meanwhile predominantly Christian environment. With respect to
other passages, one may even speak of a completely secular tendency, for in-
stance when Aphthonius occasionally remarks that the commonly believed
stories about the gods may, after all, just be mere fictions made up by the
poets (see e.g., Refutation, Kennedy 2003, pp. 101-02, Encomium p. 110).
All these various features in Aphthonius’ work, which was widely
used for teaching beginners in rhetoric, were very clearly totally at odds with
the real contemporary political world outside the classroom. This raises the
question: what kind of impact might those teachings have had on society?
Was the interior world of the rhetorical school really so completely insulated
from the real world outside that nobody ever noticed the blatant discrepan-
cies? Or were they intentionally ignored? Or did the employment of those
themes and topics contribute to the establishment of a kind of liberal-think-
ing intellectual elite of scholars who were well aware of both the assets and the
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drawbacks of democracy on the one hand, and of their own monarchic and
hierarchic society on the other? The mere fact that not even state officials
seemed to have taken offence at the kind of ideas that were expounded in
rhetorical schools appears to reveal an astonishing amount of liberal thinking.
2.5  Contrasting practices in medieval and early modern times
That such liberal-mindedness of the sort described above was far from being
a matter of course, can be easily demonstrated by a contrastive glimpse at
later periods in the history of Aphthonius’ little manual, which was also
widely used in the Byzantine and (in multiple Latin translations) in the early
modern period (for a survey, see Kraus 2005, pp. 164-65 and 167-83). Basically,
the core of its text was transmitted in unaltered form, but a considerable
number of additional model examples were composed to adapt the work to
contemporary needs and ideas. Byzantine scholars, for instance, added a great
number of clearly Christian examples, taken from Scripture, from the lives of
the saints, or even from controversial theological debates; these would praise
typically Christian virtues and values such as humility or steadfastness in faith,
and markedly Christian heroes such as the martyrs (for details, see Hunger
1978, pp. 111-16). There were also explicit commitments made, and sub-
servience shown, to the politics of Byzantine emperors; particularly so in
times of internal quarrels or external wars (see ibid. p. 111).
In a similar way, in their adaptations of Aphthonius’ textbook, Ren-
aissance scholars would also add examples in which they would take a clear
stance on the political or religious issues of their day. In the age of the Ref-
ormation, in particular, authors from both sides of the denominational divide
openly acted as partisans of their respective parties by unconditionally ex-
tolling the political and religious commitments of their own side, while at
the same time mercilessly and ruthlessly attacking and censoring the oppos-
ing party. These model examples were deliberately used for aggressive politi-
cal and religious indoctrination and argument. While allegedly practising the
art of rhetoric, students would thus subconsciously absorb their lessons in
controversial theology and party prejudice. One would find refutations of
Roman Catholic dogmas, accusations of alleged crimes committed by the
“papists”, offensive vituperations of Popes and Catholic bishops and corre-
sponding eulogies of pro-reformation princes and potentates on the Protes-
tant side as well as defences of the Catholic creed and religious practices,
encomia of saints, and aggressive slanders and vituperations of outstanding re-
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formers and their secular supporters on the Catholic side. This was particu-
larly so in Jesuit circles, which were highly influential in rhetorical education
in those times (for details, see Kraus 2008, p. 65). In that period, which was
dominated by religious strife, teachers in rhetorical schools were very clearly
taking sides, and the model examples presented to students were, as a rule,
strongly affirmative of the respective values. Internal criticism was not meant
to be. Evidently, the amazing toleration of the huge discrepancy between the
values presented in classrooms of rhetorical schools and the reality of the po-
litical world outside, which we observed as the result of a long-standing and
excessive classicism in the late antique period, had vanished.
2.6. Conclusion: Lessons to learn for contemporary teaching
What then can we learn from those ancient stories? In our modern globalized
and pluralistic societies, very often we do not even know if any fixed sets of
values to agree or disagree with exist at all. Perhaps human or civil rights may
be something everyone could (or should) agree on. But basically, the princi-
pal commitment is not to make any commitments at all. Everything seems
to be dominated by the rule of political correctness, which is often a com-
mitment to non-commitment, and if there is a commitment, the side to be
taken is almost mandatory, and the opposing view is strictly banned. 
Yet rhetorical exercise will always have to make controversial com-
mitments and to take controversial sides in public deliberation. Otherwise it
would not be rhetoric. Strict observation of the rules of political correctness
would make any reasonable choice of examples for rhetorical exercises ex-
tremely difficult and awkward, if not impossible. Almost any assignment we
choose would be open to criticism from some social, religious or other group
within society. Consequently, for instance, most of the “contemporary” ex-
amples of exercises recently offered by Frank D’Angelo for rhetorical training
in the spirit of Aphthonius’ Progymnasmata, such as, e.g., Confirmation or
Refutation of newspaper stories on a “Man Arrested in Scalding of a Tod-
dler” (D’Angelo 2000, p. 123) or a conflict between two high school students
(ibid. p. 127), Praise, Vituperation or Comparison of local public figures,
characters from TV soaps, familiar locales or works of art (ibid. pp. 160 and
187), Speeches-in-Character of caring parents sending their son or daughter
off to college (ibid. p. 207), or Discussion of a law that would prohibit the
taping of TV movies without paying royalties (ibid. p. 241), are not concerned
with top-level political issues, but rather with issues of either more local or
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very general interest. Some hotter potatoes, however, can be found in the
book by Crowley and Hawhee (1999, e.g., was George Bush Sr. right to par-
don several people connected with the Iran-Contra affair? pp. 333-35, or dis-
cussion of a law that permits pornography, pp. 363-64).
Perhaps we not only cannot, but also need not, and even should not,
always strictly observe the rules of political correctness when assigning tasks
to our students. Otherwise we will implant invisible razors in their heads that
will curtail and crop their inventive imagination and fancy. We might learn
something from the way earlier periods in history managed to endure and
tolerate discrepancies between classroom exercises and social and political re-
ality, namely that rhetorical education will never be able to abstain completely
from making explicit or implicit commitments to sets of moral, social or po-
litical values, but that these sets of values need not imperatively coincide with
any given society’s “official” values, and that practical exercises in rhetoric
should be regarded as a kind of playground instead (or marketplace, to take
up the metaphor of Ineke Sluiter1) for experimenting freely with various kinds
of ideas and values, in order to weigh them up and compare them against
one another in open and unrestrained debate, and in this way learn how to
make our own independent and well-founded commitments.
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3 Melody and Rhythm in Ancient 
Political Discourse
On How Emotions Induce Persuasion
marie formarier
3.1  Introduction
If we admit with G. A. Kennedy that, “all communication involves rhetoric”
(Kennedy 1999, p. 1), any speaker has to be careful when choosing words and
gestures so as to give a persuasive performance. This was especially true in An-
tiquity. In those days, people who decided to devote themselves to politics had
to learn rhetoric during their whole childhood. Skilled speakers were then sup-
posed not only to be able to write discourses and to learn them by heart but
also to improvise in front of any audience. Most of all, they had to adapt their
speeches to the surroundings and to the hearers’ socio-cultural backgrounds
(Michel 1996, pp. 201-209, May 2002, pp. 53-54). Indeed, rhetoric had to be
used differently in a tribunal, on the forum (Aldrete 1999, pp. 77-81, May 2002,
pp. 55-59) or in front of the Senate, before judges or ordinary people who were
often illiterate (Aldrete 1999, p. 85). Actually, a good speaker was supposed to
make a “one-man show” of it (Narducci 2002, p. 439, Hömke 2009, pp. 240-
255) since the public “entered the forum and listened to a speaker, expecting not
only to hear the facts of a case, but also to be entertained while doing so” (May
2002, p. 59). One of the most fundamental rules the ancient speaker had to
keep in mind was to adapt and modulate melody and rhythm. Indeed, since
Antiquity, musicality in political discourse has been considered as essential for
persuasion. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (1st century bc) clearly summarised this
challenging relationship between rhetoric and music. According to him,
Political eloquence is a sort of music. The difference between eloquence and music –
either vocal or instrumental – is quantitative not qualitative. Actually, words in
speeches follow a melody and a rhythm. (...) Consequently, the difference between
music and speech consists of a “more or less”. (DH. De Comp. 6, 11, 64-66)
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A good speaker has to master music because a proper melody and rhythm
actually give him the power to influence the hearers’ feelings and decisions.
An emblematic example is the case of Antonius. In Cicero’s treatise De Ora-
tore (1st century bc), this orator concludes his demonstration with these words:
“By moving the judges’ emotions more than by providing proof, I triumphed
over you, Sulpicius.” (Cic. De Or., 2, 201). This statement suggests that the
musical quality of words played a central role in the ancient rhetorical theory
as well as in the way speeches were actually delivered. Consequently, speak-
ers had to imitate singers. They accordingly used to train their voices and re-
hearse their gestures to be able to modulate intonations and to keep up
rhythm. This was clearly stated in Quintilian’s pedagogy (1st century ad)
(Quint. Inst., 1, 10, 22; 1, 11, 12; Hömke 2009, pp. 243-244). 
Furthermore, melody and rhythm were used in ancient music to play
on emotions and to give pleasure; rhetoric in Greece and Rome adapted this
process to its specific goal, which was persuasion. Indeed, to obtain the ex-
pected feedback from their audience and to follow their strategies of persua-
sion successfully, speakers had to earn people’s goodwill, to sway their feelings
and emotions (Solmsen 1938, pp. 390-404; 1941, pp. 35-50; 169-190; Wisse
1989, pp. 65-74, Cooper 1996, pp. 238-257, Leighton 1996, pp. 206-237).
Therefore, although the distinction between singing and speaking was a leit-
motiv in Cicero’s rhetoric and also in Dionysius’ and Quintilian’s works, po-
litical eloquence was nevertheless based on a deep interaction between music,
emotions and persuasion. This interaction raises two main questions: how
does this process work? And what does it mean as far as the relation between
politics and ethics is concerned?
3.2  Natural music in speech and song
3.2.1  Melodic and rhythmic properties in speech and song
Linguistic theories in Antiquity were based on the belief that the melodic and
rhythmic properties of languages were rooted in nature. For instance, to Cic-
ero, nature had an effect on the stress patterns of Latin: 
Nature itself, as if to modulate human speech, has placed an accent, and only one,
on every word and never farther from the end of the word than the third syllable.
(Cic. Or. 58)
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According to him, nature supplied melodic modulations to Latin by deter-
mining verbal dynamics, while giving to the voice
A marvellous quality, so that from merely three intonations (ascending, descending
and also ascending then descending), it produces such a rich variety in song. How-
ever, there is in speech too a sort of secret singing. (ibid. 57)
Cicero therefore admitted that speech and song were based on the same
melodic properties, characterized here by three types of intonations that were
in fact common to Latin and Greek (DH. De Comp., 6, 11, 77-79). However,
political discourse could not sound like a song. Melody had to remain dis-
creet, somewhat hidden. Dionysius of Halicarnassus added that vocal ampli-
tude in speech was to be narrower than in song – never higher than an interval
of one fifth (ibid. 73-74). Actually, to mistake a speech for a song would have
meant a loss of dignity for the speaker because it would have given political
discourse the same role as musical entertainment. Clearly enough, ancient
political discourse was definitely influenced by music since it was based on
melody and rhythm. But it was to be plainly distinguished from song at the
same time. This difficult compromise was absolutely fundamental since it
gave its specificity to the aesthetics of political rhetoric and determined de-
livery as well.
3.2.2 Nature in the creation and perception of music
The great power assigned to nature had a huge impact on the way ancient the-
orists considered the process of musical creation and perception. First, musical
performance, either in song or in speech, had to comply with the demands of
nature. Here is the rule given by Cicero: “Therefore let art follow the leadership
of nature in pleasing the ear” (Cic. Or., 58). In other words, according to an-
cient theorists, rhetoric must be based on the gifts granted to the human voice
by nature. It is necessary for any speaker to follow this rule so as to deliver a
good speech which is to please an audience. Moreover, since rhythm and
melody are natural, they are supposed to be intuitively perceived by anyone,
even by uneducated people. Indeed, Cicero, Dionysius of Halicarnassus and
Quintilian all told short anecdotes in their treatises to illustrate the universal-
ity of musical judgement (Cic. De Or., 3, 195; Or., 173; Quint. Inst., 9, 4, 11-12;
DH. De Comp., 6, 11, 29-52). According to them, illiterate hearers can unani-
mously notice any mishap in rhythm or in melody. To quote Cicero, it is 
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Because in this particular department as in every other, nature has a vast and indeed
incredible power (Cic. De Or., 3, 195). Actually, nature itself has placed into our
ears the faculty of judging long and short, high and low sounds. (Cic. Or. 173)
For ancient rhetoricians, there is therefore no need for any previous knowl-
edge, for any linguistic skill to perceive melody and rhythm. When untaught
people listen to a song or a speech, they can feel and judge what follows the
musical rules or not, in spite of knowing nothing about musical and rhetor-
ical theories, notions and techniques.
Consequently, Cicero and Quintilian used to draw a clear distinc-
tion between the process of feeling and the process of analysing. According
to them, the former is based on emotions, the latter on reason. The ability to
assess ideas requires culture and knowledge in many fields such as linguistics,
philosophy, law and politics while the ability to appraise melody and rhythm
is given to everybody: 
While the faculty of assessing facts and words is based on intellectual skills, ears can
assess sounds and rhythms. The first assessment is linked with logic, the second one
with pleasure. In the former, reason discovers art whereas in the latter, perception
does (Cic. Or., 162). That is the reason why cultivated people understand the com-
position of discourse while uncultivated people can perceive its charm. (Quint. Inst.
9, 4, 116)
A speaker who carefully chose melody and rhythm was consequently sure
to exert an influence on the whole audience, even if the argumentation de-
veloped in this discourse remained somewhat unclear for a lot of people.
This idea may sound rather discriminatory but it was held by people who
had received a good education and belonged to the elite. Moreover, this
dual system which distinguished rational and emotional assessments was
also prompted by a vast experience of rhetoric. Ancient theories, especially
Cicero’s, were indeed based on empirical observations. Eventually, this dis-
tinction has also been proved today by cognitive sciences. Very interesting
experiments truly suggest that people who cannot read and who know noth-
ing about music and rhetoric can however be sensitive to musicality (Warren
1994, pp. 41-52, 69-70). 
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3.3  From emotions to persuasion: The power of pathos
3.3.1  The orator’s threefold psychological task
In ancient rhetoric, melody and rhythm in speech were deemed necessary to
have a deep impact on the whole audience. Indeed, musicality was supposed
to be emotionally perceived by everybody, but also to provide a speech with
a powerful emotional quality. Ancient rhetoricians were indeed clearly aware
of the role of emotions in the interaction between performer and audience.
Aristotle first clarified the process to follow to play on feelings and emotions
(Solmsen 1938, p. 393, Wisse 1989, p. 65):
It is necessary to divide the material about each of the emotions under three heads;
for instance, when talking about anger, (1) what state of mind makes people in-
clined to anger, (2) with whom they usually get angry, (3) and on account of what.
For if we knew one or two of these heads, but not all three, it would be impossible
to arouse anger; and the same applies to the other emotions. (Arist. Rhet. 1378a 23-
28)
According to Aristotle, the speaker must follow this tripartite psychological
process in order to arouse emotions. For him, oratory success is thus based on
accurate psychological knowledge and on appropriateness. Indeed, the most
important is to adapt speech to the hearers’ moods and to the topic which is
to be developed (Hömke 2009, p. 242). Aristotle’s analysis is therefore based
on the belief that political discourse must have a psychological impact to be
persuasive. This implies a close correlation between emotions and persuasion:
Emotions are all those feelings that so change men as to make their judgements dif-
ferent, and that are accompanied by pleasure and pain; such are anger, pity, fear,
and the like, as well as their opposites. (Arist. Rhet. 1378a 20-23)
For Aristotle, controlling the hearers’ emotions enables the speaker to control
their minds and thus to sway their judgements. This is the reason why he
considers that playing on emotions plainly contributes to the oratory strat-
egy of persuasion. This use of emotions (pathos) must work together with ra-
tional demonstration (apodeixis) and moral characterisation (ethos) (Solmsen
1938, pp. 390-397; 1941, p. 178, Wisse 1989, p. 5, pp.15-21):
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Of the means of persuasion furnished by the speech, there are three kinds, for some
depend on the character of the speaker (ethos), some on putting the hearer into a
certain emotional state (pathos), and some on the speech itself, brought about by
proving or seeming to prove (apodeixis). (Arist. Rhet. 1355b 35-1356a 4)
This threefold division of persuasive material was also used by Cicero as a
basis for his rhetoric. However, as he was initially under the influence of the
Stoics when writing his treatise De Inventione, the younger Cicero focused
on argumentation and a little on moral characterisation rather than on emo-
tions (Wisse 1989, p. 267, Achard 1994, p. 13): for him, persuasion was defi-
nitely induced through a well-built series of different kinds of arguments
(Cic. De Inv. 1, 34-76; 2, 159-169). Yet, after many oratory experiences, he fi-
nally took into account the fundamental role played by emotions in persua-
sion. More precisely, he correlated each means of persuasion to a specific
oratory task. According to him, the speaker must inform his audience and
prove what he says in order to achieve success in his demonstration. He must
also convince everybody that he is a good citizen and that he defends virtue
so as to win them over by earning their goodwill and pleasing them. Finally,
he must play on emotions to move the hearers’ hearts deeply to make sure his
victory is overwhelming (Cic. De Or. 2, 115; 2, 128; 2, 310; 3,104; Brut. 185; 276;
Or. 69; Solmsen 1938, p. 399). Actually, “to prove is the first necessity, to please
is charm, to move is victory; for it is the one thing of all that avails most in
winning verdicts” (Cic. Or. 69). This analysis is clearly influenced by Aristo-
tle’s theory but it also illustrates a lucid awareness of communication
processes. As J. Wisse (1989, p. 6) explains, “arguments seem to be bound up
with the message, ethos seems to be bound up with the sender, pathos intends
an effect of the message on the receiver.”
The role played by melody and rhythm in this threefold psycholog-
ical task is really crucial. Indeed, in ancient rhetoric, especially in Cicero’s, the
most powerful rhetorical material to charm and to move is music (Chiron
2008, pp. 27-46):
For as art started from nature, it would certainly be deemed to have failed if it had
not a natural power of affecting us and giving us pleasure; but nothing is so akin to
our own hearts as rhythms and sounds – these rouse us up to excitement, and
smooth and calm us down, and often lead us to mirth and to sorrow. (Cic. De Or.
3, 197)
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To put it briefly, ideas developed in argumentation supply a demonstration
while melody and rhythm alter feelings and emotions. In other words, music
in speech has a strong role to play in persuasion since it participates in two
of the three psychological oratory goals, as shown below: 
figure 3.1
This process was quite fundamental in ancient rhetoric. It also suggests that
any strategy of persuasion must take into account the whole subjectivity of
both performer and hearer. Since melody and rhythm take part in the
shaping of the speaker’s morality and the conditioning of the hearer on an
emotional level, they are thus definitely essential for persuasion. 
3.3.2  Melody and rhythm in emotional mimesis
The close interaction between emotions and persuasion unquestionably raises
a challenging problem: how can melody and rhythm sway the hearers’ emo-
tions and hence induce persuasion? Actually, on this particular point, ancient
rhetoric was influenced by music theories first developed by Plato and Aris-
totle (5th-4th centuries bc) in Greece and then summarised by Aristides Quin-
tilianus during the Roman Empire (3rd century ad). In music as well as in
rhetoric, melodies and rhythms were classified according to their character
and the emotions this character was supposed to rouse. For instance, a quick
rhythm associated with a high-pitched melody can express anxiety or mirth
(Cic. Or. 193; A. Quint. De Mus., 2, 15, 34; West 1992, p. 158) whereas a peace-
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ful rhythm and a low-pitched melody can express calm, solemnity or deep
sorrow (Plat. Leg., 3, 700b; Arist. Poet., 1459a 8-10; Quint. Inst., 9, 4, 83; A.
Quint. De Mus., 2, 6, 1-7; 2, 15, 16-22; Duysinx 1990, p. 122; Mathiesen 1999,
p. 62; Dangel 2001, pp. 44-45). Consequently, melody and rhythm them-
selves were described according to their ethos and their pathos, i.e., their moral
characterisation and their emotional impact. 
Well-chosen melodies and rhythms thus determine the stylistic and
musical properties of speech and contribute to the strategy of persuasion by
participating in the oratory ethos and pathos. More precisely, melody and
rhythm first mimic real feelings and emotions. Then, out of empathy, the
hearers recognise – consciously or not – part of their own subjectivity and are
led to feel the same emotions (West 1992, p. 249, Halliwell 2002, p. 53, Zag-
doun 2007, p. 96). This empathy is actually induced by the similarity be-
tween what is expressed in the speech and felt in the soul; indeed, after
Cicero’s words, “nothing is so akin to our own hearts as rhythms and sounds.”
Consequently, as matched with ideas, melody and rhythm contribute to the
strategy of persuasion through a double emotional mimesis (see figure 3.2): 
figure 3.2
This conception is obviously correlated with the above-mentioned belief that
language and the oratory use of language come from nature as Cicero’s words
read: “art started from nature.” Therefore, speech itself is “regarded as a living
organism possessing a certain character, by which it can influence the hearers”
(Wisse 1989, pp. 61-62). Melody and rhythm definitely determine this charac-
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ter by providing speech with their own properties. They are part and parcel of
the strategy of persuasion in controlling what is irrational in the hearers’ sub-
jectivities. This system reveals how much ancient rhetoricians were aware of
the psychological impact of delivery itself on persuasion. Indeed, music in
speech is expressed by vocal intonations, rhythms of words and gestures (Cic.
De Or. 3, 220; Brut. 278; Quint. Inst. 1, 10, 22; 11, 3, 107-108; Aldrete 1999,
p. 39): the whole body must be involved in the delivery to communicate
melody and rhythm, to arouse emotions and finally to persuade.
3.4 What about ethics?
3.4.1  Music and oratory manipulation
The interaction between emotions and persuasion may raise some deep eth-
ical concern. Indeed, in Aristotle and Cicero’s views, the same emotions can
be used respecting ethics or not. Thus, “rhetoric is a tool that may be used
rightly or wrongly, and it is morally neutral in itself ” (Wisse 1989, p. 297).
Consequently, the speaker who uses them in his strategy of persuasion has a
strong moral responsibility. According to Cicero, he must exercise his rhetor-
ical skills to help justice (Cic. De Or. 1, 30-34; 2, 33-38; Wisse 1989, p. 397):
If anyone neglects the study of philosophy and moral conduct, which is the highest
and most honourable of pursuits, and devotes his whole energy to the practice of
oratory, his civic life is nurtured into something useless to himself and harmful to
his country; but the man who equips himself with the weapons of eloquence, not
to be able to attack the welfare of his country but to defend it, he, I think, will be a
citizen most helpful and most devoted both to his own interests and those of his
community. (Cic. De Inv. 1, 1)
However, can this ideal be truly reached in reality? Cicero was actually aware
of the heuristic function of this introduction: his aim was to describe the per-
fect speaker in order to provide a model of rhetoric but also to warn against
immoral oratory practices. These had already been evoked by Aristotle in an-
cient Greece:
Appropriate style also makes the fact appear persuasive; for the mind of the hearer
is imposed upon under the impression that the speaker is speaking the truth, be-
cause, in such circumstances, his feelings are the same, so that he thinks – even if it
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is not the case as the speaker puts it – that things are as he represents them; and the
hearer always sympathises with one who speaks emotionally, even though he really
says nothing. (Arist. Rhet. 1408a 19-24)
An appropriate speech is characterized by a perfect correspondence between
formal properties, topic and psychological goals. Melody and rhythm thus
determine appropriateness. According to Aristotle, a speaker who perfectly
masters the music of words, vocal intonations, tempo and gestures, can
achieve persuasion whatever he says. Consequently, persuasion can be exclu-
sively based on emotions. The problem is that formal properties – above all
melody and rhythm – do not serve ideas but replace ideas themselves. In
other words, the message is deprived of what must be its main component.
These practices were clearly inspired by Gorgias’ theory of “the dominance of
the passive psychè by the active logos” (Wardy 1996, p. 79). Nevertheless, this
ethical danger is still real nowadays: emotional manipulation through melody
and rhythm is indeed an oratory tool which may be the basis of dictatorship.
3.4.2  Solutions
Ancient rhetoricians suggested some solutions against emotional manipula-
tion in political discourse. First, emotions like ideas have to be “permeated by
reason” (Wardy 1996, p. 62) because reason is necessarily guided by morality
and honesty. The “reasonable” speaker can therefore show himself as a wise
and trustworthy person. This means that throughout the performance, the
emotional mimesis must always be correlated to the argumentation (Arist.
Rhet. 1356a 14; Garver 2000, p. 17). 
Cicero proposed an additional solution. In his view, a good speaker
must also feel the very emotions he wants to arouse (Wisse 1989, p. 264, Cooper
1996, p. 239) and then express them with appropriate melody and rhythm dur-
ing the performance. In other words, morality is implied by the genuineness
of the emotions to be displayed (Narducci 1997, p. 77). The orator Antonius
analyses this process in detail in the second book of De Oratore: 
It is impossible for the listener to feel indignation, hatred or ill-will, to be terrified
of anything, or reduced to tear of compassion, unless all those emotions, which the
advocate would inspire in the judge, are visibly stamped or rather branded on the
advocate himself. Now if some feigned indignation had to be depicted, and that the
same kind of oratory afforded only what was counterfeit and produced by mimicry,
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some loftier art would perhaps be called for. (...) I give you my word that I never
tried, by means of a speech, to arouse either indignation or compassion, either ill-
will or hatred, in the minds of a tribunal without being really stirred myself, as I
worked upon their minds, by the very feelings to which I was seeking to prompt
them. (Cic. De Or. 2,189).
This solution thus suggests that genuine emotions are the most persuasive
because they imply sincerity and are consequently effective in defending the
truth. Actually, these two solutions have to work together, as shown by fig-
ure 3.3:
figure 3.3
However, Cicero holds an ambiguous position about emotions and ethics.
On the one hand, he insists on the fact that good speakers have to be “aflame”
before attempting to “inflame” the hearers (Cic. De Or. 2, 189-196, Wisse
1989, pp. 257-258, Narducci 1997, p. 80) – but it is far from easy to tell a good
speaker from an actor and thus to draw the line between rhetoric and dra-
matic eloquence. On the other hand, imitation and pretence can also be part
of the strategy of persuasion. In this case, rhythm and melody are regarded
as an oratorical trick based on pleasure (Cic. De Or. 197; 208): they secretly
coax the hearers into experiencing the emotions that will eventually persuade
them. However, Cicero believes that the speaker must keep in mind that “no
doubt reality always does better than imitation” (Cic. De Or. 3, 215). Conse-
quently, imitation must never be the last step – it must support truth and
virtue (Wisse 1989, p. 262).
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3.5  From Cicero to Obama: Melody and rhythm in the victory speech
(4th Nov. 2008)
By altering emotions, melody and rhythm play a fundamental part in the
strategy of persuasion. This process was interpreted in Antiquity in the light
of mimesis. Even though this conception clearly belonged to a specific social,
cultural and aesthetic context, it can rightly elucidate aspects of some per-
suasive process involved in modern political discourses. Many examples could
be taken, among which Obama’s victory speech on November 4th 2008. That
day, as soon as the Obama family appeared, people in the audience showed
their joy and goodwill. Obama’s aim was therefore to reinforce his partisans’
support as well as to associate all the American people with his victory, even
those who had not voted for him. 
3.5.1 Anaphora, solemnity and admiration
His speech followed a clear argumentative progression. Vocal intonations and
syntactic rhythm specifically contributed to the whole architecture as they
guided the hearers from one idea to another while maintaining an unques-
tionable emotional tension as well. One of the most striking musical effects
was based on anaphora, i.e., the repetition of the same word or expression at
the beginning of sentences. This repetitive effect can create a rhythm because
it influences perception by inducing anticipation and recognition of a specific
pattern. Particular vocal intonations also make it easily perceptible. At the
same time, it is clear that it contributes to the argumentative structure of the
speech. This process is particularly patent in the introduction:
If there is anyone out there who still doubts that America is a place where all things
are possible;
who still wonders if the dream of our founders is alive in our time; 
who still questions the power of our democracy, tonight is your answer. 
It’s the answer told by lines that stretched around schools and churches (...) 
It’s the answer spoken by young and old, rich and poor, Democrat and Republican,
black, white, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, gay, straight, disabled and not dis-
abled (...) 
It’s the answer that led those who have been told for so long by so many to be cyni-
cal, and fearful, and doubtful of what we can achieve (...).
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Rhythm in this extract is based on two very simple ternary anaphoric patterns.
The first consists of the repetition of the same syntactic structure: “who still”
+ verb. Actually, the main musical marker is the adverb “still” as is clearly
shown in the sonogram in figure 3.4:1
figure 3.4
Time (s) is reported on the horizontal axis whereas frequency (kHz) is reported
on the vertical one. Each sound corresponds to a series of harmonics, repre-
sented here by a stratification of lines. The lowest harmonic constitutes the
fundamental tone – A#2 in Obama’s voice. The blackness of the harmonics
corresponding to “still” signals a strong vocal intensity, induced by the harsh-
ness of sounds but also by Obama’s will to plainly mark the beginning of each
segment. Measures of frequency tend to reveal a binary melodic development:
first, the voice follows a rising movement and then a falling one. Time spans
are also shorter and shorter; this acceleration of tempo creates a tension likely
to produce expectancy among the hearers. This ends with the words “tonight
is your answer” which corresponds to the first direct address to the audience.
The same process is applied to the anaphoric clause “It’s your answer.” In fact,
the use of a ternary rhythm and vocal amplitude – as in an incantation – gives
solemnity to the speech and dignity to the speaker. In this specific case, it con-
1 I employed the software Audiosculpt (ircam, Paris). 
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tributes to encourage goodwill by associating the hearers with political victory
and nourishing their collective energy too.
Other musical processes, also based on anaphora, may be observed in
the following parts of this speech. They confirm a shift in the oratory strat-
egy. Indeed, after thanking all the people who had been involved in the cam-
paign, Obama exposed the difficult task ahead. Sentences tend to be shorter
as if to delineate each step. A good example is this sentence: “There’s new en-
ergy to harness and new jobs to be created; new schools to build and threats
to meet and alliances to repair.” Here again rhythm is based on the anaphora
of a syntactic group: “new” + noun + infinitive. The first coordinative “and”
initially suggests a binary rhythm. However, the addition of the third group
“new schools...” actually induces a modulation and thus introduces ternary
dynamics. 
figure 3.5
This group “new schools to build” is in fact the pivot of this sentence. Indeed,
it marks the end of the first ternary group and the beginning of the second
one. This central role is moreover given by melody and rhythm: the adjective
“new” corresponds here to the highest vocal tension. It also initiates the sec-
ond ternary movement which follows a parabolic intonation. Indeed, fre-
quency measures show that the central group “and threats to meet” is
characterized by a vocal suspense – the voice does not fall down to the fun-
damental tone as it usually does to mark punctuation. Therefore, Obama vis-
ibly mastered melody and rhythm in this sentence. By choosing short
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sentences and cautiously chunking them, he hinted at each difficult step to
be taken in the future task. As he combined binary and ternary rhythms while
modulating his voice, he maintained solemnity and in a way built up an at-
mosphere of epic tension: he and the American people would have to be “he-
roes” to achieve this renewal. 
3.5.2 The chorus “yes we can” for a collective victory
The most famous musical effect in this speech must be the repetition of the
credo “yes we can.” This short phrase really played the role of a chorus when
Obama finally told the story of Ann Nixon Cooper, the 106-year-old woman
who voted during this election. The oratory goal was to inflame the audi-
ence, to make everybody proud of America and its history that this lady – de-
scribed by Obama as extraordinary – was supposed to embody. By repeating
the chorus, the hearers showed their unity and confirmed it was a successful
speech. Then it was time for Obama to conclude: 
This is our chance to answer that call. 
This is our moment. 
This is our time
to put our people back to work and open doors of opportunity for our kids; 
to restore prosperity and promote the cause of peace; 
to reclaim the American dream and reaffirm that fundamental truth 
that out of many, we are one; 
that while we breathe, we hope, and where we are met with cynicism and doubt,
and those who tell us that we can’t, 
we will respond with that timeless creed that sums up the spirit of a people: yes, we can.
Here again, ternary anaphoric patterns (“this is our chance (...) this is our
moment (...) this is our time (...) to put (...) to restore (...) to reclaim”) were
used to reinforce the chanting rhythm full of solemnity. Moreover, by em-
ploying the pronoun “we,” Obama did associate the whole American people
with his victory. However, the last sentence is the most interesting as far as
melody and rhythm are concerned. The sonogram (see figure 3.6) indeed re-
veals a very elaborate musical process:
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figure 3.6
First, this sentence is based on a binary progression: the credo “yes we can” is
clearly isolated by a pause (of around 1s). In the first part, vocal tension is
maintained: the first harmonic higher than the fundamental tone is around
C, which truly corresponds to a huge stress in Obama’s voice. A descending
movement can however be observed on the last word “people”, just before
the pause. The second part is characterized by a lower tension, as to signal a
final punctuation. The most striking effect is the use of specific rhythmic pat-
terns. Indeed, as in Latin, stress in English plays a fundamental role in ver-
bal dynamics. In this sentence, each stress thus marks the beginning of a
musical measure. Each measure is clearly distinguished and typified by a
rhythmic pattern based on contrasts between long stressed and short un-
stressed syllables (of around 0.20s and 0.10s). Moreover, some regularity can
be detected. Among the five opening measures, the first and the second are
based on a dactylic pattern (one long and two short syllables), the following
two on a trochaic one (one long syllable and one short syllable) and the last
on a spondaic one (two long syllables). Then a pause occurs as to emphasise
the group of words “the spirit of a people.” This begins with the unstressed
syllable “the” which can be interpreted as an anacrusis, i.e., a preliminary
measure after which the beat starts. The two following measures are based
on a rhythmic pattern that used to be most appreciated by ancient orators: a
peon (one long syllable and three short syllables) and a trochee (one long syl-
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lable and one short syllable). The phrase “yes, we can” can finally be inter-
preted as a series of three long syllables, which is a moloss. Consequently,
melody and rhythm in this last sentence are particularly elaborate. The rhyth-
mic regularity and melodic tension set up an easily perceptible pace and pro-
vide the whole speech with a cadence likely to be greeted with cheers of
agreement and admiration.
3.6 Conclusion
Melody and rhythm can be rightly considered as highly powerful tools to
achieve persuasion. It has been experimented since Aristotle and Cicero. Dur-
ing Antiquity, political speeches, as well as songs, were supposed to alter feel-
ings and thus to determine the hearers’ behaviours. More exactly, the speakers’
duty was to take advantage of the natural gifts of the human voice, i.e., in-
tonations, long and short sounds, contrasts of intensity, etc. Indeed, ancient
theorists such as Aristotle and Cicero knew that ideas were not sufficient to
impose a point of view, that they were to be reinforced by delivery and most
of all, by melody and rhythm. Through a complex mimetic process that in-
volves rational and irrational material, ancient speakers were supposed not
only to develop an argumentation and provide evidence on facts but also to
adapt rhythm and melody in order to make speeches appropriate, to prove
themselves wise and trustworthy and to play on emotions as well – a last step
necessary to achieve persuasion. In other words, music in speech was con-
sidered as deeply correlated to ethos (moral characterisation) and pathos (emo-
tional impact). The analysis of Obama’s victory speech has shown how much
this interaction between music, ethos and pathos is definitely and unques-
tionably fundamental in rhetoric, even today. Consequently, although an-
cient Greek and Latin differ from our own languages, although those cultures
may appear so alien to our daily worries, ancient thought can really provide
a good starting point for our reflections on rhetoric. It is particularly true
when we deal with the interaction between emotions and persuasion and the
ethical concern inferred by the psychological impact of music in political
speech.
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When debaters disagree, it is important to understand the exact nature and
scope of their disagreement. Each debater has an interest in knowing the pre-
cise reasons that make his opponents disagree with him, because if he wants
some of his opponents to change their minds, those are the reasons he should
try to refute. The onlooker, too, has an interest in knowing them, because
they are probably the reasons that will best help him decide for himself.
However, public debaters often misrepresent and widen their disagree-
ments. They distort each other’s standpoints and reasons, representing them
as either bizarre or toothless (two subtypes of the ‘straw man’ fallacy). Or they
ignore the opponents’ real reasons and attribute imaginary reasons to them.
They speculate on their opponents’ basic, hidden motives. Often they see an
opponent as part of a large, monolithic block, so that he is either a member
of a conspiracy or at least a “useful idiot”. Attacks on the opponent’s ethics, in-
tellect and personality often follow. Partisanship and polarization flourish. De-
baters see their own standpoint as representing righteousness, while any
divergent standpoint is seen as opposite, usually in a dichotomous sense: there
are no third positions, no neutral ground. This way, political and social debate
may resemble trench warfare as in the First World War. In both, we can see a
typical widening of the front zone where the two parties clash.
For onlookers who look to debates for enlightenment to choose a
standpoint there is little help. They would be better served if the debate would
focus on those smaller sectors of the front where debaters crucially disagree,
and where a true breakthrough might most likely occur. Litigation lawyers
know the need to focus their argument on potentially decisive points and
present a coordinative argumentation rather than a multiple set of uncon-
nected reasons – to use the terminology of Francisca Snoeck Henkemans
(2000). Interestingly, an empirical study of televized political debates where
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representative audiences voted on issues before and after each debate showed
that here too the coordinative strategy is superior: what we called “single
ground” debaters performed significantly better in terms of votes than “mul-
tiple ground” debaters (Jørgensen, Kock and Rørbech 1994, 1998). Readers of
a famous essay by Orwell (1946) will know that to shoot a mad elephant (as
the young Orwell once had to) one should place one bullet in the exact right
spot with great force. A similar piece of advice seems to be sound regarding
deliberative argument.
4.2  Status theory as a focusing tool
Ancient stasis (status) theory was a tool to help forensic debaters focus their
case. The central part of the theory was the status rationales: the conjectural,
the definitional and the qualitative, equivalent to the questions: What are the
facts? How are the facts to be categorized? What particular circumstances
characterize them?
These status rationales question the facts at issue, but another main part
of status theory were the status legales, which question the laws by which the
facts were to be judged. Usually, four types of disagreement are mentioned.
In all of them the debater argues that there is no clear one-to-one match be-
tween a law and a fact. Ratiocinatio is when there is no norm that meaning-
fully covers the fact, so we must reason by analogy from existing norms about
something else. Ambiguum is where there is one relevant norm that may cover
the fact, but it is ambiguous or abstract. In scriptum et voluntas there is also
one relevant norm, but this time it is too specific; it may literally cover the
fact, but the argument is that we should read the spirit of the law, not the let-
ter. Finally, contrariae leges is where two or more norms which may cover the
fact, but they point to different conclusions.
Notice that here we pass logically from cases with no applicable norms,
to cases where one norm may apply, which is either too abstract or too spe-
cific, to cases with more than one applicable norm. 
Ancient status theories also included lists of so-called “practical issues”,
such as legality, justice, advantage, feasibility, honor and consequence. All these
are examples of relevant norms (or norm systems) that may legitimately be
invoked in social and political argument, but they are mutually heterogeneous,
i.e., the set of relevant norms is ‘multidimensional’, and hence the norms will
necessarily tend to clash. For example, a debater might support a policy as ad-
vantageous; another might oppose it as dishonorable. This is the practical par-
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allel to the issue of contrariae leges. But the main components of the status sys-
tem – the status rationales and the status legales – were intended for legal ar-
gument; they presupposed the existence of explicit, formal rules (leges), which
were meant to cover the facts of the case, i.e., to correlate ius and factum. 
I suggest a way to generalize and integrate all these strategies into one
scheme which can help identify and narrow down the decisive reasons not just
in legal argument, but in deliberative argument as well, that is, in any social
disagreement over action. Such a scheme (see table 4.1) might help clarify,
for debaters and onlookers alike, what current disagreements are essentially
about, and in particular what they are not about.
We should note that the differences between legal and political argu-
ment are not absolute. Legal argument often relies on informal norms used
in practical reasoning; political argument often invokes legal considerations.
Both kinds are about action – legal argument is about legal action in response
to past acts, political argument is mainly about future action but also about
evaluating and modifying past acts. In both cases acts are being supported or
opposed with reference to norms of right action, which function as ‘warrants’,
to use Toulmin’s term (1958). The difference is mainly that legal norms are
typically written statutes which are recognized as valid and operative by all;
norms underlying political argument are usually informal, unwritten and not
always recognized as valid by all, or to the same degree. Also, they are most
often implicit rather than explicitly stated, and they are more heterogeneous
or ‘multidimensional’ than legal norms: some may be purely prudential and
are perhaps only concerned with economic consequences; others may be
virtue-ethical norms about moral conduct, fairness or justice; others again
are in fact formal and legal, for example considerations as to whether a pol-
icy is constitutional. 
4.3  Applying status theory to social and political argument
Status theory is a typology of the problems we may meet in correlating norms
and facts, and since these problems are analogous in the two fields, I propose
we use status theory to consider not just legal argument, but social and po-
litical argument as well.
For this purpose, I further propose to integrate the status legales in the
status rationales. In the status of definition, we discuss how a fact can be sub-
sumed under a norm. The status legales are about the same kind of discussion,
but they start from the other end: the norms. The reason they are useful is that
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they specify the problems raised by the correlation of norms and facts. Finally,
I also propose to include the ‘practical issues’ of political argument among the
many norms that are invoked, implicitly or explicitly, in political argument. 
So this is how we may integrate and generalize the various components
of ancient status thinking into a comprehensive typology of disagreement in
social debates: 1) We generalize the formal legal concept of ‘laws’ into a
broader, more varied concept of norms; 2) We see the status legales as specifi-
cations of the ways in which the correlation between facts and norms may be
contentious; and 3) We use the ‘practical issues’ to specify some of the varied
norms that may clash in social debates.
The complete, integrated status system for practical debates is given
in the table 4.1. I have named the cells with letters and number, filled in
some terms drawn from ancient status theories and supplied examples for the
different types of disagreement. We will look at some of these. (Notice that
the table also contains examples and comments not cited in the text of this
chapter.)
But you may ask: why do all this? Is this meant to be a better interpretation
of what ancient rhetoricians meant? No, I propose it as a useful tool for han-
dling current social and political disagreements. If public debaters and audi-
ences would think about disagreements in terms like these, they might better
avoid the characteristic widening of disagreements where debaters impute
imaginary standpoints, policies, reasons, intentions and personality features
to each other. With greater awareness of the specific type of disagreement in
a particular case, debaters may be more conscious of the norms that their
own argument relies on, and of those on the other side. 
Let us look at some of the types of disagreement that our generalized
and integrated version of the status system specifies. Those that primarily call
for comment are those representing the four status legales, seen as specifica-
tions of the status finitionis (C5-F5 in the table). This is where the traditional
system of status rationales is most notably enriched; the status conjecturae and
the status qualitatis, on the other hand, are defined and subdivided by the
present scheme in the same way as we find in ancient theory (more specifi-
cally that of Hermogenes). 
If, for example, the disagreement is one where no pre-existing norm
clearly and indisputably applies (cell C5 in the table), then that understanding
might be a starting point for a discussion where both parties collaborate to find
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a relevant norm. Issues where such a search for relevant norms is indicated con-
cern such ‘new’ phenomena as are currently emerging in fields like bioethics
and information technology: cloning of higher organisms and stem cell re-
search are activities where there is indeterminacy as to what categories may rel-
evantly apply to the entities in question – and hence there are also quandaries
as to what existing norms, if any, may relevantly apply to them. Various forms
of digital file sharing are technological phenomena which, at least according to
some, fundamentally question existing norms relating to property and intel-
lectual rights, thus necessitating the formulation of new norms.
Disagreeing debaters might also find that they both agree on a certain
norm, but that their disagreement is about interpretation, that is, about
whether the fact they discuss can indeed be meaningfully subsumed under
this norm that they both happen to support (cell D5). The philosopher Geor-
gia Warnke (1999) has written about this sort of ‘interpretive’ disagreement.
The abortion issue in the United States is a prime example; the problem is
that the participants in that debate do not realize it. Both sides are surely ‘pro
life’ as well as ‘pro choice’, but the disagreement is on whether the removal
of a new foetus, or fertilized egg, constitutes the taking of a human life, and
whether a woman’s choice to have a new foetus removed from her body can
be seen as her own choice.
Disagreements belonging in cell E5 are those where a strict and literal
understanding of a norm (either written or unwritten) is opposed by one that
will read a different underlying spirit into that norm. For example, anti-abo-
litionists in the debate on slavery in the US in the Nineteenth Century were
apt to believe that the words in the Declaration of Independence about “all
men” being “created equal,” when read in the right spirit, did not really apply
to black slaves, although they admittedly were, in a certain sense, men.
Again, two disagreeing debaters in the abortion controversy might find
that they mutually endorse the other side’s interpretation of the norms that
are invoked. Then we have a dispute belonging in cell F5: there is agreement
on two relevant norms which in the specific case point to opposite conclu-
sions, and the crucial point is now whether the argument relying on one of
these norms can be made to appear weightier than the argument relying on
the other. 
Column F in the table is the deliberative counterpart of contrariae leges:
cases like those where two or more normative concepts are used as warrants
on opposite sides. We face such issues all the time. The invasion of Iraq was
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supported by some with reference to a defence against terrorism, dissemina-
tion of democracy and the need to overturn tyrants, but it was opposed by
others with reference to its non-compliance with international law, the loss
in human and material terms, and the dangerous chaos that would be its
likely consequence. 
All of these considerations were in some sense potentially relevant to the
issue, so we had a case of what Carl Wellman (1971) and Trudy Govier (1987,
2004) called “conductive reasoning”, i.e., we must somehow weigh the pros
against the cons. Such situations exemplify the “value pluralism” propounded
by Isaiah Berlin (1998, 2002); that is, the understanding that several norms
may be relevant to a given issue, but argue for opposite decisions – and this not
only between two disagreeing debaters, but also inside the mind of an indi-
vidual. Other philosophers have recently emphasized the ‘incommensurability’
that obtains between such norms, which implies that it cannot be objectively
determined whether one or the other norm should have priority because the
relevant norms belong to different dimensions (see, e.g., Raz 1998, and Kock
2003). In legal argument the status of contrariae leges describes such situations,
and if we apply status thinking to social disagreements we are reminded that
similar contradictions are common there as well, probably more so. 
Besides value pluralism and incommensurability, another concept that
may be illuminative in polarized debates about controversial issues is that of
normative meta-consensus. The political theorist John Dryzek defines it as
“agreement on recognition of the legitimacy of a value, though not extend-
ing to agreement on which of two or more values ought to receive priority in
a given decision” (see, e.g., Dryzek & Niemeyer 2006, p. 639). In the Iraq de-
bate, both supporters and opponents of the invasion might probably agree on
values such as spreading democracy as well as respecting international law.
The dispute would then be narrowed down to one about the priority, in the
specific case, of one norm over the other; that is, there would be normative
meta-consensus. Normative meta-consensus might also be said to exist be-
tween the two sides in the abortion debate. Life and choice are two values that
both sides recognize, and their dispute is either one of interpretation because
both these notions are vague, or one of priorities. 
In proposing to apply status thinking to deliberative disputes I do not
suggest that we can expect consensus on issues like the ones I have mentioned.
The belief that rational argumentative discourse will necessarily lead to con-
sensus (or towards consensus) has been championed by Habermas in philoso-
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phy and by political theorists such as Elster (1986). In argumentation theory,
the pragma-dialectical school builds on the hypothetical assumption that the
purpose of all argumentation is for the discussants to resolve their dispute. But
as John Rawls and others have maintained, there are reasons why people may
not ever agree on issues where values are involved, hence his term “reasonable
disagreement” (1989, 1993). One of these reasons is precisely the fact that peo-
ple may, even within the bounds of reasonableness, interpret values differently;
this is the main idea in Georgia Warnke (1999). Another reason that people
may prioritize values differently; or, in the terminology of Perelman and Ol-
brechts-Tyteca (1969), their value hierarchies differ. Nevertheless, although con-
sensus cannot, for these reasons, be expected to emerge, in some cases it actually
might, and of course that would be welcome. But in the absence of consensus,
to realize that there is normative meta-consensus is also an achievement. It
would reveal that a dispute is not always an all-out clash between monolithic
blocks that reject each other’s values. Thus it would help narrow down the
scope of the disagreement, and focus everyone’s attention on where it actually
is rather than on where it is not. The polarization and the trench warfare we
often see in public debates would lose some of its fuel. Moreover, debaters on
both sides might find more persuasive arguments for their views. The status sys-
tem in antiquity had this kind of purpose. The reason it might work like that
is that helps us focus on the decisive point of disagreement. If one could change
opponents’ minds about those, then one might change their minds about the
whole issue. Similarly for undecided onlookers. They too would more likely
take our side if we were to focus on the decisive point of disagreement and
make them accept our case on that precise point. 
To complete the picture, let us briefly consider the types of disagree-
ment represented by the cells G5-L5. In G5, we have issues where a norm is
recognized, but where the presence of ‘exceptional’ circumstances is invoked
to justify the suspension of that norm. For example, during the Nazi occu-
pation of various European countries, including my own country, Denmark,
many individuals known or assumed to be informers against members of the
resistance movements were summarily liquidated by resistance men. No law
or social norm was invoked to justify these killings or the fact that no legal
steps were taken against them after the war, only the completely exceptional
nature of the situation.
Cell H5 represents issues of a partly similar nature, including the use of
“extraordinary rendition” and physical pressure bordering on torture against
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so-called “illegal combatants” captured in Iraq, Afghanistan, etc. Whereas in
G5 cases the basic norm outlawing the liquidation of one individual by another
is simply suspended by exceptional circumstances, in H5 cases there is more
of a weighing of contradictory norms against each other, with one being re-
gretfully ‘bent’ because trumped by another, based on self-defence. 
Cases represented by cells I5-L5 show gradually increasing degrees of
recognition of the norm that is being broken: In I5 cases, the victim of the
norm breach is cited as giving cause for it and deserving retaliation (“they
asked for it”). In J5 cases, no degree of mitigation of the norm breach itself is
sought, yet the perpetrator seeks acquittal or at least mitigation for himself by
seeking to shift the blame to a third party, supposedly so powerful that no al-
ternative was available for the perpetrator (“we were under orders”). In K5
cases the perpetrator admits his transgression and his responsibility for it, yet
he seeks mitigation in the fact that, e.g., the victim had long tormented or
provoked him – a circumstance that may indeed explain and even mitigate
the transgression but never justify it. Finally, in L5 the perpetrator fully rec-
ognizes the transgression and his own responsibility, seeking mitigation only
as an act of mercy, following his avowal of guilt and contrition. This strategy
may be exemplified by former President Clinton’s words: “I misled people, in-
cluding even my wife. I deeply regret that” (words which came after a series
of attempts at some of the strategies discussed above). 
Let me reiterate that what I see as the most useful feature of this pro-
posal to generalize status theory to everyday disagreements is the integration
of the fours status legales as a series of specifications of how we may disagree
about the definition or nature of the act we debate. As an example, consider
the debate on the Muhammad cartoons published by a Danish newspaper in
2005. In October of 2008, the debate was revived in another newspaper be-
tween its editor, Tøger Seidenfaden, a leading critic of the cartoons, and Fred-
erik Stjernfelt, a well-known academic (Mogensen 2008). Seidenfaden argued
that the cartoons were an act of gratuitous offence denying due empathy to
a domestic minority not deserving such treatment, namely all those Muslims
in Denmark who are peaceful and want integration, and thus the cartoons
were likely to set back integration. Stjernfelt, a self-declared enlightenment
thinker, argued that the cartoons were part of a global struggle for freedom
of speech, against special rights for cultural groups, and he rebuked Seiden-
faden for wearing “blinkers” and seeing only “the tiny Danish corner” of the
issue, ignoring the global aspects. 
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As an onlooker, I cannot help wondering why these two debaters, both
highly articulate and intelligent men, did not see more clearly the simulta-
neous relevance of two contradictory norms, both of which they probably
both support. In other words, there was normative meta-consensus between
them, but they did not realize it. Stjernfelt persisted in assuming that oppos-
ing the cartoons constituted a betrayal of the principle of free speech, and re-
jected the relevance of the ‘gratuitous offence’ argument as “tiny”;
Seidenfaden, on the other hand, appeared similarly insensitive to the global
context, where some Muslims in fact acted violently to curtail freedom of
speech, and he was unwilling to concede that the cartoons might relevantly
be seen in that context – in which the domestically-based criticism of them
(and of the Danish government’s no-comment attitude to them) might ap-
pear as a failure to stand up for free speech. As an onlooker, I find it obvious
that the quarrel between the two sides in this debate was not about any one
of them betraying one or the other of the norms invoked (empathy with de-
serving minorities and free speech, respectively), but about how to interpret
these norms, how they were relevant to the case, and in particular what rela-
tive weight or priority should be assigned to them. In other words, the dis-
agreement was primarily an instance of the deliberative counterpart of
contrariae leges (cell F5), with elements of interpretive disagreement (cell D5)
– and the debaters should have realized that, or have it pointed out to them.
As a general principle, I would argue that onlookers looking for guidance on
a controversial issue are let down by a debate where each debater only insists
on the exclusive relevance of his ‘own’ favoured norm. What might have
helped onlookers more would be mutual recognition by the opposite sides
that contradictory norms are relevant, plus a motivated bid from each side as
to why its favoured norm should be given priority in the case at hand. 
Even more generally, I suggest that democracies like ours need a greater
awareness among debaters, audiences, journalists and educators that social
disputes should not be seen as all-out clashes along enormous front lines, but
may usually often be narrowed down to focused disagreements on more spe-
cific, but also more potentially persuasive points. I suggest that the insights
contained in status theory as presented here can help promote such awareness.
Let us not be like the two lovers in Matthew Arnold’s famous poem “Dover
Beach”, who feel that “we are here as on a darkling plain, Swept with confused
alarms of struggle and flight, Where ignorant armies clash by night.”
[  9 1 ]
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5 Rhetoric and Argumentation
j .  anthony blair
5.1 Introduction
How is the relationship between rhetoric, on the one hand, and argument and
argumentation, on the other, properly understood? That is the question this
chapter sets out to answer. Given the historical connections between rheto-
ric, argument and argumentation, it is fundamental for any understanding of
rhetoric.
Why bother with this question? One reason that will become clear is
that there are several different, and on the face of it incompatible, conceptions
of this relationship in the more or less current literature, so it doesn’t seem that
they can all be right. Another reason, as will also become clear, is that how we
understand rhetoric and how we understand argument and argumentation
depend partly on how we understand their relationship, and conversely.
The concepts of rhetoric and of argument have undergone many
changes since their articulation by the ancient Greeks. Rhetoric, said to have
originated as the art of successful pleading in the courts of Syracuse (5th c.
bce), was extended by the time of Rhetoric to Alexander (see Braet 1996, 2004)
and Aristotle’s Rhetoric (4th c. bce) to include the art of public persuasion in
court, persuasion in political forums and on occasions of public celebration.
Cicero (1st c. bce) introduces the “offices” of the orator: docere (to teach, in-
form or instruct), delectare (to please) and movere, flectere (to move or “bend”).
Following its Ramist (16th c.) relegation for a few centuries to the art of style
and embellishment, in rhetoric’s resurgence in the 20th century it was en-
larged to, in Burke’s (Burke 1969, p. 43) famous characterization, “the use of
language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by na-
ture respond to symbols,” and beyond that, to the art of symbolic commu-
nication, not just persuasion (e.g., Foss, Foss and Trapp 1985, p. 11), and finally
expanded to cover the symbolic construction of cultural meaning: “rhetoric
usually is seen now as incorporating virtually any humanly created symbols
from which audiences derive meaning” (Foss, Foss and Griffin 1999, p. 6). It
is possible to see in these changes a progression from the more particular to
[  9 5 ]
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the more general, with the term ‘rhetoric’ being promoted each time to des-
ignate the more general conception. But as Burke (Burke 1969, Section II) has
shown, there have traditionally been several strands in the concept of rheto-
ric, some of which are emphasized more than others in different conceptions.
The concept of argument or illation too has expanded from its early
understanding. Aristotle identified argument with two species of relations of
probative support, which we might loosely call “deduction” and “induction”
(each having a scientific or theoretical variant, and also a public or popular
variant). Today theorists would both introduce a narrower concept of de-
duction than Aristotle’s (restricted to necessary implication), and also expand
the varieties of induction beyond generalizing from examples, to include, for
instance, sample-to-population generalizations and statistical correlations.
Moreover, many would add such further species of argument as conduction
(Campbell 1776, Wellman 1971, Govier 1999, Hansen 2008), abduction
(Peirce 1940, Walton 2002, Woods 2008), and more generally presumptive or
plausible arguments (Rescher 1976, Walton 1996), and perhaps most gener-
ally of all, defeasible arguments (Pollock 2008). 
Argumentation, if understood as the social practice entailing at its heart
the delivery and exchanges of arguments (but including much else), has seen its
spheres expand and contract. For Aristotle, besides its role in rhetoric, it could
occur as a student game called dialectic, and more seriously as a method of build-
ing and testing philosophical theory. It was also for Aristotle a tool to be used
in speeches addressing various kinds of wider audience. In contemporary theory,
some restrict its purview to the resolution of disagreements (Van Eemeren and
Grootendorst 2004), whereas others regard it as a way of maintaining dissensus
(Willard 1987), as an instrument for negotiating in public spheres (Goodnight
1982), as a method of investigation (Meiland 1981), and/or as a method of deci-
sion-making (Rieke and Sillars 2001, Hollihan and Baaske 1994).
This chapter proceeds by classifying some of the current views about
the rhetoric–argument or argumentation relationship, followed by a critical
discussion of them, and ending with comments about which might be prefer-
able. There are, to be sure, many more views on these topics than those can-
vassed here, and that implies a restriction in the scope of this chapter.
5.2  A survey of some current rhetoric-argument conceptions 
I have found four different ways of conceiving the relation between rhetoric
and argument. In this section I describe these in turn.
[  9 6 ]
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(1) According to one, the class of arguments is a member of the class
of rhetorical entities or processes. All arguments are rhetorical. Argumenta-
tion is inherently rhetorical. 
However, rhetoric is not restricted to argumentation or arguments.
“[W]e affirm,” writes Perelman, an advocate of this view, “that every dis-
course which does not claim an impersonal validity belongs to rhetoric. As
soon as a communication tries to influence one or more persons, to orient
their thinking, to excite or calm their emotions, to guide their action, it be-
longs to the realm of rhetoric” (Perelman 1982, p. 162). Unless “argument” is
defined to be identical with such discourse, the domain of rhetoric must in-
clude other things as well as arguments. The color a room is painted, the
background music in a shop, the furnishings and lighting of a restaurant –
these and countless more examples are clearly rhetorical by Perelman’s defi-
nition, but they are not arguments unless that term is so stretched that it be-
comes too flabby to be useful. 
According to some versions of this first conception of the rhetoric-ar-
gument relation, logical (that is, deductive) or mathematical or scientific
demonstrations, which might look like arguments or argumentation, are ex-
cluded on the ground that they claim pure rationality and complete inde-
pendence from the emotions of the audience or the character of the arguer;
they claim objectivity; they claim to hold universally without reference to au-
dience, occasion, situation or historical circumstances. Argumentation, in
contrast, occurs over matters on which reasonable people may differ, with
particular arguers addressing particular audiences, none of which is true of
demonstrations. Thus, on Perelman’s conception, argumentation is by defi-
nition rhetorical, and what might look like an argument insofar as there are
grounds adduced in support of a claim, if it qualifies as a demonstration, does
not count as an argument. 
Besides Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958), Meyer (2008) takes this
view and Reboul’s (1991) position is similar. Meyer defines rhetoric as “the ne-
gotiation of the distance between individuals in relation to a given question”
(Meyer 2008, p. 21).1 I am reminded of once when I was driving in Italy and
at a roundabout I inadvertently started to infringe on another driver’s right of
way. He responded with an angry blast of his horn. I stopped immediately,
1 “Le rhétorique est la négotiation de la distance entre des individus à propos d’une ques-
tion donnée.”
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made an apologetic face and held up my hands in surrender. He responded by
smiling magnanimously and signaling me to go ahead of him. We had nego-
tiated the distance between my mistake and his indignation – I, by obsequious
apology; he, by magnanimous forgiveness. It was a thoroughly rhetorical ex-
change, by Meyer’s definition, but there was no argument in sight. Yet Meyer
affirms that “argumentation traditionally makes up part of the discipline of
rhetoric” (Meyer 2008, p. 85).2 So Meyer belongs among those who regard ar-
gument or argumentation as one vehicle of rhetoric, among others.
Reboul has a narrower definition of rhetoric, namely, the art of per-
suading by speech (Reboul 1991, p. 4).3 Still for him argument is not identified
with rhetoric, but included as part of it. He insists on a fundamental distinc-
tion between two means of persuasive discourse, the rational and the affective
(ibid. p. 7). The means belonging to reason are arguments; those belonging to
affect are ethos and pathos (ibid.). To be sure, these are typically combined and
not always easy to distinguish (ibid.). For Reboul the point seems to be not so
much that rhetoric includes other kinds of activity besides giving arguments,
but that the bare bones of rational argument often needs to be, or in any case
is, accompanied by various affective aspects and devices. I will call this first
view of the rhetoric-argument relation the class-inclusion view. 
(2) A second way of conceiving the rhetoric–argument relationship sees the
class of arguments overlapping with the class of rhetorical entities or processes,
so while some arguments are rhetorical, others are not, and while part of the
domain of rhetoric relates to arguments, part has to do with entities or
processes other than arguments. According to proponents of this conception,
what makes an argument a rhetorical argument is a matter of its domain – the
subject matter it is concerned with. In particular, rhetorical arguments on
this view are arguments about choices and actions, either directly, or else in-
directly by focusing on the values or norms that govern choices and actions.
There can be arguments with other subject matters, such as theoretical mat-
ters in general, or more particularly philosophy or science, but they are not
rhetorical arguments, for their conclusions are about what is true or reason-
able to believe, not about what should be done. To be sure, although these ar-
2 “L’argumentation fait traditionnellement partie de la rhétorique comme discipline.”
3 “Voici donc la définition que nous proposons: la rhétorique est l’art de persuader par le
discours. ”
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guments are not rhetorical, some of the properties that can belong to argu-
ments in the rhetorical domain, such as the intention to persuade, may be
found in some of them. 
Advocates of this second conception include Hauser (2002) and Kock
(2007, 2008). Hauser’s definition of rhetoric is strongly Burkean: “Rhetoric,
as an area of study, is concerned with how humans use symbols, especially
language, to reach agreement that permits coordinated effort of some sort”;
or again, “Rhetoric … is concerned with the use of symbols to induce social
action”(Hauser 2002, pp. 2-3). For Hauser, rhetoric is a mode of arguing
(ibid. p. 33). Rhetorical arguing is based on opinion, where the objective is
persuasion, in the realm of the contingent, aiming at probable solutions
(ibid. p. 34). Rhetorical argument is to be contrasted with dialectical argu-
ment, which is also a mode of arguing, but a different one from rhetorical ar-
guing. Where rhetorical arguing aims at securing agreement of opinion,
dialectical arguing aims at securing a transcendent truth (ibid. p. 33). Dialec-
tical arguing occurs among experts discussing their subjects in technical fash-
ion, typically belonging to a specific discipline or domain of knowledge (ibid.
pp. 33-34). The objective of dialectical arguing is criticism, working out the
necessary conclusions that follow from initial opinions, with results that “can
reach the point of virtual certainty” if no counterarguments can be found to
refute the conclusion (ibid. p. 34).
Kock (2008) cites favorably George Campbell’s description of rhetoric
as being “about that art or talent by which the discourse is adapted to its
end.” With “the ends of speaking … reducible to four; every speech being in-
tended to enlighten the understanding, to please the imagination, to move the
passions, or to influence the will” (Campbell 1776, 1969). Kock agrees with
Campbell that some of what Campbell would call discourse, such as poetry,
“so far as it aims to ‘please the imagination’, would not belong to the subject
matter of argumentation theory” (Kock, 2008). Kock concludes: 
Clearly, then, argumentation theory does not cover the entire discipline that
rhetoricians cultivate; argumentation and rhetoric intersect, but are not coexten-
sive. Not all rhetoric is about argumentation; [and] … not all argumentation is
rhetorical. (ibid.)
Kock (2008) argues that Aristotle also defines rhetoric in terms of the do-
main of choice and conduct, and Aristotle does seem to allow that there can
[  9 9 ]
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also be non-rhetorical arguments (namely dialectical ones), so there is a case
that Aristotle belongs to this group as well. I call this second conception of
the relation between rhetoric and argument the class-overlap view. 
The class-overlap view might look almost like the class-inclusion view,
just lacking its definitional fiat against demonstrations counting as arguments.
If that were the only difference there would be not two but one conception,
with two terminological variants. But proponents of the class-inclusion view
don’t see arguments and argumentation – all rhetorical – as restricted to the
domain of choice and conduct. Reboul, for instance, insists that while argu-
ment can be aimed at getting someone to do something, if it is to be rhetor-
ical argument it must do so by getting that person to believe that it is the
right thing to do: “Argumentation always aims at causing belief ” (Reboul
1991, p. 5)4. And in the Traité de l’Argumentation, Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca (1958) and Perelman (1982) pretty clearly envisage arguments and ar-
gumentation to be about what it is reasonable to believe no less than about
what to do. However, for proponents of the class-overlap view even the ar-
guments that are not context-free, definitive demonstrations but are about
what is reasonable to believe still do not belong within the realm of rhetoric.
For Aristotle, and following him closely, Hauser, dialectic is such a domain
and is to be distinguished from rhetoric. So the class-inclusion and class-over-
lap conceptions, at least as held by these theorists, are distinct.
(3) The third conception of the relation between rhetoric and argument or ar-
gumentation seems to understand these concepts in a different way from the
first two. According to the class-inclusion conception, arguments and argu-
mentation have features that identify them as rhetorical. According to the
class-overlap conception, argument and argumentation can be identified in-
dependently of any rhetorical properties, and while some possess rhetorical
properties, others do not. According to the third conception, arguments and
argumentation are amalgams of three different kinds of properties. They typ-
ically have rhetorical properties, dialectical properties and logical properties.
These three kinds of properties correlate with three perspectives from which
to consider arguments and argumentation. Arguments can be considered as
entities or products, in which case their logical properties are salient; or they
can be considered from a procedural perspective, in which case their dialec-
4 “[L’argumentation] vis toujours à faire croire.”
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tical properties are salient; or they can be considered as processes occurring
in time and embedded in historical contexts, in which case their rhetorical
properties are salient. To look at just their logical, or just their dialectical, or
just their rhetorical features is to abstract from argument and argumentation,
to focus on one perspective to the exclusion of the others, and thus to mis-
understand the essentially complex nature of arguments and argumentation. 
The person most emphatically identified with this third, perspectival,
conception of the rhetoric-argument relationship is Wenzel (1980, 1987, 1990).
Tindale (1999, 2004) may also be associated with this view. 
Each places the emphasis slightly differently. Although Wenzel himself
is a rhetorician and communication theorist, he regards none of the three
perspectives as privileged; each has its legitimate uses and provides its dis-
tinctive illumination. Wenzel’s conception of rhetoric is quite traditional: “the
practical purpose of rhetoric is helping speakers marshal all the available
means of persuasion to help people in social groups make wise decisions”
(Wenzel 1990, p. 14), for “rhetoric is applied in decision-making situations
where people have to make a choice between alternatives and where there
may be good reasons on both sides” (ibid. p. 13). His conception of rhetoric
seems to line up with that of Kock and Hauser. But he does not, as they do,
identify a particular type of argument as rhetorical. “Human judgment,”
Wenzel writes, “depends upon argumentation, and argumentation depends
equally upon the resources of rhetoric, dialectic and logic” (ibid. pp. 25-26).
Tindale, an informal logician initially, has come to see the rhetorical
perspective as deserving priority. Rhetoric, for Tindale, “concentrates on the
communication process inherent in argumentation, on the means by which
arguers make their cases for the adherence of audiences to the claims ad-
vanced” (Tindale 1999, pp. 3-4). Quoting Richard Andrews, Tindale under-
stands rhetoric as, “’the arts [sic] of discourse’ with all the associations of
discourse embedded in social contexts” (Andrews 1995, p. 30, as quoted in
Tindale 1999, p. 14). Discussing the effect of rhetorical figures such as anal-
ogy, praeteritio and prolepsis, Tindale writes, “It is [the] … rhetorical nature
[of arguments drawn from figures] that makes them most effective, not just
in persuading an audience, but engaging them at a quite deep, often emo-
tional level, before reason moves in as an organizing force. They relate” he
continues, “to a level of engagement that grounds the argumentative situation,
and thus” – and this is the point of difference with Wenzel – “they further
demonstrate why the rhetorical is the primary, most influential layer in any
[  1 0 1 ]
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model of argument that seeks to integrate the logical, dialectical, and rhetor-
ical” (Tindale 2004, p. 86).
However, both Tindale and Wenzel regard an argument’s or argumen-
tation’s rhetorical properties as just one set of properties that coexist with the
other two. And both think that any argument put to use in argumentation,
and the argumentation itself, will have rhetorical properties. So the perspec-
tival conception of the rhetoric-argument connection shifts the focus from
rhetorical vs. non-rhetorical argument to argument as rhetorical or dialecti-
cal or logical.
(4) I turn now to the fourth conception of how rhetoric and argumentation
relate. According to it, the rhetorical properties of arguments and argumen-
tation consist of the framing, selecting or formulating arguments or argu-
mentation that can make logically and dialectically good arguments more
appealing and persuasive, although it can also be mis-used to cover the blem-
ishes of logically or dialectically defective arguments. Thus this fourth con-
ception of how rhetoric is related to argument might be called the cosmetic
conception. Rhetoric is enhancement. This view is Platonic in spirit, and also
somewhat reminiscent of the 16th century Ramist position that rhetoric is
style and presentation that is also expressed by writers such as Blair (1783) in
the 18th century belles-lettres tradition. 
I regard Johnson (2000) and Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2000,
2002, 2007 among many others) as contemporary proponents of this view.
Johnson thinks a speaker or writer can have different and often incompati-
ble goals. The arguer aims at rational persuasion, the goal of which is to jus-
tify truth-claims and in which the logical and dialectical strengths and
weakness of the argumentation are made manifest. The rhetor, in contrast,
aims simply to persuade the audience of the claim being argued for, where the
truth of the premises from which the argument starts and the truth of the
conclusion it seeks to establish are not essential and persuasion may consist
simply of getting the audience to accept the claim. To be sure, one can try to
combine the objectives of arguer and rhetor, but for any arguer, rhetorical
dressing should always function as auxiliary to the goal of logical and dialec-
tical manifest rationality.
For Johnson, rhetoric’s aim is persuasion and its norm is effectiveness,
so arguments used for rhetorical purposes will be designed for success, even
if that means glossing over their weaknesses. “The arguer,” Johnson writes,
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“cannot ignore objections to his argument, even if it is not known how to
forestall them … The rhetor is under no such constraint: If ignoring the ob-
jection will lead to a more effective communication, and if doing so is ra-
tional, then the objection can be ignored” (Johnson 2000, p. 163). Argument
is thus contrasted with rhetoric; both are potentially rational activities, but ar-
gument must be open and transparent, whereas rhetoric can sugar coat or
skip over awkward difficulties that argument is required to raise and con-
front. Johnson thus sees rhetoric as in principle distinct from argument.
For Van Eemeren and Houtlosser, the rhetorical aim is to win; and in
the use of arguments to resolve a difference of opinion it is to use arguments
to resolve the disagreement in one’s own favor: 
People engaged in argumentative discourse are characteristically oriented toward re-
solving a difference of opinion … – maintaining certain standards of reasonableness
… . This does, of course, not mean that they are not interested in resolving the dif-
ference in their own favor. Their argumentative speech acts may even be assumed to
be designed to achieve primarily this effect. There is, in other words, not only a di-
alectical, but also a rhetorical dimension to argumentative discourse. (Van Eemeren
and Houtlosser 2000, p. 295)
While the arguers can be presumed to maintain … critical standards, they can at
the same time be presumed to be out for an optimal persuasive result. In their ef-
forts to achieve this result, they will resort to what we have called strategic maneu-
vering, directed at diminishing the potential tension between the simultaneous
pursuit of critical and persuasive aims. (Van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002, p. 290)
On their view, “Rhetoric is the theoretical study of practical persuasion tech-
niques” (Van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2000, p. 297). Since, in their view, ar-
gumentation is a dialectical activity, which means that it lies under the
constraint of rationality, and since the whole point of argumentation is to
use reasons to resolve a difference in a reasonable way or on the merits, it fol-
lows that the result can be a conflict between the rhetorical objective of win-
ning and the dialectical constraint of being reasonable. Rhetoric’s influence
on arguments makes them subject to derailment. “If a party allows its com-
mitment to a critical exchange of argumentative moves to be overruled by
the aim of persuading the opponent,” they write, “we say that the strategic
maneuvering has got ‘derailed’” (Van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002, p. 290):
[  1 0 3 ]
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The rhetorical aspect of argumentation manifests itself in our view in the strategic at-
tempts to direct the resolution process effectively toward the acceptance of one’s own
position. As the word goes, effective persuasion must be disciplined by dialectical ra-
tionality. (Van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2000, p. 297) 
It is dialectic that keeps the rhetorical components of the discussion on the
tracks.
Although Johnson’s and Van Eemeren and Houtlosser’s theories differ
in many respects, they both treat rhetorical objectives as in potential conflict
with fully manifest rationality. Rhetoric consists of strategies to win or per-
suade, and while it can thus enhance the attractiveness of a dialectically or log-
ically reasonable argument, there is always the risk that it will mask dialectical
or logical subterfuge. So on both views, rhetoric has the properties of a cos-
metic designed to make merits more appealing but subject to being used to
conceal flaws.
5.3  Discussion
5.3.1  The class-inclusion position
My reservation about the class-inclusion conception is its acceptance of the
positivist identification of logic with formal deductive logic. This conception
of logic is open to challenge. 
On Perelman’s view, logic is restricted to formal deductive systems. De-
ductively valid arguments in natural language are relegated to the status of
“quasi-logical” arguments. Presumably that would also be the fate of materi-
ally valid deductive arguments in natural languages. (Example: Question:
“Did Fred have any siblings?” Answer: “Didn’t you know that he was Julia’s
uncle?”) It would thus exclude from logic proper what Ryle (1936) termed
“informal logic,” by which he meant the entailment relations among con-
cepts that map their structure, for example that the concept of fear entails
the apprehension of danger. It also relegates to extra-logical or quasi-logical
standing the “logic” of presumptive inferences, and in general of defeasible
reasoning and arguments. To be sure, one can use terms any way one likes as
long as one is consistent, but restricting the scope of logic to formal deduc-
tive logic banishes to a conceptual limbo various kinds of reasoning and ar-
guments that don’t clearly have a home anywhere else than under the rubric
of logic. And if the term ‘logic’ is to denote the norms of good reasoning or
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good inferring as such reasoning and inferring are exhibited in or invited by
arguments used in argumentation, it certainly must include other norms be-
sides deductive validity, let alone formal validity.
If the term ‘logic’ is given the wider denotation I suggest it ought to
have, then it becomes permissible to speak of the logic of arguments in ar-
gumentation without relying on the qualifier ‘quasi,’ and to see logic as a tool
of rhetoric. Since logically good arguments in fact tend to be effective argu-
ments (see O’Keefe 2003), the class-inclusion conception of the rhetoric-ar-
gument relation, at least as it is defended by the kinds of arguments Perelman
makes, seems to restrict unduly the nature of rhetorical argument. 
5.3.2  The class-overlap position
The class-overlap conception of the rhetoric-argument relationship regards ar-
guments about what is true or reasonable to believe as lying outside the do-
main of rhetoric. Rhetoric is to be restricted to arguments about what to
choose or do. According to Kock, this is because rhetoric deals with what
cannot be settled definitively, about issues on which people may reasonably
disagree because these issues are decided on the basis of people’s values, pri-
orities and weightings, all of which are subjective. Presumably, then, the tools
of rhetoric are the only reasonable resource to use to move people to choose
or act in a certain way; objective arguments cannot settle disagreements here.
For example, there is no way to establish by impersonal argument that every-
one should rank liberty more highly than security – that it is true that liberty
is preferable to security – should the two conflict, whereas rhetorical argu-
ments stand a chance of getting a person who is willing to sacrifice some lib-
erty in exchange for greater security to shift his perspective.
Kock’s reason for confining rhetoric to arguments about choices is a
meta-ethical position known as non-cognitivism. According to non-cognitivism,
sentences expressing normative judgements of values, prescriptions, and so on
have no truth conditions and are not susceptible to knowledge. In taking this
position, Kock joins a respectable tradition in philosophy, but it is one that is
far from universally shared. The modern debate between cognitivism and non-
cognitivism arose in earnest in the 1930s, with people like Ayer (1936) and
Stevenson (1944, 1963) raising the non-cognitivist banner, but the issue remains
undecided in the philosophical literature to this day (see van Roojen 2008). So
accepting Kock’s rationale requires at the least relying on a promissory note
that non-cognitivism will win out over the cognitivism.
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Even if Kock is right that prescriptions cannot have truth conditions,
it does not follow that they cannot be objectively evaluated on other grounds;
for instance, as being practical or impractical, wise or foolish, short-sighted
or far-sighted, and so on. And a good many such judgements are liable to a
very high degree of inter-rater reliability. I do not mean to suggest that these
properties take arguments about choices out of the realm of rhetoric. On the
contrary, my view is that arguments that can have a degree of objectivity
should not therefore be excluded from rhetoric. A good deal of what we argue
about even when the ideal is to establish the truth of the matter cannot be set-
tled beyond doubt or controversy. For example, predictions constitute a huge
class of such arguments. Think of predictions about the weather, or the econ-
omy, or the adult traits a child will develop, or the success of a student, or the
effects of human actions upon the environment, and so on and on. These are
judgements about what we hope to be true and think to be reasonable to be-
lieve. Arguments for and against various alternative cognitive positions are
thus in many cases no less subject to dispute than are those about prescrip-
tions or commendations. So if disputability is the password of rhetorical ar-
guments, then all of such disputatious topics in which any position is a
candidate for knowledge, or reasonable belief will be topics for rhetorical ar-
guments and argumentation no less than decisions or choices.5
I conclude from these considerations that the class-overlap view of the
relation between rhetoric and argument, at least as defended using the argu-
ments that Kock offers, unduly limits the realm of rhetorical arguments and
argumentation. But if matters of belief no less than matters of action can be
topics of rhetorical argumentation, then the class-overlap view seems to be-
come the class-inclusion view.
5.3.3 The cosmetic position
According to the cosmetic position, rhetoric’s inherent objective is persuasion,
its overriding norm is effectiveness, and its design and deployment of argu-
ments, although capable of increasing their success and in principle compati-
ble with logic and dialectic, is also liable to conflict with rationality or
reasonableness. There is reason to think that this view saddles rhetoric with
5 I won’t mention another argument that is too controversial to take up here, namely that
philosophical claims – those that Kock contends are about truth – are all conceptual – that
is, all about how we should conceive of the world – and as such, are all normative.
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the reputation cast upon it by those who abuse it, and that seems to subject
rhetoric to a double standard. After all, a clever logician or dialectician can use
equivocation, vagueness, flawed analogy, improper appeal to authority and
other fallacies to trick his audience, but logic and dialectic have managed for
the most part to avoid being tarred with the brush of fallacy mongering. It
seems unfair that the possibility of rhetorical trickery should be due to the
essence of rhetoric any more than logic or dialectic should be deemed guilty by
association with those who trade in logical or dialectical fallacies. Braet (1996,
2004) has contended persuasively that from the earliest surviving handbooks
rhetoric has included the use of legitimate argument schemes as central to its
persuasive devices. In addition, the Roman tradition of forensic rhetoric advised
finding and using arguments that would result in rational persuasion. At least
part of the aim of rhetoric, traditionally, has been to make rational arguments
effective, not to make arguments effective at the expense of rationality.
So it seems that the cosmetic conception of the rhetoric-argument re-
lation relies on an understanding of rhetoric that takes more from its popu-
lar reputation than from its historical record, viewing rhetoric as requiring the
discipline of logic or of dialectic.
5.3.4 The perspectival position
I have left discussion of this position to the end because it seems to avoid the
shortcomings of the other three. It leaves open the possibility of arguments
that count as logical even if they are not formal demonstrations. It also puts
no restriction on the domain of rhetorical argument. And it does not seem
to require identifying rhetorical argumentation with the goal of mere per-
suasion. Yet a question can be raised about it just the same.
Here is the problem. If, from the perspective of rhetoric, the aim of the
use of arguments and argumentation were rational persuasion, then, since
logic is the custodian of some of the norms of rational arguments, the rhetor-
ical perspective must include the logical perspective. Furthermore, since di-
alectic is the custodian of the norms of reasonable argumentation, then the
rhetorical perspective must include the dialectical perspective. In sum, if
rhetoric’s use of arguments is to persuade rationally or reasonably, then logic
and dialectic must be tools of rhetoric. But if the rhetorical perspective is
conceptually distinct and separate from the logical and the dialectical – which
is what the perspectival position requires – then the norms of rhetoric would
seem to be independent of those of logic and dialectic. And if that is so, then
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it will be possible for an argument to be good rhetorically but weak logically
and/or dialectically. Thus the door is opened to the position that rhetoric’s
telos is after all mere persuasion. In other words, it appears that the perspec-
tival position implies the cosmetic position.
5.4  The upshot
If these last speculations are correct, then we seem to be faced with the fol-
lowing dilemma. Either rhetoric as it relates to arguments and argumentation
is to have rational persuasion as its goal, in which case the rhetorical com-
mitment to reasonableness means that the norms of rhetoric imply those of
logic as applied to arguments and of dialectic as applied to argumentation. Or
else, rhetoric represents one analytic and normative perspective on arguments
and argumentation independent of those of logic and dialectic, in which case
there is no commitment to logical or dialectical norms from the perspective
of rhetoric, and the rhetorical reasonableness of arguments and argumenta-
tion becomes purely instrumental – whatever works.
It could be that we can talk and think either way. That is, theorists
might be free to adopt whichever conception of how rhetoric relates to ar-
guments they prefer. However, there are risks in overlooking the insights of
tradition. The class-inclusion and class-overlap views build in no commit-
ment on this matter and so offer us no guidance. The cosmetic view of the
relation between rhetoric and argument seems to over-emphasize in its con-
ception of rhetoric the goal of winning over or persuading the audience or in-
terlocutor. Whether the perspectival view shares this defect depends on what
conception of the rhetorical perspective one builds into it. 
In appealing to the tradition of rhetoric, I am guided by the arguments
of Michael Leff in a paper discussing the relation between rhetoric and di-
alectic, arguments which have a bearing on the rhetoric–argument relation-
ship. Leff draws attention to the fact that historically there was a difference
even for Aristotle “between using the art [of rhetoric] properly and achieving
a specific outcome” (Leff 2000, p. 244). Leff continues:
Rhetoricians in the Latin tradition make much the same point when they differen-
tiate the end and the duty of the orator. The end is to persuade through speech; the
duty is to speak in a manner suited for persuasion. (ibid. p. 245)
The point is that rhetoric is subject to normative standards of its own. 
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In the tradition that stretches from Isocrates to Cicero and from there to the Ren-
aissance humanists, content and style, words and thoughts, the aesthetic and the ra-
tional are regarded as interconnected parts of eloquence. Rhetorical argument is not
simply decoration added to logic. It is a fully embodied expression of reason that is
at once accommodated to and also capable of intervening in public situations.
Rhetoric, then, imbricates style and argument to achieve evocative and emotional
force, and while rhetorical argumentation often uses dialectical principles, it does
not add a linguistic veneer to them so much as it transforms them into instruments
for public action. (ibid. p. 246)
If this understanding of rhetoric is correct, then the relation between rheto-
ric and argument and argumentation is more complex than what has been
suggested by the views canvassed above, although three of the four are con-
sistent with it.
The class-inclusion conception, at least with a broadened notion of
logic, leaves room for independent and non-instrumental rhetorical norms to
apply to arguments as well as to other forms of discourse. The class-overlap
conception, if extended to envisage arguments about contentious matters of
belief as well as prescriptions, is also consistent with independent rhetorical
norms. The perspectivalist too is at liberty to understand the rhetorical per-
spective as bringing to bear on argument and argumentation standards of
suitableness to audience and occasion that go beyond, and thus can override,
the goal of winning over the audience. 
It is only the cosmetic conception that shortchanges the rhetorical tra-
dition, on Leff ’s expansive reading of it. For the cosmetic conception of the
rhetoric-argument relationship relies on a narrow, merely instrumentalist con-
ception of rhetoric. While it is no doubt a virtue of the cosmetic conception
that it emphasizes that the goal of winning the argument or persuading by ar-
gument can conflict with dialectical or logical norms, it is also a shortcom-
ing of this view that it leaves out of account in its conception of argument and
argumentation the broader rhetorical norms that the rhetorical tradition cited
by Leff assigns to them. This broader role allows rhetorical insights about
how new possibilities for thought and action can be brought to public con-
sciousness to shape our arguments and our argumentation, while continuing
to respect people’s capacity for reasoned and reasonable belief and conduct.6
6 My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for many corrections and helpful comments.
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6 Generalizing about the Persuasive
Effects of Message Variations: The
Case of Gain-Framed and Loss-
Framed Appeals
daniel j .  o’keefe
6.1  Introduction
One recurring interest in rhetorical studies is the identification of useful
general principles of effective message design – identifying what makes for
more or less persuasive appeals. The most systematic way of gathering
evidence on such questions is to conduct an experiment, in which (to take the
simplest form) participants are exposed to one of two versions of a message,
where the versions are identical except for the one particular feature of
interest. For example, one might compare the persuasiveness of a message in
which the advocate’s overall conclusion is stated explicitly and that of the
same message with the conclusion omitted. There is now quite an extensive
empirical literature on such matters, examining a great many different
message variations.
This chapter focuses on one such variation, the contrast between what
are called “gain-framed” and “loss-framed” persuasive appeals. A gain-framed
message emphasizes the advantages of compliance with the communicator’s
recommended action or viewpoint; a loss-framed message emphasizes the dis-
advantages of noncompliance. For example, “if you take your high blood
pressure medication, you’ll probably get to play with your grandchildren” is
a gain-framed appeal, whereas “if you don’t take your high blood pressure
medication, you might not get to play with your grandchildren” is a loss-
framed appeal. The animating research question is: Which kind of appeal is
more persuasive (generally, or in specified circumstances)?
The effects of this message variation are interesting enough in their
own right, but I want to discuss this research also because the story of gain-
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loss message framing research speaks to some larger issues concerning this
kind of research – experimental research aimed at producing dependable gen-
eralizations about the persuasive effects of message variations. So what follows
is a rough narrative of gain-loss persuasive message framing research, con-
cluding with some larger lessons that can be extracted from this case study.
6.2 Gain-loss framing effects: Initial results
The story begins over 20 years ago, in 1987, when one of the first studies of
gain-loss message framing was published: Meyerowitz and Chaiken’s article
in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, a very well-regarded psy-
chology journal. Meyerowitz and Chaiken compared the effectiveness of gain-
and loss-framed messages that were aimed at encouraging women to under-
take breast self-examinations (for the early detection of breast cancer). They
found a loss-framed appeal to be substantially more effective than a gain-
framed appeal (Meyerowitz and Chaiken 1987). 
This was a really striking result. After all, the underlying argument is
exactly the same in the two messages; the same underlying substantive con-
sideration is invoked in the two appeals. Even so, this simple change of frame
– emphasizing the disadvantages of noncompliance rather than the advan-
tages of compliance – produced a large difference in persuasiveness.
So the question that naturally arises is: Why? Why this difference in
persuasiveness, given substantive similarity in the arguments? As it happens,
a good explanation of these results was ready to hand, in the form of the psy-
chological phenomenon commonly called “negativity bias.” Negativity bias
is the heightened impact of, and sensitivity to, negative information (as op-
posed to otherwise-equivalent positive information; for a review, see Ca-
cioppo, Gardner and Berntson 1997). 
This “robust psychological phenomenon” (Cacioppo and Gardner
1999, p. 206) has a variety of manifestations. For example, gains and losses are
psychologically asymmetrical such that persons are generally more sensitive
to losses than to otherwise-equivalent gains; specifically, people are more likely
to prefer a risky (vs. less-risky) decision option if the option is presented in a
way that emphasizes avoiding possible losses rather than obtaining possible
gains (the classic study is Tversky and Kahneman 1981; for a review, see Kuh-
berger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck and Perner 1999). Negative information has a
disproportionate impact on evaluations or decisions compared to otherwise-
equivalent positive information (e.g., Hamilton and Zanna 1972; Lutz 1975;
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for reviews, see Kanouse 1984; Rozin and Royzman 2001; Skowronski and
Carlston 1989). Negative stimuli are preferentially detected, that is, detected
at lower levels of input or exposure than are positive stimuli (e.g., Dijkster-
huis and Aarts 2003). Finally, negative events generally evoke stronger and
more rapid reactions (of various sorts) than do positive events (for a review,
see Taylor 1991); for instance, negative events evoke more cognitive work than
do positive events (Peeters and Czapinski 1990).
Taken together, these findings indicate that negative information is
more potent than positive information – which of course is a natural expla-
nation for why a loss-framed message was more persuasive than a gain-framed
message in Meyerowitz and Chaiken’s study. And in fact, Meyerowitz and
Chaiken (1987, pp. 501, 507) invoked negativity bias as a plausible explana-
tion of their results:
Theorizing associated with the negativity bias effect in person perception and deci-
sion-making research . . suggests that losses may be weighted more heavily than
gains . . . Thus it might be predicted that a pamphlet stressing the negative aspects
of not doing bse would have a greater persuasive impact than a pamphlet stressing
the positive aspects of doing bse.
Given the combination of Meyerowitz and Chaiken’s finding and the ac-
companying negativity-bias explanation, the natural conclusion to draw is
that loss-framed appeals are generally more persuasive than gain-framed ap-
peals. And indeed that’s a common-enough conclusion to see in the literature.
For example: “Framing studies . . . have generally shown that . . . loss frames
are generally superior to gain frames” (Consedine, Horton, Magai and
Kukafka 2007, p. 551). Or: “Typically, loss frames are more persuasive than
gain frames” (Johnson, Maio and Smith-McLallen 2005, p. 640). 
6.3 Synthesizing research results through meta-analysis
But is it really true that loss-framed appeals are generally more persuasive
than gain-framed appeals? Many subsequent studies have been conducted
concerning the relative persuasiveness of gain- and loss-framed appeals, and
in recent years Jakob Jensen and I have been engaged in an ongoing project
in which we synthesize the results of these studies. 
The traditional way of summarizing such studies has been the “narra-
tive” review, in which studies are sorted on the basis of whether the message
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variation of interest made a statistically significant difference or not (and in
what direction the difference occurred), where the reviewer searches for fea-
tures that distinguish the significant and nonsignificant studies (or for features
that distinguish the significant studies with one direction of effect from those
with the opposite effect). But this way of synthesizing research is unsatisfac-
tory for various reasons, and especially because of the role that statistical sig-
nificance plays. As is now more widely appreciated, statistical significance is
something different from the size of the effect of interest. To take a simple
case, the correlation between two variables (X and Y) might be statistically sig-
nificant in one study and nonsignificant in another – even though the cor-
relation was actually larger in the second (nonsignificant) study – because of
differences in sample size (the number of participants) in the two studies. 
In contrast to traditional narrative means of synthesis, meta-analysis focuses
specifically on (what is called) the “effect size” in each study – the magnitude
(size) of the effect or relationship of interest. Thus (crudely) a meta-analytic
review involves three steps: (1) locating the studies of interest; (2) extracting
the effect size (and related information, such as sample size) from each study;
and (3) computing average effect sizes both across all the studies and within
sub-categories of interest. Meta-analytic methods have replaced traditional
narrative methods and indeed have become the standard for syntheses of this
kind of research. (For useful general introductions to meta-analysis, see
Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins and Rothstein 2009; Cooper 2010; Cooper,
Hedges and Valentine 2009.)
So we have been engaged in ongoing meta-analytic work to synthesize
the results of existing research on gain-loss message framing effects. We search
quite widely, across a number of databases with a variety of search terms, try-
ing to find every relevant study we can: published articles, dissertations, con-
ference papers, master’s theses, and so on. Our interest, of course, is specifically
in locating experimental studies comparing the persuasiveness of gain- and
loss-framed messages.
For each such study, we convert its results into an effect size, which
represents the size and direction of the difference in persuasiveness between
the gain-framed appeal and the loss-framed appeal. Specifically, we use the
correlation coefficient (r) as our effect size index. A correlation is a value that
can range from positive 1 to negative 1. In this application, a correlation of
zero indicates no difference in persuasiveness between the two appeals. A pos-
itive correlation (for a given study) indicates a persuasive advantage for the
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gain-framed appeal; a negative correlation indicates an advantage for the loss-
framed appeal. The larger the absolute value of the correlation, the larger the
difference in persuasiveness between the two appeals. 
Details of our methods are available in our published work (O’Keefe
and Jensen 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009), so here I want only to specify how the
present results are related to those previously reported. The cases analyzed
here represent the cases initially analyzed by O’Keefe and Jensen (2006), with
the addition of the subsequent studies concerning disease prevention behav-
iors that were included in the analyses of O’Keefe and Jensen (2007) and the
subsequent studies concerning disease detection behaviors that were included
in the analyses of O’Keefe and Jensen (2009). 
6.4 Initial meta-analytic findings: Are loss-framed appeals generally
more persuasive?
Even though persuasion effects research has been going on for quite some
time, it’s still rare to find more than 10 or 15 studies of any given message
variable. Persuasion research, like many areas of social-scientific research,
doesn’t see replication as often as one might like. But gain-loss persuasive
message framing has attracted a lot of research attention: over 200 studies,
with over 60,000 participants.
If loss-framed appeals are generally more persuasive than gain-framed
appeals, one would expect to find, on average, a negative correlation. Based
on the effects observed for other persuasive message variations, one would
not expect to see mean correlations as large as, say, .30 (or -.30). About the
biggest mean effects one sees are in the .15 to .20 range, and most mean ef-
fects are .10 or so – not large, but dependable (see O’Keefe 1999).
For the comparison of gain-framed and loss-framed appeals, the aver-
age effect size across all studies, expressed as a correlation, is actually only .01
(mean r = .010, k = 219, N = 62,836). And, unsurprisingly, that mean effect is
not significantly different from zero (the 95% confidence interval limits are
–.006 and .027, that is, the confidence interval contains zero) – which is to
say we cannot even be confident that the actual population effect is something
other than zero. In short, there is no overall difference in persuasiveness be-
tween gain-framed and loss-framed appeals.
When statistically nonsignificant results are obtained, it is often useful
to ask whether there were enough data in hand to detect some genuine effect
if it exists. This is expressed as a matter of “statistical power,” that is, the
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chances of finding a statistically significant effect (assuming, in the present
case, that the actual [population] effect size was .10 [or –.10]). Our analysis
had excellent statistical power (.99, Hedges and Pigott 2001), which means it
is correspondingly unlikely that the population effect size is indeed that large.
So Meyerowitz and Chaiken’s initial study produced a striking exper-
imental result (loss-framed appeals more persuasive than gain-framed appeals)
and had a good explanation (negativity bias) – but that explanation turned
out to be misplaced. Loss-framed appeals are not generally more persuasive
than gain-framed appeals.
6.5 Renewing the search for negativity bias effects
The conclusion that loss-framed appeals are not generally any more persua-
sive than gain-framed appeals is, of course, a disappointing one – not least be-
cause of how Meyerowitz and Chaiken’s initial finding fitted so nicely into the
larger picture of negativity bias. So perhaps it is the case that loss-framed ap-
peals really are more persuasive than gain-framed appeals, but that somehow
that effect is being masked in these studies. After all, negativity bias is gen-
uine, a very well-evidenced psychological phenomenon. So perhaps there is
some factor at work that is preventing negativity bias from manifesting itself
in these studies.
A little reflection on the nature of gain-framed and loss-framed appeals
suggests a natural candidate for such a factor; namely, the linguistic repre-
sentation of the “kernel state” of the consequence under discussion (O’Keefe
and Jensen 2006). The kernel state is the basic, root state mentioned in the
message’s description of the consequence. A given framing form might men-
tion either desirable or undesirable kernel states. For example, a gain-framed
appeal might take the form “if you wear sunscreen, you’ll increase your
chances of having attractive skin” (where the kernel state, “attractive skin,” is
a desirable one) or the form “if you wear sunscreen, you’ll reduce your risk of
skin cancer” (where the kernel state, “skin cancer,” is an undesirable one).
Similarly, a loss-framed appeal might mention either desirable kernel states
(“If you don’t wear sunscreen, you’ll reduce your chances of having attractive
skin”) or undesirable kernel states (“If you don’t wear sunscreen, you’ll in-
crease your risk of skin cancer”).
Notice, thus, that a gain-framed appeal might be phrased entirely in
terms of undesirable kernel states (“skin cancer,” “tumors,” “premature
death,” etc.) that are avoided by compliance, and a loss-framed appeal might
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be phrased entirely in terms of desirable kernel states (“long life,” “attractive
skin,” and so forth) that are foregone by virtue of noncompliance. Plainly,
variations in kernel states might interfere with the appearance of the expected
negativity bias effects. 
To remove such interference and permit negativity bias to emerge, a
more focused comparison is required. The comparison of interest is that be-
tween a gain-framed appeal that has exclusively desirable kernel states and a
loss-framed appeal that has exclusively undesirable kernel states. Such a com-
parison pits a thoroughly “positive” message (gain-framed with desirable ker-
nel states) against a thoroughly “negative” message (loss-framed with
undesirable kernel states). If negativity bias is at work here, this comparison
should yield a substantial negative mean effect, representing the expected per-
suasive advantage for loss-framed appeals.
Twenty different studies (with 21,213 participants) have investigated
such a comparison. The average effect size across these studies is –.01 (actu-
ally, –.005, that is, an effect that is almost literally zero). This effect is not sta-
tistically significantly different from zero (the 95% confidence interval limits
are –.048 and .039; the statistical power was .99).
So not only do loss-framed appeals not enjoy any general persuasive ad-
vantage over gain-framed appeals, they are not more persuasive even under
conditions in which negativity-bias effects would be expected to be maxi-
mized. 
6.6 Changing course: Disease detection and disease prevention
Given the lack of any overall persuasive advantage for loss-framed appeals –
and given that the average difference in persuasiveness is statistically indis-
tinguishable from zero – it naturally becomes attractive to consider the pos-
sibility that gain-framed appeals are more persuasive than loss-framed appeals
under some (specifiable) circumstances, and loss-framed appeals have a per-
suasive advantage under other circumstances. (Notice that this might account
for there not being any average difference overall.)
A 1999 study by Detweiler, Bedell, Salovey, Pronin and Rothman pro-
vides a convenient illustration of a study encouraging such a line of think-
ing. Detweiler et al. (1999) found that a gain-framed appeal was significantly
more persuasive than a loss-framed appeal for encouraging people to use
sunscreen (which prevents skin cancer). This study, in conjunction with sev-
eral others, gave rise to the idea that, at least in the realm of health behavior,
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there might be a systematic difference in the relative persuasiveness of gain-
and loss-framed messages depending on whether the advocated action is a
disease prevention behavior (like sunscreen use, the one Detweiler et al. stud-
ied) or a disease detection behavior (like breast self-examination, the one
Meyerowitz and Chaiken studied). Here, for example, is a formulation of
this idea:
The literature on framing and health promotion has yielded an interesting pattern
of findings . . . Loss-framed messages have been effective in promoting mammogra-
phy, bse, and hiv testing, all early-detection behaviors. Conversely, gain-framed
messages have been effective in promoting the use of infant car restraints and sun-
screen, both prevention behaviors. (Salovey and Wegener 2003, p. 57)
So the suggestion is that for prevention behaviors, gain-framed messages will
be more persuasive, but for disease detection behaviors, loss-framed appeals
will be more persuasive. However interesting such a pattern of results might
be, the natural question that arises is why such a difference should occur – that
is, what would explain such a difference? The explanatory framework that is
commonly offered derives from Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory
(1979) – and specifically from the finding that people are more likely to un-
dertake risky behaviors when potential losses are salient but prefer risk-averse
choices when gains are prominent (the classic study is Tversky and Kahneman
1981). As Rothman and Salovey (1997, p. 3) put it:
Prospect theory proposes that people are more willing to accept risks when they
evaluate options in terms of associated costs but act to avoid risks when the same
options are described in terms of associated benefits.
In the context of health behaviors, the supposition is that disease detection be-
haviors are riskier than disease prevention behaviors, because undertaking a dis-
ease detection behavior might uncover an abnormality. Hence as applied to
gain-loss message framing, the reasoning is that the perceived riskiness of de-
tection behaviors will make loss-framed messages more persuasive, whereas pre-
vention behaviors will be more effectively promoted by gain-framed messages.
From a prospect theory point of view, the perceived risk (of finding an abnormal-
ity) could make loss-framed messages more persuasive in promoting the detection
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behaviors. However, … gain-framed messages might be more likely to facilitate per-
forming prevention behaviors. (Salovey and Wegener 2003, pp. 57-58)
This is now the overwhelmingly most common way of describing gain-loss
message framing persuasive effects: that there’s a difference between preven-
tion and detection behaviors in the relative persuasiveness of these appeal
variations, with the explanation derived from prospect-theoretic reasoning.
For example: 
A series of research studies converge on a single conclusion . . . Gain-framed mes-
sages are more effective at encouraging prevention behaviors, but loss-framed ap-
peals are more effective at fostering detection behaviors. (Dillard and Marshall
2003, p. 504)
There are a number of effects of message framing that have been consistently ob-
tained. Detection behaviors generally are better promoted by loss-framed messages,
but prevention behaviors seem better promoted by gain-framed messages. (Salovey
and Wegener 2003, p. 70)
Gain-framed messages are more effective in promoting prevention behaviors . . .
However, loss-framed messages are more effective in influencing early detection be-
haviors. (Perloff 2003, p. 196)
Research on changing general health behaviors shows that gain-framed messages are
more effective when the advocated behavior is prevention-oriented. Prevention be-
haviors are viewed as low-risk behaviors . . . Loss-framed messages, on the other
hand, appear to be more effective when the advocated behavior is detection-ori-
ented. Detection behaviors . . are perceived as high-risk. (usda 2007, p. 2)
And elements of this generalization have even entered the popular literature:
Framing matters: people are more likely to engage in self-examinations for skin and
breast cancer if they are told not about the reduced risk if they do so but about the
increased risk if they fail to do so. (Thaler and Sunstein 2009, p. 159)
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6.7 Further meta-analytic findings: Disease prevention and disease
detection
This is a terrific explanation – but is there really that difference between pre-
vention and detection behaviors with respect to the relative persuasiveness of
gain- and loss-framed appeals? There are now many more studies of prevention
and detection messages than the handful that initially encouraged this gener-
alization, so those accumulated studies can be analyzed to address this question.
Concerning disease detection behaviors: Across 55 studies (with 9,247
participants), there is no statistically significant difference in the persuasive-
ness of gain-framed and loss-framed appeals. The mean effect size is –.03 (–
.029), with 95% confidence limits of –.066 and .008 (power = .99). So
loss-framed appeals are not more persuasive than gain-framed appeals con-
cerning disease detection behaviors.
Concerning disease prevention behaviors: There is a statistically sig-
nificant difference such that gain-framed appeals are more persuasive than
loss-framed appeals – but the difference is so small as to be trivial: Across 103
studies (N = 22,652), the mean effect size is .04 (.038), with 95% confidence
interval limits of .012 and .064. Thus there is no substantively important dif-
ference in the persuasiveness of gain- and loss-framed messages concerning
disease prevention behaviors.
And, just to round out the picture, there are no significant differences
on other message topics. For other health-related behaviors (e.g., getting hear-
ing aids), the mean effect (across 13 studies with 4,702 participants) is –.02 (–
.021; 95% confidence interval limits of –.073 and .031; power = .99). For
advertising of non-health-related consumer products and services (ads for
laundry detergent, insurance, etc.), the mean effect (across 25 studies with
3,805 participants) is –.01 (–.013; 95% confidence interval limits of –.074 and
.049; power = .99). For the remaining topics (a miscellaneous set including
taxpayer compliance, recycling participation and public policy questions),
the mean effect (across 23 studies with 22,430 participants) is .03 (.029; 95%
confidence interval limits of –.021 and .079; power = .99). 
Thus not only is there no overall difference in persuasiveness between
gain-framed and loss-framed messages – even under conditions in which the
effects of negativity-bias processes should be maximized – but the studies to
date do not underwrite the suggestion that loss-framed appeals will have a
substantial advantage concerning disease detection behaviors and gain-framed
appeals a similarly large advantage concerning disease prevention behaviors.
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In short, the expected differences in persuasiveness between gain- and loss-
framed appeals do not obtain, despite the presence of attractive explanatory
frameworks (negativity bias, prospect theory) that are ready to accommodate
findings of such differences.
6.8 Larger lessons
I want to draw out three larger points here concerning how, as a research
community, we should approach the task of generalizing about persuasive ef-
fects from research evidence of this sort. These are phrased as advice to con-
sumers of this research – but of course those who produce such research
should heed these lessons as well.
First: Pay attention to the size of an effect, not just whether the effect
is statistically significant. Researchers are commonly focused on the question
of whether a given message variation makes a statistically significant difference
to persuasiveness. That’s a natural and understandable focus. After all, a sta-
tistically significant difference means that the difference is probably genuine,
that is, not zero – and knowing that an effect is not zero is valuable. But – as
illustrated by the finding concerning disease prevention behaviors – it is pos-
sible for an effect to be statistically significant and yet trivially small. That is,
there are some effects that, even though they are not actually zero, are suffi-
ciently small that they might as well be zero.
I don’t mean to say that it’s always easy to decide just how small is “so
small it might as well be zero” (see, e.g., Abelson 1985). But when a researcher
reports that (for example) the difference in persuasiveness of two messages
was statistically significant, it will be useful to ask “How big was that differ-
ence; that is, what was the size of the effect?”
Second: Don’t put too much faith in the results of any single study.
The early study by Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987) found a loss-framed ap-
peal to be more persuasive than a gain-framed appeal. And, as we have seen,
some commentators have invoked that finding as evidence for the claim that
generally loss-framed appeals are more persuasive. But there is no such gen-
eral difference between gain- and loss-framed appeals. So obviously
Meyerowitz and Chaiken’s early result was in some sense unrepresentative,
and hasty generalization from that finding was inappropriate. 
Another way of expressing this second point is: Ask for replications.
The results of any single study are all very nice, but the results of any one
study cannot speak to questions of generalization in the way that is wanted.
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Messages are like most other things: Generalizations about a category require
examining more than one instance of the category. A study that compares
one gain-framed appeal against one loss-framed appeal may yield very useful
information about the relative persuasiveness of those two particular mes-
sages, but it cannot provide good evidence for claims about any general dif-
ferences in persuasiveness between gain-framed and loss-framed messages. 
Notably, studies of the persuasive effects of message variations quite
commonly display considerable variation in effects from one study to the
next (see O’Keefe 1999). The plain implication is that the results of any one
study are not necessarily an indication of the overall pattern of results across
studies. That is to say, there is good empirical evidence that in this research
domain, the results from any single study cannot be depended on to be rep-
resentative of the picture that will emerge once a number of replications have
been performed. 
Third: Be wary of the combination of limited evidence and a good ex-
planation. That is, be especially alert when presented with the combination
of (a) a small number of statistically significant effects (or just one such effect)
and (b) a good explanatory story. 
Consider that early study by Meyerowitz and Chaiken, which found a
significant advantage for loss-framed appeals. There was a compelling expla-
nation for that result, in the form of negativity bias. This combination, I
think, encouraged people to draw those broad conclusions about the greater
persuasiveness of loss-framed messages.
Or consider the small number of studies that seemed to fit a pattern in
which loss-framed appeals were more persuasive for disease detection behav-
iors (such as breast self-examination, the behavior studied by Meyerowitz and
Chaiken), whereas gain-framed appeals were more persuasive for disease pre-
vention behaviors (such as sunscreen use). The combination of these few stud-
ies and a prospect-theory explanation is apparently almost irresistible; that’s
the story one commonly sees told nowadays about message framing effects –
even though it’s not true. So: Don’t be seduced by limited evidence, no mat-
ter how good the explanation seems to be. In fact, don’t be seduced by lim-
ited evidence especially when accompanied by a good explanation. 
I am happy to acknowledge that resisting this temptation will be dif-
ficult. Given some research finding – and especially some unusual or striking
finding – our natural inclination is to ask “what’s the explanation?” But bear
in mind the previous point: Don’t put too much faith in the results of any sin-
[  1 2 8 ]
LUP Bending Opinion Boek_Layout 2  27-01-11  14:46  Pagina 128
generalizing about the persuasive effects  of message variations
gle study. Another way of putting that might be: No single study yields some-
thing to be explained (i.e., some genuine phenomenon). With a number of
successful replications in hand, we might be confident in concluding that the
phenomenon is genuine (and so would be confident in considering possible
explanations) – but without more extensive evidence, we cannot be sure there
is anything to explain. Briefly put, the motto should be: No explanans with-
out an explanandum. When faced with a singular finding, don’t ask “What’s
the explanation?” Ask “Where are the replications?” 
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7 The Contribution of Praeteritio to
Arguers’ Strategic Maneuvering in the
Argumentation Stage of a Discussion
a.  francisca snoeck henkemans
7.1  Introduction
Deputy Prime Minister Bos was some time ago reported by the Dutch news-
paper NRC Handelsblad to have made the following announcement on televi-
sion about the possibility of a recession in the Netherlands:
As long as there are no concrete indications that we are heading for a recession, 
I shall not utter that word. (Deputy Prime Minister Bos, October 25, 2008)
For all sorts of reasons it is unlikely that this message will have reassured the
general public in the Netherlands that there was no danger of a recession in
the near future. One of them could certainly be that Minister Bos made use
of the rhetorical technique of praeteritio in the presentation of his an-
nouncement. Characteristic of praeteritio is the self-defeating character of this
figure of thought: by making use of a praeteritio, speakers announce that they
will not say something or not speak of something, which they say or mention
nonetheless.
In classical and modern rhetorical studies, praeteritio has mainly been
described as a device that can be of use in the presentation of arguments.1 In
an earlier publication, I showed that praeteritio may have a strategic function
not just in the argumentation stage, but in each of the stages of an argu-
mentative discussion as a means to further both the arguers’ dialectical and
their rhetorical aims (see Snoeck Henkemans 2009). In this chapter, I want
to look more closely at the role that has traditionally been ascribed to the sty-
1 This is, for instance, how the Ad Herennium, Usher (1965) and Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca (1969) describe this figure. 
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listic device of praeteritio. I shall do this by investigating what role praeteritio
can play in arguers’ strategic maneuvers in the presentation of their argu-
ments. I shall first give an analysis of the general effects the use of praeteritio
may have due to the presentational means that are employed. Then I shall
focus on how the device of praeteritio may contribute to arguers’ dialectical
and rhetorical aims in the presentation of their arguments. Finally, I shall pay
attention to the ways in which the use of praeteritio for presenting moves that
form part of the argumentation stage may derail and thus become fallacious.
7.2  General effects of praeteritio
According to the Ad Herennium, an important reason for using praeteritio is
to get some information or evidence across without drawing attention to the
fact that one is giving this information or presenting this evidence: 
This figure is useful if employed in a matter which it is not pertinent to call specifi-
cally to the attention of others, because there is advantage in making only an indi-
rect reference to it, or because the direct reference would be tedious or undignified,
or cannot be made clear, or can easily be refuted. As a result, it is of greater advan-
tage to create a suspicion by Paralipsis [praeteritio] than to insist directly on a state-
ment that is refutable. (iv, 27.37)
Other authors see praeteritio first and foremost as a way of emphasizing the
allegedly omitted material. Lanham, for instance, defines praeteritio as a
way of “emphasizing something by pointedly passing it over” (1991, p. 104).
And Dupriez makes a distinction between “semi-preteritions which hardly
emphasize an utterance” and “true preterition” which “is a form of pseudo-
simulation, concealing the better to display” (1991, p. 354).
I have argued that praeteritio can best be analyzed as a combination of
emphasizing and hiding (Snoeck Henkemans 2009). Instead of just keeping
silent about something or refraining from performing a particular speech act,
speakers or writers who use praeteritio explicitly deny that they are commit-
ted to a certain proposition or explicitly announce that they will not speak of
something. By denying their commitment to a proposition, the proposition
in question becomes more prominent in the consciousness of the audience.2
If a speaker explicitly announces that he will not bring up a certain subject
instead of just remaining silent about it, he thereby also draws attention to the
speech act he claims not to perform, since this explicit announcement fo-
[  1 3 4 ]
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cuses the audience’s attention on the fact that he could have brought up the
subject or that it may have been expected that he would do so. Denying a
commitment or denying that one is going to perform a certain speech act
therefore draws the attention of the audience to the information speakers or
writers claim that they will not provide or the speech act they announce that
they will not perform. If this refusal to commit oneself or to talk about some-
thing is a case of praeteritio and not just of reticence, the information is given
nonetheless, but it is generally presented in such a way that the contradiction
between what speakers claim to be doing and what they do in reality is cam-
ouflaged.3 It is in this way that praeteritio can be seen both as a form of em-
phasizing and of hiding. 
In some cases it may become more difficult to establish what the com-
mitments of speakers exactly are, as in example (1) where the arguer attempts
to cancel an implicature by means of a praeteritio. In other cases it is not so
much unclear what speakers are saying, but the use of particular techniques in
presenting the praeteritio makes it less easy to hold them accountable for what
they have said. Examples (2) to (4) seem to have this effect. In these examples,
by way of the praeteritio, a distinction is brought about between what is said
“on record” and what is said “off the record”. In this way, speakers can avoid
responsibilities that they would have had if they had not used the praeteritio. 
(1) I am not anti-Obama. I am pro-America. And I am not saying being 
pro-Obama is anti-American. 
(www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=viewa&address=132)
(2) Dan: Saw “the Big Bite” sketch show on tv last night. How lame. 
How Unoriginal. 
Joe M.: uh, Dan, it would be too easy to say “You do better” but a few people 
around here make their living from helping comedians get their stuff to air. 
2 As Clark (1975) observes with respect to Richard Nixon’s famous “I am not a crook”-
statement, denials presuppose that the audience does or could believe what is being denied.
A similar analysis is given by Ducrot (1984, pp. 216-217), who claims that sentences con-
taining a (polemic) negation entail a dialogue with a (silent) second “voice” that maintains
the opposite viewpoint. 
3 For a more detailed explanation of the types of presentation techniques that can be em-
ployed to mask the contradiction inherent in praeteritio, see Snoeck Henkemans (2009). 
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I’d rather watch and support a local comedy for local people than any 
imported reality series.
(www.phorums.com.au/archive/index.php/t-33805.html - 12k)
(3) You’re a smart person, so I don’t have to tell you that the Internet is making a 
lot of people rich, you already know that. 
(www.makemoneyonline-now.com - 28k)
(4) If I didn’t like you so much, I would say that I find your story crap.
(www.dichttalent.nl/?nav=orthKsHrGmKhLkBgE&gedsel=hgkruBsHrGmKhL
AssxsUDKLuwB) [Author’s own transl.]
7.3  The contribution of praeteritio to strategic maneuvers in the ar-
gumentation stage
In order to determine in what way using praeteritio could contribute to ar-
guers’ strategic maneuvers in presenting their arguments, the question has to
be answered why it would be to the advantage of arguers not to officially as-
sert the content of their arguments but to make sure that these arguments are
noticed by the audience nonetheless. 
According to Van Eemeren and Houtlosser, the arguers’ rhetorical
objective in advancing their argumentation is to make the strongest case
(2002, p. 139). In order to achieve this aim, arguers may formulate their ar-
guments in such a way that they are less likely to raise particular criticisms,
that they seem as strong as possible or are most likely to appeal to their au-
dience. It is in all these respects, I think, that making use of praeteritio can
help to make a strong case and thus make the argumentation potentially
more effective.
That praeteritio may be a means of making an argument more difficult
to criticize was already pointed out in the Ad Herennium, where this device
is seen as a means for presenting weak evidence.4 Usher (1965) takes this analy-
sis as a starting point and claims that the device of praeteritio can be used “as
4 According to Lausberg (1998, p. 393), the announcement of the intention to leave out cer-
tain things implies the mentioning of those things, but “what is being dispensed with is the
specification of these things.” Lausberg mentions as an important motive for the use of
praeteritio “that the things left out are unfavorable to one’s cause […], the effect on the au-
dience is such that the things retreat to a secondary, less important level”.
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a medium for presenting evidence in such a way that it may be accepted by
the audience in spite of its doubtful veracity or value.” (1965, p. 175). He gives
the following description of how praeteritio might work:
Occultatio [praeteritio] is thus used to present material which would, if critically ex-
amined by an alert jury, be found false or refutable. It enables a statement to be
made and mentally noted by the jury in the speaker’s favour; but because he seems
to regard it as unnecessary for his argument or irrelevant, they do not examine it
too closely. By this means, weak arguments and false evidence could be introduced
with confidence under the pretence of omitting them. (ibid. p. 176)
In a similar vein, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, p. 487) emphasize
that praeteritio may be a useful technique for arguers who are afraid to use a
certain argument, albeit that these authors do not mention the weakness of
the argument as a reason for this fear, but its inappropriateness or illegiti-
macy:
The specific remedy open to a speaker who is afraid to use a particular argument is
to hint at it. Too explicit use of some arguments is contrary to good taste, danger-
ous or even prohibited. There are arguments that can be referred to only by insinu-
ation or allusion, or by a threat to use them. (ibid. p. 487)
Praeteritio is seen by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca as a type of “semi-re-
nunciation” or “pretended sacrifice” of an argument (ibid. p. 487). 
In addition to the advantage of being able to put forward an argument
in an unobtrusive way, thereby avoiding the negative consequences that pre-
senting the argument in a more open and direct manner might have, the use
of praeteritio may also have a positive effect on other arguments an arguer has
advanced. According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, “the sacrifice of the
argument satisfies the proprieties, while it suggests also that the other argu-
ments are sufficiently strong to make this one unnecessary” (ibid. p. 487).
In the classical and modern rhetorical literature the main advantage
mentioned is thus the possibility of putting forward weak or otherwise prob-
lematic arguments without having to take the consequences. In view of the
additional effect mentioned by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca of reinforc-
ing the other arguments the arguer has advanced, I think that presenting a
strong and acceptable argument by means of a praeteritio could also be to the
[  1 3 7 ]
LUP Bending Opinion Boek_Layout 2  27-01-11  14:46  Pagina 137
snoeck henkemans
advantage of the arguer. If the arguer can supposedly do without a strong,
maybe even the strongest argument, this may make the rest of the argumen-
tation seem even stronger. Praeteritio can then, in other words, also be in-
strumental in presenting the arguments in such a way that they seem as strong
as possible. 
In example (5) the arguer seems to use the praeteritio for exactly this
purpose. The standpoint that the arguer’s family does not give her Christmas
gifts that are personal or appropriate is first defended by a number of exam-
ples of ill-chosen bath products: 
(5) Despite my best attempts to familiarize my family with me, their gifts 
always seem to be the results of a last-minute dash to Walmart where the first 
thing falling under the theme ‘girl, age 10-76’ was purchased and labeled with
my name […] So, I get crap for Christmas. […] Mostly I receive junk I’m 
pretty sure comes form the dusty shelves of the dollar store. And sometimes a 
capful of the dollar store junk is missing because someone in the family has 
bought it, ran a bath for themselves, discovered that it smells suspiciously like 
burnt hair, and pawned the remains on me. […] The very family who osten-
sibly know me to be the most sensitive-skinned person in the world, and yet 
gift me with cheap-ass bubble bath because nothing says I love you like a 
bottle of crap so drying that my skin will flake off and I will be unable to self-
lubricate for weeks on end! Oh the joy! And I won’t even mention the fact that
I don’t have a bathtub. 
(saintvodkaofthemartini.blogspot.com/2006/12/im-getting-crap-for-hristmas.html)
The final argument that is introduced by means of a praeteritio makes the
unsuitability of the gifts even more apparent: the receiver of the inappropri-
ate bath products does not even have a bathtub. By presenting this very strong
example of the inappropriateness of the gifts her family buys for her as if it is
not necessary to mention it, the impression is given that the other arguments
that have been advanced are more than strong enough. 
Unlike in example (5), in example (6) the argument that the arguer
supposedly does not mention is not a very strong argument, since the fact
that one did not get a job at a certain magazine does in itself not say anything
about the quality of the magazine. This might thus be an example of the ar-
guer using a praeteritio in order to advance an argument that is too weak to
withstand criticism and that is therefore best presented off the record. I think,
[  1 3 8 ]
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however, that in this case the argument is so weak, that we should probably
take it as a form of irony: the reader is supposed to understand that the rea-
son that the arguer pretends not to mention is in fact the main reason (or
motive) for her not to buy the magazine People, and that the arguments pre-
sented before are just arguments from convenience:
(6) I never buy People. I never even leaf through it at the doctor’s office; I’d rather
read a four-month-old issue of Parenting. Even an unapologetic pop-cultivore
like me has to draw the line somewhere, and I like a trashy celebrity exposé as
much as the next girl, but People’s so-called exposés never really expose any-
thing, except, of course, for the peppy unctuousness and terminal lack of
writing flair of the staff. I won’t even mention the fact that I auditioned for a job
there and got turned down.
(tomatonation.com/?p=392 - 16k -) 
In example (7) a member of the organization Tusiad (Turkish Industrialists’
and Businessmen’s Association) is defending the standpoint that there is no
need to criticize the Report made by the European commission in which an
assessment is made of Turkey’s progress in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria.
There is no need to dwell on the mistakes of the report, because, according
to the arguer, the audience already knows that the assessment made in the re-
port is irrelevant for the judgment of whether Turkey should be admitted to
the screening process for potential eu members. Also, the author claims, his
audience already knows or recognizes that for most of the lack of progress it
is the eu that is to blame. And finally, the author believes that there are more
important things to do than advance criticisms against a report made by peo-
ple who are against Turkey becoming a member of the eu:
(7) I am sure that in Ankara you will hear aplenty about what the Report got 
wrong both on technical grounds and in its approach. I will not dwell in these. 
For you already know that the Copenhagen criteria do not constitute a 
precondition for the screening process to begin. You already recognize that the 
eu is at fault in terms of the assistance it provides to Turkey. You know that in 
the negotiations over the inclusion of services in the Customs Union, it is 
Brussels and not Ankara that drags its feet. It is on your records that Turkey has 
not received the financial assistance that was promised to her under the 
Customs Union agreement and is not getting its fair share for the efforts it is 
[  1 3 9 ]
LUP Bending Opinion Boek_Layout 2  27-01-11  14:46  Pagina 139
snoeck henkemans
currently undertaking. And only part of the reason for this lag is attributable 
to Ankara’s lethargy. I will not dwell on these matters for I believe we must rise 
above the trees and look at the whole forest that constitutes Turkey-eu
relations. For us membership in the eu is the culmination of the civiliza-
tional project first undertaken over two hundred years ago. A process that was 
given a radical boost by the founding fathers of our Republic. We will not be 
deterred or sidetracked in this goal either by the enemies of the eu in this 
country or the Turcophobes in Europe. 
(www.tusiad.org/.../d00127d66ca9c239c225679f00276512/ffafcf97cfce9408c22
56b100043d6a9 /$FILE/duyuruno52.pdf)
By using the device of praeteritio several times in the presentation of his ar-
guments, the speaker attempts to give the impression that his case in favor of
Turkey joining the eu is stronger than that of those opposing Turkey’s eu
membership, and also that he is morally superior to others who find it nec-
essary to criticize the eu report. Of course, he manages to get his criticisms
across all the same. The flaws signaled in the report are irrelevant, or cannot
be blamed on Turkey. That the criticisms in the report are irrelevant or un-
justified, is presented by the arguer as a common starting point about which
no further discussion is possible or necessary. The repeated use of praeteritio
thus allows the arguer to present the arguments for his standpoint that the re-
port is not worth criticizing as indisputable and at the same time strengthen
his own ethos by giving the impression that he is a morally high standing
person who is above the petty squabbles. In this way, he can attempt to make
a favorable impression on the audience. 
7.4 Conclusion
As we have seen, using praeteritio when putting forward arguments in de-
fense of a standpoint can contribute to the arguers’ rhetorical aim of mak-
ing their case seem as strong as possible. When the argument is weak,
presenting it by means of a praeteritio can be a way of protecting oneself
against criticism, since it then becomes more difficult for an opponent to
hold the arguer accountable for any flaws in the argument. If the argument
is strong, the pretended sacrifice of the argument may make the remaining
arguments seem even stronger. Apart from this effect, especially if the sac-
rifice supposedly concerns refraining from being critical about someone
else’s position, the arguer may give the impression of being benevolent or
[  1 4 0 ]
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morally superior to his opponent. At the same time, the praeteritio allows
him to let his criticisms of the other party reach the audience. And finally,
as we have seen in example (7), where the praeteritio was justified by refer-
ring to the superfluity of mentioning the criticisms, this device may make
it possible for an arguer to present those criticisms as if they already belong
to the common ground. 
Making use of a praeteritio does not necessarily result in a fallacy. There
is nothing fallacious about example (5) for instance, and example (7) would
be an evasion of the burden of proof only if what is presented as a common
starting point by means of the praeteritio was in fact not an agreed upon start-
ing point. Although making use of a praeteritio does not by definition result
in a fallacy, there is a real possibility that strategic maneuvers involving prae-
teritios may derail. In the argumentation stage, the use of praeteritio can typ-
ically result in evasions of the burden of proof, since this figure makes it
possible for arguers to present their arguments in such a way that they are
able to avoid the responsibilities that they would otherwise have taken upon
themselves. 
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8 Limits and Effects of Reductio ad
Absurdum Argumentation
henrike jansen,  marianne dingemanse
and ingrid persoon
8.1  Introduction1
A few years ago the documentary First Kill was reviewed in the NRC Handels-
blad, a Dutch newspaper. According to the reviewer, the documentary, pre-
senting soldiers in wartime, supported the view that people actually like
killing. The reviewer opposed this view. He wrote: “Everyone knows instinc-
tively that the claim that people – men in particular – like killing, as they can
do unpunished in wartime, is not true. If it were true, most of us would be
serial killers.” What strikes one in this argument is that the standpoint is sup-
ported by an If…then sentence: If people liked killing [If it were true], [then]
most of us would be serial killers. This is striking because, in argumentation text
books, an If…then sentence is most often the implicit element of an argu-
ment; after all, an If…then sentence expresses the inference license between
the argumentation (the premise) and the standpoint (the conclusion). The el-
ement that has remained implicit in the reviewer’s argument is not an If…then
sentence, but has to be reconstructed as: Most of us are not serial killers. A
pragma-dialectical analysis of the argument reads as follows:
1. Standpoint: The claim that people like killing is not true.
1.1 Explicit premise: If people liked killing [‘If it were true’], [then] most of us 
would be serial killers.
1.1’ Implicit premise: Most people are not serial killers.
[  1 4 3 ]
1 This chapter is an adapted version of: Jansen, H., M. Dingemanse and I. Persoon (2009).
Raadsels voor de argumentatietheorie. Het belang van de volgorde in de presentatie van en-
kelvoude argumentatie. In: W. Spooren, M. Onrust and J. Sanders (Eds.), Studies in Taalbe-
heersing 3 (pp. 163-174). Assen: Van Gorcum. We thank Ton van Haaften for his lucid
comments.
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It should also be noted that the If…then sentence in this example is for-
mulated in the subjunctive mood. Argumentation with an explicit If…then
sentence in the subjunctive mood has the structure of reductio ad absurdum
argumentation.2 Jansen (2007) has argued that reductio ad absurdum argu-
mentation cannot be characterized on the basis of the inference license’s
specific pragmatic content (e.g., causality, analogy, sign – the pragma-
dialectical threefold), but has to be regarded as an argument’s presentation
mode. Arguments can also be presented in another mode, such as the one
discussed earlier, in which the If…then sentence is an implicit premise
(and is reconstructed in the indicative mood). Such an argument reads as
follows:
1. Standpoint: The claim that people like killing is not true.
1.1 Explicit premise: Most people are not serial killers.
1.1’ Implicit premise: If most people are not serial killers, then it is not true 
that people like killing.
We will call this latter presentation mode ‘standard presentation’, which is
merely meant to indicate that this is the usual way in which argumentation
is presented in text books.
Of course, other presentation modes exist, but in this chapter we con-
centrate on the two modes discussed above.3 In particular we will discuss the
problem that argumentation that appears causal in the presentation mode of
reductio ad absurdum, appears symptomatic in the standard presentation (see
also Jansen 2008, pp. 50-51). Consider the previous example:
Reductio ad absurdum presentation:
1. The claim that people like killing is not true.
2 Jansen’s collection of reductio ad absurdum arguments shows that when such an argument
contains a descriptive/factual standpoint (as all the examples presented in this chapter do)
it always has an If…then sentence with a subjunctive mood. Reductio ad absurdum argu-
ments with normative standpoints can also have an If…then sentence with an indicative
mood (van Wijk, 2008).
3 Another way of presenting, for example, is leaving the standpoint implicit. Arguments
can also be presented with various stylistic particulars, such as a reversed order of an-
tecedent and consequent or a contraction of the antecedent by ‘then’ or ‘otherwise’. 
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1.1 If people liked killing, then, as a causal consequence, most of us would be 
serial killers.
1.1’ Most people are not serial killers.
Standard presentation:
1. The claim that people like killing is not true.
1.1 Most people are not serial killers.
1.1’ If most people are not serial killers, then this indicates that it is not true that 
people like killing.
The central question of this chapter is: Why does the argumentation scheme
of an argument seem to change when the argument’s presentation mode is re-
placed by another mode? That is, how can it be possible that the argumenta-
tion scheme which an argument is based on is perceived differently when
another presentation mode is used? With “perception of an argumentation
scheme” we mean the impression that the argument conveys at first sight. We
do not mean the qualifying of a scheme after careful analysis. To provide an an-
swer to our question, we will first take a closer look at how the argumentation
schemes of the causal and symptomatic types are described in pragma-dialec-
tics, which is our theoretical framework. Next, we will try to explain why the
type of argumentation scheme seems to change when a change in the presen-
tation mode of an argument is made. Then we will examine the implications
of our explanation and illustrate how this explanation is also applicable to other
phenomena connected with the altering of an argument’s presentation mode.
8.2  Causal vs. symptomatic argumentation
8.2.1 Pragma-dialectical definitions
Van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans (2002, pp. 96 ff.) and
Van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans (2007) define argumen-
tation which is based on a symptomatic relationship as argumentation that
expresses a sign, a symptom or a distinguishing mark of what is claimed in the
standpoint. An example is (Van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henke-
mans 2007, p. 154): 
Bill must be an only child, because he is egocentric. (And egocentrism is character-
istic of people who are an only child.)
[  1 4 5 ]
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A ‘reversed’ variant of symptomatic argumentation also exists, in which the
standpoint expresses a sign of what is stated in the argument:
Bill is very egocentric, because he is an only child.
It is the first variant, in which the argumentation expresses a sign of the
standpoint that is regarded as the prototypical format of symptomatic ar-
gumentation.
In causal argumentation, a cause (means, instrument, etc.) is expressed
as a reason based on which an effect is concluded in the standpoint. The
standpoint is made acceptable by presenting the cause as a self-evident fact
and the effect as inevitable (Garssen 1997, p. 19). An example is (Van
Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans 2002, p. 100):
Lydia must have weak eyes, because she is always reading in poor light. (And read-
ing in poor light gives you weak eyes.)
Reading in poor light is the cause based on which a conclusion is made as to
the effect of weak eyes. There is also a reversed, abductive, variant of causal
argumentation, in which the standpoint expresses the cause and the argu-
mentation the effect (ibid. p. 101):
Lydia must have read a lot in poor light, because she has weak eyes.
In neither Van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans (2002) nor
Van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans (2007) do we find any dis-
cussion about prototypical or non-prototypical variants of causal argumenta-
tion. Nevertheless, following the distinction that we have made with regard to
symptomatic argumentation, we will consider causal argumentation in which
the argumentation expresses the cause and the standpoint the effect, as the pro-
totypical variant. The reversed variant we will call the non-prototypical one.
To sum up, in the pragma-dialectical theory, the causal and the symp-
tomatic argumentation schemes are distinguished by their content. In a causal
argumentation scheme a cause-effect connection between the argumentation
and the standpoint is expressed. An arguer who makes such a connection in
his argument suggests inevitability; namely that, in the event of the cause,
the effect will automatically happen. In a symptomatic argumentation
[  1 4 6 ]
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scheme, a connection of sign between the argumentation and the standpoint
is expressed. In an argument such as this, an arguer suggests that if the sign
is true, then the standpoint is true as well. 
8.2.2 A difficult distinction 
In the argumentation “Lydia must have weak eyes, because she is always read-
ing in poor light” a causal connection is made between reading in poor light
and eyes becoming weak. On the basis of this connection, the effect of weak
eyes can be deduced from the cause, reading in poor light. But where does this
causal relationship actually come from? After all, a causal relationship is not
perceptible in itself. When we see that it is raining (cause) and we notice that
the streets get wet (effect), we only see that one event or state of affairs is fol-
lowed by another. The two events are perceived separately and the causal re-
lationship between them is precisely that which is not visible. Apart from the
fact that it is not visible, it is not a necessary relationship either, because it can
easily be conceived that an event or state of affairs may be followed by an
event other than expected. If it is raining the streets may very well stay dry,
for instance if the rain is blocked by a shop’s awning. Establishing a causal re-
lationship is, therefore, not a matter of the senses. Language users merely pos-
sess inductively gathered knowledge that says that the one event is most often
followed by the other event. On the basis of such knowledge it is expected
that when one thing happens, another will happen too. 
If causal relations are described as a regular correspondence between the
occurrence of a cause and the occurrence of an effect, they resemble sympto-
matic relations. That is, the two events co-occur and belong together and,
therefore, the occurrence of the one event can be regarded as a sign of the
other, and vice versa. Rain often goes with wet streets and reading in poor
light with weak eyes. In other words, it is a symptom of rain that it makes
streets wet and it is a symptom of reading in poor light that it makes one’s eyes
weak. So, if there is a causal connection there is also a symptomatic connec-
tion, because of the regular co-occurrence of the two events. 
Not only do causal relationships possess symptomatic characteristics
but, turning it around, you can also say that (at least some) symptomatic re-
lationships possess some kind of causality. Take Van Eemeren, Houtlosser and
Snoeck Henkeman’s (2007) example that Bill is very egocentric, because he is
an only child. In the argument it is stated that Bill belongs to a class of peo-
ple who are only children and will, therefore, possess the characteristic of ego-
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centrism. Why do we think that egocentrism is symptomatic of people who
are only children? We do so because they do not have to share their toys with
siblings and get all of their parent’s attention, etc. Simply because there is a
causal relationship between being an only child and having an egocentric char-
acter, egocentrism can be regarded as symptomatic of only children. 
Having a closer look at the Bill example may cause severe doubt as to
whether the relationship between standpoint and argumentation is of a symp-
tomatic nature at all. However, we are not interested in deciding which ar-
gumentation scheme underlies an argument in essence. We are concerned
with the affinity between causal and symptomatic argumentation schemes
and with the fact that it appears to depend on an argument’s presentation as
to which scheme is prominent. We will argue that it is probably the argu-
ment’s presentation mode that puts one scheme or the other to the fore and
thereby influences the listener/reader’s perception of it.
8.3 The order of elements in the argument structure
8.3.1 Does the argument structure reflect the order of events in reality?
In the introduction two presentation modes were distinguished: the standard
presentation and the presentation mode of a reductio ad absurdum argument.
An important difference between these two modes is that they present the
order of events which are expressed in an argument – the order of cause and
effect, or of the symptom and what it is a symptom of – in a different way.
As a result, from the perspective of information structuring, the inference li-
censes expressed in both modes are opposite to each other. This is due to the
fact that, from a logical point of view, both presentation modes are each
other’s counterpart. If the inference license in the standard presentation mode
reads If X, then Y, it reads If –Y, then –X in the reductio ad absurdum presen-
tation mode. In our view, this is the reason why an argumentation scheme is
perceived differently in another presentation mode. (It is true that the issue
of whether the inference license contains negations or not may play a part as
well, but that is subject to further research.) 
Pander Maat and Degand (2001) concentrate on the order of the in-
formation in an inference. In causal argumentation, the order can either lit-
erally reflect the causal order in reality, or it can present it in a reversed way.
The argument below (Pander Maat and Degand 2001, p. 222) describes
causality in reality:
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It has rained continuously for two days. The tennis court will probably be unplayable. 
The inference license of the argument reads: “If it has rained continuously for
two days, the tennis court will probably be unplayable”; in other words: If
[cause], then [effect]. Pander Maat and Degand consider this a “causality based
epistemic relation” (an epistemic relation is, for example, the connection be-
tween argumentation and standpoint, as it is here). Because the causal order
in the inference license (which they call “assumption”) corresponds to the
cause>effect order in reality, causality plays a role both in the ‘real-world’ do-
main and in the argumentative domain: “Causality-based inferences simply
transpose a real world link into the inferential domain” (ibid. p. 224). 
Pander Maat and Degand also distinguish “noncausal epistemic rela-
tions”. In such relations, real-world causality is opposite to the causality as it
is expressed in the inference license (as in an abductive argument) or is irrel-
evant (as in an argument based on a comparison): 
the assumption behind abductive and other types of noncausal inference i[s] no
longer modeled on real-world causal links, although it may sometimes be based on
real-world regularities. (ibid. p. 224)
In an abductive argument, a cause is deduced from an effect. The inference
license that underlies such an argument reads If effect, then cause. Such an in-
ference is ‘non-iconic’; that is, it does not reflect the real-world causal pattern
and, therefore, only exists through the speaker’s mental activity. From this
Pander Maat and Degand (ibid.) conclude that noncausal inferences exhibit
a larger degree of speaker involvement than causality-based epistemic rela-
tions. Since our perspective is directed by a listener/reader’s perception of an
argument, we want to add that noncausal inferences require a larger degree
of listener involvement as well. After all, the listener has to identify the un-
derlying real-world causality herself. (This is something that Pander Maat
and Degand do not say explicitly, but they may nevertheless have had this in
mind as well.)
What does the foregoing imply for the If…then sentence in both the
standard presentation mode and the reductio ad absurdum mode? It implies
that if the If X, then Y sentence reflects real-world causality, the If –Y, then –
X sentence gives an abductive representation of causality, and vice versa. The
reductio ad absurdum presentation of our example about serial killers in the
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introduction contains an If…then sentence that reflects real-world causality:
liking killing causes killing. Therefore the argument is perceived as a causal
one. The reformulated argument as an argument in the standard presentation
contains an abductive inference license: being a serial killer is symptomatic of
liking killing. In a presentation such as this there is no prominent causal re-
lationship which immediately strikes the eye and the argument is perceived
as a symptomatic one instead. But this may not be the whole story. In the next
section we will discuss in more detail the influence that the order of infor-
mation in an argument has.
8.3.2 A further examination of argument structure 
In this section we demonstrate what the other consequences of altering the
order of information presented in the antecedent and consequent of an in-
ference license are. We do so by systematically reformulating instances of an
argument expressed in the standard presentation mode as an argument in the
reductio ad absurdum mode. (The preceding sections reflect the research out-
come of working in the other direction, which was reformulating instances
of arguments presented in the reductio ad absurdum mode as arguments in the
standard presentation.) The following consequences were found: In some
cases there was an altered argumentation scheme as well, but in others the ar-
gumentation became nonsensical. Our findings are presented below.
Causal argumentation
Causal argumentation in the standard presentation mode, with a standpoint
in which the effect is expressed and an argumentation in which the cause is
expressed, cannot be reformulated as reductio ad absurdum argumentation.
This will be shown on the basis of the following example. The first item pres-
ents the argument in the standard presentation mode; the second (with an
apostrophe) contains the reductio ad absurdum version:
(1) Eric will probably be fired, because he has been too late several times. 
(Garssen 1997, p. 209 [Our translation])
(1’) # Eric will probably be fired, because if he were not fired, he would not 
have been too late several times.
The argument in the reductio ad absurdum presentation is confusing, because
it is hard to work out the line of its reasoning. It seems to suggest that Eric
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has been too late deliberately, because he already knew that he was going to
be fired, which does not make sense. The same effect is created by rewriting
argument (2):
(2) I assume that Bert will not be fully compensated, because he was 
underinsured. (Garssen 1997, p. 172 [Our translation])
(2’) # I assume that Bert will not be fully compensated, because if he were fully 
compensated, he would not have been underinsured.
When presented as a reductio ad absurdum, the argument seems to suggest
that Bert was underinsured on purpose, because he would not get full com-
pensation anyway. The line of reasoning in the original presentation is, as it
were, reversed in the reductio ad absurdum presentation mode, and this makes
the argument nonsensical. 
In our view, the reformulation problems discussed above are caused by
the fact that the order of antecedent and consequent in the inference license of
the standard presentation is opposite to the order in the reductio ad absurdum
presentation. The order changes from real-world causality in the standard pres-
entation to an abductive order in the reductio ad absurdum presentation mode.
An abductive order does not seem natural in an If…then sentence; this may be
because a sentence such as this suggests a causal order. The word ‘antecedent’
indicates that it presents the preceding element, whereas the word ‘consequent’
indicates that it presents the event that follows from the event which is pre-
sented in the antecedent: first the cause, then the effect. In the examples (1’) and
(2’) the order is from effect to cause, which obviously clashes with the sug-
gested order of the If…then formulation. However, this cannot be the entire ex-
planation; the subjunctive mood also has something to do with it. After all, an
indicative If…then sentence can indeed contain an abductive order, as is shown
by “If the tennis court is unusable, it must have rained for two days”. Nonethe-
less, since a modal element had to be added to this sentence (must have), it
demonstrates that a causal order is preferable in such an If…then sentence.
Why an abductive order is not only not favored but even impossible in a sub-
junctive If…then sentence, we have not examined yet.
To sum up, we conclude that the order of the elements in the inference
license explains the nonsensicality of causal arguments that are reformulated
as reductio ad absurdum arguments. An objection to this view could be that
both examples (1’) and (2’) contain a prediction, and that this property might
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explain the observed phenomenon. However, the following example demon-
strates that the problem of nonsensicality also arises when we reformulate an
argument from a standpoint in which something is assumed. Such an argu-
ment can be nonsensical in the reductio ad absurdum presentation as well:
(3) Lydia must have weak eyes, because she is always reading in poor light. 
(Van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans 2002, p. 100)
(3’) # Lydia must have weak eyes, because if she did not have weak eyes, she 
would not always be reading in poor light. 
The words “must have” indicate an assumption. The speaker assumes some-
thing about the present, namely that Lydia has weak eyes. In (3) it is argued
that the cause “reading in poor light” entails the effect “weak eyes”, but in (3’)
it seems as if Lydia is always reading in poor light for the simple reason that
she has bad eyes. 
It is also not true that standpoints in which an assumption is expressed
cause the problem of nonsensicality. Other arguments with similar stand-
points can yield an entirely normal argument in a reductio ad absurdum pres-
entation, as is shown in example (4’):
(4) I assume that Frank has been ill, because he has lost weight substantially. 
(Garssen 1997, p. 209 [Our translation]) 
(4’) I assume that Frank has been ill, because if he had not been ill, he would 
not have lost weight substantially.
This argument is completely acceptable in the reductio ad absurdum presen-
tation. It perfectly fits in the following conversation:
A: I assume that Frank has been ill.
B: Why do you think that?
A: Well, otherwise he would not have lost weight so considerably. 
We conclude that it is not the type of standpoint that explains the problem of
nonsensicality, but the order of information which is presented in the an-
tecedent and consequent of an If…then sentence. Example (4) represents the
‘reversed’ variant of causal argumentation described in section 2.1, which is the
non-prototypical variant of causal argumentation. This variant has an abduc-
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tive structure: its line of reasoning goes from an observed effect, expressed in
the argumentation, to a deduced cause, expressed in the standpoint. As we dis-
cussed in 3.1, the inference license of an abductive argument formulated in the
standard presentation does not reflect real-world causality. However, if such an
argument is reformulated as a reductio ad absurdum argument, the inference li-
cense takes on the cause>effect order, and thus expresses causality very clearly.
After all, the If [effect: losing weight], then [cause: being ill] sentence in the ar-
gument presented in the standard way, changes into an If [non-cause: not being
ill], then [non-effect: not losing weight] sentence in the reductio ad absurdum
presentation. Therefore the reformulation of example (4) as (4’) sounds com-
pletely normal. The same can be shown by reformulating the prototypical
causal argument in (3) as an abductive (non-prototypical causal) argument in
(3a) (by changing the premise and the standpoint). The reductio ad absurdum
presentation of this argument also sounds perfectly normal:
(3a) Lydia must have read a lot with poor light, because she has weak eyes.
(3a’) Lydia must have read a lot with poor light, because if she had not read a lot
with poor light, she would not have weak eyes. 
Since the If…then sentence of the reductio ad absurdum presentation in (3a’)
represents real-world order causality (not reading in poor light prevents one
from getting weak eyes), it is a perfectly sensible argument. 
The issue of the order of information presented in the inference license
of an argument explains why causal argumentation with a standpoint con-
taining a prediction becomes nonsensical when it is presented as a reductio ad
absurdum argument. In a causal argument with a standpoint containing a
prediction, the standpoint always expresses the effect and the argumentation
the cause. “Eric will probably be fired” is an effect that is predicted on the
basis of the cause of having been too late several times. In a reductio ad ab-
surdum the effect is repeated in the antecedent of the If…then sentence. Al-
though it is true that the effect is put in the negative in the antecedent – “Eric
will probably be fired” is repeated in the antecedent as “If Eric were not fired”
– that is not relevant to the claim that we want to make. That is, if the effect
that is expressed in the standpoint is repeated in the antecedent of the infer-
ence license, the If…then sentence takes on an effect>cause structure. As we
have shown in this section, such a structure makes a reductio ad absurdum ar-
gument nonsensical. 
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Symptomatic argumentation
With regard to one of the subtypes of symptomatic argumentation, i.e. ar-
gumentation that is based on a definition, there is no problem in reformu-
lating it as a reductio ad absurdum argument. Consider example (5’):
(5) Chickens are not birds, because they don’t fly south in winter.
(5’) Chickens are not birds, because if they were birds, they would fly south in 
winter. (Example based on Fogelin and Sinnott-Armstrong 1991, p. 132)
Taking into account the explanation of the reformulation problems argued for
in the preceding section, it is not very surprising that (5’) is not problematic.
In argumentation that is based on a definition, the time aspect that is needed
for the suggestion of causality, however little it may be, is absent. As a con-
sequence, a reformulation of the argument does not yield a reversed tempo-
ral order that clashes with the suggested If [cause: earlier event], then [effect:
later event] order in a reductio ad absurdum argument.
Reformulation of common symptomatic argumentation, based on a
sign, is also unproblematic. Illustrative is (6’):
(6) Carla likes traveling, because she is a travel guide. (Garssen 1997, p. 206
[Our translation])
(6’) Carla likes traveling, because if she did not like traveling, she would not be 
a travel guide. 
However, example (7’) proves to be problematic:
(7) Our car is really solid, because it is French-made. (Garssen 1997, p. 206
[Our translation])
(7’) # Our car is really solid, because if it were not, it would not be French-
made.
(7’) poses a problem because the characteristic of solidness now seems to imply
the brand, instead of the other way around, as is meant in the argument. This
problem can again be explained on the basis of the issue of the order of in-
formation presented in the If…then sentence. In the symptomatic argumen-
tation in (7) an underlying causality can be observed: a French make brings
about solid cars. If symptomatic argumentation with underlying causality has
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a standpoint in which the effect is expressed, it conveys the structure of causal
argumentation which has a standpoint in which the effect is expressed and an
argument in which the cause is expressed (prototypical causal argumentation).
Therefore, this kind of symptomatic argumentation becomes nonsensical in
the reductio ad absurdum presentation mode, in the same way as prototypical
causal argumentation does. After all, in such an argument the standpoint ex-
presses the later event and the argumentation the earlier event, and this pro-
vides the If…then sentence of the reductio ad absurdum argument with a ‘later
event>earlier event’ structure (because the antecedent repeats the standpoint). 
On closer inspection causality underlies example (6) as well, as we can
see by making a reversed version of it. If we do this, the abductive structure
(effect>cause) of the original argument’s If…then sentence will be changed
into a causal structure (cause>effect) in the new argument’s If…then sentence.
The original argument runs: “Carla likes traveling, because she is a travel
guide”, which makes the inference license: Being a travel guide points to lik-
ing traveling. The reformulated reversed argument runs the other way around:
“Carla must be a travel guide, because she likes traveling”, which transforms
the inference license into a causal structure: Liking to travel causes a desire to
become a travel guide. The argument now behaves as a prototypical causal ar-
gument, which means a reductio ad absurdum presentation of the argument
is problematic:
(6a) Carla must be a travel guide, because she likes traveling.
(6a’) # Carla must be a travel guide, because if she were not, she would not like 
traveling.
Now the reductio ad absurdum argument suggests that Carla likes traveling be-
cause she is a travel guide, which is opposite to what is meant in the original
argument (that Carla is a travel guide because of her liking of traveling). This
can be explained by the fact that a symptomatic argument with an underly-
ing causality and a standpoint in which the later event – the effect – is ex-
pressed, has the structure of a prototypical causal argument. Both cannot be
presented as reductio ad absurdum arguments.4
4 Jansen (2007b) discusses the role of the order with regard to symptomatic argumentation
that is based on a counterexample. 
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8.4 Conclusion
We have argued that the order of the elements in the inference license (the –
implicit or explicit – If…then sentence) of an argument influences (1) the
perception of the argumentation scheme that is expressed in an argument
and (2) whether or not it is possible to present such an argument in the pres-
entation mode of reductio ad absurdum. The two presentation modes dis-
cussed in this chapter, the standard presentation and the presentation as a
reductio ad absurdum argument, contain inference licenses that are each other’s
counterpart. An If X, then Y inference license in an argument in a standard
presentation mode, takes on an If –Y, then –X structure when the argument
is reformulated as a reductio ad absurdum argument. 
The difference with regard to the order of events expressed in the
If…then sentence explains the phenomenon that a reductio ad absurdum ar-
gument which looks causal, seems to be symptomatic when it is reformu-
lated as an argument with a standard presentation. Causal reductio ad
absurdum arguments have an inference license that reads: If [cause], then [ef-
fect]. The inference license takes on an abductive structure5 when such an ar-
gument is reformulated as an argument in a standard presentation, and that
is why the impression of a symptomatic argument is created. 
The altered argumentation scheme is not an isolated phenomenon;
this has been demonstrated by reformulating arguments and, in that way,
changing their presentation mode the other way around. When causal ar-
guments presented in a standard mode which have an abductive inference
license (non-prototypical causal arguments) are reformulated as reductio
ad absurdum arguments, their causality becomes much more apparent; after
all, an abductive inference license with an If [effect], then [cause] structure,
takes on an If [non-cause], then [non-effect] structure in the other presen-
tation mode. That a reductio ad absurdum presentation conveys causality
better than the standard presentation also holds for symptomatic argu-
ments in the standard presentation which possess an underlying causality
and a standpoint in which the earlier event is expressed. Since these argu-
ments contain an abductive inference license in the standard presentation,
5 The abductive variant of a causal argument is always the non-prototypical version of a
causal argument. With regard to symptomatic argumentation with an underlying causality,
the way the causality is structured (in a cause>effect or an abductive way) bears no relation
as to whether the argument is the prototypical version or not.
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they behave in the same way as causal arguments which have an abductive
structure. 
The difference with regard to the order of events expressed in the
If…then sentence also explains the following phenomenon. This phenome-
non concerns arguments in the standard presentation mode that are either
prototypically causal or that are symptomatic with an underlying causal struc-
ture and a standpoint that expresses the effect. Since these arguments have a
standpoint that expresses an event or state of affairs that is preceded by the
event or state of affairs mentioned in the argumentation (standpoint: ‘later
event’, premise: ‘earlier event’), they become nonsensical when they are re-
formulated as reductio ad absurdum arguments. The reason is that the real-
world order of cause>effect, which is the order of the inference license in the
standard presentation, changes into an abductive order in the reductio ad ab-
surdum presentation, and thus clashes with the suggested causal interpretation
of an If…then sentence in a subjunctive mood. Presumably such an If…then
sentence suggests an order that follows the structure of causality in the real
world: If [earlier event], then [later event]. 
In our view, our findings have the following implications. Apparently,
both causal arguments on the one hand, and symptomatic arguments with
underlying causality and a standpoint that expresses the later event on the
other, have an abductive variant. On which argumentation scheme an argu-
ment is based in essence is a question that we do not find very interesting.
What we do find interesting is that a speaker/writer can influence her lis-
tener/reader’s perception of the type of argument that she makes use of. As a
causal argument is more compelling than an argument based on a sympto-
matic relationship, the speaker/writer should choose the presentation mode
for her argument that presents it as a causal one. The speaker/writer has this
choice between the two presentation modes when the standpoint expresses an
earlier event (that precedes the event mentioned in the argumentation). In
that case, the reductio ad absurdum presentation mode is the preferred choice.
Be that as it may, if an argument appeals to a well-known causality, such as
frost causing a frozen pool, the choice for the one or the other presentation
mode is less pressing. However, if the causality is less striking, a presentation
mode with an inference license presenting ‘earlier event>later event’ enhances
an argument’s causality. 
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9 Professionalizing Speech Production
Changes in 15 Years of Ministerial
Speeches
jaap de jong and bas  andeweg
9.1  Introduction
“Yes, I agree with that” Ien Dales (Dutch Minister of the Interior, 1989-1994)
said just after citing a passage from her speech text thus insinuating the text
was not her own. Such slip-ups illustrate the distance between the speaker
and the speechwriter in those times. Such a slip is rare nowadays.1
Every Minister, State Secretary or other high official in the Nether-
lands delivers dozens of speeches a year. By making these speeches, they are
out to establish a base for their policies and to improve their relations with
the electorate. The past few years ministerial speechwriting has shown sig-
nificant changes. Some fifteen years ago most speeches were written by gov-
ernment employees, or policy advisors – experts in the policy field. However
ten years ago a new profession entered the offices of the departments: the
speechwriter (Andeweg and De Jong 2003, 2004; Snoek 2001). This change
can be characterized as a form of professionalization. The speechwriters
themselves have described this development based on both their personal
experiences and on the stories that circulated around the various depart-
ments (Snoek 2001). There was also some interest in the ministerial changes
from academia; especially interest in the introduction (Andeweg and De
Jong 2003, 2004) and the closing of these new speeches (De Jong and An-
deweg 2008). 
1 The authors thank their students Marissa Driesprong, Eva Helder, Mieke Pulles and Mar-
tijn Wackers for their useful analyses and interviews and inspiring cooperation in this proj-
ect. With many thanks to speechwriter Suzanne Levy and colleague Maarten van Leeuwen
for their useful comments on an earlier version of this article that was published in Tijd-
schrift voor Taalbeheersing 4 (2008).
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Recently both the Dutch ministerial organizations and the (informal)
speechwriting association expressed the need for an evaluation of the quality
of the contemporary ministerial speeches. One way to assess the quality of the
speeches is by looking back. Such a historical analysis can illuminate our per-
spective on the existing properties of modern speeches. What is still lacking
however is a factual comparison of recent speech texts with the texts that orig-
inated in the eighties written by civil servants. 
Therefore the main question in this research deals with the main tex-
tual differences between speeches of fifteen years ago and those written today.
The manner in which these speeches are presented, the actio, will be left out
of consideration.
9.2 Speechwriting in The Hague
In the 1980s, speeches were not written by specially appointed speechwriters,
but by the civil servants themselves.2 The assumption that it was often the
youngest staff member that had to perform this task (Geel 2002) is refuted
by the civil servants involved “it was part of the duties of a civil servant.”
From the beginning of the 1990s men and women were appointed with the
explicit task to write speeches. Besides their speechwriting task they also per-
formed other duties like writing columns, prefaces and introductions. In
2001, almost all (95%) governmental speechwriters in The Hague had a Uni-
versity Masters degree (Andeweg and De Jong 2004). Only fifteen percent
had done a special communications major in Rhetoric or Journalism; most
speechwriters (55%) had some journalistic experience although four had no
such experience at all. Currently there is no speechwriting training in the
Netherlands. Most speechwriters said that they learned their skills from their
more experienced colleagues or the head of the communication department.
From the beginning of the nineties special courses are offered to newly ap-
pointed speechworkers.
2 Much of the historical information stems from interviews we held in summer 2008
amongst civil servants who wrote speeches in the eighties and nineties of the last century.
The structured interviews were organized with a fixed set of questions. With many thanks
to the civil servants of ecs: Ype Akkerman, Roelco Offerein, R. Tiggelman, Frank Willem-
sen and the present speechwriter Suzanne Levy, and the civil servants of the Dutch Min-
istry of the Interior Renée Broekmeulen, Auke de Vries and the present speechwriters Luc
van Koppen and Bauco van der Wal.
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There are many accounts of how speeches were written. Some of the
civil servants involved say that sometimes the opening and closing phrases
“Ladies and gentlemen” and “Thank you” were added to an existing docu-
ment and then sent to the minister as a formal speech (Mulder 1995). The
interviewees in our research could not really corroborate that image of the
situation. They found it somewhat exaggerated but not completely beside
the truth. They perceived it as a ‘safe’ way of speechwriting; that way the
speeches would not contain incorrect information.
This view on the process of speechmaking was reinforced by the cus-
tom of finalizing a document by putting one’s initials (‘paraaf ’) on it (‘a cul-
ture of parafen’): every supervisor in the organization had to finalize the
document themselves. “At the Dutch Ministry of the Interior this bureau-
cratic process was maintained very strictly; every supervisor had their own
color for writing their initials on the document” often demanding supple-
mentary information or comments that sometimes were inconsistent with
former comments (see also Janssen 1991; Van der Mast 1999). The result
was – according the civil servants involved – a very long and frustrating
writing process: “it did not contribute to the quality of the speeches. The
speeches became dry because so many people wanted their own opinions re-
flected in it”. In other words: “Until the last possible moment work was
done on the document; sometimes even till the essence of the message was
lost” (Kagie 1992, p. 9).
Officially the same culture of finalizing documents exists today. The
difference between then (the end of the 1980s) and now is that speechwrit-
ers today – especially in the case of occasional speeches  – employ ‘backdoor
methods’ to discuss speech drafts with the speaker at an earlier stage, re-
sulting in a kind of official approval before all the other supervisors in the
organizational line approve the document. In practice, the level of contact
between speechwriters and speakers varies according to the speaker.
9.3 Plan of research
Every year hundreds of speeches are delivered by Dutch officials. Whether
those speeches are different from those fifteen years ago is the question in
this chapter. Analysis of the speeches is a way to answer that question. In this
chapter, we will first discuss the way the speeches were selected, after which
the analyzing method is described.
[  1 6 1 ]
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9.3.1 Assembling the speech corpora
Two ministries were selected from the thirteen ministries that make up
Dutch government: the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (ecs)
and the Ministry of the Interior (mi). By doing so, we could profit from
speech analysis done in earlier research commissioned by these ministries
(see for the ecs research De Jong et al. 2003; and for the mi research De
Jong et al. 2004). The selection of speeches in this earlier research was a
blueprint for the selection of older speeches of fifteen years ago. The result
was that there would be a small difference in the number of speeches se-
lected for each ministry (see table 9.1), but that small difference was out-
weighed by the advantage of using earlier analysis work. The selection of the
fifteen-year period was pragmatic as well: (easy) access to speech archives
only dates back to 1988. In the selection of the speeches, we allowed for the
difference in policy and occasional speeches.3 Working this way, compara-
ble sets of speeches were selected for the 1988-1989 period and the 2003-
2004 period (see table 9.1).
table 9.1  selection of speeches
Policy speeches Occasional speeches
ecs mi ecs mi
1988/9 [n=33] [n=9] [n=11] [n=8] [n=5]
2003/4 [n=33] [n=9] [n=11] [n=8] [n=5]
ecs: Ministry of Education, Culture and Science
mi: Ministry of the Interior
3 The ‘Culture’ sub department was an addition (reorganization) to the ecs department
in 1994, so the 1988/9 Culture speeches were not present in the ecs archives. To obtain
a representative corpus, the 1988/9 Culture speeches were selected from the Staatscour-
ant (Government Gazette, the formal communication medium of the Dutch Govern-
ment) of 1988.
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9.3.2 Rhetorical analysis
How different are speeches written in the eighties from contemporary
speeches? A plethora of topical and textual elements presents itself. Our ap-
proach was threefold: 
1. Which text characteristics are considered to be important by
the speechwriters?
2. Which models of analysis are available?
3. Which methods are at our disposal to quantify text differences?
What are important speech characteristics?
Andeweg and De Jong (2004) report that speechwriters consider the intro-
duction and closing essential and important parts of the speech, in which
they can excel. That research shows that speechwriters perceive style charac-
teristics such as extracts quoted by the press (soundbites) and concrete ex-
amples as important but difficult writing techniques. Also textual aspects like
speech length, sentence length, humour, anecdotes and the appropriate ad-
dressing of the target audience are named as important factors to be consid-
ered by the speechwriter. A good message is considered to be of the utmost
importance; speechwriters complain that it is often missing in the input they
get from the policy departments. “Without proper message, no proper
speech” (Levy 2008, p. 4). Unfortunately, content qualities could not be stud-
ied within the context of the present research.
Rhetorical analysis of ministerial speeches
To study the differences between the introductions and closings of speeches,
we made use of earlier developed analysis models: the exordium model (An-
deweg and De Jong 2004; Van de Mieroop, De Jong and Andeweg, 2008; see
table 9.2) and the peroration model (Andeweg and De Jong 2006, see table
9.3). Both models are based on advice literature from classical heritage and
modern writings.4
The summarized techniques from these literature studies are classified
by the classic-rhetorical function model of attentum parare (making the au-
dience attentive), benevolum parare (making the audience benevolent) and
4 The empirical basis of the models is an object of research: Andeweg, De Jong and Hoeken
(1998); Andeweg, De Jong and Wackers (2008).
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docilem parare (enabling the audience to follow, or understand, the key
points of the presentation). The models contain a large number of classical
and modern techniques that are at the disposal of the speaker; classified by
the rhetorical function of the technique. These techniques can represent for
instance a conceptual move (topical techniques like the Appeal to Pity in
the closing) or a figure of speech (e.g., a metaphor; a question; a repeti-
tion). The original models have been simplified in order to apply them to
this large speech corpus. Some of the techniques that did not seem to be ap-
plicable were discarded (e.g., the introduction techniques Pantomime, Image
and sound effects).
table 9.2  simplified descriptive exordium model (andeweg and de
jong 2003), overview of functions and supporting techniques in
the introduction of the speech
Function – making attentive (attentum parare): [classical techniques] Stress the importance
of the subject for the audience; Literally ask for attention; Promise to be brief; Humor (Pre-
sent something wittily); Apostrophe (Address third parties); Introduce imaginary person;
Historic example; Comparison and metaphor; Irony; Puns; [modern techniques] Anecdote;
Make a challenging statement; Quote; Question; Current point of view; Salutation; Riddle
and paradox; Example; Proverb
Function – making benevolent (benevolum parare): [classical techniques] Present oneself as
credible; Praise one’s own side; Make the impression to be improvising; Take away preju-
dices against speaker; Take the underdog position; Depreciate one’s opponent; Praise sus-
pect characteristics; Praising and making compliments; Stress common points; Alarm or
reassure the audience; Mention positive sides to the subject; Shift responsibility for un-
favourable matter onto someone else; Ask for understanding for inadequate speech; Praise a
praiseworthy person; [modern techniques] Thank introductory speaker
Function – making understanding possible (docilem parare): [classical techniques] Present the
essence of the matter (propositio); Announce the main points (partitio); Briefly present his-
torical background of the matter (narratio). [modern techniques] Mention the subject;
Present definition; Speech routine statements; From general to specific (funnel opening);
transition to kernel of speech (bridge)
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Finally, the figures of speech are analysed in the complete speech text (not
only those in the introduction and closing). These figures of speech are part
of the former models or are mentioned by the speechwriters as having a
rhetorical effect. The starting point of the current list of figures of speech was
the publication of Braet (2007). Table 9.4 gives an overview of the thirty-six
figures of speech that were included in the research.
table 9.4  overview figures of style in analysis
Addressing; Amplification; Anecdote; Antitheses; Anticipation; Chiasm; Quotation; Cli-
max; Complex sentence; Contrast; Dubitation; Ellipsis; Enumeration; Euphemism; Excla-
mation; Repetition figure; Humor; Hyperbole; Inversion; Irony; Litotes; Metaphor;
Metonymy; Paradox; Preterition; Rhyme; Soundbite; Proverb; Synonym; Expression/say-
ing; Understatement; Example; Prophesy; Question; Pun; Self correction.
table 9.3  simplified descriptive peroratio model (andeweg and de
jong 2006:159), overview of functions and supporting techniques in
the closing of the speech*
Function – getting attention (attentum parare): [no classical technique advised]; [Modern
techniques] Announcing the close.
Function – evoking emotions (affectus; benevolum parare): [classical techniques]Appeal to pity
(commiseratio); Praising one’s own side; Anticipating the opponent’s moves; Arousing neg-
ative feelings (indignatio); Suppressing positive feelings towards the opponent; Extenuating
circumstances/excuses; Alarming the audience; [Modern techniques] Inciting audience to
action; Word of thanks; Congratulations; Encouragement; Flattering, Praising and thank-
ing; Cooperation/feeling of togetherness
Function – going back over main issues (recapitulatio; docilem parare): [classical techniques]
Summary [Modern techniques] Circular technique; Closing speech
* The stylistic devices that are commonly used to excite the audience are not treated as part
of the closing but as figures of speech of the whole text.
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Methods: tagging and counting
The selected speeches in the corpus – only available on paper – were scanned
and through optical text recognition software and transformed into digital
text files. Next, the speeches were divided amongst four trained analysts, who,
independently from each other, read a part of the total number of speeches;
they searched for occurrences of rhetorical techniques described in the three
models. The speeches were divided evenly between the analysts on the basis
of period (old-new) and genre (occasional-policy). The analysts were divided
into two teams, corresponding with the two ministries involved. Every oc-
currence of a technique was tagged by using atlas.ti software. In total 5500
text fragments were tagged. The purpose of dividing the speeches evenly was
to reinforce the reliability of the research: the speeches within each sub cor-
pus (1988/9 vs. 2003/4; occasional vs. policy) were analysed by four re-
searchers. That way the idiosyncrasies of the individual analysts were
distributed evenly. This distribution was not completely achieved in the third
division (Ministry of ecs vs. Ministry of the Interior), because the teams were
split between those ministries. So the speeches of ministries were only
analysed by two instead of four researchers.5
First, the frequency of the observed rhetorical techniques was com-
puted. In the analysis of the techniques in the introduction the relative fre-
quency was computed, instead of the absolute frequency: a rhetorical
technique that was used more than once in the introduction or the closing
was counted as one occurrence. This way the resulting figures provide a bet-
ter answer to the question of how common the use of a technique is in a
speech introduction or closing (see also Andeweg and De Jong 2006).
The whole speech text (including introduction and closing) was ex-
amined for occurrences of the relevant figures of speech (see table 9.4). Here
too the frequency was established and related to the length of the speech (total
number of words). That way we computed the occurrence of a particular fig-
ure of speech per 1000 words. Through statistical procedures (anova - spss)
we ascertained whether or not the difference in occurrence between the sub
corpora was significant. 
5 A repeated analysis of (part of ) the speeches to compute reliability figures (Cohen’s
Kappa) was unfeasible due to time constraints.
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9.4 Results
What are the textual characteristics of the ministerial speeches from the nine-
teen eighties and those today? In this section we present the characteristics
quantitatively. The techniques that stand out because they are substantially
differently deployed or elaborated will be described in more detail.
9.4.1  The length of the speech
The total corpus consists of 66 speeches. Table 9.5 presents an overview of the
average length of the speeches in the corpus. Policy speeches (mean 2058
words; sd 1005) are substantially longer (F(1, 64) = 21.220 p<.001) than the oc-
casional speeches (1120 words; sd 313).
table 9.5  mean length of the speeches (in words) and introduc-
tion/closing (percentage)
Speech length (words) Length intro (%)* Length closing (%)*
1988/9 2003/4 1988/9 2003/4 1988/9 2003/4
All speeches 1870 1507 15.9 22.2 12.3 10.0
Policy speeches 2384 1732 14.0 19.4 11.7 8.9
Occasional speeches 1079 1161 18.8 26.6 13.3 11.7
* Length intro/closing: percentage of length total speech
The numbers in the table suggest that in general the length of the speech de-
creases through time. That difference is statistically speaking non-significant
(F(1, 64) = 2.589 p = .113). However, when we analyse the results per speech
category the difference in length between the old and new policy speeches is
found to be substantial (F(1, 38) = 4.583 p<.05): generally speaking, the more
recent policy speeches are shorter; this difference is not observable in the oc-
casional speech sub corpus.6
A similar difference can be found when we look at the (relative)
6 The differences between the individual ministries with regard to the introduction of the
speeches are substantial (F(1, 64)=35.777 p<.001): the average introduction at the mi
speeches is 11.7 % of the total speech (sd 8.8) whereas those of the Ministry of ecs were
26% (sd 10.5). Apparently the idea on how such an element of a speech should be defined
differs between the ministries.
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length of the introduction and closing in the speeches in table 9.5. Here
too the differences between the policy speeches (m 16.7%; sd 11.1) and the
occasional speeches (m 22.7%; sd 12.6%) are substantial (F(1, 64) = 4.133
p<.05). Generally the relative length of the introduction is longer in the
newer speeches (F(1, 64) = 4.827 p<.05). The relative length of the closing
stayed approximately the same. It was 12.3% of the total length of the speech
falling to 10% in the new millennium; the difference is non significant
(F(1,64) = 1,840 P = .180).
Sentence length
The average sentence length in the speeches varies form 10 words per sen-
tence to 29 words per sentence per speech.7 The sentences in the 1988/9 cor-
pus (18.7 words) are on average substantially longer (F(1, 64) = 14.921 p<.001)
than those in the 2003/4 corpus (15.8 words). The same holds true for the pe-
riod differences between the genres. In general there is no difference in sen-
tence length between policy speeches and occasional speeches. It appears that
sentence length and speech length are related (r.27 p < .05): longer speeches
often have a longer average sentence length.
9.4.2 The introductions of ministerial speeches
Which functions are realized in the introduction of the speeches? We inter-
pret the occurrence of rhetorical techniques as a sign of realizing one of the
central introduction functions (Attentum parare, Benevolum parare and
Docilem parare). Table 9.6 presents an overview of the functions that were re-
alised in the speeches.8
7 The average sentence length was computed using the program Text Analyser 2.0
www.writeitpro.co.uk.
8 When more of the same introduction techniques were observed in the same speech intro-
duction, they were counted only once in the function overview. The reasoning for this was
that a single occurrence of an attention technique (e.g., Pun ) in a speech introduction im-
plicates that the corresponding (attentum parare) function is realised.
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table 9.6  functions in the introduction
N <2 functions 2 functions 3 functions
All speeches 1988/9 33 5 12 16
2003/4 33 2 16 15
Policy speeches 1988/9 20 1 7 12
2003/4 20 0 9 11
Occasional speeches 1983/4 13 4 5 4
2003/4 13 2 7 4
<2 functions: no functions or only A(ttentum) or B(enevolum) or D(ocilem) 
2 functions: ab; ad; bd
3 functions: abd
The analysis of the data in table 9.6 shows that in the introduction of the
1988/9 speeches a comparable number of functions were realized as in the
2003/4 corpus (F1, 62) = 0.266 p = .608). No substantial period differences
are evident in the individual genres.9 In general it appears that there are more
functions realized in the introduction of policy speeches than in occasional
speeches (F(1, 64) = 9.143 p<.05). Which techniques are used to realize those
principle functions of the introduction?
Attentum techniques
Table 9.7 presents an overview of the observed attentum techniques in the in-
troduction (organized by frequency in the 1988/9 corpus). A speech intro-
duction contains nearly always a Salutation. The other introduction
techniques are less frequent. Metaphor and Question can be observed in well
over 40% of the 2003/4 speeches; the other techniques are only found in 1 out
of 4 speeches (or even fewer).
Table 9.7 shows that some of the introduction techniques occurred sig-
nificantly more often in the 2003/4 corpus than in the 1988/9 corpus: Exam-
ple, Anecdote and Irony. We will discuss the first two techniques.
9 In the introductions of the ecs speeches more rhetorical functions are realized than in the
mi speeches (F(1, 64)=14.966 p<.001).
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Example. An example (exemplum) is a topical, often narrative technique
which can be used to concretize an abstract concept. It can also be used to
rhetorically enlarge parts of the message (amplification): to put them more in
the centre of the attention of the listener. Examples in the introductions of the
1988/9 corpus were only observed in two policy speeches; the language is no-
ticeably formal and not very inspiring. In the 2003/4 corpus there are more
and more elaborated instances of this style technique:
If a butcher wants his customers to return to his shop, then he has to be able to an-
swer the question whether his meat is bse free and how he can guarantee that. And
for those of us who do not cook: when we buy a new product at the butcher’s we
want to know from him how to prepare it. [Speech 28; np110]
table 9.7  attentum techniques in introduction (percentage
speeches in which the technique occurs)
All speeches Policy Occasional
Period 1988/9 2003/4 1988/9 2003/4 1988/9 2003/4
N 33 33 20 20 13 13
Salutation 91 91 90 90 92 92
Current point of view 24 24 30 20 15 31
Metaphor 21 42 25 50 15 31
Question 21 42 30 45 8 38
Pun 15 6 10 5 23 8
Humor 12 15 5 10 23 23
Quote 12 24 10 15 15 38
Example 6x 27y 10 20 0x 38y
Anecdote 0x 27y 0x 30y 0 23
Irony 0x 15y 0 15 0 15
* xy: row difference within one category is significant p<.05 (F>5)
* introduction techniques which occurred in less than 3% of the old or new speeches are
omitted from this overview
10 We use two characters and one digit to refer to the specific speech sub corpus. First char-
acter: N(ew; 2003/4) or O(ld; 1988/9); second character concerns the genre: P(olicy) or
O(occasional); the digit refers to the department: 1=ecs, 2=mi.
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Anecdote. The anecdote is a short, witty and complete story that is presented
in a lively and appealing way (Andeweg and De Jong 2006). The speech-
writers of the 1988/9 corpus did not appear to use this rhetorical technique.
In the introductions of the 2003/4 corpus there is more to enjoy. The anec-
dotes often have a fresh quality and a personal quality both in occasional
speeches and in policy speeches:
Moving to a new home is always a case of selection. What do you take with you
and what stays behind. But I did not hesitate for a moment about the necessity of
one particular item when I moved to the new office in Zoetermeer: my card-index
box had to come! In my former job I was often laughed at: an old-fashioned card
box. All addresses where at that time already – up to date – in a database. I had a
bet with a colleague: who could find an address faster: he, using the database or I
with my card-index box. You can guess who won! [Speech 32; np1]
Benevolum techniques
Table 9.8 presents an overview of the benevolence techniques which occurred
in the introduction of the speeches. The differences between the (sub) corpora
are statistically non-significant: the number of observed benevolence tech-
niques stays approximately the same.
table 9.8  benevolum techniques in the introduction (percentage
speeches in which the technique occurs)*
All speeches Policy Occasional
Period 1988/9 2003/4 1988/9 2003/4 1988/9 2003/4
N 33 33 20 20 13 13
Present oneself as credible 73 73 80 80 62 62
Compliments and praise 58 52 45 50 77 54
Stress common points 18 36 20 35 15 38
Alarm or reassure the audience 9 9 15 15 0 0
Praise a praiseworthy person 9 9 10 0 8 23
Take the underdog position 6 0 5 0 8 0
* Benevolum techniques which occurred in less than 5% of the old or new speeches are
omitted from this overview.
[  1 7 1 ]
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Table 9.8 shows that ministerial speeches generally use two benevolum tech-
niques: Presenting the credibility of the speaker (or their organization) and
Praising and giving compliments (Flattering and praising).
Presenting one as credible. The presentation of oneself or the organization as
credible is often achieved in a simple and indirect way. The member of gov-
ernment says for instance “it was with great pleasure that I accepted the in-
vitation to address you today”. In doing so they state that in their opinion the
inviting party (the attendees) is credible and trustworthy (praise). At times a
member of government might even pride himself on his own qualities.
Praising and making compliments. This ancient rhetorical technique occurs in
over fifty percent of the speeches. Sometimes in a limited form like: “In a pleas-
ant meeting like this …” [speech 36; op2] or “The platform does a fantastic job,
already for years, and it does this concerning an incredibly tough subject”
Docilem techniques
The third main function of the introduction – making it possible to under-
stand the speech (docilem parare) – does not seem to concern the speech-
writers any differently now than it did in earlier days. Table 9.9 suggests that
the application of docilem techniques somewhat decreases, but the difference
between the 1988/9 corpus and the 2003/4 corpus is non-significant. 
table 9.9 docilem techniques in introduction (percentage speech-
es in which the technique occurs)
Techniques All speeches Policy Occasional
Period 1988/9 2003/4 1988/9 2003/4 1988/9 2003/4
N 33 33 20 20 13 13
Announce the main points (partitio) 33 18 40 30 23 0
Transition to kernel of speech (bridge) 27 21 35 20 15 23
Brief background of the matter (narration) 18 12 15 10 23 15
Mention the subject 12 12 10 20 15 0
Essence of the matter (propositio) 9 15 10 20 8 8
Present definition 9 3 10 5 8 0
[  1 7 2 ]
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Table 9.9 shows that generally two docilem techniques can be observed: the
partition and the bridge.
Partitio. The partition is an announcement of the main points (of a part) of
the speech. The partitios in the 2003/4 corpus seem to be slightly more ex-
plicit in the phrasing of the announcement: they contain more meta-com-
munication like: “I will discuss the following points”, while for instance in the
1988/9 speeches a number of questions are posed without mentioning that
those are the questions which will be answered in the speech.
Transition to the middle of the speech (bridge). On occasions where there was
no partitio in the introduction, there was often a Transition to the kernel of the
speech, an announcement of only the next topic; an overview of the rest of the
speech remains unmentioned:
I will primarily discuss the policy perspective: a much-published topic under heavy
debate. (Speech 11, OP1)
9.4.3 The closing of ministerial speeches
In the closing of a speech, speakers have to realise three functions.
1. Speakers have to gain refreshed attention for the last part of their
speech (attentum parare).
2. Speakers have to reinforce the understanding of the listeners by
summarizing the gist of their message (docilem parare).
3. Speakers have to use those last moments to positively influence
the feelings of the audience towards them and the message
(benevolum parare). 
The rhetorical functions of the closing of a speech mirror those in the in-
troduction of the speech (Braet 2003; Andeweg and De Jong 2006). Which
functions are realized in the closing of these ministerial speeches? We in-
terpret the occurrence of a rhetoric technique as a sign for the realizing of
a specific function. Table 9.10 presents an overview of the realised func-
tions.11 In the 2003/4 speech corpus, the functions are realized substantially
more often.
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table 9.10  functions in the closing of the speech 
N <2 functions 2 functions 3 functions
All speeches 1988/9 33 11 16 6
2003/4 33 7 9 17
Policy speeches 1988/9 20 5 11 4
2003/4 20 3 6 11
Occasional speeches 1983/4 13 6 5 2
2003/4 13 4 3 6
<2 functions: no functions or only A(ttentum) or B(enevolum) or D(ocilem) 
2 functions: ab; ad; bd
3 functions: abd
Which rhetorical techniques are applied in the closing?
Attentum techniques
Announcing the close. The attentum parare – refreshing the attention of the
listeners in the last part of the speech – is a function that is not explicitly
mentioned by classical authors like Quintilian or Cicero. It is a modern func-
tion of the closing of the speech. The Announcement of the close can be made
explicitly by saying something like “I come to a close”, or “To summarize”,
or “Before I formally open this meeting I would like to say ...”, or the some-
what blunt phrase “This is the end of my speech”. The announcement can
also be made more implicit by using a Salutation “Ladies and Gentlemen”,
provided that the Salutation has not already been used too much during the
speech as a continually returning attention refresher. Generally speaking, there
are no differences between the 1988/9 corpus and the 2003/4 corpus (table
9.11). If we omit the category of implicit Salutations from the statistical analy-
sis then a difference surfaces: modern speechwriters are less inclined to an-
nounce the closing explicitly (F(1, 64) = 4.000 p = .05).
[  1 7 4 ]
11 When more occurrences of the same closing technique are observed in the same closing part
of the speech then they are only counted once in the overview (table 9.10; see also note 8).
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table 9.11 attentum techniques in the closing (percentage speech-
es in which the technique occurs)
All speeches Policy Occasional
Period 1988/9 2003/4 1988/9 2003/4 1988/9 2003/4
N 33 33 20 20 13 13
Announcing the close 52 42 50 50 52 48
Benevolum techniques
Table 9.12 presents an overview of the topical benevolence techniques that
are meant to manipulate the emotions of the listeners in those last moments
of the speech. The figures of speech that are also recommended for use (for
the same reason) in the closing of the speech are taken together in the pres-
ent research with the number of occurrences of figures of speech in the com-
plete speech text (see section 4.4). Overall, there are no differences between
the two time periods in the use of benevolum techniques. The differences
in the technique Cooperation/feeling of togetherness, however, are significant
(F(1, 64) = 4.531 p<.05).
table 9.12 benevolum techniques in the closing (percentage
speeches in which the technique occurs)
All speeches Policy Occasional
Period 1988/9 2003/4 1988/9 2003/4 1988/9 2003/4
N 33 33 20 20 13 13
Flattering, praising and thanking 48 36 35 20 69 62
Congratulations 45 39 35 35 62 46
Cooperation/feeling of togetherness 21x 45y 25x 60y 15 23
Inciting audience to action 18 12 30 15 0 8
Word of thanks 12 3 5 0 23 8
Alarming the audience 9 6 15 10 0 0
Encouragement 9 9 15 10 0 8
Anticipating the opponent’s moves 3 12 5 15 0 8
Extenuating circumstances/excuses 0 9 0 10 0 8
* xy: row difference within a category is significant p<.05 (F>5) 
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The classical rhetorical techniques Appeal to pity (commiseratio), Arousing neg-
ative feelings (indignatio) and Suppressing positive feelings towards the opponent
were not observed in the corpus. In general, the closings were particularly
characterized by the presence of the rhetorical techniques of Flattering, prais-
ing and thanking and Congratulations. 
Docilem techniques
The docilem techniques are traditionally the most important techniques
for a speaker to employ in the last part of the speech. The techniques Sum-
mary and Circle technique are regularly observed (see table 9.13). The Sum-
mary is applied in a quarter of all cases; it seems to be a trend that the
Summary occurs in policy speeches more often than in occasional speeches
(F(1, 64) = 3.110 p = .08). The Circle technique is deployed substantially more
often in the 2003/4 corpus than in the 1988/9 corpus (F(1, 64) = 13.938
p<.001).
table 9.13  docilem techniques in the closing (percentage speeches
in which the technique occurs)
Closing techniques All speeches Policy Occasional
Period 1988/9 2003/4 1988/9 2003/4 1988/9 2003/4
N 33 33 20 20 13 13
Summary 27% 18% 35% 25% 15% 8%
Circle technique 12%x 52%y 10%x 50%y 15%x 54%y
* xy: difference is significant p<.05 (F>5)
Summary (recapitulatio): Quintilian (6.1.3) distinguishes two functions for
the Summary: remembrance and making an impression. He writes: “[it] is
intended both to refresh the memory of the judge, to place the whole of the
case before his eyes, and, even although the fact may have made little im-
pression on him in detail, their cumulative effect is considerable.” He warns
to be brief. A speaker should not make a new “second speech” in the closing.
Long summaries can be observed incidentally in the corpus (lists of more
than ten points). Normally, the observed summaries were shorter and thereby
had more possibilities for remembrance and impact. Most of the times, how-
ever, a form of recapitulation was missing – a missed opportunity.
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Circle technique: “It can be nice and still functional (…) when the closing
and especially the last closing sentence has a relation in one way or the other
to the opening statement of introduction” states Korswagen (1976, p. 34). De
Jong and Van der Spek (1996, p. 21) describe the effect of this technique as an
enhancement of the cohesiveness of the speech: “it is the last piece of the jig-
saw puzzle that falls rightly in place.” For example:
Coming back to the beginning of my speech I again state that a review of the his-
tory yields lessons to be learned and pleasures to be enjoyed. [Speech 38; ob2]
9.4.4  Figures of speech
“Style is like a magic wand: all it touches changes into gold” said Logan P.
Smith in 1865. A way of giving a speech text more impact is the deployment
of figures of speech: special examples of language use. Figures of speech are
not only particularly suitable to catch and hold the attention of the audience,
but are also good for making a text more acceptable or persuasive (Braet
2007). Did speeches become richer in figures of speech in the last decade or
did they lose some of that magic? A prudent use of figures of speech could im-
prove the listening experience of the audience. In total 3300 text passages in
the corpus were tagged as figure of speech. A rough comparison between the
use of figures of speech in the 1980s and now – adding all the thirty-six fig-
ures of speech (per 1000 words) – shows (F(1, 64) = 61.755 p<.001) that in the
2003/4 speeches figures of speech were used significantly more (35.5 style fig-
ures / 1000 words) than in the 1988/9 speeches (17.2 style figures / 1000
words). Overall, the policy speeches did not distinguish themselves from the
occasional speeches in this respect (F(1, 64) = .655 p = .421).
The, statistically speaking, most important quantitative differences are
observed in the use of the techniques Expression/saying, Soundbites, Repetition
figures and Metaphors. Table 9.14 presents an overview of the thirteen figures
of speech that are used considerably more often than in the eighties. The
other twenty-three figures of speech (not mentioned in the table) are found
equally frequently at that time as nowadays.
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table 9.14  significant period changes in the number of figures of
speech (per 1000 words)
Figure of Style# All speeches Policy Occasional
Period M sd M sd M Sd
Expression/saying 1988/9 0.64a 0.70 0.57a 0.51 0.75 0.94
2003/4 2.46b 2.04 2.27b 1.72 2.75 2.49
Soundbite 1988/9 0.04a 0.14 0.07 0.18 0.00a 0.00
2003/4 0.75b 0.85 0.55 0.75 1.07b 0.93
Repetition figure 1988/9 0.60a 0.92 0.62 0.79 0.58 1.12
2003/4 2.60b 2.39 2.47 2.12 2.81 2.84
Metaphor 1988/9 0.76a 0.93 0.61a 0.73 0.98 1.18
2003/4 2.57b 2.17 2.42b 1.89 2.80 2.60
Example 1988/9 0.76 1.19 0.78 0.83
2003/4 2.04 1.67 2.02 1.73
Antithesis 1988/9 0.92 1.09 0.73 0.82
2003/4 2.03 1.45 1.99 1.56
Ellipsis 1988/9 0.71 1.12 0.90 1.32 0.41 0.68
2003/4 1.74 1.34 2.00 1.42 1.35 1.16
Humor 1988/9 0.16 0.41 0.03 0.10
2003/4 0.83 1.17 0.50 0.62
Metonymy 1988/9 0.08 0.23 0.06 0.24
2003/4 0.37 0.62 0.40 0.61
Questions 1988/9 0.92 0.88
2003/4 1.70 1.52
Climax 1988/9 0.13 0.34
2003/4 0.42 0.57
Irony 1988/9 0.12 0.33 0.09 0.26
2003/4 0.44 0.74 0.45 0.60
Self correction 1988/9 0.09 0.29 0.04 0.11
2003/4 0.39 0.70 0.44 0.81
# All values are significantly different p<.05 (F>5)
ab: the difference are greater than p<.001 (F>15)
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9.5 Conclusion
What are the most important differences between ministerial speeches from
the 1980s and those from the beginning of the new millennium? Before we
draw our conclusions it is advisable to consider the choices made in this re-
search and the subsequent limitations. First, the corpus we assembled came
from only two of the thirteen Dutch ministries. Maybe the differences be-
tween the ministries exceed the resemblances. All kinds of (sub)cultural dif-
ferences exist between the individual ministries, often relating to the societal
role they fulfil (e.g., the Finance Department, where most of the employees
wear three-piece suits in contrast with the more informal dress code at the
Ministry of Social Services and Employment). Furthermore, the speakers –
ministers and state secretaries put their individual stamp on the speech style
of a ministry. Our analysis shows that there are in fact significant textual dif-
ferences evident between the ministries. The introductions of speeches by the
Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (ecs) for instance, are substan-
tially longer than those of the Ministry of the Interior (mi). In those ecs in-
troductions we find a greater variety of rhetorical techniques, and on average
more of the three central rhetorical functions are achieved.12 However, the
observed change over time appears similar in both ministries. By assembling
a relatively large corpus of speeches we believe to have produced a reliable re-
flection of the changes that took place between the chosen periods; a reflec-
tion that also shows the changes in the other eleven ministries. It is very likely
that the tendency to produce shorter speeches, shorter sentences and more fig-
ures of speech is a typical development for Dutch ministerial speeches.13
Secondly, in this part of the article we also should consider our method
of analyzing. After all, the selection of text passages from the larger speech
texts, the naming and classifying of those fragments in terms of the three
rhetorical models is a rather subjective analyzing activity. By training the an-
alysts, by using teams of analysts and by systematically dividing the texts be-
tween the analysts, we aimed to control the idiosyncrasies of the individual
analysts. Furthermore, we are convinced that the combination of a quantita-
12 The differences between the two ministries must be regarded with some extra reserve. Every
ministerial sub corpus was analysed by only two of the four analysts, in contrast to the situ-
ation with the other sub corpora (fours analysts per sub corpus, see section 9.3).
13 A similar trend towards shorter sentences is apparent in American governmental speeches
(Lim 2008).
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tive and qualitative analysis produces a reasonable inter-subjective descrip-
tion of the textual phenomena.
By way of a conclusion, choosing the perspective of a seasoned listener
from the 1980s may provide some insight. What would catch the ear of such
a man or woman at a speech from the new millennium (2003/4)? The first
thing they would notice is the little time reserved in the official program for
a speech of an important government official. The minister’s speech would be
shorter than in former days. Speech text, written by the newly appointed
speechwriters, shrank from on average 1870 words (almost twenty minutes of
speaking time) to 1507 words (approximately a quarter of an hour).
The speech begins, as in the past, with a salutation of the present au-
dience. Often some flattering compliments will be made. The modern speaker
will appear somewhat more informal, more amiable. Such a concrete exam-
ple or anecdote in the introduction of the speech to get the attention of the lis-
teners, was usually absent in the earlier days; and what to think of a minister
making – in a humorous fashion – some amusing, self-deprecating remarks?
No, unthinkable. It is not always clear what point the speaker wants to make.
In former days the speaker would have helped the listeners by listing the
points he would cover in the speech. Also transitions to the next sub topic in
the speech are rarely made. There is little explicit structure to keep the lis-
teners on track. The introduction takes longer, but still not all central func-
tions are realised.
The middle of the speech contains less very long sentences and more
figures of speech are deployed. And with those ellipses and direct addressing tech-
niques it appears like a real speech, made and improvised by the speaker. Pol-
icy is still presented in the 2003/4 speech; also policy that is not always directly
linked to the occasion for which the people in the audience are assembled.
However, there are more examples, metaphors and commonplace expressions.
There is more to enjoy; there can be even some laughter. Also soundbites like
“Safety is more than catching criminals” [Speech 56; np2] and the use of repe-
tition techniques amount to a more catchy phrasing of the policy statements.
Fortunately, in the closing of the speech the speaker comes back to the
example in the introduction (a circle technique) or one would nearly have
missed the end of the speech. In former days the speaker usually announced
explicitly the last part of his or her speech; this maybe somewhat bookish, but
it was an effective wake up call (as confirmed in experimental research, see An-
deweg, De Jong and Wackers 2008). Considering the bookish style, summa-
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rizing the main point of the speech is something that speakers – in those days
and today – often refrain from. Wasn’t there just one point important enough
to repeat? It appears that nowadays speakers use those last moments of the
speech to seize the opportunity to stress the Cooperation/feeling of together-
ness: “That is your job – that is my job – that is our mission” [Speech 26;
np1]. Metaphors and Soundbites are more often evident in the closing of the
speech, but they seldom become emotional. The closing is as long as in the
older days, but often more complete (more central functions realized).
All that shines in the 2003/4 speeches is not all rhetorical silver, but
the average quality of 2003/4 ministerial speeches is substantially better than
the quality of the 1988/9 speeches. In the older speech corpus some good
speeches can be found, but most of them consisted of formal language and
were less audience oriented (few examples, anecdotes, comparisons; lots of
abstract passages). Although not every 2003/4 speech surprises with fresh
metaphors and convincing examples – humor is still very scarce and memo-
rable soundbites are conspicuous by their absence, the craftsmanship of the
speechwriters yields a rather stylistically satisfying speech text. However, the
question whether the modern speech also has a clearer message, demands an-
other kind of research.
The more central position of the speech in government communica-
tion, and the changing place of the speechwriters in the ministry (closer to
their clients: the minister or state secretary) makes it less likely that a minis-
ter would let the remark “Yes, I agree with that” slip publically. Or even – and
this really did happen – “This must be spelled correctly, speechwriter!”
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10 The Correlation between Style and
Argument in Newspaper Columns
hilde van belle
10.1  Introduction
A column doesn’t have any characteristics, because a column doesn’t exist. A series
of columns does. And even then, it’s difficult to define specific characteristics. For
the time being only this one: they all should have the same length.
This is how Willem Bekius, in his manual for journalists, starts off the chap-
ter on columns. As the Dutch author goes on, nothing very specific is added.
“A column holds opinion and entertainment”, he claims, and, for a checklist,
three very concise items of advice are presented: the day-after-test, the right
amount of words, and the unity of style (Bekius 2003, p. 143). Bekius ironi-
cally suggests that there isn’t much to be said about columns.
Of course, other manuals do give a better introduction and more use-
ful instructions. They mention the well-known formal features, like the
fixed regularity of author, amount of words or place in the paper. They try
to pin down the functions a column can have: opinion, entertainment, aes-
thetic pleasure. All of them stress the style element: a compact style is the
rule. In general, columns are listed in the category of persuasive articles,
but invariably the style element is stressed as well. Asbreuk and De Moor
admit: “columns are complicated genres where style and argument are in-
trinsically interwoven” (Asbreuk and De Moor 2007, p. 415). Apparently,
columns should be well written in the first place; they function as exercises
in style. As for the form, there are almost no limits. Columns come in the
form of anecdotes, comments, letters, dialogues, interviews, essays, poems,
aphorisms, book reviews, caricatures, portraits, news stories, art criticism,
satire, nonsense.
Some authors speak condemningly about columns, like William Metz,
who enthusiastically lists and explores a range of “genres”, like crime report-
[  1 8 5 ]
LUP Bending Opinion Boek_Layout 2  27-01-11  14:46  Pagina 185
van belle
ing, interviewing, fire reporting, sexism, sports and so on, but doesn’t spend
much time on (editorial) columns. The only thing we can read about them
goes as follows:
But editorials are recognised as expressing a particular point of view. As such, they
are not given the credence that is accorded to news accounts that are written to in-
form, not to sway. Many students of the press doubt that the editorial page has
much clout anymore. (Metz 1985, p. 11)
In his 1922 textbook on journalistic writing, Grant Milnor Hyde does dis-
cuss columns. He claims that the chief purpose of the (editorial) column is
to interpret the news, and he adds an interesting note about the historical
context of column writing:
In general, during wars and other periods of national stress, the editorial has wide
influence; then it is likely to be argumentative. In periods of calm and quiet indus-
try, its importance subsides, and it becomes a thoughtful expository interpretation
of events. However much it may rise and fall, it is likely to continue to be an essen-
tial part of every newspaper. (Hyde 1922, p. 269)
Also the Dutch authors Kussendrager and Van der Lugt (1992) are not very
clear about the genre: they sum up four features, “short, well written, sur-
prising perspective, polemic”, and they continue with a discussion of funny
and shocking cases where “the limit of freedom of expression” is at stake.
They end with the claim that our western column writing is a less exciting
matter than in less tolerant societies: another historical note (ibid. pp. 294-
295). In the 2007 version of their manual, we find a new chapter on columns,
but now it’s indulging into a wide but not very clear range of examples, aims,
possible themes, opinions, etc. The literary techniques that columnists can use
come down to: hyperbole, fallacies [!], absurd reasoning [!], lies [!], and ar-
chaisms (Kussendrager 2007, pp. 338-342).
In many manuals, column writing simply is not mentioned (e.g., Fox
1977, Epstein 1967) or only sporadically mentioned. Donkers and Willems just
name the column, put it in the class of opinion articles (Donkers et al. 1999,
p. 313) and connect it to the registers of amusement and/or shock (Donkers
and Willems 2005, p. 70). Obviously, it is not easy to categorize columns or pin
them down to something. They can handle any theme, in any form, and ful-
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fil any function. Often, they’re considered to be too superficial to be called lit-
erature, and too frivolous to be called real journalism (Gijselhart 1986, p.11).
As columns are very closely linked to a specific author, one could ask
whether this ethos element plays a major role in the understanding of the
phenomenon. For one thing, columns are places where the public space
moves very close to the personal, and the personal involvement of the author
is part of this. Columnists apparently want to write down their daily obser-
vations and critique in an attractive and moving way. But it is difficult to
point out what their aim is. They might be motivated by pigheaded ob-
structionist contrariness, morality, individualism, exhibitionism, idealism,
liberalism or cynicism. To some, columnists are annoying egos, giving su-
perficial comment on anything imaginable, chasing the ephemera of the day,
changing their opinions and moods every once in a while, as well as the tar-
gets of their praise or attacks. To others, they are really involved in the core
business of democracy, keeping up the spirit of enlightenment, challenging
the powers and modes of the day (Gijselhart 1986). Or are they rather the
fools, saying what everybody thinks, occasionally getting blamed for their
impudence, but at the same time symbolically contributing to the greater
power and glory of their masters?
The personal aspect of columns also holds for us, their readers. Maybe
we are looking for news, knowledge, inspiration, wisdom, ideas, approval,
controversy; but we might also be looking for emotion, beauty, shock, laugh-
ter, entertainment; and some of us might even be driven by a touch of mali-
cious pleasure or voyeurism. And who else is reading with us? Not only our
bosses and colleagues, our neighbours, friends and families, but also socially
and politically engaged people, like judges or politicians.
The great variety of forms and functions that columns can display
could indeed make one ironically decide that they really “don’t exist”, that it
is impossible to define their features and their function. Their scope might be
too wide, their functions too diffuse, their appreciation too personal. On the
other hand, they are a popular phenomenon, even in this digital age, and one
could ask what it is that makes them particular. Is it just the simple ritual
regularity of a fixed time and space, together with the ethos of the author
that makes up for the otherwise indecision of the phenomenon?
Columns used to be the place where opinions could be uttered under
the shelter of style devices like irony, metaphor, satire, hyperbole and so on.
Nowadays, in our western world, the press is supposedly free to utter any
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opinion, and columns are not the outspoken places for opinion anymore.
But then what are their new functions? Readers find an article on the same
place, at the same time, of the same length, by the same author. Newspaper
editors know how important it is to create and encourage daily habits and rit-
uals for their readers. Yet, my suggestion is that this is not the only reason why
column writing has survived in time. I want to explore this phenomenon
from another angle. I argue that the main function has changed from a free
space for opinion into a free space for style.
In this chapter, I will track down the intense correlation between style
and argument in the history of columns (section 10.2). Second, I will look at
old and new theories about rhetorical figures and their argumentative func-
tion (sections 10.3 and 10.4). Finally, I will bring together these lines in a pro-
posal about the actual function of columns.
10.2 Columns and reasoning
The early history of the column shows how, from the start, they were spaces
where literature and opinion, or style and argument, somehow were closely
intertwined. Political comment, and artful and witty satire: they are inherent
to our modern democracy; they played a basic role in the growth and evolu-
tion of our actual democratic society (see also Gijselhart 1986). They were
printed and published in the form of pamphlets, brochures, books, weeklies,
etc. They stood apart from 17th-century and 18th-century newspapers because
those were strictly restricted to the publication of plain news, to facts and
messages both local and international. Sentimental and sensational facts were
to be found in separate sections, along with advertizements; but no opinion
or critique whatsoever.
The reason for this very strict attitude is obvious: censorship. Every
now and then, an occasional uprising simply wasn’t mentioned in the paper,
as if it hadn’t happened at all. All over Europe, rulers were very sensitive to
criticism, or libel, and they all tried out their own methods for minimizing
or silencing critique, by different regulations and restrictions and other sys-
tems of suppression and prohibition. Newspapers had to work under special
licenses, and apply for monopolies and privileges. In France, for example, the
Gazette de France (licensed in 1631) was to speak in favour of the absolute
monarchy. And Elizabeth I simply prohibited news pamphlets in England, ex-
cept those published by … Elizabeth I. In general, analysis, comment or rea-
soning, as it was called, was forbidden.
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The public space for reasoning was to be found elsewhere. The more
rigid the laws and prohibitions of censorship became, the more creative writ-
ers and commentators grew. For comment did flourish, indeed. Great 18th-
century writers like Voltaire, Diderot, La Fontaine, Swift, Defoe, Fielding,
Addison and Steele found ways of bypassing censors and governors. In this
age of satire, critique was abundantly alive in papers and periodicals, in books
and pamphlets. When reasoning was presented anonymously or under pseu-
donym, or in literary forms where it could sail safely under the flag of fiction,
the rulers couldn’t do very much. 
This doesn’t mean that writers did not disappear in jail or were banned
once in a while – with or without any form of trial. Voltaire, one of the many
darling gens de lettres in the Parisian salons travelled all over Europe, often
looking for shelter and protection. Many rich and famous people protected
him, while others were after him. Daniel Defoe, the founding father of Eng-
lish journalism, spent some time in jail; but then, he did have this bad habit
of asking money for the opinion articles he wrote for very different parties.
Rulers tried to silence the subversive voices by many means, like the enact-
ment of libel laws in England as well as more undercover tricks. Yet, they
found that it’s not easy at all to trial anonymous or pseudonymous writers or
to pin down the real meaning of their ambiguous allegories or satires, espe-
cially if the court decides to go along with the benefit of the doubt in the
case of the so-called innuendos.
In the 19th century, newspapers gradually attained more freedom and
independence. They reserved more space for serious political comment and
analysis. In 1800, in France under Napoleonic press censorship, the Parisian
theatre critic Julien Louis Geoffroy created a space for his short, witty, lively,
sharp and entertaining comments on everyday social and cultural life. He
found room for his literary opinions and observations in the feuilleton, the
paper’s advertizing appendix. Due to their popularity, his columns moved to
the pages of the actual paper, and even made it to the bottom (the rez-de-
chaussée/the ground floor) of the first page, separated from the real news by a
thick black line. All over Europe, famous writers followed this example with
great enthusiasm: Sainte Beuve, Victor Hugo, Heinrich Heine, Theodor
Fontane, Pushkin, Dostoevsky, Turgenev, Tsjechov.
At first, the feuilletons were an innocent a-political playground for
witty literary pieces with criticism on books and theatre, society gossip and
nonsense stories; in short on a variety of themes, the big nothing - as it was oc-
[  1 8 9 ]
LUP Bending Opinion Boek_Layout 2  27-01-11  14:46  Pagina 189
van belle
casionally called by some grudging critic. But gradually, and along with the
many uprisings between 1830 and 1848, the themes grew more serious, the
critique sharper, the tone more grim. After all, the children of the enlighten-
ment wanted to work towards the political and cultural awareness and edu-
cation of the public. Newspaper editors remained cautious, however, and
tried to find a balance between the safety of correct news reporting and the
popularity of their all too witty enfants terribles.
In columns, opinion could find its way, thanks to the grey zone be-
tween form and idea, between language and meaning, between style and ar-
gument. This indecision was vital for the phenomenon. This is all the more
fascinating, when we realize that it took well into the 20th century before
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958) took a position on the matter of style
and argument. Their discussion on the argumentative value of style figures
might shed some light on the phenomenon of columns.
10.3 Argument and rhetorical figures
In their famous study ‘The new rhetoric’ Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca
(1958) restored the link between style and argument and claimed that the
study of rhetoric should not be reduced to stylistics or the superficial orna-
mental language of literature on the one hand, or to mere speech and ar-
gument exercises on the other. Rhetoric concerns the basic human activity
of reasoning and logos is put back into its centre. Formal logic is no longer
the exclusive domain for the development of human reasoning, since logic
leaves out the domain of language. The quest for reasonable arguments and
for acceptable compromises and solutions, within the plurality of opinions
and interests that forms the basis of the democratic debate, that’s what rhet-
oric is about.
According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, the link between style
and argument has been neglected or misunderstood all too often. From an-
tiquity onwards, rhetoricians were too busy setting up elaborate classification
systems for all kinds and modes of expressions that one way or another stood
out from the normal language use. Once the argumentative role of rhetorical
figures is disregarded, their study is reduced to a useless pastime, they claim,
narrowing down into a search for strange names for affected turns of speech,
put down in a classification system of rhetorical figures with no other func-
tion than the ornamental. Rhetorical figures can give an argument presence,
they claim; this is what links rhetoric as art of persuasion and rhetoric as tech-
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nique of literary expression. And indeed, how could, e.g., a hypotyposis, which
is a lively demonstration of a certain situation, not be part of an argumenta-
tive move, as it brings about a new presence in our minds? (Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, p. 167) To Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, it is im-
portant to ask how and in what respect the use of particular rhetorical figures
is explained by the requirements of argumentation.
Rhetorical figures need two necessary characteristics in order to be a
figure, they claim, the first being a discernable structure, or a form; and the
second a use that is different from the normal manner of expression, and in
this way attracts attention. This means that, in the right circumstances, any
structure could be considered a figure. On the other hand, not any uncom-
mon structure can be called a figure. But in what respect exactly should a use
be regarded as unusual? Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca suggest that this is the
case when a distinction between form and substance is perceived, because the
expression is recognized as not natural, not real, as a pretence.
The reader’s perception of this distinction is basic, and this is the point
where Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca let in the argumentative significance
of rhetorical figures. A figure is argumentative when this distinction between
form and substance is dissolved through the effect produced by the speech.
This means that a change should be brought about: “Forms which seem at
first to be used in an unusual manner may come to appear normal if their use
is justified by the speech taken as a whole”, they claim. A figure is argumen-
tative if it brings about a change of perspective, and its use seems normal in
relation to this new situation. So, only if the speech does not bring about the
possibility of adherence to the argumentative form, the figure will be per-
ceived as a mere figure of style: nice, original, poetic, but no part of the ar-
gument (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, p. 169).
It is important to notice that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca stress the
dynamic aspect and the change of perspective that rhetorical figures can bring
about. This is why rhetorical figures should never be studied in isolation or
separately, as if they were convertible elements, since this is precisely how
they lose their argumentative value, which makes it impossible to conceive of
“a step from the common to the uncommon, and a return to another order
of commonness, that created by the argument at the moment of its comple-
tion”. When rhetorical figures are put in a vertical, paradigmatic and static
contrast to some so-called normal or neutral expression, they are studied sep-
arately from the argument construction in a text (ibid. p. 171).
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In the second half of the 20th century, the rhetorical turn took place, and many
scholars (re)discovered rhetoric as a basis not only for speech production, but
also for text analysis, evaluation and discourse theories in general. The per-
suasive aspect of rhetorical figures has been recognised by many rhetoricians,
like, e.g., Olivier Reboul, who, unlike Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, is es-
pecially concerned about both the aesthetic and persuasive aspect of rhetor-
ical figures. Reboul doesn’t completely agree with Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca’s suggestion that rhetorical figures are condensed arguments. To him,
this theory is too intellectualistic, as it forgets the pleasure rhetorical figures
generally generate, either emotional or entertaining, but always in the range
of pathos (Reboul 1999, p. 122).
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca make a distinction between effective
argumentative rhetorical figures and mere ornamental, literary rhetorical fig-
ures, leaving literature a very marginal position. Reboul does not follow them
here, claiming that the main function of rhetoric is the creation of literary
prose and the study of functional aesthetics (Reboul 1999, pp. 72-73). How
could figuration be explained in terms of “écart”/“deviation”, Reboul won-
ders, since it is impossible to determine the norm, or to indicate normality
in a text. One shouldn’t appear at a wedding party in a bathing suit, he ex-
plains, but neither should one appear on the beach in a tuxedo. The norm is
a relative phenomenon. Reboul dismisses the popular idea of some zero de-
gree, the possibility to track down a rhetorical figure to its proper sense. A
figure does add sense to what is said; so if you do away with the figure, you
lose sense as well, he claims. A figure can’t be reduced to a useless or superfi-
cial language game with convertible elements. Moreover, in what way could
this idea of “deviation” explain the persuasiveness of an expression? Not when
the hearers distinctly appreciate it as a deviation, because precisely in that sit-
uation an expression is not persuasive. A figure should be richer, more ex-
pressive, even more exact and right than the so-called plain or zero degree or
neutral way of saying. Paradoxically, this way, the figure could be called the
norm, because it is the best way of putting something (ibid. pp. 74-77).
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca restored the link between style and ar-
gument, stressing the persuasive aspect and the dynamic power of rhetorical
figures. They refuse to treat rhetorical figures as if they were a collection of
extra’s one can add to a text. Reboul picks up their ideas on style and argu-
ment, but, in an answer to their struggle with the perception of the (un)com-
mon, claims that rhetorical figures are most persuasive when they’re not
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perceived as such. This basic idea of functionality is what Jeanne Fahnestock
(1999) tracks down in the earliest works on rhetoric.
10.4 The constitutive power of rhetorical figures
10.4.1 Rhetorical figures as extra value
Theories of figuration in the first place try to explain and categorize individ-
ual rhetorical figures, Fahnestock argues, but when it comes to figuration in
general and the notion that rhetorical figures form a departure from normal
language, we find a long history of theories. 
As a whole, value-added theories of the rhetorical figures have domi-
nated in the rhetorical tradition1, Fahnestock explains. The rhetorical figures
are considered to be sources of emotion, charm, vividness, force or elegance2.
The overall problem with value-added theories is that they often impose a
distinction between figurative and non-figurative language. This supposed
difference between unmarked and marked language has pushed the rhetori-
cal figures to the exclusive field of markers of the literary text, and made us
forget about any possible other function (ibid. p. 20).
Indeed, what could the norm for normal language be? And what does it
mean to claim that rhetorical figures are not typical? Fahnestock is sceptical
about the possibility of providing statistic evidence of typical (literal) versus
not typical (figurative) language without taking its context into consideration.
Most definitions carry an implicit division of language in them: literal lan-
guage on the one hand and figurative language on the other hand, as if one can
switch back and forth between two levels of reading and understanding. This
either/or-state theory isn’t very fruitful. Even ancient biblical hermeneutics,
with their simultaneous fourfold senses, did better (ibid.).
As for the added value of emotion, it is impossible to set an exclusive
figure/emotion connection, not only because emotion is very much a func-
1 Fahnestock also refers to the discussion about the Latin ornamentum that also means fur-
niture, equipment, which would bring ornament closer to the notion of essential gear and
armament than it is to adornment. Both interpretations keep the rhetorical figures on the
surface of language, though, as if they could easily be removed.
2 See also the traditional medieval icon for rhetoric as a woman whose dress is decorated
with flowers. Language is supposed to be the dress of thought, and the rhetorical figures are
the added embroidery (Fahnestock 1999, p. 18).
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tion of the larger rhetorical situation of an utterance, but also because it is un-
likely that anything at all could be said or heard without involving more or
less remarkable emotion. How could an emotional dimension be factored
out of an expression leaving a content behind? How could in the aposiopesis
figure, for instance, where the speaker stops in mid-sentence, the emotional
and argumentative value be separated? The suggested inexpressibility works
both on the emotional and material level.
10.4.2 Rhetorical figures as epitomes
All the work on added values reveals important functions of the rhetorical
figures, but none of them is exclusively constitutive of a text’s many meanings.
Rather, Fahnestock proposes, figure functions can be considered to exist
within a continuum of expressive possibilities. The figures of speech hold a
central position in rhetorical theory, she claims. It’s her point to study the
constitutive power of rhetorical figures and see how they are epitomized in
various lines of argument. All along, writers in the rhetorical tradition have
provided important “taxonomies of naturally occurring verbal devices and of
lines and methods of argument, and, more important, of the connection be-
tween or even identity of these two” (ibid. p. 7).
So, rhetorical figures can also be understood as epitomes of lines of
reasoning, as the formal embodiments of certain ideational or persuasive func-
tions. 
Associating certain verbal rhetorical figures with general lines of reasoning, called
‘topics’ in the rhetorical tradition, also assumes that it is possible to define these
lines or arguments in the first place, a notion that for contemporary readers with
no exposure to rhetoric may seem as odd as the rhetorical figures themselves.
(ibid. p. 23)
A traditional lexicon for lines of argument disappeared together with the cog-
nate notion of the rhetorical figures as epitomes of those lines. This notion
of the generic skills of rhetoric conflicts with our ideas of spontaneity of in-
vention based on complicated cognitive processes, and with the confinement
of procedures of method and argument to the specific disciplines or profes-
sions. But the popularity of the metaphor to generate analogical reasoning
could be a starting point for the assumption that human reasoning can fol-
low many more lines than analogy alone.
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Arguments that link form and function of the rhetorical figures can be
found all the way back to Aristotle, who in Rhetoric, Book III, nowhere claims
the rhetorical figures to be emotional, ornamental or epiphenomenal in any
other way. On the contrary, he “suggests that certain devices are compelling
because they map function onto form or perfectly epitomize certain patterns
of thought or argument” (ibid. p. 26). In his comments on the function of
asyndeton and polysyndeton, both adding meaning to a text, but also on
metaphor, antithesis and energeia he points out the functionality of those de-
vices, as they are perfect embodiments of the speaker’s intentions.
10.4.3 The role of history
The reason for the gradual separation of the two functions is the confusion
caused by the sequences of the rhetorical system, she claims, as if the differ-
ent aspects of speech construction represented chronological steps in com-
position. Also, certain subject matters grew more and more apart, locked up
in traditional methods and systems of teaching. Fahnestock mentions schol-
arly restorations that took place in the twentieth century: Kenneth Burke,
saw to the heart of the ability of the rhetorical figures to express a particular line of
argument and simultaneously to induce an audience to participate in that argu-
ment simply by virtue of their form. (ibid. p. 34) 
And of course, also Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca claimed
the argumentative role of rhetorical figures and re-established the link be-
tween the rhetorical figures and argumentation by dispersing the rhetorical
figures among the techniques of argumentation, thus confirming a view of
the rhetorical figures as the epitomes of certain durable lines of argument
(ibid. p. 36). 
By showing the conceptual or heuristic aspects of rhetorical figures,
Fahnestock aims at restoring their full rhetorical function. When studied in
their specific context and dynamism, style and argument elements prove to
be interdependent and inseparable in many ways. The notion that style ar-
gues opens up possibilities for careful rhetorical analysis of texts or genres. 
10.5 Columns and style
Both argument and style are basic features of newspaper columns. New stud-
ies on rhetoric reveal how style figures are not just to be seen as surplus fea-
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tures one can add to argument. Columns are not only interesting places to
discover how the rhetorical means of persuasion work, how logos, ethos and
pathos are intertwined in the structure of the argument; but they also show
how rhetorical figures cannot be locked up safely in an elaborate classification
system, ready to be fetched down from the shelves to serve as extras that add
aspects like pathos. On the contrary, they take part in the creation and ex-
pression of the argument itself. Consider this specific example, from a Flem-
ish columnist who is retorting someone’s attack on some local poetry project,
claiming it’s far too expensive and as such it is a waste of community money;
money that should better go to old and needy people.
The artist as a parasite:
[…]
Every single time an artist receives a little money, handicapped and retired people
are dragged into the picture. Why is that? In matters of waste, fraud, and inequal-
ity, is it really the artists that should be the first logical target? Are they the big
spenders with their millions hidden abroad? Or are they an easy target for pop-
ulists? The artist as a parasite, enemy of the people. Abolish art, pensions will rise.
[…]
(Tom Naegels, Spijkerschrift/De artiest als parasiet. The Standaard 09/30/2004
[transl. HvB])
An experienced reader at once detects an interesting set of rhetorical figures
in this passage: rhetorical question, comparison, hyperbole, allusion, sarcasm
and antithesis. They all serve in the line of argument that tries to lay bare and
counter the all too easy opposition between public well-being and art, and to
replace it by the new opposition between public well-being and the big
spenders with their millions hidden abroad. In the last sentence, the presenta-
tion of the argument in the antithetical construction is a convincing move,
not in the least made possible by the creation of what Reboul would call aes-
thetic functionality. It would be impossible and destructive to try to break
down this text into separate sets of rhetorical figures, or to try to peel off the
layers of pathos or ethos in order to end up with some basic or neutral or
zero-degree content or argument. Breaking down the text into the different
style figures and studying them apart from one another and from the line of
argument would be a kind of analysis that totally misses the core aspect of
columns: the match between style and argument. 
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Is this match typical for columns? Of course not. Style and rhetorical
figures are not restricted to literature or columns whatsoever. But columns are
the only places in the media where this correlation between the what and the
how of an argument is explicitly recognized and encouraged. They are typi-
cally well-demarcated places where the mere existence of style is explicitly al-
lowed, where ideas and arguments are not explicitly separated from ethos and
pathos, where aesthetic pleasure can be part of the persuasion. 
Opinion and analysis have become respectable activities in our western
world. Our columnists no longer need a grey zone of double-speak to protect
themselves from revenge. For the time being, this kind of indecision seems to
have disappeared more or less from our range of vision – although it should
be kept alive without any doubt. Clearly, the taboo on reasoning and argu-
ment has lost ground. I suggest that the matter of style is another kind of in-
decision that has come into play. 
News media go by the traditional understanding of literary style and
style figures as an extra value that can be added to a neutral text. As the sug-
gestion of clear and transparent representation of facts and ideas is crucial in
the production of news and opinion, any suggestion of a gap between form
and content raises suspicion. The quality newspaper is a place for plain facts
and clear opinions; newspaper articles obey to strict rules and style prescrip-
tions, rules that have to safeguard the quality of information and opinion.
The suggestion of direct transmission from an event to the reporting of it is
crucial; and the elements of choice and language are hidden under the sug-
gestion of total transparence. This so-called neutral reporting of facts that
can safeguard the idea of transparency is only possible in a form of writing
that is dominated by well defined traditions. In this kind of journalism, any
risk of too high a style level is carefully avoided. The element of style and the
creative power of language are taboo in traditional journalism. 
This might be a contemporary function of columns: they make up for
the (necessary) blind spot in journalism; i.e., the fact that transparency (neu-
trality, normality) is the effect of a very strict and traditional low style of writ-
ing. This way, columns are not so much free spaces for political ideas, but
rather free spaces away from the very strict style prescriptions and traditions
in the rest of the paper. They are places of real human creativity, playful or
grim exercises in thinking and writing, and in that way, they’re always places
of risk.
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10.6 Conclusion
Two final conclusions I want to draw: the first is pedagogical, the second is
of a more theoretical kind. As for the pedagogical consequences of my find-
ings, I want to stress the hermeneutic aspect of text analysis. To read and in-
terpret texts as a whole often seems to come down to an old fashioned,
scholastic, “passive” way of analysis. Yet, looking for the (in)coherence be-
tween context, argument, structure, formulation and presentation of a text
is an essential aspect of analysis and this art should not be minimized or
neglected. 
And here is where the theoretical aspect comes in. The most interest-
ing aspect of this “Rhetoric in society” question to me is the correlation be-
tween empirical sciences and hermeneutic praxis. A scientific analysis of texts
always aims at abstraction from the actual written or spoken form, in order
to look for general rules. The rhetorical praxis is different, since the focus lies
on the appreciation and evaluation of the text as a whole. Rhetorical analy-
sis is a specific activity, a kind of praxis. And columns provide an exemplary
invitation to this kind of praxis.
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11 If This Goes On …: The Rhetorical
Construction of Future Problems
joel best
11.1  Introduction
People who hope to draw attention to social problems find themselves com-
peting in a sort of social problems marketplace (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988,
Best 2008). Rhetoric is central to this process; the most compelling claims
attract concern from the press, the public and policymakers. Most often, so-
ciologists study claims that depict problems of the present, arguments that
some contemporary condition causes harm, that this is intolerable, and that
something ought to be done to solve the problem. Such claims address the
question: “What’s wrong?” Less common are claims that construct past prob-
lems, what we might characterize as postmortem attempts to answer
“What went wrong?” (Lewis 2003).
This chapter focuses on a third type of social problems claim: predic-
tive claims about the future, claims about what could – or will – go wrong
unless action is taken. History – and literature – is filled with prophets, seers
and other people foretelling the future or warning about impending crises.
In many cases, we can compare their predictions with what actually hap-
pened; so we can say that some of those predictions proved to be accurate,
while others turned out to be misguided. It is more difficult to assess today’s
claims about tomorrow’s problems. At any given moment, there are plenty
of folks telling us that trouble lies ahead. They compete in a social problems
“futures market”, each trying to convince us to worry about their vision of
what is to come. Of course, we may give more credence to some predictive
claims, and less to others. When large numbers of scientists argue that global
temperatures are likely to rise during the coming century, they are making a
predictive claim, but then so are the people warning that the Mayan calen-
dar indicates the world will end in 2012. Still, few people give these two fore-
casts equal weight.
[  2 0 3 ]
LUP Bending Opinion Boek_Layout 2  27-01-11  14:46  Pagina 203
best
11.2 The rhetoric of future claims
Future claims are rhetorically interesting. They vary of course. They evoke a
wide range of rationales and authorities, including divine revelation, prog-
nostications of soothsayers, models derived from natural or social science,
speculation about possible worst-case scenarios, etc. Their intended audiences
may range from small groups of true believers, to powerful policymakers, to
the general – even global – public. But all predictive claims have one impor-
tant feature in common: they are always subject to challenge and dispute.
Critics, skeptics, and in fact pretty much anyone can question how – or
whether – one can actually know what the future holds, and it is always pos-
sible to cast doubt on a particular forecast. Future claims lead to debates be-
tween prophets and skeptics, between urgent calls for action and doubts about
the very reality of the threat. Thus, there is rhetoric that predicts future prob-
lems, and counter-rhetoric that calls those claims into question.
Of course, claims about the problems of the present and the past are
also subject to dispute, but the inherent uncertainty regarding what the fu-
ture holds makes the rhetoric of predictive claims particularly interesting.
This is a topic of more than academic interest. In the aftermath of catastro-
phe, we may puzzle over why people failed to heed the warnings they were
given. Explaining why some claims or counterclaims succeed or fail is central
to the study of rhetoric. In particular, debates over future claims tend to re-
volve around four issues of uncertainty – prediction, magnitude, probability,
and timing. This chapter begins by considering each of these issues in turn.
11.2.1 Prediction: What’s going to be the problem?
By definition, every predictive claim forecasts what the future holds. Many
predictions are grounded in measurements; they envision that an observable
trend will continue, or perhaps that it will change in some predictable way,
for instance, grow at some increasing rate. Such predictions extrapolate from
data about the past and present them as a basis for forecasting the future:
things used to be not so bad, but today they are worse, and we can project that
they will continue to get worse into the future. We are all familiar with such
data-based projections: forecasts that the world population could reach 7.4 or
8.9 or even 10.6 billion by the middle of this century; that the world’s oil pro-
duction will peak within the next ten years; that average global temperature
will increase between 1.1 and 6.4ºC by century’s end. These arguments use the
language of trends and data as rhetoric. They often invoke scientists and other
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experts, people who are understood to be capable, not just of accurately meas-
uring the trends that led to today’s situation, but of being qualified to proj-
ect those trends into the future. We live in an era – and in a part of the world
– when scientists’ judgments tend to be considered authoritative, as our most
reliable means of predicting the future. In turn, experts trade on this author-
ity, using their professional credentials to bolster their predictions.
However, even apparently authoritative data-based claims are subject
to dispute. Counterclaims may challenge the data, and argue that the way
the trend is being measured or projected isn’t all that accurate. Or they may
suggest that the experts disagree, that not all scientists are convinced that the
predictions are correct. Or they may point to embarrassing instances when
supposedly data-based predictions proved to be wildly off the mark (such as
some climate scientists’ well-publicized warnings during the 1970s about
global cooling). If experts’ trend-based predictions have been erroneous in
the past, why should we believe them this time? In some cases, a discipline’s
track record in making predictions may be spotty enough to warrant reser-
vations about its authority to accurately forecast what will come (here, eco-
nomics comes to mind). And, of course, it is always possible for some critics
to dismiss the very authority of science, to argue that we need to turn to other
guides (such as holy texts) to understand the future.
Trend-based claims invite relatively open debate centered on issues of
evidence. Being able to measure something over time, to say that the prob-
lem was at Level A ten years ago, and at Level B five years ago, and at Level
C today, suggests that it may reach Level D in five more years. We assume that
there is some factor or set of factors that causes this trend, and that the
processes that have produced change in the past will continue to work, lead-
ing to a foreseeable outcome. While critics may challenge these measurements
and assumptions, there is at least some agreement about what is at issue.
Arguments over global warming – at least in my country – illustrate ar-
guments over data-based predictions. Over the years, skeptics have argued
that the evidence regarding global warming was ambiguous, that not all sci-
entists agreed that global warming was occurring, that some of those experts
who concurred that temperatures were increasing were unconvinced that this
was caused by humans’ activities, and so on. In response, those most active
in warning about global warming emphasized that increasing evidence that
supported their claims, that there was growing consensus among experts that
the threat was real, and so on (McCright and Dunlap 2003; Spencer 2007).
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These are fundamentally arguments rooted in a rhetoric of authority. Most
of us – and this includes most policymakers – are utterly unqualified to as-
sess the evidence presented by scientific authorities; in fact, few scientists are
well qualified to evaluate evidence produced by colleagues in other speciali-
ties, let alone disciplines. Thus, the issue becomes, not just should we believe
– and act upon – forecasts made by people with scientific authority, but
should we believe the reports we are given that claim to represent what those
authorities are saying?
Of course, not all predictions rely on trends. In some cases there are
forecasts of very rare, or unprecedented, or even unique events, so that it is
impossible to construct a credible trend. Here, claims argue that something
– the Second Coming, a terrible disaster, a new discovery, whatever – will
change the world in ways that make current trends irrelevant. Such predic-
tive claims are much harder to assess: What is the reasoning that justifies this
prediction? What authority do those making this claim have? It is easier to
construct such claims, but also easier to dispute them. In most of these cases,
the rhetorics of both claims and counterclaims focus, not on the nature of
problem, but on other key questions.
11.2.2 Magnitude: How big will the problem be?
Claiming that things will get worse is just the first element in predictive rhet-
oric. A second concerns the scope, or magnitude of the problem. Just how bad
will things get? Because future claims must compete for our attention with
one another (and with all of the present claims about today’s problems), the
most compelling claims tend to predict that things will get very, very bad.
The more ghastly the forecast, the more likely people will listen.
The twentieth century raised our threshold for what constitutes a re-
ally bad problem. Improved communication and transportation linked peo-
ple around the globe, enabling bad news to travel farther and faster. Looking
back, we see an impressive array of catastrophes: a global influenza epidemic
(more than 20 million deaths); a worldwide economic depression; two world
wars and dozens of lesser conflicts (accounting for perhaps 100 million
deaths); highly rationalized systems of political repression (that killed tens of
millions more); the emergence of vastly more efficient, more lethal weapons
(with previously unimaginable killing capacity); a sudden leap in overall pop-
ulation; and so on. The collective sense of just how bad things could get
would never be the same.
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In response, during the second half of the twentieth century, people in-
creasingly worried that the future might hold really big problems. Dystopian
literature and popular culture flourished, but so did frightening projections
by sober, expert authorities. For more than sixty years, for instance, the logo
for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has been a “doomsday clock” that at-
tempts to assess the precarious state of humankind. The clock is periodically
reset, as current events make the world’s prospects seem somewhat better or
worse, but the hands have always shown just a few minutes until midnight.
We have become aware of a variety of doomsday scenarios:
• The first, of course, involves the threat of a nuclear world war – hor-
rific explosions killing hundreds of millions, followed by radiation
poisoning killing hundreds of millions more. In the 1990s, there were
arguments that the greatest danger might come from nuclear winter
– dust clouds caused by explosions blocking sunlight, suddenly low-
ering global temperatures, wiping out most plant life, and leading to
the starvation of most of those who survived the explosions and the
radiation.
• There were also the various ecological threats associated with popula-
tion, resources and environment. There was a choice of mechanisms
that could cause it all to end. Overpopulation? Depletion of vital re-
sources? Pollution? The current concern with climate change is just
one scenario within this variety of doomsday thinking. 
• There were new medical menaces – the possibilities of horrific, un-
treatable diseases spreading by air travel into sudden, global pandemics.
hiv/aids made the threat seem plausible and invited the most dramatic
projections. For instance, one book devoted to warning about the
2005-06 avian flu suggested that “the true worst-case scenario . . . [is]
in the range of 1 billion deaths” (Davis 2005, p. 126 – emphasis in orig-
inal). Even if the losses from that year’s bird flu – and from Ebola, sars,
and West Nile virus – failed to live up to the most frightening forecasts,
it is easy to claim that the next epidemic (such as the form of swine flu
that began spreading in 2009) might prove much worse. 
• There was the prospect of an economic collapse. Could an increasingly
interconnected world economy remain stable? In a densely populated,
interdependent world, a failing economy could in turn unleash all four
horsemen of the apocalypse – famine, disease, war and death.
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• And there were fears that our reliance on increasingly sophisticated tech-
nology might lead to ruin. Innovations such as cell phones or Franken-
foods might have devastating consequences. The world may have
circumvented to the world-ending threats posed by Y2K or cern’s Large
Haldron Collider, but what of a robot uprising? Or of nanotechnology
producing “gray goo” that would envelope the entire planet?
• Finally, in recent years, there has been increasing attention to the pos-
sibilities of huge natural disasters. Forget hurricanes and tsunamis.
Think big. Do you realize that a major collision with a large meteor or
asteroid – or an eruption of, say, the super-volcano beneath Wyoming
– have the power to kill off most species? Again, these are scenarios
that emphasize the possibility that dust or ash filling the atmosphere
could block sunlight and thereby lead to the extinction of most plant
and animal species. The growing scientific consensus that a wayward
asteroid killed off the dinosaurs has attracted considerable attention to
this possibility. 
This is rhetoric to reckon with. These are predictive claims that warn of “an end
to civilization,” “an end to life as we know it,” “an end to life itself.” In a world
that now holds about seven billion people who are increasingly dependent on
technology and interlocking political and economic systems, the possibility
that trouble could spread and, in the process, topple one key element in the so-
cial system after another allows us to envision horrific possibilities.
Counterclaims often focus on the sophistication and resilience of mod-
ern social systems, on their capacity to keep small problems from growing
out of control. Our knowledge of medicine or economics is greater than in
the past, giving us the capacity to minimize the damage caused – or even, in
some cases, to prevent the problem from occurring. Pandemic influenza may
have killed tens of millions in the aftermath of the Great War, but modern
medicine is more sophisticated, and probably able to avoid a repetition of
that catastrophe. Or is it?
11.2.3 Probability: How likely is it that the problem will occur?
Future claims depict possibilities, things that might happen. But, skeptics
may counter, what about probabilities? What is the likelihood that some sce-
nario will occur? Is it worth worrying about something that is extremely un-
likely to happen?
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The most compelling response to such doubts is to argue that a pro-
jected future is certain – or nearly certain – to occur. Perhaps the forecast
comes from an arguably unimpeachable authority – holy writ, or people
whose expertise is generally accepted. In some cases, claims insist that some
outcome is inevitable over the long haul – at some point, Earth will surely col-
lide with another wayward asteroid – although advocates concede they can-
not predict just when the problem will occur.
Where a threat cannot be depicted as certain – at least not in the short
run – advocates may try to estimate the chances of the problem occurring.
Obviously, the better the chances, the more forceful the claim:
The odds that a potentially devastating space rock will hit Earth this century may
be as high as one in 10. (Easterbrook 2008, p. 74)
California has more than a 99% chance of having a magnitude 6.7 or larger earth-
quake within the next 30 years. . . (ScienceDaily 2008)
Such efforts to quantify probability often may be found in scientific model-
ing, where experts present calculations suggesting a range of likely outcomes,
based on different assumptions about what might occur. Thus, we have al-
ready noted that projections for future world population growth or global
warming are often presented as ranges – with the understanding that the fu-
ture is likely to produce something between the highest and lowest estimates
considered plausible.
Questions of probability also figure into counterclaims. One obvious
critique of predictions of extremely rare threats, such as asteroid strikes or
super-volcano eruptions, is to simply agree: yes, these things happen, but they
don’t happen very often, the next event might be thousands, or tens of thou-
sands of years in the future, and there isn’t a whole lot we could do about it
in any case, so let’s not worry about it. In other words, the probability of the
problem occurring within the reasonably near future is so small that, critics
argue, the risk can be ignored. 
A common response to such criticism is to argue that, even if the
prospect is remote, the downside risk is too great to ignore. The chance of
some outcome occurring may be very small, but so long as the threat is suf-
ficiently grave, it cannot be ignored. Perhaps, if disaster arrives sufficiently far
in the future, we can find ways to circumvent it; science fiction has long imag-
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ined that humans will seek to spread beyond the solar system, if only to es-
cape their dependence on an aging Sun. In the shorter run, we should seek
to minimize our risks. Although most scientists agreed that operating the
Large Haldron Collider would not cause a mini-black hole that would destroy
the planet, the project’s critics insisted that, so long as there was even a tiny,
remote possibility that a world-ending catastrophe might result, we could ill
afford to take that chance. Such rhetoric demands that we take every dooms-
day prediction – even the most unlikely – seriously.
11.2.4 Timing: When will the problem occur?
Perhaps the most impressive formulation for a predictive claim is to argue, not
just that a big problem will inevitably occur, but that it will take place on a
particular date. Thus, according to some interpretations, the Mayan calendar
forecasts the end of the world on December 21, 2012. This is an impressive va-
riety of claim, in that it argues that (1) a very big problem (such as the end of
the world) is (2) certain to occur and (3) on a specified date (4) in the near
future. Of course, the Mayan prediction is hardly unique. There have been
any number of time-certain, end-of-the-world predictions over the years;
most often, these have been associated with particular religious beliefs, but
secular versions are possible (as evidenced by Y2K fears). Such predictions are
the subject of a sociological literature, where observers study the reactions of
the faithful when the world does not end on schedule; it turns out the true
believers have little difficulty adjusting to the world’s continued existence
while maintaining their beliefs. The Jehovah’s Witnesses, for instance, rallied
around five specific predictions that the world would end in 1878, 1881, 1914,
1918, and 1925, yet managed to endure when each forecast proved mistaken
(Zygmunt 1970).
A slightly different set of future claims insists that catastrophe is in-
evitable, although it acknowledges that the precise date cannot be known.
Often, these claims feature rhetoric that suggests that the big problem is due,
perhaps even overdue:
[According to] Nature, perhaps the world’s most respected science journal … at
least three-quarters of Earth’s species are wiped out every 62 to 65 million years. It
has been 65 million years since the Cretaceous-Tertiary disaster extinguished the di-
nosaurs, meaning that we are now overdue for a cataclysm that will without doubt
reduce our population by at least half … (Joseph 2007, p. 12)
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Similarly, there were major eruptions of the super-volcano beneath Yellow-
stone National Park about 2 million, 1.3 million and 630,000 years ago, so the
next event might occur any time now.
The problem with such formulations is that threats that occur on a
schedule that can only be measured on a geological time scale lack a certain
urgency. More pressing are future claims that depict threats that occur far
more frequently, such as severe flu epidemics, or earthquakes on major fault
lines. Here, claims tend to emphasize the near-certainty that there will be a
problem in the not-too-distant future; there may be attempts to quantify the
risk, preferably in seemingly urgent terms: “Seismic experts say a quake this
size [7.8 on the Richter Scale] thumps the [Los Angeles] area every 150 years
– and the last one occurred 151 years ago,” (Los Angeles Times 2008, C11). Such
claims warn that a problem is not just predictable, but inevitable, and that it
can be expected to emerge in the near future.
Alternative quantitative formulations adopt a slightly longer view. At
least in the United States, flood-control engineers speak of 100-year floods,
meaning water levels likely to be attained on average once per century; there
may be calculations that it makes economic sense to build flood-control struc-
tures designed to contain a 100-year flood, while the costs of building to with-
stand a 500-year flood are considered prohibitive. 
Yet another way to address the question of timing is to check off warn-
ing signs. Evangelical Christians, for instance, have long sought to interpret
real-world events as the signs of Christ’s imminent return, as forecast in the
somewhat oblique language of the Book of Revelations. The appearance of
the anti-Christ, for instance, has been heralded in the rise of such figures as
John Lennon, Mick Jagger, Bill Clinton and, of course, Barack Obama. To the
degree that some predictions in Revelations seem to have been borne out,
then surely the remaining forecasts must also be true, and can be expected to
be fulfilled very soon. (Similarly, followers of other seers, such as Nos-
tradamus, point to their uncanny records of accurate predictions [when prop-
erly interpreted].)
In sum, warnings about future problems – and resistance to those
warnings – revolve around issues of what is being predicted, the prospective
magnitude of the problem, its probability of occurring, and the timing of its
arrival. Advocates argue there are reasons to be concerned – to anticipate cer-
tain problems, to worry that they will be large, that they are quite likely to
occur, and this will happen soon. Skeptics doubt that the predictions will be
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fulfilled – the projected problem may not emerge, or if it does develop, it
won’t be as severe or happen as soon as forecast. As forms of rhetoric, debates
over what might seem to be very different issues – warnings grounded in, say,
climate science and interpretations of the Mayan calendar – are actually fairly
similar.
11.3 The consequences of rhetoric about future problems
The fact that there are so many predictions of future problems, and that they
must compete for the attention of the public, the press and policymakers,
means that that competition pits rival future claims against not only one an-
other, but also the many claims about pressing present problems. This com-
petition encourages alarmist rhetoric. With so many claims clamoring to be
treated as priorities, advocates need to frame issues in the most dramatic
terms: this is what is going to happen; it will be a very big problem; it is very
likely to occur; and it will happen in the very near future. Such a threat ar-
guably demands quick action. Inaction or delay will have catastrophic con-
sequences. Half-measures won’t work. The only salvation lies in an
immediate, fully committed response.
These arguments often draw lessons from history. Look what happened
to those who ignored predictions that came true. Look at the fates of those
who assumed that the future would be no different from the past, who did-
n’t understand the need to confront the impending danger. Their failures,
the disasters that overtook them, offer proof that not heeding warnings –
whether through arrogance or indifference or ignorance or whatever – can be
catastrophic. We cannot afford not to act. This rhetoric always seems quite
compelling to those who accept the arguments, and the authority of those
making the claims. They believe the warning, and probably view the source
as authoritative, the evidence as compelling, the logic as convincing. They
support taking action. 
On the other hand, not everyone will be so receptive. There will al-
most certainly be counterclaims promoted by critics and skeptics, people who
remain un-persuaded by the claim’s rhetoric, who discount the source or the
evidence. This reaction may take the form of wholesale rejection: probably
most people who receive the news that the Mayan calendar forecasts big – and
probably really bad – things for 2012 simply shrug and ignore the warning.
More interesting are those folks who concede that a prediction may be valid,
but don’t get caught up in the urgency.
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Consider, for example, earthquake preparedness. Los Angeles and San
Francisco are major cities built on major seismic fault lines. Both have expe-
rienced devastating quakes in the past, and all of the seismological authori-
ties agree that there are other jolts in both cities’ futures. For decades,
authorities have been distributing advice on how to be prepared for an earth-
quake; in particular, they urge citizens to have emergency kits in their homes
and cars – packs stocked with flashlights, bottled water, and so on. Now vir-
tually everyone who lives in those cities knows that there is a real earthquake
danger; they talk about “The Big One”, and make jokes about California
falling into the ocean. This is not a matter of debate; I don’t know of any
earthquake skeptics. Yet only a small fraction of the citizens in these cities ac-
tually have earthquake kits. I have a colleague, a world-renowned sociologist
who specializes in the study of disasters, the co-author of an important book
on the challenges earthquake preparedness poses for Los Angeles policymak-
ers, who lived in LA for years; she did not have an earthquake emergency kit.
If asked, most Southern Californians will concede that a major quake could
occur at any time, but they also know that the odds are it won’t happen today
or tomorrow. There’s plenty of time to get prepared – someday.
We might dismiss this as the foolhardiness of an ill-informed public.
But policymakers sometimes adopt an analogous sort of reasoning. Consider
all of the criticism after Hurricane Katrina flooded New Orleans in 2005. It
turned out there was a lengthy history of people warning that the city’s lev-
ees needed attention; there were repeated warnings that, when a major hur-
ricane next struck the New Orleans area, the levees would likely fail, and
those making the warnings noted that, sooner or later, such a hurricane would
certainly arrive. And yet, levee maintenance was not policymakers’ top pri-
ority. Fixing levees is an expensive business; it costs a lot of money, and there
is stiff competition for those dollars, with lots of other claims arguing that
there are more urgent needs for that money. It is easy to imagine policymak-
ers thinking that, while we’ll certainly need those levees someday, they’re not
unlike earthquake kits, in that we probably won’t need them this year, be-
cause there’s only a tiny chance that there’ll be a major, levee-threatening hur-
ricane this season. Why not spend that money on this year’s most pressing
needs, and turn our attention to the levees next year? And the next year, of
course, they could make the same calculations; year after year they gambled
(always with the short-run odds in their favor), until they finally suffered a
spectacular loss.
[  2 1 3 ]
LUP Bending Opinion Boek_Layout 2  27-01-11  14:46  Pagina 213
best
Obviously, it is easy to view this as a rather blatant policy failure, but
it is hardly unique, at least in the United States. My parents married imme-
diately after the Second World War ended, and I showed up 51 weeks later. I
was, then, a first-year Baby Boomer, one of 3.47 million American infants
born in 1946. Just a few months before I’m told the Mayan calendar forecasts
the end of the world, I will be eligible for Social Security. For more than sixty
years, policymakers have known with considerable accuracy how many
boomers are out there, and when they will be able to collect Social Security.
This is not very speculative: the demographic information is readily available
and generally accepted; simple arithmetic can estimate how much money will
be needed. Yet, over the years, in spite of numerous warnings, my country’s
policymakers have chosen to address more urgent problems first, and thereby
allowed the Social Security system to develop serious problems. The failures
to convince ordinary Angelenos to assemble earthquake preparedness kits,
like the failures of policymakers to maintain the levees in New Orleans and
the Social Security Trust Fund, suggest a first problem with future claims:
they describe the future – a future that isn’t here, that may not arrive anytime
soon, and that seems less pressing than other, immediate claims on our at-
tention and resources. Even when everyone accepts a bleak forecast, unless the
threat seems immediate, it is hard to get people to take action.
Precisely because it is difficult to mobilize people to address the prob-
lems of the future, those who make predictive claims find themselves look-
ing for ways to make their warnings more competitive in the social problems
marketplace, more likely to attract attention, arouse concern and move more
people to take action. Karen Cerulo speaks of “caldrons” – “a context in which
competition is always bubbling; alliances are fluid; social bonds are constantly
forming and reforming in accord with groups’ and individuals’ current in-
terests and goals” (2006, p. 156). The public sphere is one such caldron. In
such circumstances, it’s hard to get people to pay attention and stay focused
on your predictive claims. The obvious solution is to devise more compelling
rhetoric, to create dramatic arguments that will frighten the audience into
taking action. Thus, advocates – who, after all, may be perfectly sincere in
their belief that they have identified an important future problem – find it
useful to emphasize the problem’s magnitude (that is, to suggest that it will
be very large), its likelihood (that is, to claim that it is very likely to occur),
and its proximity (that is, to suggest that it will arrive sooner, rather than
later). It is easier to convince people to worry about a giant problem that is
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certain to appear in the immediate future, than to get them concerned about
a problem of uncertain size, that is more-or-less likely to occur sometime
(who knows when) in the future.
There are, then, powerful incentives to ramp up the rhetoric, to start
talking about doomsday scenarios in order to grab people’s attention. This
may help explain why history is littered with apocalyptic predictions that
never came true. But, of course, the memory of those erroneous forecasts can
be used to construct counterclaims. If there have been many mistaken warn-
ings in the past, why shouldn’t we suspect that today’s warnings will also prove
to be exaggerated? Moreover, the more powerful the rhetoric, the more likely
it will be disconfirmed. Forecasting a huge problem means that the occur-
rence of even a somewhat smaller problem serves to discredit the claim. As-
signing a high probability to catastrophe casts doubt on the claim so long as
the event does not occur. Predicting that a problem will arrive on a particu-
lar date – or within the very near future – makes it easier to disconfirm the
prediction. In other words, the more powerful the rhetoric, the less credible
the claim is likely to seem so long as the prediction is unfulfilled. In the face
of those doubts, there is a powerful temptation to overcome the resistance
by devising even more powerful rhetoric, launching a new cycle of even more
extreme predictions that, in turn, inspire further doubt.
In recent years, scholars have tried to better understand the dynam-
ics of failing social systems. History offers us plenty of examples of collapse,
of political empires or religious beliefs that succeeded, expanded across con-
tinents and endured over centuries, their successes embodied in great palaces
and splendid temples, only to wither. Recently, Jared Diamond published
Collapse (2005), a thick volume that examines the failure of nearly a dozen
social systems (including the Mayans) that endured for at least four hundred
years (that is, they lasted at least as long as English speakers have inhabited
North America). Diamond is most interested in accounts of collapse caused
by ecological crises, by civilizations that exhausted their resources or found
themselves constrained by climate change. For example, he argues that the
global cooling cycle that began around 1300 (the onset of what is now rec-
ognized as the Little Ice Age), eventually forced Norse settlers to abandon
their colony on Greenland. The cooler weather caused other, less dramatic,
but arguably more consequential changes in Europe and Asia. Philip Jenk-
ins (2008) notes how colder temperatures reduced harvests, which
prompted famine and plague: “Whatever the religious coloring of particu-
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lar societies, this was a world that directly attributed changes in weather or
harvest to divine will, and it seemed natural to blame catastrophes on the
misdeeds of religious deviant minorities who angered God” (pp. 136-37).
Thus, the cooler weather led to Western European pogroms that decimated
the Jewish population, while Christian minorities in several Muslim soci-
eties suffered severe losses. The link between climate change and religious
persecution – hardly self-evident – illustrates that future problems may take
unpredictable forms.
In fact, Diamond argues that history shows elites often being oblivious
to warnings – whether in the form of predictive claims or empirical evidence
that a society is becoming hard-pressed. Often short-run advantages to ig-
noring the danger seem more pressing than forecasts of doom to come. Add
the fact that predictions are often exaggerated, imperfect, or incomplete, and
it is not difficult to justify ignoring the rhetoric of warning.
Postmortem analyses of what went wrong often address whether any-
one predicted that the problem would come to pass and it is easy to point to
cases when the danger was anticipated in at least some quarters, yet action was
not taken. In retrospect, it seems natural to criticize these failures to ward off
the impending threat. Most critiques tend to blame policymakers for failing
to act in the face of warnings. However, focusing on the rhetoric of future
claims invites us to consider why some claims inspire action, while others are
dismissed. What is it about the ways claims are presented, and about the ways
that their audiences interpret these messages that leads to different outcomes?
Understanding how we assess the risks of the future may help us avoid hav-
ing regrets about the past.
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12 Exploring Everyday Ethos 
Ethos Techniques in Online Discussions 
about Extraordinary Experiences
peter burger and lotte anemaet
12.1  Introduction: Bianca’s story1
One Saturday night in May 2004, Bianca, a Dutch teenager, had a fright-
ening experience at a dance party. Although she had had no drinks beyond
the usual (“five Vodka Red Bull cocktails”),2 she suddenly started to shake
all over, her vision blurred and her heart raced. She suspected that someone
had drugged her drink, but she could not be sure. Sharing her worries with
the crowd at Partyflock, a thriving Dutch Internet community for dance par-
ty enthusiasts, she ends her first message: “Does anyone know what could
have caused this?”
Bianca knew in advance that she would meet with both sympathy and
a fair amount of skepticism, since drink spiking is a controversial issue among
Dutch adolescents: some are convinced that it is a genuine crime problem,
others that it is a combination of urban legend and hysteria (Hulsebosch et
al. 2008). Bianca’s audience was not present at the party, so they have to take
her words on faith – as do we. In order to elicit sympathy, Bianca has to con-
vince others that she is a reasonable, likeable person, and a trustworthy wit-
ness to that night’s events. To pre-empt the argument that she must have been
drunk, she volunteers information about her alcohol intake, which does not
exceed the limits deemed acceptable among Partyflock visitors. She also states
her suspicions with caution: “I’m certainly not the one to jump to the con-
clusion that drugs were slipped into my drink, but I was just sooo scared.”
In rhetorical terms, Bianca has to establish ethos to convince her audience
that something extraordinary has happened to her. 
1 Thanks to Jaap de Jong for his contribution to this chapter.
2 All translations from the Dutch are by the authors.
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Like Bianca, millions of people use the Internet to share experiences and
debate all sorts of issues. Whether or not this constitutes an extension of the
public sphere (Habermas 1989) is itself a matter of debate (Dahlberg 2001; Pap-
pacharissi 2002; Warnick 2007, pp. 1-23; Witschge 2007). Some have welcomed
newsgroups, blogs and web-based discussion boards as new public arenas, of-
fering universal access and a more level playing field, others doubt the Inter-
net’s democratic potential and possibilities for deliberative discourse. 
Perhaps topic starters like Bianca are not looking for debate. The very first
thing they crave for is a reply. Getting a reply, let alone generate a discussion is
quite an achievement in itself: in a study of 40,931 messages in 99 Usenet news-
groups it was found that 43 percent of the topic starters never received a reply;
similar percentages were found in other studies (Burke et al. 2007). Using in-
troductions and making requests raised the likelihood of receiving replies. This
in turn has important group cohesion effects: posters who received a reply, par-
ticularly if they were newbies, were more likely to post again (Burke et al. 2007).
Although Burke et al. label these introductions and requests as rhetori-
cal strategies, they eschew the framework of classical rhetoric. This is sympto-
matic for the study of online rhetoric: although this topic has come in for some
scholarly attention (Enos and Borrowman 2001; Warnick 2007), the rhetori-
cians in this field are few and far between. However, given the prominence of
the online world as an arena for public rhetoric, and, as we will argue, the abun-
dance and ready availability of excellent research materials it offers, this prom-
ising topic is well worth the consideration of rhetoricians.
The present study explores the use of ethos in online discussions. To jus-
tify our focus on ethos, we might call to mind Aristotle’s view that this is the
most persuasive of the three modes of persuasion (Aristotle 1974, pp. 100-101;
Braet 2007, p. 50). Hence our research questions: What model can be used
to study the ethos aspects of online discussions? What ethos techniques are
used in the present sample of online discussions about drink spiking? And fi-
nally, do ethos techniques described in the classical literature possess real life
– or rather, virtual life – validity? 
12.2  Drink spiking as crime legend
Discussions about drink spiking among Dutch adolescents offer a convenient
point of entry into the study of online ethos. Drink spiking and drug rape emerged
during the 1990s as an international crime problem. In bars and at dance par-
ties, young women are allegedly drugged and subsequently abused. The so-called
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rape drugs or date rape drugs mentioned most frequently are ghb and Rohypnol
(or “roofies”). In spite of widespread concerns among adolescents and dire warn-
ings by prevention agencies and police forces, however, forensic experts and a
number of police officials remain unconvinced (Beynon et al. 2008; Burgess,
Donovan and Moore 2009). The alleged effects of rape drugs, they claim, are
merely the mistaken symptoms of unacknowledged alcohol abuse. This con-
troversy also exists at the popular level of blogs and digital discussion boards. 
The present study is part of a larger research project concerning the so-
cial construction of new crimes in various media and the relations between
crime news and folklore (e.g., Burger 2009). Why folklore? Folklore is the realm
of unofficial knowledge and informal stories. Stories and discussions about in-
stances of drink spiking can be studied as belonging to the genre of legend.
Traditionally viewed as narratives about man meeting the Other World, e.g.,
ghosts, vampires and aliens, in the opinion of a number of scholars (e.g., Best
and Horiuchi 1984; Best and Hutchinson 1996; Donovan 2002) legend also
encompasses stories about ordinary people meeting the Underworld. 
In these crime legends, ordinary persons experience the extraordinary
in the shape of organ thieves, hook-handed maniacs, or drug rapists. These
narratives may be told as personal experience stories or as second-hand or third-
hand tales, attributed to the proverbial ‘friend of a friend’, hence ‘foaf tales’
(Dale 1978). Legends are truth claims in narrative form, which typically en-
gender debate. As such, these legends provide ample opportunity for study-
ing ethos in action. 
The online sample used in this study was assembled for a previous study
of logos in drink spiking discussions that sought to answer the question what
arguments discussion participants used to argue their belief, disbelief or par-
tial belief in the threat of drink spiking (Hulsebosch et al. 2008). A threefold
typology of crime legend belief and disbelief was used (Donovan 2002, 2004),
that distinguishes between debunking (“It’s a hoax / an urban legend / a case
of hysteria”), fervent belief (“It’s true! This is just the tip the iceberg!”) and so-
called instrumental or conditional belief (“Given the state of the world, it could
be true, and even if it isn’t, one can never be too careful”). From the quanti-
tative content analysis of frequently used arguments, a fourth type emerged:
experiential belief (“I know it’s true, because it happened to me”).
A breakdown of the arguments into the broad categories of those for
and those against belief in the reality of drink spiking allegations, shows a neat,
almost even distribution (figure 12.1). A closer look at the arguments on the
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figure 12.1 arguments (n=503) used in online discussions about drink
spiking (54 threads)
believing side shows them to be an uneven mix, in which those expressing fer-
vent belief were negligible, whereas those expressing instrumental and expe-
riential belief accounted for the majority of arguments.
From the study of logos in drink spiking discussions we can deduce that
Bianca, and other believers, could expect strong opposition to their claims of
having been spiked. Before we can answer the question how they established
ethos, and how their adversaries tried to bolster their own ethos as they were
trying to undermine the believers’ ethos, we turn to the insights of the schol-
ars who tilled this field before us. 
12.3  Studying ethos: Aristotle and beyond
In order to study the ethos techniques used in the discussions under consid-
eration, we did not have to start from scratch. Both classical authors and con-
temporary academic literature offer a number of perspectives on the study of
ethos. Our main sources of inspiration were Aristotle’s rhetoric (2004) and the
‘rhetoric of truth’ model devised by folklorist Elliott Oring (2008), but we also
drew on discursive psychology and social-psychological research into computer-
mediated communication. 
The terms used in these disciplines are not exact matches. The Aristotelian
notion of ethos overlaps social psychology’s source credibility (McCroskey 2001,
Fervent 3.4 %
“Tip of the iceberg”
Debunking 51.3 %
“It’s an urban legend”
Experiential 24 %
“It happened to me”
Instrumental 21.3 %
“You never know…”
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pp. 83-85; McCroskey and Young 1981). Then again, Potter’s discursive psy-
chology offers terms like entitlement (Potter 1996, Ch. 5). Since the more re-
cent psychological approaches address parts of the rhetorical whole, which is
covered in its completeness by the Aristotelian model, we will stick to the clas-
sical terminology.
In the following overview, techniques that we incorporated in our in-
tegrated ethos model (see section 12.4) are tagged with bracketed numbers.
12.3.1  The Aristotelian tradition
According to Aristotle, a speaker’s ethos is construed by the audience as it lis-
tens to his speech (Johnson 1996, p. 243). The audience judges three dimen-
sions: the orator’s φρóνησις (phronesis: expertise, knowledge), his άρέτη (arete:
virtue), and his ευνοία (eunoia: goodwill) (Aristotle 2004, p. 101)3.
An orator displays expertise by demonstrating an understanding of the
topic at hand, and insight into the issues it raises, e.g., by offering details and
numbers. Another way of showing expertise is by referring to one’s experience
and education (Braet 2007, p. 51) (4).
Orators make a virtuous impression when they appear to speak the truth.
One way of achieving this is by simply claiming to be a truthful person (9).
Another, more roundabout way of reaching the same goal is by disclosing in-
formation that could be harmful to one’s ethos, e.g., by admitting ignorance
or minor sins (8). 
Orators are judged to be persons of good will when they appear to share
the characteristics of their audience. One can search for common ground by
emphasizing personal or issue characteristics (10). One’s political affiliation or
religious orientation may be an ethos booster, as can be the choice of issue, e.g.,
addressing environmental aspects when discussing the proposed expansion of
an airport will be more likely to win the sympathy of a left-leaning audience
than addressing economic interests (Braet 2007, p. 52). Other techniques that
establish goodwill are vilifying common enemies (12): doing this enhances the
speaker’s own ethos (Andeweg and De Jong 2004, p. 54), and praising and thank-
ing the audience (ibid. p. 55) (11). 
Although the classical tradition remains of paramount importance for
the present-day study of rhetoric, the Aristotelian model was tailored to the
3 The literature offers various translations. McCroskey and Young (1981, p. 24) summarize
Aristotle’s dimensions as “intelligence, character, and good will”.
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analysis of public monologues on matters juridical, political or ceremonial, which
is a far cry from the free-for-all polylogues on discussion boards like Partyflock.nl.
In order to study these informal discussions, however, we can draw on three
further research traditions, those of computer-mediated communication (cmc)
studies, discursive psychology and folklore studies.
12.3.2 Computer-mediated communication studies: Burke et al. (2007)
Burke et al. (2007) identified two successful rhetorical strategies for topic starters:
introductions referencing lurking (“I have been reading here a while and want-
ed to ask”) or a personal connection to the topic (“I was recently diagnosed
with Epilepsy”, in alt.support.epilepsy); and questions and requests (“What
can I expect from chemotherapy?”; “Wondering the best way to dissolve choco-
late, besides eating it.”). We focus on the introductions, in which topic starters
search for common ground by emphasizing personal or issue characteristics
(10). Requests, although they are rhetorical strategies, are indirectly related to
the poster’s ethos. As such, they need not concern us here.
The introductions clearly relate to the Aristotelian dimensions of ethos:
“Including a self-disclosing introduction demonstrates legitimacy and com-
mitment to the group […]” (Burke et al. 2007, p. 16) Introducing yourself as
a former lurker means disclosing information that could be mildly harmful
to one’s ethos (8): “I’m not one of the regulars, until now I have not made any
contribution to the community.” In effect, this strategy turns out to be benef-
icent: instead of being chastised for previous freeloading behavior, the poster
is rewarded with a reply. Topic introductions establish common ground: the
newbie shares the disease, music taste or cultural background of the community. 
Although the number of techniques analyzed by Burke et al. (ibid.) is
limited, the paper stands out for its strong empirical and experimental design.
Correlation between these techniques and the number of replies was estab-
lished by automatic content analysis of a Usenet sample consisting of almost
41,000 messages. The extent to which the response rate was caused by these
techniques was investigated by tweaking and reposting a number of messages,
systematically varying the presence of introductions and requests. 
Group introductions (“I’ve been lurking here a while”) double the num-
ber of replies. Topic introductions (“I was diagnosed with Epilepsy”) did not
have a significant effect, however. Requests did increase the number of replies,
but their effect was less pronounced than that of the group introductions. 
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12.3.3  Discursive psychology
Discursive psychology is part of the wider field of inquiry of discursive con-
structionism (Potter and Hepburn 2008). Its aim is the analysis of the discur-
sive practices that are used to construct facts in various kinds of discourse. Build-
ing on ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, discursive psychologists have
analyzed marriage counseling sessions, informal conversations between televi-
sion documentary makers, talk show interviews and other forms of discourse to
study the way talk constructs social reality (Potter 1996). Particularly relevant to
our drink spiking case is Wooffitt’s (1992) study of accounts of the paranormal.
Wooffitt shows how speakers construct their extraordinary experiences as real by
employing discursive practices a rhetorician would recognize as ethos techniques.
From this literature, we considered five techniques as potentially relevant
for our model. 
A. Present oneself as an ordinary person 
The person relating the extraordinary experience may volunteer information
as to his condition at the time: e.g., sitting upright in bed, wide awake and
consequently fully conscious of what went on around him (Wooffitt 1992, p.
152). To stress one’s rationality, one may report a reality check (1), testing the
extraordinary explanation, e.g.: “When I thought I heard the voice of my de-
ceased mother, I first made sure that the radio was off, to exclude that as an
explanation” (Wooffitt 1992, p. 83). To show that they possess their critical fac-
ulties, people may also correct themselves (Wooffitt 1992, p. 110):
H: John, you told me about an experience that happened to you, 
repeatedly I take it, as a child. Would you give the details?
J: It wasn’t exactly as a child.
I was a teenager at the time, you know.
Well, fifteen, sixteen years of age.
In this example, John does not want to label his younger self as a ‘child’, rather
than a teenager or better still, a fifteen or sixteen year old, meaning that he
was old enough to understand the experience correctly. 
B. Stressing the ordinariness of the situation
A technique frequently employed is describing the situation just before the ex-
tra ordinary event took place: “I was just doing X, when Y” (Wooffitt 1992, p.
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118). Typically, ‘X’ is a mundane activity like doing the dishes; its very every-
day quality means that what follows (“when I heard a voice in my head”) could
happen to anybody. Since this technique pertains to logos rather than ethos,
we did not incorporate it in our model.
C. Referring to authorities or other witnesses
Appeals to authority (2) may make a story appear more credible. One may re-
fer to others who concur that somebody really had an extraordinary experi-
ence or was acting or looking different. This is someone talking about a girl
who was found to be mentally ill:
[…] I was actually the last of her close friends who was openly willing to admit 
that she was becoming mentally ill.
The person talking enlists the opinion of other ‘close friends’ to shore up her
own conclusion that the girl was becoming mentally ill. This objectivates the
extraordinary (Potter 1996, pp. 127-128; Wooffitt 1992, p. 101). Speakers may
also try to construct the phenomenon as a generally acknowledged one by point-
ing out others who have experienced it and who have expressed belief in it.
One way of doing this is by quoting those people:
She says
“Did you feel something?”
“Damn right I felt something!”
I said,
“There’s a ghost up there.”
She says,
“Yeah, we know.
We didn’t want to tell you
because we didn’t want to
unnecessarily frighten you.” (Wooffitt 1992, pp. 169-170)
In this example a third party vouches for the correctness of the extraordinary
experience. 
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D. Footing
The experience under discussion may be one’s own, a second-hand account
or it may be even further removed from the speaker. Potter dubs this speak-
er-source relationship footing, a term coined by Goffman: “the range of rela-
tionships that speakers and writers have to the descriptions they report” (Pot-
ter 1996, p. 122). We will use the term distancing (5, 6, 7), developed by Or-
ing (2008) as an addition to the classical ethos devices (see below).
Since we are dealing with legends or urban myths, often characterized
as ‘friend-of-a-friend stories’ or ‘foaf tales’ (Dale 1978), it is worth repeating
Potter’s analysis of this formula (1996, pp. 134-135). ‘Friend’, Potter observes,
serves as an epistemic term, a warrant for factuality: “a friend told me” sounds
more credible than “somebody told me”. The ‘friend of a friend’ formula par-
takes of the epistemic authority of ‘a friend’, but avoids the danger of claim-
ing a close relationship with the protagonist of an extraordinary event. Potter:
The ‘friend of a friend’ construction, then, provides some category entitlement but,
at the same time, means the teller is not accountable for gaps, questions and issues
with respect to the story: it was just what they heard. What it provides is a trade-off
between factuality and deniability. (1996, p. 135)
E. Reluctance
A final ethos technique from the discursive psychology literature worth men-
tioning is the avowal of prior disbelief or skepticism: “I used to think that x
was utter nonsense, but a recent experience has convinced me that it is, after
all, for real.” (Lamont 2007, Potter 1996, pp. 125-126, Wooffitt 1992, pp. 78-
79). Conversely, skeptics may try to bolster their ethos by claiming that they
were initially believers. In Potter’s terms, this ploy belongs to the category of
stake inoculation: the speaker pre-empts the counter-argument that he is mere-
ly holding a certain position because he has a stake in the argument. Since the
initial qualitative analysis of the drink spiking discussions did not yield instances
of this particular technique, however, it was not incorporated in our model. 
Summing up: the discursive psychology literature offers a number of
concepts and techniques that are relevant to our study of ethos in online dis-
cussions. The above examples show that storytellers tend to be prepared for
attacks on their ethos. This literature also contains discussions of subjects per-
tinent to our inquiry into crime legends. Methodologically, these authors fa-
vor qualitative content analysis: the techniques they distinguish are based on
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the micro-analysis of spoken dialogues and other forms of discourse; they do
not attempt to assess their frequency or test their effect. Neither have these
concepts been applied to online discussions.
12.3.4  Folklore studies
Although folklore scholars have been studying folktales since the early nine-
teenth century, efforts to apply the framework of rhetoric to the telling of folk-
tales are scarce indeed. Rhetoric features in a number of studies (e.g., Bennett
1988, 1989, 1999; Correll 2005; Hill and Irvine 1993), but the first full-scale at-
tempt to apply the Aristotelian framework to legend studies is a recent paper
by Elliott Oring (2008). Oring’s model covers all three modes of persuasion:
logos, pathos and ethos. In the ethos category, it distinguishes four topoi 4: the
authority of the source, risk to the narrator, distancing and judgment. 
A. The authority of the source
“The authority of a source depends, to some extent, upon the social position
of the narrator and/or the reputed source of the narrative” (Oring 2008, p. 131).
Using Aristotle’s distinction, this status can be entechnic or atechnic, i.e., em-
bodied in the discourse or known beforehand. Narrators may construct their
authority within the narrative, and besides they may be known as, say, a physi-
cian, an adventurer or, for that matter, the village fool. Since our study focuses
on the construction of ethos in discourse, we will leave the atechnic part aside.
B. Risk to the narrator
Disclosing information that could be harmful to one’s ethos (8) features in Or-
ing’s model as ‘risk to the narrator’: “The more risk a narrator takes in telling
a tale, the more likely a story would be perceived as true” (2008, p.133). A physi-
cian telling a ghost story risks his reputation as a man of science, but this, par-
adoxically, lends plausibility to his narrative. 
C. Distancing
Oring uses the term distancing (2008, pp. 133-135) to describe the relationship between
the teller and the alleged source of the narrative (cf. Potter’s concept of footing). Fol-
lowing Georgina Smith (1981, p. 169), he discerns three degrees of separation: 
4 Oring applies the term tropes here, which many scholars will interpret as a form of ‘figura-
tive language’.
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1) ‘Incorporated’, i.e., first-hand, personal experience stories; 
2) ‘Semi-incorporated’, i.e., second-hand, events allegedly experienced by an
acquaintance, a named friend or a local character; 
3) ‘Detached’, i.e., third-hand, without source attribution or identification of 
the protagonists. 
The more unambiguous the source, and the closer to the narrator, the more be-
lievable the story. It is important to realize that distancing is to a certain extent
a rhetorical choice: narrators may choose not to name a source when this is to
their advantage, or they may even tell personal experience stories as third-per-
son narratives or vice versa. Oring refers to an example in Slotkin (1988), of a
person telling a ghost story in the third person, and, a month later, as a personal
experience story. 
More examples can be found in the literature on legends. The British
writer Roald Dahl used to entertain guests at dinner parties with his reper-
toire of urban legends and his own short stories, told as personal experiences
(Burger 2002, pp. 137-139).5
Like Potter, Oring points out the advantages of the ‘friend-of-a-friend’ formula:
“[…] a brilliant compromise in that the narrator can establish a relation to a
potentially credible source without being held accountable for it” (2008, p. 135).
D. Judgment
Oring states that discernment and judgment are the most important charac-
ter traits a narrator must display to appear believable (2008, p. 135). In this re-
spect, he lists five basic techniques: reflexivity, considering alternative expla-
nations, showing reluctance, professing ignorance and reporting tests.
1) Reflexivity
Narrators may evaluate their stories from their audience’s perspective and pre-
empt counter-arguments reflecting on their reliability (3), e.g., “You may think
I’m crazy, but…” (Correll 2005, pp. 3-4; Oring 2008, p. 136).
5 Other examples can be found in Wachs (1988, pp. 31-38), who came across a number of
urban legends told as personal experiences when collecting New York crime victim stories;
Bennett collected a story told by a relative as a dream, and later as an actual experience (1999,
p. 16).
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2) Alternative explanations
In order to make their judgment appear more sound, narrators may offer al-
ternative explanations for their anomalous experience, only to discard them
after due consideration (Oring 2008. p. 136). Since this technique pertains to
logos rather than ethos, we did not incorporate it in our model.
3) Reluctance
The narrator presents himself as a reluctant witness: “prior to the alleged event,
he did not believe in ghosts, but now…” This avowal of prior skepticism height-
ens the story’s credibility.
4) Ignorance
Narrators may profess ignorance of the facts, presenting themselves as cautious
witnesses who do not jump to conclusions. 
5) Testing
Narrators may report reality checks (1), e.g., in a story about a ghost encounter,
the teller might say that he waved his arms to make sure he was not watch-
ing his own reflection in the mirror (Oring 2008, p. 137). 
Although Oring’s bid to match legend studies with classical rhetoric proved
seminal for our study, it has certain limitations. His examples, taken from an
unspecified sample of legend texts, illustrate his rhetorical model of legend telling,
but he does not assess their relative frequency. The legend texts are monologues,
whereas legends in the wild typically appear in the context of dialogues or poly-
logues. Unlike the text samples used in the discursive psychology literature,
Oring’s examples are reconstructed speech, based on research interviews, not
spontaneous discourse. Finally, Oring’s rhetoric is a ‘rhetoric of truth’, which
omits the part of the debunkers. It should be augmented by a rhetoric of dis-
belief (Bennett 1999; Dégh 2001; Donovan 2002; Hufford 1982). All in all, the
literature on ethos (however it is labeled) offered a number of rhetorical de-
vices we could apply to the case in hand. 
12.4 The integrated ethos model
Based on the literature review and on a qualitative pilot study of our online
discussions sample, we drew up the following model. We stick to the Aristotelian
dimensions of expertise, virtue, and good will, the validity of which has been
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confirmed by social psychologists (McCroskey 2001, pp. 85-87; McCroskey and
Young 1981). Because of space constraints, we refer to the literature review for
descriptions and examples of these devices. 
Expertise
1 Reporting a reality check
2 Appealing to authority 
3 Pre-empting counter-arguments reflecting on one’s ethos
4 Stressing one’s expertise: knowledge, experience, education
5-7 Distancing from source of narrative (either first-hand (5), second-hand (6), 
or friend-of-a-friend (7))
Virtue
8 Disclosing information that could harm one’s ethos 
9 Referring to one’s honesty
10 Searching for common ground by emphasizing personal or issue characteristics
Good will
11 Complimenting and thanking the audience
12 Vilifying a common enemy
The model combines devices described in classical and in modern literature. Note
that all techniques could be used by both proponents and debunkers of the claim
that drink spiking is for real. By assessing the frequency with which these techniques
are used by both parties, we try to improve on Oring’s ‘rhetoric of truth’ (2008).
12.5 Method
12.5.1  Sample
Our sample consists of 25 discussions about drink spiking, published on Dutch
web-based discussion boards during the years 2000-2008. These discussions
were randomly chosen from a larger sample consisting of 54 discussions con-
structed for a study of argumentation about drink spiking (Hulsebosch et al.
2008). Most of the participants are adolescents who have an interest in dance
parties and/or drugs. Typically, the discussion boards belong to community-
type websites; a minority of four discussions were found on news sites, where
participants do not belong to one subcultural community.
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12.5.2 Method of analysis
A quantitative content analysis was carried out by two coders. The method-
ological choices involved in the content analysis of online discussions have been
discussed before, although most of the literature deals exclusively with com-
puter conferencing in closed educational environments (Marra et al. 2004; Mur-
phy et al. 2006; Rourke et al. 2000; Strijbos et al. 2006; De Wever et al. 2006;
Whittaker et al. 1998). The sticking points identified in these papers are uni-
tization, coding manifest versus latent content and reliability. Briefly, the choic-
es we made were as follows.
Unitization: the unit of analysis may be as small as the individual sen-
tence, or as large as the entire discourse. The literature offers various classi-
fications: Rourke et al. (2001) distinguish sentence, paragraph, message, the-
matic unit and the illocutionary unit; whereas Strijbosch et al. (2006) enu-
merate discourse, message, meaning, argument and proposition. In order to
study ethos techniques, we opted for the message as the unit of analysis, since
this is objectively identifiable and produces a manageable set of cases (Rourke
et al. 2000). 
During pilot analyses, however, it was found that the majority of mes-
sages consisted of bursts of invective or (to a lesser extent) approval. Initially
we coded these as ‘vilifying a common enemy’ or ‘praising and thanking the
audience’, but then we realized that these messages did contain argumenta-
tive moves, but did not use ethos as a means of persuasion. To cut out the jeer-
ing and cheering, we chose the formal criterion of message length, putting aside
all messages of 50 words or less. This left 234 relevant messages.
Coding manifest versus latent content: manifest content, such as sentence
length, word frequency and other easily observable phenomena, is suited for
machine analysis. Analyzing rhetorical devices requires interpretative efforts
by human coders, but the inherent subjectivity this entails is held in check by
the assessment of inter-coder reliability.
Reliability: various practices are described in the literature to ensure in-
ter-coder reliability. Not uncommonly, one coder identifies segments in which
the sought-for phenomenon is present; the second coder then has to identify
the phenomenon (Pander Maat 2004). Since this comes down to the second
coder second-guessing the first one, we opted for the more severe design of two
coders independently analyzing pre-defined units, i.e., the relevant messages. 
A number of indexes are used to report inter-coder agreement. Percent
agreement is a common measure, but in our view this is too liberal, since this
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fails to account for agreement by chance (Lombard et al. 2002). We used the
more conservative Cohen’s Kappa instead. Values above 0.75 are generally con-
sidered to be good to excellent, those below 0.40 poor and those in between
fair to good (Neuendorf 2002; De Weever et al. 2005). One of the drawbacks
of Cohen’s Kappa is that it fails to compute when both coders do not use the
same range of codes (for instance, when coder 1 uses 1, 2, 3 and 4, and coder
2 uses 1, 3 and 4). 
A final problem common to this type of content analysis is that the
sought-for phenomena are typically scarce. In the latest pilot test we conducted,
half of the variables were not found in the test sample (table 12.1). 
table 12.1 latest pilot test 
Ethos technique Cohen’s  Kappa   
Believers Debunkers  
Reporting a reality check * Not found  
Appealing to authority Not found Not found
Pre-empting ethos attacks .527 .464
Stressing one’s expertise .034 1.00
Distancing (first-hand) .706 1.00
Distancing (second-hand) * Not found
Distancing (third-hand) * Not found
Disclosing harmful information .634 Not found
Referring to one’s honesty Not found Not found
Searching for common ground Not found Not found
Complimenting & thanking * Not found
Vilifying common enemies .571 Not found
* = Cohen’s Kappa failed to compute
12.6 Results
The 234 relevant messages were found to contain 217 instances of ethos tech-
niques, i.e., a mean score of 0.93 per message. 173 were used by believers, 44
by debunkers. Al in all, believers used more, and more varied, ethos techniques
than debunkers (but the same amount of arguments (figure 12.1)). 
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figure 12.2 the five most frequently used ethos techniques 
(percentages) (both groups) 
The most common technique in our sample was telling first-hand stories, which
was used 52 times (24%). Stressing one’s expertise was used 33 times (15.2%),
pre-empting arguments reflecting on one’s ethos 28 times (12.9%) (figure 12.2). 
figure 12.3 the five ethos techniques most commonly used 
by believers (percentages) (n=173) 
Proponents of drink spiking as a genuine threat never explicitly referred to their
honesty, but they did use all the remaining eleven techniques. Most common
were first-hand stories (46 times, 26.6 %), vilifying common enemies comes sec-
ond (26 times, 15%), stressing one’s expertise third (22 times, 12.7%) (figure 12.3).
Debunkers used ethos techniques less often than believers (44 versus 173 times).
Moreover, their repertoire is less varied (9 different techniques versus 11). Re-
porting a reality check, telling second-hand stories and complimenting and
thanking the audience were not found in debunking messages. Of the 44 in-
stances of ethos techniques used by debunkers, stressing one’s expertise was
most common (11 times, 25%). Pre-empting attacks on one’s ethos was used
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figure 12.4  the five most commonly used ethos techniques 
by debunkers (percentages) (n=44)
table 12.2  ethos techniques in discussions about drink spiking (25
discussions, 234 relevant messages) 






0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Believers N % Debunkers N %
1) Reporting a reality check 1 0.4 13) Reporting a reality check 0 0
2) Appealing to authority 9 4.14 14) Appealing to authority 7 3.22
3) Pre-empting counter-arguments 18 8.2 15) Pre-empting counter-arguments 
reflecting on one’s ethos reflecting on one’s ethos 10 4.6
4) Stressing one’s expertise: 22 10.13 16) Stressing one’s expertise: 11 5.06
knowledge, experience, education knowledge, experience, education
5) Distancing from source of narrative, 47 21.65 17) Distancing from source of narrative, 5 2.3
category 1: first-hand category 1: first-hand
6) Distancing from source of narrative, 14 6.45 18) Distancing from source of narrative, 0 0
category 2: second-hand category 2: second-hand
7) Distancing from source of narrative, 10 4.6 19) Distancing from source of narrative, 2 0.92
category 3: third-hand category 3: third-hand
8) Disclosing information that could 14 6.45 20) Disclosing information that could 2 0.92
harm one’s ethos harm one’s ethos
9) Referring to one’s honesty 0 0 21) Referring to one’s honesty 1 0.4
10) Searching for common ground by 9 4.14 22) Searching for common ground by 4 1.84
emphasizing personal or issue characteristics emphasizing personal or issue characteristics
11) Complimenting and thanking 3 1.38 23) Complimenting and thanking 0 0
the audience the audience
12) Vilifying a common enemy 26 22.22 24) Vilifying a common enemy 2 0.92
Total 173 79.7 Total 44 20.3
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12.7  Conclusion
Our integrated ethos model is based on Oring’s (2008) application of classi-
cal rhetoric to folk legends (the ‘rhetoric of truth’). We improved on this mod-
el by adding techniques from other sources and by applying the model to be-
lievers and disbelievers alike.
One of the aims of this study was to assess the validity of the ethos tech-
niques described in the literature. Of the classical techniques, explicit refer-
ences to one’s honesty and complimenting and thanking the audience were
hardly found at all. The others, however, were. Classical techniques were aug-
mented by devices identified in more recent studies. For instance, the concept
of distancing (or footing) proved a useful modern addition to Aristotle. 
Both parties participating in the discussions about drink spiking use ethos
as a means of persuasion, but believers use more and more varied ethos tech-
niques. Apparently, the burden of proof is on them – they have to work hard-
er to appear sensible and reliable persons. They stand to lose more than their
opponents when their personal stories are dismissed as urban legends and their
requests for advice remain unanswered.
Of the three Aristotelian ethos dimensions experience, virtue and good
will, the first is used the most by both parties. Believers often refer to specif-
ic personal experiences, i.e., they claim to be the victims of drink spiking. Dis-
believers typically do not counter these claims with their own personal expe-
rience stories, but rather stress their experience as party-goers or drug users.
Appeal to external authorities plays a minor role for both parties, as does an
appeal to their own formal education and position. For the last point, we have
to rely on the coders’ personal impressions, since we did not distinguish be-
tween references to informal experiences and formal education.
Although the discussions can be quite uncivil (as witnessed by the large
number of messages consisting of invective), there is a discussion going on.
In fact, both parties attempt to bolster their ethos by searching for common
ground and pre-empting counter-arguments: they don’t want to appear too
dismissive or gullible, too distrustful, too much in favor of or against drug use.
They generally agree that it is good to be careful and that drug use should be
a free choice. The character of these discussions supports the view of the in-
ternet as an extension of the public sphere.
[  2 3 6 ]
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12.8  Discussion
The present study has attempted to assess empirically and quantitatively what
ethos techniques are used in online discussions about drink spiking, in order
to add to the knowledge base about online rhetoric. It remains to be seen to
what extent the findings based on this sample can be generalized to other on-
line discussions. The discussions in our sample probably differ from others in
which personal experiences are not as centrally important. In the end, the drink
spiking discussions are about making sense of personal experiences, not about
making claims about public policy. 
Political discussions may differ in the role they accord to education and
external authority. We expect discussions in this genre to contain more appeals
to the authority of experts, news media or other cultural authorities. 
More research is needed, but those who want to try this should be fore-
warned that content analysis of online discussions is a trying and often frus-
trating procedure. Still, rhetorical research stands to win by collecting and an-
alyzing internet discussions: the Web is full of massive amounts of raw and
juicy, largely un-moderated rhetorical material that can be collected unobtrusively. 
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13 The Popular Virgin and the Wolf in
Sheep’s Clothing: A Case Study of the




Crime is popular and this popularity has a long-standing tradition. Most peo-
ple like to read news about crime, watch crime series on television, read books
about crime, and a large number of movies are about crime. Evidently, we
have a ‘pleasurable fascination with crime’ (Katz 1987, p. 57). Crime is prob-
ably one of the most popular subjects in the stories people tell each other, in-
cluding news stories. 
Stories such as these do not only provide information about (specific
types and incidents of ) crime and the criminal justice system, but they also
give information about the cultural and social rules of living and provide an
explanatory framework of how to make sense of everyday life. Since it is eas-
ier to make sense of a world in which everything is either black or white,
without any nuances, it might come as no surprise that (news) media tend
to focus on the stereotypical crimes and the stereotypical actors: victims and
offenders. By using specific rhetorical devices (frames) we are encouraged to
interpret words, phrases, or visual images, as well as stories in general, in a
specific way. In this chapter, we examine how the Dutch media constructed
stereotypical images of the victim and the alleged offender by using these
frames or rhetorical devices in a particular case; the case of Holloway/Van der
Sloot. By making content analyses of newspaper and magazine accounts,
photographs and television programs, it becomes clear how the Dutch media
convinced the public of Holloway’s innocence, and Van der Sloot’s guilt. We
will describe how the Dutch media presented the Van der Sloot/Holloway
case, both visually and verbally, and what means were used to construct guilt
and innocence. 
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Our general question in the project is: How do media construct frames
of victims and offenders? More specifically for this chapter the question is:
What rhetorical means have the media used to construct guilt and innocence
by portraying Joran van der Sloot as an ideal offender and Natalee Holloway
as an ideal victim? In this chapter, we look at news as a narrative, which has
specific social functions that we will discuss. Also, news stories selectively de-
pict reality and play a major role in the construction of social problems. This
selective depiction of reality is demonstrated overwhelmingly by empirical
studies that illustrate the stereotypes of victims and offenders which are com-
mon in (news) stories. These stereotypes are partly created by rhetorical de-
vices which we will elaborate on. The following section describes the method
we used to study the cases and the various instruments used in different con-
tent analyses. When presenting the results, we focus on the photographs pub-
lished in tabloids, magazines, newspapers and on the Internet. 
Finally, the chapter ends with a discussion of the main implications of
this study, which suggest that Holloway can be presented as a stereotypical
victim with features that fit the stereotype. Van der Sloot, on the other hand,
is a more round and complex character and not a stereotypical offender. A
methodological point is made about the limits of a quantitative content analy-
sis of the photographs. We found that the quantitative instruments were not
able to fully grasp the meaning of the images and we make a case for using a
mixed methods research design (Cresswell and Plano Clark 2007). Our analy-
sis shows that some media – like the Peter R. de Vries tv program – use sev-
eral rhetorical devices to present the distinction between victim and offender
in as clear a manner as possible. Yet, in cases like the Holloway/Van der Sloot
case, when the stereotypes can be challenged, the just world is challenged too
and the rhetoric of victims and offenders is less simple and clear-cut, enabling
discussion and different scenarios about who is good and evil to exist. But,
first we will begin by broadly describing the Van der Sloot/Holloway case.1
13.2 The case: Van der Sloot/Holloway
The case which we have focused on involves the disappearance of the Amer-
ican high school student Natalee Holloway, who spent her holidays with her
classmates on the Dutch Caribbean island of Aruba.
1 With thanks to our students L. van Dijk, D. Guldemond, M. Lammers, V.B.M. Nistro,
N.J.K.J. Raats and C.W. Wong, who, among other things, collected and coded the data.
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Natalee Holloway disappears after a night of dancing and drinking.
Two Surinam brothers – Deepak and Satish Kalpoe – and a Dutch adolescent
named Joran van der Sloot are arrested as suspects, but are released a few
months later because of a lack of evidence. Almost a year after the disap-
pearance of Holloway, Dutch and Aruban television broadcast a reconstruc-
tion in the program Opsporing verzocht (comparable to America’s Most
Wanted). When Van der Sloot, the son of a Dutch judge, returns to the
Netherlands, he is arrested again. Once again, he is released because of a lack
of evidence. The Dutch crime reporter Peter R. de Vries concentrates on the
case in his tv program The Peter R. de Vries Show and presents footage filmed
using a hidden camera. De Vries puts the hidden camera in a car, and uses an
accomplice, Patrick van der Eem, to find out what happened. Van der Sloot
thinks of Van der Eem as his friend, not knowing that he is, in fact, working
for De Vries, and he talks with Van der Eem in the car. 
Caught on camera, Van der Sloot tells Van der Eem that he and Na-
talee were making out at the beach, when all of a sudden she started having
convulsions. Not knowing what to do, he phones a friend, some people guess
that this friend is in fact his father, who helps him to put her in a boat. He
states that she was dumped in the sea. The body is never found. This episode
of The Peter R. de Vries Show, trailed as “the confession”, received a lot of
media attention. The week after the broadcast, Van der Sloot appears on tel-
evision and says that he made the whole story up. He is not arrested because
legal evidence is still lacking. Currently, Van der Sloot is still a free man.2
The case generated a huge amount of media exposure, not only in the
Netherlands, but also in the rest of Europe, and – because Holloway was
American – in the United States as well. Baynes (2008) gives an overview of
the amount of media coverage of the case. According to Google Trends, dur-
ing the month after Holloway’s disappearance, the story generated thirty
times the number of Google searches as the American Secretary of State, Con-
doleezza Rice. During the month of June 2005, Google searches for Holloway
were more than double the number of Iraq war searches. Holloway’s disap-
pearance was one of the top ten stories on network and cable television and
it made the top ten stories list for the week of February 4-10 2008. Accord-
ing to a Lexis Nexis Report, the story was at the top of the most talked about
2 Since June 2010, Van der Sloot is locked up in a Peruvian jail, charged with murdering a Pe-
ruvian girl.
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news stories in 2005 (Baynes 2008). The interest in this particular case, that
media and the public shared alike, is also reflected in the publications about
the death of Van der Sloot’s father on sale in February 2010. In these recent
publications, De Vries is interviewed again and argues that the case will never
be solved, since the father’s knowledge and role will now never be known.
The Van der Sloot/Holloway case is a typical high-profile crime
(Chancer 2005), receiving a lot of attention in the media. These media, in-
cluding the footage from the hidden camera interviews with De Vries, from
Van der Sloot and his parents, Holloway’s mother Beth, websites and books
written by the main characters (i.e., books by Van der Sloot, the accomplice
Van der Eem, Holloway’s mother, Holloway’s father), two Dutch plays, and
a movie broadcast by Lifetime in the usa, all provide information on this
case. All these media are the main sources of information; this is elaborated
in the following section.
13.3 Theoretical framework: Media as sources of information
Media are usually the most important source of information about crime.
Most people have no direct experience and hence no knowledge of (specific
types of ) crime and the criminal justice system. Therefore, people obtain their
knowledge, ideas and attitudes from other people and from the (news) media.
Yet, the information which people get from the media does not necessarily re-
flect reality. On the contrary, numerous studies have found that a variety of
media, such as movies, cartoons and newspaper accounts, tend to focus on the
more sensational, unusual and stereotypical crimes (Vanderveen 2006). All
these media, these kinds of sources of information, provide the social context
and the material and ideological constraints that act on individuals. 
In general, the way a society gives meaning to social phenomena such
as crime and specific incidents thereof, and the way news media use rhetori-
cal devices to depict these phenomena, can be described in terms of framing.
Though the definition of framing is still under discussion (e.g., Scheufele
2008), in this study the concept contributes to an understanding of how a
frame, consisting of a set of characteristics – or rhetorical devices – works to
picture or to frame a social phenomenon. Framing concerns the inevitable
process of selective influence over the individual’s perception of the mean-
ings attributed to words, phrases, or visuals. A frame – the set of characteris-
tics used to frame a phenomenon – defines the packaging of elements
of rhetoric in such a way as to encourage particular interpretations and to dis-
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courage others. Ervin Goffman (1974, p. 21), one of the founding fathers of
framing theory, suggests that the idea of frames can be used to label the
“schemata of interpretation” that allow individuals or groups “to locate, per-
ceive, identify, and label” events and occurrences, thus rendering meaning, or-
ganizing experiences and guiding actions. In our study, frames are considered
the means that media use to construct the picture of victims and offenders. 
Similar to Gamson and Lasch (1983), our analysis focuses on the ele-
ments in visuals that make them persuasive. These framing devices are part
of the rhetorical structure of visuals (photographs, info-graphics), like
metaphors, stereotypes and particular features of the image. Thus, in our
study about the guilt or innocence of the leading actors of the assumed mur-
der of the American high school student Natalee Holloway, certain aspects of
the visuals function as rhetorical devices to convince the public. All sorts of
media, as sources of information about crime and criminal incidents, employ
frames or rhetorical devices to construct a story or narrative. As we will dis-
cuss belowbelow, whether the source of information is fiction or news is, in
line with narrative theory, irrelevant. 
13.4 Media as social context
Stories from various sources provide information about cultural and social rules
for living and offer an explanatory framework of how to make sense of every-
day (urban) life. According to Wachs (1988, p. 32), the purpose of a lot of sto-
ries that people tell one another is to address human predicaments by showing
how people act in times of crisis and danger; they provide models for the re-
construction of everyday experience. Wachs (1988) suggests the stories stress
street smarts; the importance of being on one’s guard, being aware of the envi-
ronment, following one’s intuition and being suspicious, as part of sensible
(urban) behaviour, since it increases the ability to act in case of danger: 
Street smarts were developed by the American National Crime Prevention Council
for policy purposes and are propagated by American city councils and police de-
partments. These street smarts portray the popular images of crime as well.
“Wherever you are – on the street, in an office building or shopping mall, driv-
ing, waiting for a bus or subway – stay alert and tuned in to your surroundings”,
“Trust your instincts. If something or someone makes you uneasy, avoid the per-
son or leave”. The popular image of the offender as a stranger instead of an ac-
quaintance is reflected by, for example: “Have to work late? Make sure there are
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others in the building, and ask someone – a colleague or security guard – to walk
you to your car or transit stop”; “Never hitchhike or accept rides from strangers”;
“If you have to walk in the street, walk facing traffic. A person walking with traf-
fic can be followed, forced into a car, and abducted more easily than a person
walking against traffic” and “Walk confidently, directly, and at a steady pace.
Don’t stop to talk to strangers.” (ncpc, n.d.)
Stories have an important function in warning people, especially women,
about dangers and threats. Stories tell them how to protect themselves in
cases of danger. The more frightening stories, in particular, serve as caution-
ary tales (Wachs 1988, p. 61). Obviously, several sources reinforce each other;
they result from and further shape the shared assumptions about the appro-
priate behaviour for people and victims and set the limits of this appropriate
behaviour (e.g., Green, Hebron and Woodward 1987). Sometimes, the warn-
ings are very explicit. For example, immediately after the Lifetime movie on
Holloway/Van der Sloot, Beth Holloway (Natalee’s mother) was screened in
a public service announcement, in which she encouraged (young) people to
take the proper precautions before traveling abroad (mylifetime.com, n.d.).
In addition to the social function that stories have, teaching people
“what crimes to fear, where and when to be afraid, who is dangerous and who
is safe” (Madriz 1997, p. 343), there are other consequences as well. Indeed,
the information the public gets from the media about crime, victims, of-
fenders and the criminal justice system can have several other consequences.
For example, people may become more afraid of crime and of becoming a vic-
tim of crime (Heath and Gilbert 1996). Also, the overrepresentation of
African-Americans in offender statistics leads to the development of stereo-
typical notions of the relationship between race and violent behavior (e.g.,
Dixon 2007, 2008). Besides the effect on perceptions and attitudes, infor-
mation portrayed in the media on particular cases can have direct, behavioral
consequences in real life as well. For example, high-profile cases, cases that get
an extraordinary amount of attention from the media, can lead to public ha-
tred, loathing and the commission of vigilante actions (see Jones and Wardle
2008). As noted previously, the case in this current study is such a high-pro-
file case. The Van der Sloot/Holloway case received extensive (news) media
coverage in the Netherlands, Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles as well as in
the United States.
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13.5 News as narrative
In this study, the question as to whether the source of people’s information
is fiction or news, is irrelevant. The media are usually the most important
source of information about crime, and what specific type or background the
media have is of little interest here. In other words: this study is in line with
narrative theory. Narrative Theory, developed in the seventies and the eight-
ies (Fisher 1987) changed the idea that news is objective, that it is about the
truth and nothing but the truth. Narrative theory created a new perspective
on news and the function of news in society. Ettema and Glasser (1988) set
out this perspective in their article called ‘Narrative Form and Moral Force’.
They point out that – referring to Tuchman (1976, p. 97) – news is a selec-
tive reality with its own internal validity, with particular forms and themes.
The writers suggest that our fascination with crime can be explained because
of the way crime news helps us to establish our ideas about good and evil,
about normal and deviant. Every time we read or see news about crime we
establish our norms; thus, crime news also functions as a mean of establish-
ing coherence in society or within groups in that society. Similarly, Kellner
(1995, p. 24) states: “Media images help shape our view of the world and our
deepest values; what we consider good or bad, positive or negative, moral or
evil”. Other researchers follow this line of reasoning. For example Grabe et
al. (2006), who describe a number of studies (Erikson 1966; Grabe 1999;
Schattenburg 1981; Stevens 1985) which have examined the potential of crime
news to serve social functions and found patterned evidence that journalis-
tic narratives support social control, the construction of morality and social
integration. With what is called by Durkheim and Mead “episodes of shared
outrage”, individuals reaffirm their membership of society (Durkheim 1933;
Mead 1918). Thus, news, like any other source of information, provides nar-
ratives or stories that contain information about cultural and social rules for
living. This holds for several types of news programmes which we describe
in the following section.
13.6 News as entertainment 
Analogous to Ettema and Glasser (1988) who suggest looking at news as nar-
ratives, Surette and Otto (2002) state that news and entertainment cannot be
clearly distinguished; this is reflected in the term infotainment. Infotainment
refers to the blurred boundaries between fact and fiction in media depictions.
News media, or other predominantly factual programs, use dramatic, recon-
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structive elements (Mason 2002). Besides news and news magazines as com-
mon types of infotainment, reality-based crime shows and co-opted court-
room dramas and media trials can also be distinguished (Craig and Newcomb
2003; Surette 1989; Surette and Otto 2002). For example, a violent incident
can be presented as news with “story lines, plot and character development,
victims, villains, and dramatic endings” (Surette and Otto 2002,p. 445).
Gilliam and Iyengar (2000) also found that (local) news stories follow a ‘nar-
rative script’ that contains two essential elements, namely that the crime is vi-
olent and the perpetrator is a non-white male. 
Reality-based crime shows broadcast on television, like COPS, Real Sto-
ries of the Highway Patrol and America’s Most Wanted (see Eschholz et al. 2002)
typically employ dramatizations of actual crimes, police narratives and inter-
views or actual video footage (Surette and Otto 2002). The format that is
often used by these shows and news media is a secular version of a morality
play, building on the audience’s familiarity with narratives that spell out sim-
ple and clear truths (Altheide 1997, 2002). The Dutch crime reporter, Peter
R. de Vries, has a television show which is of special interest to this study as
it complies with the format of such a morality play; the program adheres to
existing traditions and morality in the history of popular culture and fulfils
a traditional need for a sense of justice (Reijnders 2005).
Peter R. de Vries
Peter R. de Vries is the presenter of a non-fiction (Dutch) crime television
program, in the tradition of America’s Most Wanted or Crime Watch UK. Reijn-
ders (2005) studied sixteen episodes of The Peter R. de Vries Show, in which 21
murder cases were featured. In 14 of the 21 cases, the murder victim was fe-
male; in four cases the victim was a child and in only three cases was the mur-
der victim a man. The victim is presented as innocent and helpless, by
highlighting characteristics that contribute to such an image. According to
Reijnders, any information that contradicts the stereotypical representation
of the victim and offender is ignored. The show uses rhetorical devices to
convince the public of the proposed scenario, including the alleged inno-
cence and guilt of the victim and offender. For example, the mourning fam-
ily of the victim is shown extensively. A lot of information, in the form of
photographs and tv footage, is given about the offender too. This informa-
tion focuses on personal details, like dress, appearance and life style, which re-
inforce the idea that the person is indeed an offender. Reijnders states Peter
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R. de Vries “commits character assassination of suspects before they have been
tried and convicted.” (Reijnders 2005, p. 644). As we will see, the character-
istics of The Peter R. de Vries Show outlined by Reijnders appear to be appli-
cable to the reports on the Van der Sloot/Holloway case as well. The main
episode was highly successful and De Vries got an Emmy for it; the episode
also appeared to exert a strong influence on public opinion. This episode pre-
sented Joran van der Sloot as an offender without a conscience, and Natalee
Holloway as his innocent victim: two stereotypes that were convincingly pre-
sented to the public by using rhetorical means. 
Stereotypes of crimes, victims and offenders
We have already referred to stereotypes in the media presentations of crimes,
victims and offenders. The mere classification as offenders and victims gives
meaning to the reality depicted by our media. These kinds of simple con-
trasts – victim and offender, good and evil – make a storyline clear. This
arrangement, the classification of offenders and victims, helps media con-
sumers to give meaning to their reality and define our general ideas about
good and evil. Also, these stereotypes conform to our belief in a just world:
people deserve what they get (Lerner 1980). The stereotypical victim has a set
of typical characteristics. Vanderveen (2006) analyses the literature on media
representations of offenders and victims and presents the characteristics that
are perceived to be essential for a victim (see table 13.1). A victim can be per-
ceived (and represented) as having all these characteristics. Christie (1986, p.
18) refers to this as the ‘ideal victim’: “a person or a category of individuals
who – when hit by crime – most readily are given the complete and legitimate
status of being a victim”. An ideal victim behaves in a manner which con-
forms to this specific social role; any role inconsistencies make the victim less
ideal and less stereotypical, which leads to the attribution of more responsi-
bility (i.e., “she shouldn’t have been drinking”). Information about inconsis-
tencies with the stereotype can be ignored by media representations, which,
according to Reijnders (2005) is what The Peter R. de Vries Show does. Also,
media consumers, people themselves, can discredit information that is in-
consistent with their concept of the ideal victim by for example, giving these
pieces of information less weight or reinterpreting them. The same holds for
the ‘ideal offender’: the more stereotypical a suspect is, the easier people find
it to acknowledge that the suspect is indeed the offender and attribute full re-
sponsibility to him.
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table 13.1 essential characteristics (vanderveen 2006)
Essential characteristics of ideal victim/ideal victimization
Victim Weak, vulnerable, innocent
Offender Evil, cruel and bad
Activities victim Respectable (e.g., going to school, getting groceries for sick friend)
Relationship Stranger, unknown offender, no relationship between victim-offender
Incident Physical force/violence, deliberately
Victim protests and resists (physically)
Offender is brutal, cruel, violent
Random & senseless (random violence) or specific selection (e.g., series 
of eroticized murder) 
Protection Victim has made a reasonable effort to protect him/herself 
Location Somewhere where s/he cannot possibly be blamed for being, somewhere 
s/he was supposed to be (e.g., home)
Time Somewhere where s/he cannot possibly be blamed for being at that 
particular time, somewhere s/he was supposed to be at that time 
(e.g., during the day) 
As is overwhelmingly reported in the literature, the two powerful stereotypes
designate the victim as a young, weak, vulnerable, beautiful and innocent
woman, who lives a peaceful life and is loved by family and friends (Van-
derveen 2006). The offender is constructed as evil, cruel, cold-blooded – or
hot-headed as Reijnders (2005) states. The crime incident involves a victim
who is doing something respectable: she is working, going to school. When
the offender, unknown to her, brutally and violently attacks her, the victim
protests and resists so that she can protect herself. The location of the crime
is somewhere where she cannot possibly be blamed for being at that partic-
ular time. Stories in the (news) media comment on these different aspects, so-
cially constructing a more or less stereotypical offender and victim. In some
cases, for example, when (very) young children are involved, the information
fits the stereotypes more easily: the rhetorical devices are clear. For example,
in the case of the young girl Madeleine McCann, who disappeared in the
south of Portugal. Clearly, this girl has the characteristics of an ideal victim:
a three-year old blond girl, sleeping in the hotel room of her parents. Yet, in
this particular case, the role of the offender is not clear. Are the parents vic-
tims of a lost child or were they involved in her disappearance (Machado and
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Santos 2009)? These less clear-cut cases elicit a lot of discussion: people don’t
know how to make sense of them, but nonetheless want to. The discussion
on responsibility, guilt and innocence increases, especially in more complex
cases where a victim and an offender do not entirely conform to their stereo-
typical formats. Vanderveen (2006) argues that this is because, in cases such
as these, one can identify with both the victim and the offender, as well as
contrast oneself with them.
Stereotypes in a just world: identification and contrast
Cases including an ideal victim and an ideal offender are clear: we can iden-
tify with the victim (or the mourning family) and contrast ourselves with the
offender. In general, people’s reactions can take different forms when they
are faced with visual and verbal information about victims, offenders and the
reactions of law enforcement officials and actors within the criminal justice
system. Four reactions are distinguished here, based on the possibility of iden-
tification or contrast with the victim and/or offender (see Vanderveen 2006).
The elicited identification or contrast with the victim and/or offender influ-
ences people’s reactions, such as attributions of responsibility and culpability,
and penal attitudes, attitudes to punishment and sentencing decisions. 
Starting from a social comparison perspective, which suggests that
people relate and compare themselves to others, two comparison targets can
be identified: the victim or the offender. People can engage in downward
comparisons with the victim and offender, considering the role of victim or
offender as not being desirable (see Wills 1981). Next, people can identify
with the target, or contrast themselves, as is suggested by the identification-
contrast model (Buunk and Ybema 1997). Identification has been consid-
ered to be closeness to the target, forming a bond with the target, being
similar in personality to the target or viewing the situation of the target as a
similar potential future for oneself (see Carmona et al. 2008). Identification
with the offender involves interpreting the offender as less stereotypical. For
example, identification with both victim and offender refers to a tragedy (see
table 13.2); in this situation the individual offender has not acted in a vol-
untarily capacity under the given circumstances (Fletcher 1974, p. 1306).
These ‘excusing conditions’ make the offender less culpable, responsible and
blameworthy, causing less punitive reactions and encouraging empathy with
offender and victim. 
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table 13.2 identification and contrast with victim and offender:




Identification Excusing circumstances; Stereotypes; popular images
voluntariness “He is a monster” 
Victim “She couldn’t help herself ” (Dutroux, Fritzl)
Blaming the victim Ignoring
Justified vigilantism; self defense; Criminals shooting criminals
Contrast necessity “Let them kill each other”
“I would have done the
same thing”
In cases with an ‘ideal’ victim and an ‘ideal’ offender, in which victim and of-
fender are presented in a stereotypical manner, people will contrast them-
selves with the offender, thinking he is entirely different, or not even human:
a monster or beast. Blaming the victim occurs when people contrast them-
selves with the victim, for example, because s/he acted in ways that are dis-
approved of, accompanied by identification with the offender. Another typical
case would be a father taking the law into his own hands by killing the bru-
tal rapist of his young child (see Neapolitan 1987).
The likelihood of identification or contrast can be experimentally ma-
nipulated (e.g., Aguiar et al. 2008), and is also manipulated by the (news)
media. In the case of the disappearance of Holloway, The Peter R. de Vries
Show used particular rhetorical means: framing devices in order to make Joran
van der Sloot a more stereotypical (ideal) offender, encouraging the public to
contrast with him. Also, the rhetorical means showed Natalee Holloway as a
stereotypical (ideal) victim, encouraging the public to identify with her (and
her mother). The main episode of the show in which the footage from the
hidden camera was shown, provided an apparently clear picture featuring an
immoral offender and an innocent victim. If it were such a clear-cut, stereo-
typical case, moral outrage would prevail. Yet, in this case The Peter R. de
Vries Show wasn’t the only source of information. Other sources presented
information which was less consistent with these stereotypes, showing a more
complex narrative in which good and evil seem less clear. Because the stereo-
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types can be challenged and contested with other information, the public,
and young people in particular, are able to both identify with Holloway and
Van der Sloot, and contrast themselves with them. Thus, besides moral out-
rage (see table 13.2), other reactions are possible as well. The complexity of the
narrative generates a lot of discussion, possibly because in a case that is less
stereotypical, there is a stronger need to make sense: the just world is chal-
lenged. The narrative has generated a lot of discussion over a longer period
of time, which is hardly surprising. The case involves (possibly) an accident
(convulsions); before Holloway was missing, the victim and offender were
young people having a good time; and last but not least, the story has an
open ending: different scenarios are still possible. These elements enable
(young) people to identify with both victim and offender. 
Method
To investigate the rhetorical means that media employed to construct the
guilt of Van der Sloot and the innocence of Holloway, we employed a quan-
titative and qualitative content analysis of text, photographs and footage from
a variety of sources. In this chapter, we focus only on the photographs. We
will briefly describe the two checklists we used to code the information de-
rived from photographs published in tabloids, magazines, newspapers and
on the Internet. 
Dataset
All the material was published in the period from May 31 2005 until March
31 2008. Several archives were searched, including the archive of the public
broadcasting company, archives of commercial television programs and Lexis
Nexis. The photographs that provide the relevant cases for this chapter were
collected from different databases. First, photographs from newspapers, in-
cluding De Volkskrant (broadsheet), Telegraaf (middle market – tabloid) and
three free Dutch newspapers (Spits, Metro and De Pers), were collected from
the kb (National Library) and the online database archives of newspapers
(Lexis Nexis). Photographs from magazines were collected from databases
provided by the magazines. We chose three popular Dutch magazines: the
popular men’s magazine Panorama and two women’s (gossip) magazines Privé
and Story. These three could be seen as leading tabloids in the Netherlands
and they paid a lot of attention to the case. Other photographs were collected
on the internet using the website FlickR, an international social networking
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site based on sharing and exchanging amateur and professional photographs.
Our collection amounted to a total of 283 photographs, 189 (66%) of Joran
van der Sloot and 94 (33%) photographs of Natalee Holloway. 
Instruments
As text, television programs and photographs were analyzed, a total of six in-
struments (A to F, see table 13.3) were developed to examine the content: one
on Joran van der Sloot and one on Natalee Holloway, for the three different
formats (television, photographs and texts). In part, the instruments or check-
lists are the same in the checklists for the different formats; other variables are
specific for one of these formats. 
table 13.3 six instruments




Some variables were the same for both actors, for example, formal variables
concerning the description of the size of the photograph, use of color, pub-
lishing date, caption used and the source. Other variables included in both
checklists referred to, for example, the position of the body (i.e., standing, sit-
ting), the relative size of the person depicted, facial expression, or where the
photograph was taken (i.e., home setting, public setting). 
From the literature and an exploratory qualitative analysis, we derived
more than fifty variables of stereotypical features. To mention a few: the phys-
ical appearance of Van der Sloot included variables related to whether or not
the photograph showed him unshaven, with cops, handcuffed, wearing jeans,
wearing a baseball cap, wearing a t-shirt, sweating and so on. Physical features
of Natalee Holloway that were coded included the use of make-up, whether
or not she appeared to be sweating. Other variables included, for example,
whether Van der Sloot or Holloway were depicted with friends, with a drink
in their hands, a joint, in interaction with other persons, etc. Figures 13.1 and
13.2 show a selection of the photographs found.
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figure 13.1 depicting the offender
figure 13.2 depicting the victim
A content analysis gives quantitative characteristics of the collection of pho-
tographs in terms of the frequency with which the variables occurred. All the
photographs were coded by two or more coders using the relevant checklist.
In a pilot training session, the coders were trained and instructions were de-
fined explicitly. The checklists were adjusted till inter-rater reliability was suf-
ficient; for all the variables scored, Cohen’s Kappa was at least .75. After
coding the data from a total number of 283 photographs, checklists were en-
tered in spss, a statistical software program.
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Results
Our main research question concerned the means that were used to construct
the guilt of the offender and the innocence of the victim, in this particular case.
We looked at these means in two ways: first we collected the frequencies of dis-
tinctive features and afterwards we combined these means in terms of frames:
collections of variables that work together to portray the main characters. 
The variables were aggregated by way of a qualitative analysis of the
photo material and the literature. After the analysis it became clear that some
variables gave almost no variance or just did not occur. We found, for exam-
ple, almost no photographs with Joran and Natalee together and no photo-
graphs where Joran was smoking. The last finding was particularly
remarkable, because the stills from the television show of Joran in the car,
smoking pot presented a very strong, almost iconic image of him that lasted
long after the television show. But indeed: on almost all of our photographs,
he was NOT smoking. Table 13.4 summarizes the percentages of photographs
that show these particular characteristics. 
Table 13.4 shows that most of the variables were coded as binominal
values: yes or no. So it is clear that when Natalee is depicted in 85% of the
photos with others, in 15% she is alone. Most of the photos are taken from
an eye-level perspective, looking right into the camera and most of the pho-
tographs are posed. On almost half of the photographs she is with other peo-
ple, in most of them with known others like friends, parents, etc. She has
interaction with the people in the photograph and if she is with others she
has, in almost 70% of the cases, eye contact and physical contact. In almost
all the photographs, coders judged the facial expression as happy; she has no
exceptional make up (“natural” in 97.9% of the photographs) and her hair is
always neat. She is not sweating, not smoking. Her position is judged as pas-
sive in 70% of the photographs. 
In the photographs of Joran the overall image is somewhat different.
Although most of the photographs are taken at eye level (60%), a substantial
number of them are taken from a bird’s perspective (20%) and from a frog’s
perspective (20%). Joran does not look right into the camera in 46% of the
photographs and in fewer photos than Natalee is he posing (in only 76% of
them). There are some photographs (16%) where Joran is shown with police
and in handcuffs. In 48% he is not with others in the photograph. And if he
is with others, he is not making eye contact with anyone else in the photo-
graph (97%). In 50% of the photographs his facial expression is judged neu-
[  2 5 6 ]
LUP Bending Opinion Boek_Layout 2  27-01-11  14:46  Pagina 256
the popular virgin and the wolf in sheep’s  clothing
[  2 5 7 ]
tral; in 49% as happy. In most of the photographs he is clean shaven with a
fresh hair cut. In 60% of the photographs he is judged as active.
Frames
Can we set out these variables in terms of frames, as in “collections of vari-
ables that work together to portray the main characters”? A common tech-
nique of doing this is the homals analysis, or optimal scaling option which is
available in spss, but the scores were too diverse and – because of the large
number of variables – in many cases too few per variable to make an analy-
table 13.4 results
Holloway Van der Sloot
(n=94) (n=189)
Camera perspective, eye level 89.4 59.3
Camera bird perspective 8.5 20.6
Camera frog perspective 2.1 20.1
Subject looks into camera 94.7 54.5
Subject is unshaven * 39.7
Posed photograph 94.7 42.9
Handcuffs * 6.3
With Peter R. de Vries * 8.2
With cops on photograph * 16.3
With others 84.8 57.1
With mom on photograph 15.2 11.2
With dad on photograph 6.5 22.4
Interaction with people on photograph 78.3 66.3
Eye contact 66.7 3.0
Physical contact 68.4 97.0
Happy face 98.9 41.8
Natural make up 97.9 *
Decent haircut 100 57.7
Decent clothing 83.0 *
Alcohol 4.3 4.8
First impression nice 74.5 33.9
First impression innocent 88.3 26.5
First impression passive 84.0 24.9
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sis that would make any sense. Nevertheless, by looking at the preliminary re-
sults of optimal scaling/homals, as well as the frequencies of the main char-
acteristics, we can distinguish two remarkable sets of variables: we called them
the Popular Virgin and the Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing.
Popular Virgin
The Popular Virgin frame can be characterized by the following features: a
camera perspective at eye level, eye contact with the viewer of the photo-
graph, posed, interaction with people in the photograph, eye contact with
the other people in the photograph, a happy face, natural make up, combed
hair, decent clothing (see figure 13.3). Coders characterized her at first sight
as nice, innocent and passive in most of the photographs. More than 50% of
the photographs represent these typical features.
figure 13.3 popular virgin
Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing
The analysis of the photographic material on Van der Sloot shows more di-
mensions. The photographs are more diverse than those of Natalee (see figure
13.4). Obviously, this is because after the disappearance of Holloway, the devel-
opment of visual material related to her stopped, yet the visual material depict-
ing Van der Sloot could still be created and published. Besides that, the
distribution of the features of the visual material depicting Van der Sloot is also
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more varied. On several photographs, the coders did not consider him to be ob-
viously nice, or happy, but when he is with friends in a photograph, he makes
eye contact and physical contact. Also, he is a character in more snap shots, in
photographs which have not been posed: he has been in the news for longer than
Natalee and became an important news topic after her disappearance. We called
this frame The Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing (also used in e.g., McIntyre 1988 and Sper-
ber et al. 2009). A lot of the photographs are quite similar to photographs fea-
turing Natalee, yet he is often framed as a criminal (e.g., figure 13.5, a screenshot
from the website of Peter R. de Vries). This makes him a man with two faces. 
figure 13.4 wolf in sheep’s clothing
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figure 13.5 stereotypical victim and offender: cased solved
(“opgelost”) 12 november 2009
13.7  Conclusions and discussion
Browsing through the collection of the 283 photographs from newspapers,
magazines, websites and tabloids, one’s intuitive impression is that the two
main actors in this drama are two normal adolescents, from white middle-
class families. Several photographs of the victim and offender show both of
them with friends, obviously having fun, or with their family members. A
quantitative analysis underpins this intuition. 
Holloway can be presented, and she often is, as a stereotypical victim
with features that fit the stereotype: decently posed photographs of a fresh-
faced, happy girl, looking straight at the camera, in the company of friends
or her mother, graduated and easily perceived (and judged by our coders) as
passive, nice and innocent. Her clothing, combed blond hair, her smile re-
vealing healthy white teeth and her good-looking friends in the photograph
support the impression of her innocence. These are the rhetorical means by
which she is constructed. Information that contests this impression hasn’t re-
ceived a lot of attention – it is said, for example, that she was drunk and
under influence of drugs before she died. This kind of information does not
appear on these photographs and appeared rarely in the written press. She is
the flat character in this morality play.
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In sum, Holloway is constructed as a normal female adolescent and this
offers all the possibilities for identification: it could have happened to you.
Van der Sloot, on the other hand, is the round and more complex char-
acter. Based on this collection of photographs, Joran van der Sloot is not a
stereotypical offender: we get a far more diffuse picture of him. In more than
half of the photographs he is depicted as a normal adolescent with whom one
can easily identify (see figure 13.6). These photographs are rather similar to the
photographs of Holloway: socializing with friends and family. Yet, after Hol-
loway’s disappearance and his possible role in that incident, his ‘confession’
caught on hidden camera and his appearance in television, he can easily be
perceived as a wolf in sheep’s clothing. In more than 20% of the photographs,
he is shown with police officers and/or in handcuffs.
figure 13.6 a normal adolescent
Anticipating the findings from the analyses of the television footage, it appears
that the impression of deviance that we get from Van der Sloot comes from
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his appearance in television shows. There we can see and hear him lying and
reacting short temperedly. Although the stills from these television shows, for
example the stills from the footage from the hidden camera in The Peter R.
de Vries Show (see figure 13.7), were not published very often in the print or
news media, they established an extremely powerful, almost iconic picture of
Van der Sloot. 
figure 13.7 still from hidden camera
The narrative has generated a lot of discussion over a long period of time. In
retrospect, this is not that surprising. The case involves (possibly) an acci-
dent, the main characters are young people having a good time before Natalee
went missing; and the narrative has an open ending so different scenarios are
still possible. These elements enable (young) people to identify with both vic-
tim and offender. There is hardly any discussion about Holloway’s fate: she
is dead, no one doubts that. This results in a mono-dimensional framing of
her. In contrast with Holloway, Van der Sloot’s role is, to a certain extent,
questioned. Since nobody knows exactly what really happened that night,
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nobody knows whether he is really guilty or not. The incident could still have
been an accident. The story leaves a lot of room for speculation, which en-
ables the different media to portray his character in more than one way. 
At the beginning of this chapter, we stated that the narrative of this
particular case is more complex than the stereotypes we know from our read-
ing of standard literature. The characters here are less stereotypical; at least
Van der Sloot is. The interpretation of this character can be challenged and
contested with other information. Thus, good and evil are less clear. This
makes a wider variety of opinion possible: besides just contrasting with the
offender and identifying with the victim (and her family), other reactions are
possible. Thus, the narrative generates a lot of discussion; perhaps because, in
a less stereotypical case, there is a stronger need to make sense: the just world
is challenged. 
In this discussion, a number of different issues are highlighted. The
nature of the data and method used in these analyses are discussed. After that
we will comment on the theoretical relevance of our research question with
respect to stereotypical media portrayals. But first, the societal relevance is
explored in more detail. During the development of this particular case, the
two main reasons as to why the study of media portrayals is societally im-
portant were stressed several times. The first reason is that media portrayals
reflect issues in (real) social life; that is, the media as a source of information
tells us about society. Themes such as alcohol and drug use, international
travel, rules of conduct among friends and female and male adolescents, re-
sponsibility of parents and media, dynamics between legal actors and the
public and so forth were reported on. However, the disappearance of Hol-
loway did not become a typical example of all the (female) adolescents who
have disappeared; no claims were made about her disappearance being the
tip of the iceberg. In that sense, the disappearance wasn’t constructed as a so-
cial problem (Best 2007). 
The second reason why the study of media portrayals is societally rel-
evant is because these portrayals have (real) consequences in (real) social life.
Immediately after the broadcasting of the epsiode of The Peter R. de Vries
Show in which Van der Sloot ‘confesses’ on hidden camera, many people
posted insults and threats on (what was supposedly) his social network site
(Hyves). Direct responses included protests, discussions, letters to the editor
of newspapers, comments on websites and disturbances at sites where Joran
was assumed to be hiding himself. One of the newspapers we analyzed, De
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Volkskrant, suggested that if “Van der Sloot had been found, he would have
been lynched by a furious crowd” (Giesen 2008).
One of the women’s (gossip) magazines, similar to the magazines we
analyzed (Privé and Story) had the headline “Kill the monster” (figure 13.8).
In itself, the media exposure caused effects for all (family) members involved.
Real consequences, not only for Van der Sloot, but also for legal actors work-
ing within the criminal justice system who had to defend the legal notions of
a confession and explain why the “confession” on hidden camera did not con-
stitute enough legal evidence to arrest and prosecute him. 
figure 13.8 kill the monster
Most people do not have any direct experience with (specific types of ) crime
or with the criminal justice system, so they obtain their information, and
form perceptions, ideas and attitudes, from other people and from the (news)
media. As Forst (2004, pp. 213-219) describes, the public’s perception that the
criminal justice system is just and effective, its (perceived) legitimacy can be
seriously flawed, yet this legitimacy “is essential to a well-functioning, citizen-
supported, criminal justice system” (Forst (2004:3). The public’s (mis)per-
ceptions are influenced by, among other things, high-profile media cases and
miscarriages of justice. In the Van der Sloot/Holloway case, The Peter R. de
Vries Show refers to the footage, in which Van der Sloot tells acquaintance
Van der Eem what had happened, as ‘the confession’. Several other (news)
media report on the ‘confession’ and people perceive this confession to be
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valid, at least to a certain extent. Nonetheless, the confession is not a confes-
sion in any legal sense and provides no further evidence. This is difficult to
explain to the general public. These kinds of developments, and other mis-
carriages of justice such as wrongful convictions, may undermine the legiti-
macy of the criminal justice system (Cole 2009). In short, these considerations
illustrate the relevance of analyses of media portrayals. Another issue we
would like to comment on in this discussion is the nature of the data and
method we focused on in our analyses. 
figure 13.9 more evidence against joran
Figure 13.9 shows the front page of De Telegraaf (June 12, 2005) with the head-
ing “Meer bewijzen tegen Joran”/ “More evidence against Joran”. The article
is illustrated with a well-known photograph of Holloway, a photograph of
Van der Sloot, who holds money in his hands, and two smaller photographs
of the two Surinam suspects. All three suspects have a black band covering
their eyes. The smaller heading between the photographs reads: “Politie Aruba
vindt sporen van bloed in auto”/ “Aruba police find blood in car”. This front
page is a good example of why a content analysis focused on the characteris-
tics of the individual characters in crime news stories, or focused on other
substantial research questions, cannot limit itself to a content analysis of text
alone. The same article in LexisNexis Academic NL News, which contains the
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complete texts of several Dutch newspapers, informs us that the article con-
sists of 335 words. In this chapter, we focused on photographs, not text, be-
cause previous research has shown that visual material is far more important
in establishing, for example, the guilt and innocence of persons (Dubelaar
and Vanderveen 2009). While most content analyses of news media are lim-
ited to textual data, we believe this will only produce valid and relevant find-
ings if the research question is extremely limited. 
However, the richness of the visual data is challenging when one is
using a quantitative content analysis. During our analyses of the visual data
derived from (print) media and television shows, we found that the quanti-
tative instruments were not able to fully grasp the meaning of the images: by
breaking up a photograph into smaller, different pieces, the overall picture can
be easily missed. By splitting the visuals up into more than fifty variables, the
whole image was covered … yet it wasn’t. What is important is the way in
which all these features work together. While some statistical tools to corre-
late (certain) features do exist, in our analyses, other issues arose because of
missing data and the huge variety of material. In many cases, visual data such
as photographs are analyzed in a rather exploratory or qualitative manner,
often missing the preciseness, the controllability and strictness of quantitative
analytical methods. Yet, these qualitative approaches offer the possibility of
analyzing the image as a whole, and analyzing the image in depth. Recapit-
ulating our experiences briefly, we would plead for a mixed methods research
design (Cresswell and Plano Clark 2007). The main advantages of using such
a design are triangulation, complementarity and development (see Greene,
Caracelli and Graham 1989). Our future analyses of the data will use a mixed
methods approach such as this; preliminary findings already indicate, for ex-
ample, that the visual material accompanying text (in the print media) and
the visual material broadcast on television highlight other aspects of the char-
acters, or highlight them in different ways.
The last issue we would like to discuss here concerns the theoretical
relevance of our research question with respect to stereotypical media por-
trayals. We have examined the way in which media construct stereotypical im-
ages of victims and offenders by using established sets of characteristics
(frames). These frames act as rhetorical devices to convince their public of
the guilt and innocence of the parties involved. Although we have found
many cases in which these frames are stereotypical, featuring Holloway as in-
nocent victim and Van der Sloot as brutal offender, this is not the whole story.
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Though the literature is consistent in stating that disproportional attention
is paid to narratives featuring stereotypes as main characters, both in news
media and fiction, this portrayal of stereotypes is a stereotype in itself as well
(Vanderveen and Koetsenruijter 2009). In many cases, such as the Hol-
loway/Van der Sloot case, the narrative is more complex. When characters
are less stereotypical, good and evil are less clear. Such narratives elicit a wider
variety of opinion and more discussion because these types of narratives fuel
the need that we have to make sense of a situation. The simple classification
of persons into either offenders or victims helps media consumers to give
meaning to their reality and define our general ideas about good and evil.
Media sources like The Peter R. de Vries Show use several rhetorical devices to
present the distinction between victim and offender in as clear a way as pos-
sible. Yet, in some cases, when the stereotypes can be challenged, the just
world itself is challenged. The rhetoric of victims and offenders is less simple
and clear-cut; this enables discussion and a variety of scenarios about who is
good and evil to coexist. 
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14 “Conceptual and Fanciful” or 
“A Depiction of Reality”: Exploiting
Visual Modality to Claim Environmental
Ethos in uk Advertizements for 




The business benefits that can be accrued through association with and ac-
tual sound environmental practices cannot be understated (Bortree 2009;
Grant 2007). Indeed, stakeholder support for organizations is increasingly
dependent on evidence of a commitment to the growing political and pub-
lic interest in social and environmental responsibility (Livesey and Kearins
2002). Moreover, automotive and energy companies typically considered
responsible for detrimental environmental effects can especially benefit from
associating themselves with pro-environmental activities through sponsor-
ship of social and environmental organizations and especially by advertis-
ing the positive environmental impacts of their products and production
processes (Fombrun and Rindova 2000; Beder 2002; Coupland 2004). 
These kinds of environmental claims in advertizements, however, do
not go without scrutiny. uk governmental bodies (defra 2006) and indus-
try watchdogs (isba 2007) offer guidelines for sound practice and, in the uk,
the Advertising Standards Authority (asa) is charged with investigating and
adjudicating on any complaints made about the legitimacy of environ-
mental claims. In recent years objections to the environmental benefits as-
serted in corporate advertizements in the uk have risen substantially (asa
2008).
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This chapter examines how corporations generate green capital by ex-
ploiting the difference in truth claims attributed to visual modality in adver-
tisements. Analysis of a corpus of uk advertizements produced by automotive
and energy companies finds that adjudications about the truth values attributed
to images or visual argument are treated differently to similar linguistic claims.
Firstly, the chapter summarizes the relationship between ancient ethos
and modern corporate image maintenance by making apparent the shared
need to demonstrate strength of character, virtuousness and an appreciation
of an audience’s values and concerns. Following the explanation of modality
as a means of distinguishing truth claims in text and image, the chapter turns
its attention to the adjudications regarding environmental claims in text and
image. This piece concludes with a call for greater visual literacy and a more
consistent consideration of the impact of images in environmental claims
that are used to add to a corporation’s reputation.
14.2 Ancient ethos and modern corporate image: Rhetorical 
connections
For Aristotle (1991, p. 38) “the controlling factor in persuasion” is the develop-
ment of ethos or a credible and trustworthy character. Constructing and main-
taining credibility relies on three complementary constituents: using practical
wisdom (phronesis), displaying virtue (arête) or moral character and demon-
strating goodwill (euonia) towards the audience (Waerass and Ihlen 2009): 
Practical wisdom means using knowledge accurately to impress an audience. This
can be accomplished by using reliable evidence of sound provenance in, for exam-
ple, the form of logical and well-founded argument, the accurate use of statistics or
in the convincing application of technical expressions. (Ihlen 2009) 
The display of virtue refers to the “all-round personal excellence … in serv-
ice of the larger community” (Solomon 2004, p. 1023). 
In this respect displaying virtue involves both character and behaviour;
that is, virtue is a disposition to act in a morally laudable fashion that serves
more than the self but also some common good. 
The third factor influencing the development of ethos is the demon-
stration of goodwill towards the audience. This is less about displaying per-
sonal affiliation but rather about demonstrating a shared affective concern
for common goals or an appreciation of the audience’s needs or interests. In
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other words, the credible persuader should “somehow identify with the au-
dience, by for instance holding some of their basic aspirations [or] speaking
their language” (Kinneavy and Warshauer 1994, p. 177). This is likely to rely
on sharing an appreciation of similar virtues and, as Ihlen (2009, p. 364)
points out, could be “indirectly supported by pathos” or arousing an emo-
tional response.
These ancient principles for constructing credibility have been rou-
tinely applied to individual orators but in more recent times the tenets have
been deployed as a means of explaining the construction of a credible cor-
porate image or reputation. Whilst applying the bases of individual ethos to
organizational credibility is not without its opponents (see for example Gowri
2007 for a critical distinction between human and corporate virtues), con-
temporary understandings of corporate image construction are indeed being
understood through the lens of these ancient rhetorical techniques (Wei 2002;
Solomon 2004; Ihlen 2009).
Consequently, it seems wholly appropriate to pay critical attention to
the ways that corporations aim to be “thought to be sensible and morally
good” or to “look right” (Aristotle 1954, 1356a1-3); that is, to identify the
means through which an organization demonstrates strength of corporate
character in terms of: phronesis, the judicious reporting of evidence; arête, the
display of shared virtues; and euonia an appreciation of “characteristics and
qualities that are valued by an audience and community” (Beason 1991, p.
330) which includes internal and “external stakeholders, especially … cus-
tomers” (Davies, Chun and Da Silva 2001, p. 113).
As Ihlen (2009) acknowledges, the virtues and characteristics valued
by modern audiences will differ to ancient audiences. Indeed, recent research
reveals that 5 of uk consumers are likely to use a product because of its asso-
ciation with a good and especially an environmentally oriented cause
(Theaker 2004; Bortree 2009). Whilst there are principles that connect be-
tween ancient and modern rhetoricians the specific means available to per-
suaders are greatly extended. The contemporary corporate communicator has
innumerable media outlets and platforms through which to meet these
“greener” goals. 
14.2 “Greening” the corporate image: Claims and concerns
Companies “will not shy away from spending millions on environmental im-
provements if there is reputational capital in it” (Beder 2002). These im-
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provements may be actual investment in changes to production and manu-
facturing but often this level of investment includes self-promotion in the
form of internal strategy documents (Pedersen and Neergaard 2009), annual
reports (Neu, Warsame and Pedwell 1998), corporate social responsibility re-
ports (Ihlen 2009; Ocler 2009), corporate websites (Adams and Frost 2006;
Coupland 2006) and advertorials (Livesey 2002). Whilst these practices are
often for restricted stakeholders the vehicle through which corporations as-
sert their good environmental citizenship is nowhere more publicly apparent
than brand and product promotion in mass media advertising. 
The rise in environmental claims in advertising has also seen a sharp
rise in concerns that these claims may be overstated (bt, 2007). As Ashforth
and Gibbs (1990, p. 180) appreciate, an organization may “espous[e] socially
acceptable goals while actually pursuing less acceptable ones”. Indeed, cor-
porations have been advised to ensure that any advertising claims should
make accurate reference to legitimate environmental action (Grant 2007) in
order to avoid allegations of “green spin” (Magee 2008), “greenwashing” or,
in its extreme, “ecopornography” (cipr 2007).
Despite this laudable counsel, complaints to the uk’s Advertising Stan-
dards Authority (asa) about environmental claims in advertising rose from 117
objections to 83 advertizements in 2006 to 561 complaints about 410 adver-
tizements in 2007 and beyond.
Contemporary advertising affords the corporate communicator a near
open-ended set of multimodal resources from which to craft messages de-
signed to persuade. As a result, the potential to combine text, image and
sound means that especially close attention to complaints made about any or
all these semiotic resources is required. This brings me to the analytic and in-
terpretative issues central to this chapter: the truth-values attributed to text
and image or linguistic and visual argument and especially to the resulting ad-
judications based on these values. 
14.3 Visual argument and linguistic argument: Modality and truth-
values 
Following Barthes (1972) it is widely acknowledged that texts and images have
differing meaning-making capacities or “individual functions and strengths”
(Lemke 1998, p. 38). For Lemke this means that language is adept at encap-
sulating typological meaning by categorizing whereas the visual can make
meanings topologically or by degree. As a result, language is interpreted as
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having more fixed, or closed, meanings whereas images are deemed to be
more polysemous, open to interpretation and often (although not exclusively)
subordinate to the text (Van Leeuwen 2006). 
That said, there is also much competing evidence to support the equal
treatment of text and image. Mitchell (1994, p. 161) maintains that “semanti-
cally speaking there is no essential difference between texts and images”. Van
Leeuwen (2006, p. 179) similarly argues that just as other semiotic resources
operate in collaboration to generate implicatures, visual analysis should focus
“not only the image as representation but also on the image as an ‘inter’act”;
that is, analysis should address how the reader/viewer interprets and deduces
meanings from the collage of signs present in, for example, an advertizement. 
There is also some support to move beyond this perceptual equity. Blair (1994,
p. 54) emphasizes the “power of visual imagery to evoke involuntary reac-
tions” and exceed linguistic argument. Further research suggests that the vi-
sual (in, but not limited to, metaphor) can be more influential than linguistic
(either literal or figurative) arguments (Blair 2004). McQuarrie and Philips
(2005) argue that the juxtaposition, replacement or fusion of images to exploit
figurative interpretations can generate a range of meanings that require com-
plex processing. This increased effort in the comprehension process can result
in an enhanced memory trace of the message and more permanent impact
(Petty and Cacioppo 1986). This scope for multiple interpretations means
that it is also true that “not all assumptions in a message can be taken as com-
municated with equal force, nor with the same degree of strength to differ-
ent people” (Forceville 1996, p. 177). Such a position is important when
understanding which aspects of an advertizement attract complaints and how
these complaints are upheld or rejected by the asa. 
Before I go on to discuss the complaints and adjudications in detail, I
briefly want to foreground another key aspect of linguistic and visual argu-
mentation: truth claims and modality. Modality refers to the status, author-
ity and reliability of a message, to its ontological status, or to its value as truth
or fact (Hodge and Kress 1988, p. 124) and marks out certainty, possibility
and necessity. Lexical choice can impose a view of truth that is difficult to
challenge or truth claims may be more qualified or weakly asserted. As a re-
sult, “truth is … a matter of degree” (Van Leeuwen 2006, p. 162).
Visual expression similarly construes different truth-values by degree
often depending on combinations of gradable differences available in terms
of saturation, differentiation and modulation (Van Leeuwen 2006). Images
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can be produced using fully saturated color, pastel or muted tones, or with the
complete absence of color. The communicative potential of saturation is am-
biguous: “high saturation may be positive, exuberant, adventurous, but also
vulgar or garish. Low saturation may be subtle and tender, but also cold and
repressed, or brooding and moody” (Kress and Van Leeuwen 2007, p. 233).
Whilst there are important distinctions in terms of light and shadow, depth
of field and degrees of detail, there are also, as we shall see, competing inter-
pretations regarding color saturation and realism. Differentiation marks out
a scale ranging from monochrome to a diverse and complex color palette.
Color can also be deployed from a flat to a fully modulated scale. Flat mod-
ulation offers a general impression or generic characteristics of an entity and
produces a more abstract representation whereas fully modulated color with
concomitant grading of nuances realises a stronger perceptual truth or carries
greater “epistemic force” (Hill 2004, p. 29). With this in mind, Hill (2004)
further argues that realism depends on vivid information using “concrete and
imagistic language, personal narratives, pictures, or first-hand experience”.
Vivid information draws on representations that are more “realistic”. For ex-
ample, in table 14.1, a photograph is considered more true to life than a line
drawing. 
table 14.1
Most vivid information actual experience






Least vivid information statistics
The relative verisimilitude of an image is based on combinations of these
modalities and the viewer’s own judgments. Realism, it seems, is judged on
dimensions such as color, degree of contextualization, comprehensiveness of
representation, nature of the perspective, sources of illumination and degree
of brightness. However, how each of these factors influences the interpreta-
tion of an image’s veracity are not insignificant matters. Kress and Hodge
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(1988, p. 147) make the importance of modality plain when they assert that
“social control rests on control over the representation of reality which is ac-
cepted as the basis for judgment and action... whoever controls modality can
control which version of reality will be selected out as the valid version in
that semiotic process.”
These kinds of judgments about what sorts of images are more repre-
sentative versions of reality can be explored in the following: a color photo-
graph, a black and white photograph with increased background saturation,
a colored pencil sketch and a black pencil line drawing.1
These images demonstrate the tension between representation, resemblance
and reality (Lopes 1996) and how form, communicative function and cultural
interpretations influence judgments about which is the more accurate version
of reality. The color photograph (figure 14.1) in contrast to the black pencil
line drawing (figure 14.4) following Hall’s (2004) criteria is likely (under some
conditions) to be judged as more ‘realistic’. The corollary is that the black pen-
cil line drawing could be considered to be “visual ‘opinion’ and less factual than
a … photograph which is held to provide reliable documentary information”
(Van Leeuwen 2006, p. 167). This overlooks, however, the powerful commu-
nicative function of a line drawing or densely saturated cartoon. 
People can identify an image more quickly when it is drawn as a car-
toon than when they are shown a photograph of a hand (Lopes 1996). Addi-
figure 14.1 figure 14.2 figure 14.3 figure 14.4
1 My thanks go to Suzanne Curran for producing these images.
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tionally, such simplified and decontextualized images can, like gesture, ac-
quire symbolic meaning that makes it possible “to form generalised images
that reflect the facts of real life correctly and in depth” (Meshcheryakov 1979,
p. 189). Moreover, diagrams, line drawings and illustrations also have the po-
tential to be read as images with “high truth-values and not as fictions or fan-
tasies” (Van Leeuwen 2006, p. 167).
There are, of course, far more meaning-making mechanisms at work
in print advertising including, not least, the role of semiotic space and how
different information values pertain to the different placement of materials on
a page. Figure 14.5 demonstrates how the location of image or text also car-
ries different information values. 
figure 14.5
When a page is spatially polarized, information on the left inhabits the given
domain: the already known or predictable. Material located on the right, in
the new domain, displays original, modified or unexpected information
which, according to Kress and Van Leeuwen (1998, p. 189), can be treated as
“problematic, contestable [or] the information at issue”. In the vertical plane,
material located in the upper part is presented as the generalized or idealized
essence of the information. In the lower part, the information is valued as
more specific, more practical or more “down-to-earth” (Van Leeuwen 2006). 
To interpret meanings and attribute truth-values, Chandler (2002) ex-
plains, readers must draw on all their “knowledge of the world and of the
medium. For instance, they assign it to fact or fiction, actuality or acting, live
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or recorded, and they assess the possibility or plausibility of the events de-
picted or the claims made in it”. These issues of realism, the credibility of the
image and the legitimacy of linguistic claims are at the heart of the data under
discussion to which our attention now turns. The data consists of the com-
plaints and adjudications about five advertizements produced by car manu-
facturers and energy companies during 2007-2008 in the uk.
14.4 The complaints and adjudications: Textual claims versus image
representation
The first text is a uk magazine advertizement and poster campaign (May
2007) for a Lexus rx 400h hybrid fuel car. Its headline states “High per-
formance. Low emissions. Zero guilt”. Visually the advertizement presents a
highly decontextualized, intensely lit, minimally differentiated photograph
containing a richly refracted reflection of the car. Accompanying the image
the body copy states: “rx 400h. The world’s first high performance hybrid
suv ... category-leading low co2 emissions. A combination without equal.
Or compromise”. 
The complaints addressed the accuracy of the headline claims “low
emissions” and “zero guilt” suggesting that they misrepresented the environ-
mental impact of the sports utility vehicle. The asa concluded that the com-
plaints about the unqualified use of the ambiguous category term ‘low’
implied the vehicle’s emission rate was negligible and readers would infer that
it had less detrimental emissions in comparison with all cars. The attempt to
use the technique of phronesis and boost ethos using albeit unqualified evi-
dence was deemed to be unsubstantiated and misleading. 
In terms of absolute truth claims, the asa additionally decided that the
term ‘zero’ (unsubstantiated by the body copy and additional evidence sub-
mitted) would (mis)lead readers to infer that the car caused little or no harm
to the environment which, the asa concluded, was not the case. Of note,
however, is that no complaints made by members of the public or comments
by the asa questioned the highly stylized, decontextualized, pristine setting
and unrealistic representation of the vehicle. The lack of attention to the
image in meaning-making is also evident in the next text.
A uk national press advertizement (January 2007) for the Golf gt tsi
uses a triptych. It shows a centrally-positioned image of the car on a split
background. The left hand side of the advertizement pictures a dimly lit for-
est with wolves and the text “High performance”. The right hand side of the
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advertizement shows a brightly lit meadow with a deer and the text “Low
emissions”. The body copy states: “It also does over 38 mpg, and emits just
175g of co2 per kilometre. More power, less pollution. Better to drive. Better
for the planet”. The text at the bottom of advertizement states: “co2 emissions
for the Golf gt tsi are lower than other engines with similar power outputs”.
The complainants challenged the assertion “low emissions”. 
The asa, in line with the previous adjudication, maintained that read-
ers would be likely to understand the weak modality of the linguistic claim
“low emissions” to mean the car had less damaging emissions than all cars and
upheld the complaint. What is of interest, again, is the lack of mention of the
content or modality of the images. 
The image on the left, in the given semiotic space, is more fully satu-
rated and the lighting adds to its near photographic quality. The image on the
right, presenting new information, uses low saturation, pastel shades, grain-
iness and an evaporating perspective along with more fanciful sources of il-
lumination resulting in a more visibly cartoon or sketch-like resonance. The
reader should take the lupine performance of the car as given, as “common-
sense and self-evident and as established” (Kress and Van Leeuwen 1998, p.
189). The new material, a deer grazing in a tranquil meadow, should be treated
analytically; “problematic, contestable, the information at issue” (ibid.). Apart
from not being scrutinized as contestable, the lack of reference also ignores
the potential implicatures generated by the low modality of the sketch. That
is, of an inescapable intertextual reference to Disney’s Bambi grazing in idyl-
lic rural pastures. This image is undoubtedly being used to underscore and ex-
tend the textual claim that has been deemed to be inaccurate and
misrepresentative. However, the evocative pastoral associations of the image
available to a viewer along with their location in a contestable space are al-
lowed to stand without scrutiny or critical evaluation. The car company has
evoked pastoral virtues and has produced a form of identification with an
uncomplaining audience by representing basic aspirations without criticism.
As a result, this particular form of image has allowed the company enhance
its image through association with environmental capital.
The third text, a national print advertizement (March 2008) for the Re-
nault Twingo Dynamique uses a photographic image of the car against a pale
green background and presents illustrations or sketches of differently sized
drawings of oversized leaves apparently emanating from the car’s exhaust.
The text on the largest leaf reads “eco2 economical ecological”. One
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complaint challenged whether the textual claim “ultra low” in the body copy
was misleading. Another complaint argued that the claims “ecological” and
“eco2” were misleading because the terms exaggerated, without evidence, the
environmental credentials of the car. The asa concluded that the unqualified
use of the terms “ecological” and the “eco2” logo could lead readers to infer
that the vehicle caused relatively little harm to the environment and had low
emissions compared with other similar cars. Whilst the asa noted the use of
large (certainly not to scale) illustrations of leaves in place of exhaust emis-
sions. However, they did not ask for them to be removed in any amended ad-
vertisements. The presence of oversized environmental “goods” meta-
phorically replacing an environmental “bad” clearly warranted but did not re-
ceive adequate critical attention.
Having foregrounded the lack of attention being paid to the visual in
complaints to the asa, the next two advertizements have images at the cen-
tre of both the complaint and the subsequent adjudications. 
Example 4 is a direct mailing circular (February 2008) produced by an
energy company. It has a black print headline “Wind Power News” and shows
a monochrome photograph of four wind turbines in the mid and back-
ground. Alongside hedge-bounded fields there are four horses grazing in the
foreground. There is a web link to an update about the proposed Nun Wood
wind farm. 
The complaints addressed the veracity of the image suggesting it gave
a misleading impression of the visual impact of the wind turbines for the
proposed Nun Wood wind farm. The photograph uses perspective, articu-
lation of background, saturated color and tonal shades to produce a rela-
tively highly modulated realization. The asa (2007a) concluded that, given
the nature of the image, readers were “likely to believe the photograph rep-
resented” how the Nun Wood wind farm would look if it were to be built.
The asa noted the image was of an already operational wind farm where the
turbines appeared to be smaller than those proposed for the Nun Wood
site. The photograph is treated as presenting “more vivid information” (Hall
2004) and thus is attributed greater “plausibility of the events depicted or
the claims made in it” (Chandler 2002). The company was asked to with-
draw the flyer. 
In the fifth example, the data example, the complaints addressed both
the environmental claims in the image and in the text. A national press ad-
vertisement (November 2007) for an energy company was headlined “Don’t
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throw anything away there is no away” and shows a generic silhouette of an
oil refinery which has four chimneys producing clouds of colorful flower
heads. The body copy states:
If only we had a magic bin that we could throw stuff in and make it disappear for-
ever. What we can do is find creative ways to recycle. We use our waste co2 to grow
flowers, and our waste sulphur to make super-strong concrete. Real energy solu-
tions for the real world.
The complainants maintained that the image of industrial chimneys emitting
flowers misrepresented the environmental impact of company’s refineries.
The objections also addressed the textual assertion “We use our waste co2 to
grow flowers” suggesting it implied that the company used all of its waste
co2 to grow flowers. The complainants offered evidence that less than 0.5%
of carbon dioxide emissions were used by local greenhouse growers to produce
plants. In its adjudication, The asa upheld the complaints regarding the un-
qualified assertion of waste carbon dioxide use that invited the inference that
the company used all, or at least the majority, of their waste carbon dioxide
to grow flowers. However, the asa did not uphold the complaint about the
potential inferences prompted by the incongruent metaphorical image that
suggests that one direct consequence of the industrial oil refining process is
the immediate production of flowers. In drawing up its decision, the asa con-
cluded that the image was “conceptual and fanciful” (asa 2007b) and that
“most readers were unlikely to interpret it as a depiction of reality.” It seems
that because the image is a flatly modulated, impressionistic or generic sil-
houette with a highly simplified visual metaphor using images akin to a child’s
rudimentary drawing of flowers and not a photograph that it is not consid-
ered to constitute a direct or vivid reference to reality (Hall 2004). Its influ-
ence on viewers is deemed to be minimal. Analytically, the judgement
overlooks the powerful effect of “generalised images” that can “reflect the facts
of real life correctly and in depth” (Meshcheryakov 1979) and, as Van Leeuwen
(2006, p.167) maintains, can carry “high truth values” and not be treated as
“fictions or fantasies”. 
This conclusion neglects recent research exploring the potency of vi-
sual metaphor to influence readers/viewers (Lagerwerf and Meijers 2008).
It also ignores the powerful connotations encoded in the typeface redolent
of 1960s pro-environmental “flower power” drawing on the densely satu-
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rated hybrid color palette associated with that period. The combination of
image and typeface are used, it seems, to express a commitment to goodwill
required to build ethos. The opening line of the body copy also seems to
demonstrate an appreciation of and alignment with the concerns of the
public. That is, the general wish to find a solution to produce a better world.
The connotations available in the image also seem to express respect for a
value system desired by some, if not all, potential readers. Certainly, as Kin-
neavy and Warshauer (1994, p. 177) suggest, demonstrating goodwill can
mean that persuaders “share or affirm the prejudices of their audience.” By
drawing the graphic outline of the emission-producing refinery on the hori-
zon goes someway to show some identification with the audience. The
image acknowledges that the refinery does produce waste but not of the
order presumed by the audience. That the complaints about the image are
rejected allows the company to accrue much green capital and concomi-
tant environmental ethos. 
These two adjudications address visual representations and truth-val-
ues in important but different ways. The image in the oil company’s adver-
tisement is treated as “visual opinion” (Van Leeuwen 2006, p. 167). The
photograph of wind turbines is deemed to provide “reliable documentary in-
formation” (ibid.). It seems when images are recognisable because of their ge-
ographic, historical or socially specific identity they are treated as arguments
and engaged with the same degree of critique as linguistic claims. When they
are decreed to be of a fictional or fanciful form they are treated as peripheral
and of minimal importance.
Overall, in these five advertizements (despite the perspectives outlined
previously that image and text should receive, at least, perceptual equity) it
seems that the word is mightier than the image or rather truth claims asserted
in linguistic argument are given greater attention and critical treatment. So
whilst The asa demonstrates a laudable capacity to tackle low modality lin-
guistic claims about environmental impacts they dismiss the persuasive value
in low modality images. So, when assertions are made that use the notion of
practical wisdom inaccurately they engage critically with the implicatures
arising from the unqualified or unsubstantiated use of such terms yet only
high modality images, deemed to represent reality, attract critical re-appraisal.
The potential benefits for the production of corporate environmental ethos
are profound. 
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14.5 Building environmental ethos, exploiting visual modality, en-
hancing corporate image
Regardless of the industry sector a company inhabits, any corporation will
have “its virtues – or morally desirable habits, its vices – or morally undesir-
able habits” (Gowri 2007, p. 391). However, for organizations considered es-
pecially responsible for detrimental environmental effects reducing attention
to these undesirable practices can reap significant financial benefits. Conse-
quently, many companies are keen to market themselves by aligning them-
selves with the virtue du jour; currently conceived in terms of environmentally
responsible activities. 
The data has demonstrated how organizations attempt to develop pos-
itive relationships and generate goodwill (eunoia) with a range of stakehold-
ers including their customers. The use of knowledge (phronesis) in the low
modality linguistic claims of environmental goods and reduced environ-
mental impacts are identified to be overstated and less than judicious. How-
ever, it seems that the use of low modality images, images that are deemed to
be “fanciful” and non-realistic, allows corporations to display a commitment
to the “service of the larger community” (Solomon 2004, p. 1023) or planet
by “wishing good for others” (Ihlen 2009, p. 364) with the aim, undoubtedly
of benefiting themselves. 
I conclude this chapter using two examples from an ibm (2008) tele-
vision advertizement from the unashamedly titled Go Green campaign to
demonstrate the extent of this strategy. Seated behind a desk, in an office, a
male executive is considering an “eco-friendly” plan to reduce energy con-
sumption. He is ultimately convinced of its worth because of its significant
reduction in costs. Previously in black and white, letterboxed in corporate
blue, following the executive’s decision to accept the plan to cut energy
use/save money/increase profit the screen surround turns a vibrant green. The
formerly monochrome executive is elevated to full color and his office be-
comes inhabited by cartoon rabbits, squirrels, birds and plants with accom-
panying music redolent of a saccharine animated film soundtrack. The
environmental consequences or, more accurately, the economic benefits of
energy reduction are realized visually and acoustically in the reductive form
of a “Disneyfied” (Bauman 2004) version of “real” nature reduced to a highly
restricted code of animals and plants. 
Whilst it is encouraging that nearly 33% of uk consumers recognize
that corporations are exaggerating their environmentally beneficial activities
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(bt, 2008). Corporate image marketing already seems wise to the different
degrees of scrutiny paid to textual claims and visual representations about
environmental goods. Corporate rhetoricians already appreciate that a per-
suader “must disguise his art and give the impression of speaking naturally
and not artificially” (Aristotle 1954, 1404b 18). However, it seems this is done
by exploiting images of nature itself. Corporations demonstrably eager to
accrue environmental ethos can accomplish this, it seems, with ease by
hoodwinking a visually illiterate public and a rhetorically inconsistent reg-
ulatory body.
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15 Rhetoric and the (Re)Constitution of
Collective Identity: The Example of
Poland
cezar m.  ornatowski
15.1 Introduction
Concern with “identity” has become increasingly salient lately, in academic
as well as in public discourse. The wave of democratic transformations in
Central/Eastern Europe and Eurasia following the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, combined with the ethnic violence in the former Yugoslavia and ev-
idence of a resurgence of xenophobia and nationalism in many areas of the
former Soviet Block, foregrounded issues of collective identity. In the wake
of these transformations, scholars such as Noemi Marin and Vladimir
Tismaneanu noted that in post-1989 Central/Eastern Europe the problematic
of “democracy” has to a large extent been coextensive with the problematic
of identity. The problematic of collective identity has also been central to the
transformation in South Africa from an apartheid (racialist) state to a multi-
ethnic and democratic “rainbow nation” (Salazar 2002). Finally, the current
global situation related to the “war on terror” in the Middle East and else-
where involves collective identity construction on the part of the various con-
testing religious, political and nationalist movements and in the context of the
various “nation building” projects (for instance, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Chech-
nya and elsewhere). Construction of collective identities – whether racial,
class, religious, group, national or transnational, has been central to ideolog-
ical projects such as fascism, National Socialism or communism or to polit-
ical projects such as the European Union or Islamic extremism.
Clearly, the problem of collective identity has not – as some had hoped
in the 1950s and 1960s – disappeared with the retreat of colonialism, spread
of democracy, development of technologies of communication, spread of
“global culture”, regionalization or the creation of trans-national institutions.
Rather the reverse. Just as in transformational contexts, the problematic iden-
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tity seems to have moved to the forefront of political debates, the pressures
of globalization, immigration, cultural diffusion and struggle over resources
appear to lead to a resurgence of identity-dominated movements and dis-
courses (witness the current debate over immigration in the us).
Although much work in political science, sociology, anthropology, his-
tory, cultural studies, and from other perspectives has focused on various as-
pects of collective identity construction, from national to social and
ideological (Anderson 1991; Cohen 1985; Gillis 1994; Guibernau 2007; Hast-
ings 1997; Laclau 1994; Llobera 2004; Smith 1991; Radcliffe and Westwood
1996; Rowland and Frank 2002; Taylor 2009; Verdery 1991), the problematic
of collective identity has not been explored in a systematic way by rhetori-
cians, although it is taken up in various ways, explicitly or implicitly, in work
concerned with post-colonialism, public memory or political transformation
(for more explicit discussion of various rhetorical aspects of collective iden-
tity construction, see, for instance, Bruner 2002; Hauser 1999; Salazar 2002;
White 1984). In all of this work, collective identity emerges as a rhetorical
project, bearing out Kenneth Burke’s insight that “identification” is one of the
primary mechanisms of rhetoric.
There is no room here for a review of relevant contemporary perspec-
tives on collective identity. Suffice to say that collective identities are gener-
ally approached as “imaginary constructions” (Anderson 1991; Bowman 1994),
“countries of words,” in so far as “the rituals of inscribing borders, picturing
territories and populations, and thematizing issues salient to those terrains
and the communities believed to occupy them occur within discourse” (Bow-
man 1994, p. 140). Anthony Cohen has agued that community “exists in the
minds of its members, and should not be confused with geographic or so-
ciographic assertions of ‘fact’” (Cohen 1985, p. 98).
It is also widely accepted that identity is negative and relational. Iden-
tity is “negative” because it does not inhere in some intrinsic essence or pos-
itive “inner” core but rather depends on an establishment of contrasts and
differences. Bowman, for instance, suggests that collective identity is “not a
‘thing’ in itself but a way of speaking, and thinking, about others who are
‘like us.’ People create communities rhetorically through thinking that some
people are ‘like’ themselves while others are ‘unlike’ them” (Bowman 1994, p.
140). Similarly, according to Cohen the “quintessential referent of community
is that its members make, or believe they make, a similar sense of things ei-
ther generally, or with respect to specific and significant interests, and, further,
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that they think that that sense may differ from one made elsewhere” (Cohen
1985, p. 16). Identity, as both Cohen and, more recently, Noelle McAfee (2002)
point out, is thus relational, because it emerges as a function of relationships
of affiliation and disaffiliation. If I were the only human left alive after a nu-
clear holocaust, my “identity” as I understand it now would cease to be func-
tional; the fact of my being American, Catholic or a Democrat would be
irrelevant in my relations with animals and rocks. If all other life forms were
gone and I was surrounded only by the inorganic, my identity would proba-
bly boil down to simply being the only living being in my environment. It may
even be that, as McAfee suggests in her concept of “relational subjectivity”, “in-
dividual” identity is a function of “community,” of a “congregation,” to use
Kenneth Burke’s term (Burke 1984), rather than the other way around. In fact,
Aristotle seems to suggest just that in the Politics: 
the state is by nature prior to the family and the individual, since the whole is neces-
sarily prior to the part; for example, if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no
foot or hand, except in an equivocal sense, as we might speak of a stone hand . . .
But things are defined by their working and power … The proof that the state . . .
is prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing;
and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. (1253a, pp. 19-30)
“All identities emerge within a system of social relations and representations,”
argues Montserrat Guibernau (Guibernau 2007, p. 10). To the extent that
identity is a function of relationships, it potentially gets richer, more “dense”,
the more relationships there are and thus the more salient distinctions (in
terms of similarities and contrasts) can be drawn and the more potential
choices are available in terms of affiliations, disaffiliations, positionalities and
attitudes. 
The distinctions and relationships that define collective identity are
vested largely in symbols (Cohen 1985; McGee 1980). Cohen characterizes
communities as “symbolic” because they cohere around networks of relevant
symbols. “The reality of community in people’s experience,” Cohen suggests,
“thus inheres in their attachment or commitment to a common body of sym-
bols” (Cohen 1985, p. 16). Symbols, however, “do not tell us what to mean,
but give us the capacity to make meaning” (ibid.). Thus, individuals may dif-
fer in their specific interpretations of the meaning of the symbols. In fact, ar-
guments about the meanings vested in symbols are, as I will argue below, one
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of the major rhetorical mechanisms of collective identity formation and trans-
formation. 
In this chapter, I propose a rhetorical framework for looking at collec-
tive identity in terms of its major constitutive dimensions. I identify the con-
stitutive dimensions of collective identity using, as my representative anecdote
(in Kenneth Burke’s sense, see Burke 1969), two versions of the Constitution
of the Republic of Poland. These dimensions represent topoi of collective
identity in the rhetorical sense of locis communis, places of argument con-
cerning such questions as who “we” are, where we are, where we come from,
how we relate to each other and to our others, what values, and what purposes
we share.1 These topoi, analogous to Burke’s Pentad of Act, Agent, Agency,
Scene, and Purpose, which represent a framework for analyzing human mo-
tives in discourse and symbolic action, offer, I suggest, a rhetorically produc-
tive way of examining the rhetorical mechanisms of collective identity
formation and transformation (Burke 1969).
15.2 Topoi of identity in the political transformation of Poland
Let me now move to my representative anecdote, which, in the Burkean
spirit, represents a reduction of complex subject matter, but which will allow
me, within limited space, to evolve a “terminological structure” that represents
a rhetorically productive perspective on collective identity formation and
transformation (Burke 1969, p. 60). Following Burke, I begin this brief foray
into the rhetorical nature of collective identity with constitutional relations
(ibid. p. 323).
Kenneth Burke has referred to constitutions as proclaiming the “com-
mon substance” of community (ibid. p. 343). Let us examine the nature of this
“common substance” as it was articulated in the Preamble to the 1952 so-
called ‘Stalinist’ Constitution of the Polish People’s Republic (the name of the
polity erased in the wake of the 1989 transformation). The Preamble states:
The Polish People’s Republic is a republic of working folk. 
The Polish People’s Republic harks back to the most progressive traditions of the
Polish Nation and realizes the liberatory ideas of the Polish working masses. The
Polish working folk, under the leadership of the heroic working class, basing on the
worker-peasant alliance, has struggled for decades for liberation from national en-
1 An earlier version of this proposal appears in Ornatowski (2008).
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slavement imposed by Prussian, Austrian, and Russian conquerors-colonizers, just
as it has struggled for the abolition of the exploitation of Polish capitalists and
landowners.
During the period of [Nazi] occupation the Polish Nation waged an unyielding,
heroic struggle with a bloody Hitlerite invasion. The historic victory of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics over fascism liberated Polish lands, enabled the Polish
working folk to win power and created the conditions for the national revival of
Poland within new, just borders. The Recovered Territories returned to Poland for
all time. 
Realizing in practice the historic directives of the Declaration of the Polish Com-
mittee of National Liberation on July 22, 1944 and extending its programmatic
principles, the people’s government – thanks to the self-sacrificing and creative ef-
forts of the Polish working folk, through struggle against the bitter resistance of the
stragglers of the old capitalist-landowner system – achieved great social transforma-
tions. As a result of revolutionary struggles and transformations the government of
capitalists and landowners has been overthrown, the state of people’s democracy has
been consolidated, a new social system is taking shape and solidifying, one that cor-
responds to the interests and aspirations of broad masses. (…)
The foundation of the current people’s government in Poland is the alliance of the
working class with working peasantry. In this alliance, the leading role belongs to
the working class as the vanguard social class, based on the revolutionary achieve-
ments of the Polish and international workers’ movement, on the historic experi-
ences of socialist construction in the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, the
first state of workers and peasants. (…) (Preamble to the Constitution of the Polish
People’s Republic of July 22, 1952, author’s translation) 
As the Preamble articulates it, the Polish People’s Republic was primarily a
community of “working folk”. The origins of this community are traced to
the “most progressive traditions of the Polish nation,” the “liberatory ideas of
the Polish working masses,” the “achievements of the Polish and international
workers’ movement” and the “experiences of socialist construction” in the
Soviet Union, as represented in the programmatic principles set out in the
Declaration of the Polish Committee of National Liberation of July 22, 1944;
the latter, in effect, becomes the “constitutive” (I’m using the word in Mau-
rice Charland’s sense) text of the new Polish republic (Charland 2001). The
Preamble also offers a highly selective historical narrative of the emergence of
this community, which connects in one chain of equivalencies the liberation
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from national enslavement by Prussian, Austrian and Russian conquerors-
colonizers, the abolition of the exploitation by Polish capitalists and landown-
ers, the struggle against the Nazi occupation and the struggle against the
“resistance of the stragglers of the old system.” It locates the community
within “new, just borders” that include the Recovered Territories (the euphe-
mism for lands taken from Germany and given to Poland in exchange for the
eastern provinces taken from Poland by the Soviet Union). The foundation
of the agreement, or social contract, that underpins this community is the
“worker-peasant alliance”, subordinated to the principle of the “leadership of
the heroic working class.” Finally, the Preamble names the “others”, the ene-
mies, of the community (Prussian, Austrian and Russian “conquerors-colo-
nizers” and Polish “capitalists and landowners”) as well as its affiliations, its
allies (the Soviet Union and – in a paragraph omitted for the sake of space –
other “peace-loving nations”). 
Let me suggest that what we have here are the “constitutive” (in the
sense developed by Maurice Charland) dimensions of the collective identity
of the “community” of People’s Poland as it was officially articulated during
the period of “real socialism”: membership (who belongs), origin and history (a
narrative of the community’s genesis and provenience), location (both in a
geographic and geopolitical, as well as symbolic sense) and key relationships,
including relations between members (internal social and political relations) as
well as relations with others (external relations, patterns of affiliation and dis-
affiliation, including the positing of the community’s “other” or “others”). 
In social practice, each of these dimensions of collective identity was in-
scribed in and articulated through multiple symbols. According to Radcliffe
and Westwood, “imaginary and embodied nations are lived through the dis-
cursive practices of everyday life.” (Radcliffe and Westwood 1996, p. 7) A
denizen of People’s Poland in the 1970s, for example, experienced her mem-
bership in this “republic of working folk” through forced participation in or-
ganizations, ceremonies, outings or events such as the May Day parade or
rituals such as the Harvest Festival, official observance of Miners’ or Steel-
workers’ Days or hearing official rhetoric in which the expression “working
people of towns and villages” functioned as the ritual invocation of the Pol-
ish people. Origin and history were figured forth through narratives, histo-
ries, films, portraits of leaders (including the ever-present duo of Marx and
Lenin, typically flanking the current party general secretary), epics depicting
the struggle for social and national liberation, and so on. Internal relations
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were symbolized through portraits and statues of leaders. Artwork depicting
social transactions in which those in uniform or wearing red ties (indicating
party or Communist Youth League membership) were shown in positions of
authority or leadership as were films depicting the socialist way of life and of
dealing with people and situations. 
Guibernau suggests that the two fundamental elements of national
identity are continuity over time and differentiation from others. Historical
continuity of People’s Poland was symbolized through working class and rev-
olutionary heroes, the official calendar of state holidays commemorating oc-
casions important to the regime and commemorating the “achievements of
the Polish and international workers’ movement” and the “experiences of so-
cialist construction” in Poland and elsewhere, as well as through histories of
liberatory struggles against various external and internal enemies. Of course,
another history existed side-by-side in private memory (see Hauser 1999) as
well as in the various symbols extent in the urban and symbolic landscape, but
not emphasized in official discourse. During his history-making visits to
Poland between 1979 and 1987, Pope John Paul II successfully deployed such
symbols to activate a different narrative of national history and a different
sense of collective identity (see Ornatowski 2008). Communist Poland’s “oth-
ers” included the “West”, especially “Western imperialism”, most prominently
represented by the U.S. and West Germany and their allies, as well as spies,
saboteurs and various “criminals,” such as, for instance, possessors or traders
of western currencies or gold, as well as ideological enemies. These were de-
picted through a variety of images, narratives and discourses. 
The dimensions of membership (who are “we”?), origin and history (how
did we become who we are?), location (where are “we”? what is the “scene” –
to use Kenneth Burke’s generative term – on which we are constituted as
agents?), internal relations (how are we organized? how do we relate to each
other?), and external relations (who are our others? What are our relations of
affiliation and disaffiliation?) are topoi in a rhetorical sense; they represent
constitutive and “strategic” dimensions of collective identity (locis communis)
within which collective identities are articulated, debated and transformed. 
As an example of such a re-articulation, consider the Preamble to the
Constitution of the Polish Republic of April 2, 1997 (the post-transitional con-
stitution that replaced the 1952 constitution). The Preamble states: 
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Having regard for the existence and future of our Homeland, Which recovered, in
1989, the possibility of a sovereign and democratic determination of its fate, We,
the Polish Nation – all citizens of the Republic, Both those who believe in God as
the source of truth, justice, good and beauty, As well as those not sharing such faith
but respecting those universal values as arising from other sources, Equal in rights
and obligations towards the common good – Poland, Beholden to our ancestors for
their labours, their struggle for independence achieved at great sacrifice, for our cul-
ture rooted in the Christian heritage of the Nation and in universal human values,
Recalling the best traditions of the First and the Second Republic, Obliged to be-
queath to future generations all that is valuable from our over one thousand years’
heritage, Bound in community with our compatriots dispersed throughout the
world, Aware of the need for cooperation with all countries for the good of the
Human Family, Mindful of the bitter experiences of the times when fundamental
freedoms and human rights were violated in our Homeland, desiring to guarantee
the rights of the citizens for all time, and to ensure diligence and efficiency in the
work of public bodies, Recognizing our responsibility before God or our own con-
sciences, Hereby establish this Constitution of the Republic of Poland as the basic
law for the State, based on respect for freedom and justice, cooperation between the
public powers, social dialogue as well as on the principle of subsidiarity in the
strengthening the powers of citizens and their communities.
We call upon all those who will apply this Constitution for the good of the Third
Republic to do so paying respect to the inherent dignity of the person, his or her
right to freedom, the obligation of solidarity with others, and respect for these prin-
ciples as the unshakeable foundation of the Republic of Poland. (Preamble to the
Constitution of the Polish Republic of April 2, 1997)
One can readily identify the same general dimensions of collective identity
as in the Preamble to the 1952 Constitution, except articulated differently.
In terms of the topos of membership, the community of the Republic of
Poland includes “all citizens of the Republic.” In addition, in deliberate
contrast to the 1952 text, the Preamble opens with the plural pronoun “we”,
symbolizing the “authentic” voice of the political community (the 1952 con-
stitution was written in Moscow and, following a review in Warsaw, was
hand-edited by Stalin and handed to the Polish parliament for endorse-
ment). The community of the new Republic further characterizes its mem-
bers as both believers and non-believers, although the former appear to be
privileged, at least by syntax. Membership is also extended to Poles living
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elsewhere (who were not considered legitimate members under the previous
dispensation). 
In terms of origin and history, the new Republic traces its origins to the
Christian tradition and the thousand-year history of Poland (the coming of
Christianity in the 10th century coincided with the appearance of Poland as a
recognizable geopolitical entity). It also pointedly erases the communist re-
public from its antecedents. The Preamble posits internal relations based on
human dignity, solidarity, social dialog, freedom, justice, and subsidiarity.
“Solidarity” implies a fundamental “horizontality” of the national community
in contrast to the class-based foundations of the socialist republic, while sub-
sidiarity contrasts with the former centralization and hierarchization of po-
litical authority. In terms of the community’s external relations, the 1997 text
refrains from naming its political “others” (although it may be read as im-
plying moral “others”, those who do not share the “universal human values”).
By explicitly calling for the “cooperation of all countries”, the text distances
itself from the affiliations and divisions (symbolized most emphatically by
the Iron Curtain) that defined the geo-political positioning and thus collec-
tive identity of socialist People’s Poland.
Both preambles “constitute” the collective identity of (the two differ-
ent Republics of ) Poland along the same five fundamental dimensions. These
dimensions functioned (and some of them continue to function) as major
“places” of argument during the political transition. 
As one example, one may consider the debates concerning Poland’s
geopolitical “location”: whether Poland after 1989 was part of “Eastern” or
“Central” Europe, whether it should be closer – politically and economically
– to Russia or the West, or whether it should form a “bridge” between “East”
and “West.” Unlike the debates on “location” after 1945, when Poland was lit-
erally shifted territorially to the West and lost territory in the East, the tran-
sition after 1989 did not involve territorial changes; still, the memories of the
“lost lands” in the East constituted a part of the discussions of post-1989 col-
lective identity. 
The symbolic resources of the topos of “location” are revealed especially
clearly in the strategic deployments of rival symbolic geographies over the pe-
riod of the political transition. During communist times, the ritual peregri-
nations of the First Secretary of the ruling party (and sometimes other officials)
to key industrial enterprises, collective farms, and “great construction sites of
socialism” mapped out a specific symbolic geography of Poland. Each newly
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appointed First Secretary, along with other major officials, also made a routine
pilgrimage to Moscow to “confer” with Soviet leaders, along with periodic vis-
its to “fraternal parties.” These peregrinations, like medieval religious pil-
grimages, endowed space with meaning by mapping its symbolic center, its key
compass points and axis. The peregrinations of the First Secretary (which in-
volved the key “building sites” and symbolic places of socialism) contrasted
with Pope John Paul II’s peregrinations around the country during the latter’s
dramatic visits between 1979 and 1987, which mapped out an alternative sym-
bolic geography: a spiritual one (involving a variety of historical and religious
sites associated with Poland’s pre-socialist and non-socialist existence) (see Or-
natowski 2009). The two itineraries, the First Secretary’s and the Pope’s, acti-
vated two visions of collective identity implicit in the symbolic resources of the
topos of “location”. I want to emphasize three important moments here. One
is that these alternative versions of collective identity existed, as it were, side
by side as interpretive possibilities implicit in the resources of place. Another
is that these possibilities existed in a dialectical tension, which enhanced their
dramatic and transformative potential. Still another is that these symbolic ge-
ographies continue to be implicit in the political “landscape” (a uniquely ap-
propriate metaphor) in Poland today and continue to be activated, as
rhetorical needs dictate, by various political a actors and parties, especially in
regard to Poland’s presumed “subservience” to the European Union; in the
discourse of the populist right wing, “Brussels” had taken the former place of
“Moscow” as a symbolic compass point and place of political “pilgrimage”, a
symbol of Poland being subsumed in a larger, and alien, collective identity. 
As a final example, one may consider the post-1989 debates within the
topos of “membership”. During the 1970s and 1980s, Polish society was basi-
cally divided, in popular perception and discourse, between “us” (ordinary
people) and “them” (the rulers). When Poland started to change toward the
end of the 1980s, the identity of the “we” became an issue. Once the transi-
tion returned the country to “us,” made the country “our own”, it turned out
that “we” are no longer monolithic, since the “other” that united and defined
“us” had disappeared. That is why the political scene quickly fragmented after
the June 4, 1989 transitional parliamentary elections. In fact, both the oppo-
sition and the heretofore ruling party quickly differentiated along a range of
new dividing lines in respect to the problems facing the changing country. 
The two constitutional Preambles cited here in effect mark out a space
of transformation of the collective identity of the Republic of Poland. In so-
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cial practice, this space was, and continues to be, elaborated and mediated
through a multitude of discourses and symbolic practices: changes in national
and local symbols, signs, place names, monuments, spatial and architectural
designs (i.e., taking down border posts, extending streets), and even rerout-
ing the entire national communication grid: from the East-West orientation
– the primary orientation of all major routes and rail lines during communist
times, when Poland was regarded as the route of possible Soviet attack against
Western Europe – to the North-South orientation, the orientation conducive
to Poland’s new economic orientation. Collective identity is a space of con-
testation and such contestation forms the constant undercurrent of public
discourse. For instance, the current anxieties about immigration in the US
imply the topos of “membership”: who, or what, is an “American” and what
it means to be “American.”
What I called here “topoi of identity” represent constitutive dimensions
of collective identity; their rhetorical sense lies in the fact that they are, to
adapt Sarah Radcliffe and Sallie Westwood’s words, “key sites” in which col-
lective identities are “generated and sustained,” as well as transformed. The
list of such topoi may be extended through further examination of how vari-
ous kinds of collective identities are rhetorically and symbolically constituted,
debated, and transformed. For instance, in the case of the United States, the
dimension of “shared purpose” or “shared fate” was an important constitutive
dimension of collective identity from the beginning of the Republic (since the
new Republic did not have much historical continuity behind it and since it
was, and continues to be, a community of immigrants with diverse histories
and points of origin). Part 1 of the Constitution of the European Union, a
transnational collective identity, also contains the dimension of shared objec-
tives, in addition to another constitutive dimension: shared values (http://
www.europeanconstitution.ie/constitution/en/parti_en.asp).
The “topoi of identity” are analogous to Kenneth Burke’s Pentad (Act,
Agent, Agency, Scene and Purpose) (Burke 1969). However, whereas Burke’s
Pentad enables a “dramatistic” analysis of human motives and actions, the topoi
of membership, origin and history, location, internal relations, external rela-
tions, shared values, and shared purpose offer a framework for examining how
collective identities are constituted and reconstituted in a variety of discourses
and practices, from public rhetoric to films, rituals, events, and other com-
municative activities. I have found them useful in examining the practices of
identity-building in the case of various political or religious groups or move-
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ments (for instance, www.palestine-info.co.uk or www.kavkaz.org.uk/eng) or
virtual “nations” such as the Kingdom of Talossa www.kingdomoftalossa.
net/index.cgi) or the Republic of Talossa (www.talossa.com). 
As in the case of Burke’s Pentad, what is most important analytically
are not so much the topoi themselves, but their “ratios”: the shifts in relative
emphases within and between them. For instance, while possession and jus-
tification for newly acquired territories (taken from Germany after world War
II in lieu of territories lost to the Soviet Union in the east) constituted an im-
portant aspect of the topos of “location” in communist post-war Polish prop-
aganda (according to which Poland had “returned” to ancient Polish lands in
the west), and an important constituent in national and ideological “identi-
fication”, after 1989 the topos of location was dominated by the shift in geopo-
litical affiliation (articulated as Poland’s “return” to its “European home” and
to Western civilization, symbolized by membership in nato and the European
Union – themselves “imaginary” communities). In the speeches of Polish
prime ministers between 1989 and 1990 one can see the shift in emphasis to-
ward relations with the West (with the addition of the United States as a
major “partner” – a new “imaginary” relationship) as opposed to commu-
nist-era primary emphasis on relations with the Soviet Union and other “so-
cialist” countries. In terms of rhetorical arrangement, this shift was
accompanied by a switch in order (relations with the West began to be men-
tioned before relations with Russia and the “East”).
15.3 Conclusion: Communication as the making of community
In biological terms, a community is a group of interacting organisms sharing
an environment (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Community). In human com-
munities, both “interacting” and “sharing” may take a wide variety of forms
and meanings, some of which are implicit in the etymology of “common”
and “community”. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term “community” de-
rives from Latin communis: com = together, munis = bound, under obliga-
tion, also in early Latin “ready to serve” (thus Lat. immunis, English immunity
= under no obligation, not bound) (“Common”). The second element (munis)
is also the source of Latin munia, “duties, public duties, functions” related to
munia, “office.” One early meaning of the root “com” in English was “public,”
“shared,” “belonging to more than one” (the Cursor Mundi of 1300 speaks of
the “commun pasture”). Another early meaning was “belonging to humankind
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alike,” a possession of the human race as a possession or attribute (for instance,
death as our “common” fate). The sense of “common” as “belonging to hu-
mankind alike” contains an implicit contrast with non-humans, as well as with
those considered not fully “human”. The latter underlies the expression “com-
mon sense,” which originated in the 14th century to designate the ordinary
power of uniting mentally the impressions conveyed by the five senses, which
became synonymous with ordinary understanding, without which one is fool-
ish or insane. Still other historical senses of “common” included “belonging to
the community at large” (thus something shared by all members of a com-
munity as opposed to those who are non-members) and something “general,”
shared by all, with an attached implication of lowliness (as in “a common”
man, or “common intelligence”). This last meaning included connotations of
lack of distinction, secularity (as opposed to holiness), and membership in the
general populace, the “commons”; it is these connotations that underwrote
the political sense of the British “House of Commons” (“Common”).
An important distinction that emerges from the foregoing is that be-
tween “commonness” as vested in something “given” (such as land, pasture,
or mental or physical attributes), as opposed to something that represents a
more “abstract” achievement, a result of cooperation, action, or decision (such
as arriving at an agreement or “making common cause”). We see here that
the etymological senses of “community” suggest a spectrum of potential foun-
dations for human association, from a shared possession or attribute (territory,
mental attribute, or a marker such as skin color – all of which, in social and
political practice, may be, and usually are, heavily over-interpreted), to more
specifically “rhetorical” products of deliberation, negotiation, or agreement
(such as “common” fate, understanding, values, or cause). Hence, “com-
muning,” or the making of community, involves both putative “givens” (i.e.,
possession of shared territory) along with acts of interpretation and “mak-
ing” that together constitute what Kenneth Burke has referred to as a “con-
gregation” (1984). 
These are not merely philological exercises.“Community,” we are re-
minded by such reflections, is implicit in “com-muni-cation,” which denotes,
literally, the “making of the common.” Such making implies both com (that
which is shared, whether a thing, property, attribute, symbol, interpretation,
understanding, or agreement) and munia (obligations, thus some form of
reciprocity, if only “symbolic”, as, for instance, being part of the Catholic
Church involves periodic acts of confession and participation in “holy com-
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munion”, or begin part of a terrorist organization involves committing act of
violence). We arrive here, albeit by a somewhat roundabout route, at funda-
mentally rhetorical territory. 
A “community” may be based on a shared attribute or territory (al-
though both may, and usually are, heavily over-interpreted), but it has to
reach an agreement; in this sense, the “makedness” of community implies a
range of “com-muni-cative” actions, from creation and/or representation of
the putative givens (territory, attribute) to creation of relatively more abstract
and “imaginary” outcomes and (sometimes enforced) rituals of participation.
For instance, the “volkisch” community of German National Socialism was
based on a (heavily mediated and over-interpreted) “natural” attribute
(“Aryan” racial origin) and possession, or conquest, of a territory (both in-
voked in the Nazi slogan of “blood and soil”), along with a specific interpre-
tation of shared fate (defeat in World War 1, economic misery presumably
caused by the Treaty of Versailles, and so on). The obligations of participation
for the ordinary German involved donating to the “Winter Aid” and joining
one of innumerable official organizations for every profession and age group.
More symbolic rituals of participation were also represented in propaganda
films such as Leni Riefenstahl’s famous Triumph of the Will. 
Topoi of identity such as of membership (who are we?), origin and his-
tory (how did we become who we are?), location (where are we?), internal re-
lations (how are we organized? how do we relate to each other?), external
relations (who are our others?), shared values (what things do we hold in com-
mon?), and shared purpose (what are we striving for?) are loci of invention of
collective identity, in effect, of community. Together, they offer a productive
lens for analysis of how human communities are constituted and reconsti-
tuted through a variety of “com-muni-cative” activities.
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16 Symbolic Power: Political Rhetoric in
a State of Exception
bart van klink,  oliver lembcke and
pablo leandro ciocchini
16.1 Introduction
The so-called “war on terror” is being waged not only with weapons and in-
telligence but (and perhaps to an even greater extent) with words. Political
leaders who are successful at manipulating linguistic symbols are able to mo-
bilize popular support for their cause and to legitimize their actions (Edelman
1967). Pursuing a war requires some sort of shared understanding of who is
to be considered a friend and who is to be considered an enemy and how the
war should be waged. Generally speaking, the “war on terror” is being fought
on behalf of “us” – people living in the “free world” – and directed against
“them” – an unspecified group of “terrorists”, presumably of a fundamental-
ist Islamic persuasion. Because states belonging to the “free world” in general
are dedicated to the Rule of Law in one way or another, they are not com-
pletely free in their selection of means. Unlike “terrorists” who may do what-
ever they like to spread terror on a global scale, political leaders in the West
can act and react only with caution, as if their hands were tied (as the popu-
lar comparison goes). Nonetheless, they are increasingly resorting to measures
that their critics (such as Chomsky 2006) consider to be at odds with funda-
mental principles of the Rule of Law. Here lies the greatest challenge for po-
litical rhetoric in our times: how is it possible to justify measures that
apparently contradict everything “we” stand for and believe in?
In their fight against terrorism, modern states seem to install a perma-
nent state of exception. Special competencies are being created that allow the
authorities involved to violate fundamental rights, such as habeas corpus and
the freedom of speech, for an unspecified period of time. Agamben (2005, pp.
6 and 50-51) denies that the state of exception is a “state of law”; instead it is
an “emptiness of law”, a space “without” or “devoid of law”, in which noth-
ing but a fictitious relation with the previously existing legal order can be es-
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tablished. Whereas, in the past, the state of exception was intended to restore
normalcy, governments currently seem to be maintaining a state of exception
on a permanent basis. Especially with the institutionalization of abortion and
euthanasia and the declara tion of a global war on terrorism, the “juridically
empty” space of the state of exception threatens to “coincide with the normal
order.” The state of exception has been permanently institutionalized; the ex-
ception becomes the rule.
In our chapter, we will examine the role that notions connected to the
Rule of Law play in key speeches delivered by two political leaders who had
to defend exceptional measures in reaction to terrorist actions and threats: the
former British Prime Minister Tony Blair and the current Prime Minister of
Spain, Jose Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. We have chosen to focus on these two
political leaders, because they both represent countries with longtime experi-
ences with terrorism – ira and eta – and, moreover, they employ in their
speeches two opposing rhetorical strategies: while Blair argues that exceptional
times call for exceptional measures, Zapatero denies that there is anything ex-
traordinary about his anti-terrorism approach.1 In the speeches selected,2 the
two leaders react on crucial political events during their leadership: the terrorist
attacks on the World Trade Center in New York on 11 September 2001, the at-
tack on a train station in Madrid on 11 March 2004, and the London bomb-
ings on 7 July 2005. Our central research questions are as follows: How are the
anti-terror measures taken justified in the speeches at hand? Are they, legally
speaking, created “from nowhere”, as Agamben (following Schmitt 1996a)
would claim, or are they still related in some way to positive law? In section
16.2 and 16.3 we will analyze the rhetorical devices that Blair and Zapatero re-
spectively use in order to justify exceptional measures that seem at odds with
the Rule of Law. In this rhetorical analysis we explore two questions: How are
“friends” differentiated from “enemies”? And, what role, if any, do notions re-
lated to the Rule of Law play in defending the measures at hand? In section
16.4 the two opposing rhetorical strategies will be compared and evaluated.
1 This chapter is part of a series of articles on the rhetoric of exception. In subsequent arti-
cles we will analyze other political leaders, including former us President George W. Bush
and current us President Barack Obama.
2 A list of the speeches can be found in the appendix. We have also used a number of state-
ments and interviews as an additional source of information (although we do not refer to
them as such in the text). We have translated Zapatero’s statements into English.
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16.2 Blair’s rhetoric of exception
For Blair, 9/11 was a turning point both in the history of humanity and in his
personal history as a leader. In a religious vein, he acknowledges that this at-
tack, “without parallel in the bloody history of terrorism,” made him see his
true vocation: “September 11th was for me a revelation” (Speech 4). What was
revealed to him, was his political mission as a world leader: “I feel a most ur-
gent sense of mission about today’s world” (Speech 3). His mission is to “re-
order this world around us” (Speech 1) or, more precisely, to restore the world’s
order: “The global threat to our security was clear. So was our duty: to act to
eliminate it” (Speech 4). The world’s security is at stake, “our” life as well as
“our” way of life.
Blair, a true champion of inclusive speech, frequently invokes a “we”.
In different contexts this sign may denote different entities. As the Prime
Minister of the uk at the time representing the country he was obviously au-
thorized to speak on behalf of the British people and he often did so. In
speeches delivered after the London bombings, “we” refers in particular to
the authorities involved in tracking down and prosecuting the offenders: “We
will pursue those responsible, not just the perpetrators but the planners of
this outrage, wherever they are, and we will not rest until they are identified,
and as far is humanly possible, brought to justice” (Speech 5). In his speech
to the US Congress, the word “we” functions as a sign of solidarity with the
American people after 9/11: “And our job, my nation that watched you grow,
that you fought alongside and now fights alongside you, that takes enormous
pride in our alliance and great affection in our common bond, our job is to be
there with you” (Speech 3; italics added). Here, “we” obviously refers to the
alliance of British and American people who stand united in their fight
against terrorism (as they once stood united against fascism). 
In many cases, “we” is used to denote an even wider circle of people:
nothing less than “the entire international community” (Speech 7C). People
building this “we” are not restricted to a certain space (e.g., the Western part
of the world); they are defined by the sharing of a particular set of convictions:
“We is not the West. ‘We’ are as much Muslim as Christian or Jew or Hindu.
‘We’ are those who believe in religious tolerance, openness to others, to
democracy, liberty and human rights administered by secular courts” (Speech
7A); “We” cherish freedom and democracy. Moreover, “we” are tolerant to-
ward people who think differently: “We are open societies. We feel enriched
by diversity. We welcome dynamism and are tolerant of difference” (Speech
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7B). “We” are not aggressive at all: “We are peaceful people” (Speech 2). Peo-
ple like “us” can also be found in the Arab and Muslim world:
Across the Arab and Muslim world such a struggle for democracy and liberty con-
tinues. . . . [We must] stand up for and not walk away from those engaged in a life
or death battle for freedom . . . many Muslims, millions of them the world over, in-
cluding Europe, who want what we all want: to be ourselves free and for others to
be free also; who regard tolerance as a virtue and respect for faith of others as part
of our own faith. (Speech 7A)
According to Blair: “these are the true voices of Muslims and Arab people”
(Speech 7C). “They” are not our enemy but our friend in the fight for free-
dom and democracy.
However, as inclusion always implies exclusion (see Lindahl 2004), not
everyone in the “the entire international community” is “our” friend. Just as
there are friends outside the international community stricto sensu – “they”
who are like “us”, “our” peers in the Arab and Muslim world – there are peo-
ple who support the enemy inside this community by defending a “policy of
benign inactivity” (Speech 7A): “It is a posture of weakness, defeatism and
most of all, deeply insulting to every Muslim who believes in freedom of the
majority. Instead of challenging the extremism, this attitude panders to it and
therefore instead of choking it, feeds its growth” (Speech 7A). Fellow-citi-
zens, who are critical of the current American and European approach to ter-
rorism, are (perhaps willy-nilly) contributing to the country’s destruction:
“[Anti-Americanism or Euro-scepticism] are the surest route to the destruc-
tion of our true national interest” (Speech 8). According to Blair, these “false
friends” are siding with the enemy: “The problem we have is that a part of
opinion in our own countries agrees with them” (Speech 7B). “They”, the
“real” enemy, are the “terrorists”, also referred to as “religious fanatics” (e.g.,
in Speech 1) or “extremists” (Speech 3). “They” are a new kind of enemy with-
out precedent in history: “In this century, a new and unconventional enemy
has appeared: a global terrorism, based on a thoroughly warped misinterpre-
tation of Islam, which is fanatical and deadly” (Speech 8). In apparent con-
trast to conventional terrorist groups in Europe such as the ira or eta, new
Islamic terrorist groups not only aim at spreading insecurity but also in killing
people for its own sake (see Mendes 2008, p. 17). This “new and unconven-
tional” enemy is described as bloodthirsty, barbarous and boundless: “These
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fanatics who will stop at absolutely nothing to cause death and destruction
on a mass scale” (Speech 4). “They” hate “us” and everything “we” and “our”
peers stand for: “They disagree with our way of life, our values and in par-
ticular our tolerance. They hate us but probably hate those Muslims who be-
lieve in tolerance, even more, as apostates betraying the true faith,” (Speech
7C). The terrorist’s aim is to spread discord and destruction: “Its purpose is
now plain: to provoke civil war” (Speech 8). In short, the enemy endorses an
“evil ideology” (Speech 6) and is prepared “to bring about Armageddon”
(Speech 4). Therefore, the possibility of compromise or communication be-
tween “us” and “them” is excluded altogether: “There is no compromise pos-
sible with such people, no meeting of minds, no point of understanding with
such terror” (Speech 1).
In Blair’s view, the differentiation between friends and enemies ulti-
mately boils down less to a clash of civilisations than to a “clash about civili-
sation” (Speech 7A; italics added). It is a “clash between extremism and
progress”, “a life and death battle for freedom”, “a battle about modernity”
and “a battle of values and progress” (Speech 7A). Terrorism is perceived as
an existential threat to the modern way of life and its liberal and hedonistic
values. According to Blair: “all civilised people, Muslim or other, feel revul-
sion at it” (Speech 6). By implication, terrorists are banned from civilization,
the “entire international community” and probably – as agents of “evil”3 –
from humanity as well.4
In order to justify the extraordinary measures to be taken against ter-
rorism, Blair resorts to roughly two different types of discourse: on the one
hand a discourse of exception in which he argues that an exceptional threat re-
quires an exceptional response, and a discourse of normalcy in which he states
that, although the threat is exceptional, the response remains safely within
the ‘ordinary’ boundaries of custom, morality and the Rule of Law (and, if it
does not, these boundaries must be stretched somewhat to make it fit). Draw-
ing on the discourse of exception, Blair claims that “we” are facing a “new type
of war”5 that “will rest on intelligence to a greater degree than ever before. It
3 The theme of “evil” is even more present in speeches by US President Bush (see Mral
2004, pp. 20–22).
4 As Schmitt (1996a, p. 37) notices, an intensification of the friend-enemy distinction may
lead to pleas for the “endgültig letzten Krieg der Menschheit” (that is, the “absolute last war
of humanity”, Schmitt 1996b, p. 36).
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will rest on intelligence to a greater degree than ever before. It demands a dif-
ferent attitude to our own interests. It forces us to act even when so many
comforts seem unaffected, and the threat so far off, if not illusory” (Speech
4). The exceptional threat – apparently distant but nevertheless “real and ex-
istential” (ibid.) – requires “us” “to be prepared to think sooner and act
quicker” if “we” want to defend “our” values. What is needed is “progressive
pre-emption” (Speech 7C). “We” have no other choice than to fight: “We
can no more opt out of this struggle than we can opt out of the climate chang-
ing around us,” (Speech 7A). “If we want to secure our way of life, there is
no alternative but to fight for it” (Speech 7B). Blair compares terrorism to a
virus: “The virus is terrorism whose intent to inflict destruction is uncon-
strained by human feeling and whose capacity to inflict it is enlarged by tech-
nology” (Speech 3). If “we” do not stop this virus, the result will be disorder:
“Our new world rests on order. The danger is disorder. And in today’s world,
it can now spread like contagion” (Speech 3). It is “our” duty to act: “The
global threat to our security was clear. So was our duty: to act to eliminate it”
(Speech 4). Everything “we” can do to avert the threat, “we” must do: “We
should take what security measures we can” (Speech 6).
Despite his frequent invocations of a “we”, it is clear that, in crucial
moments, Blair is primarily thinking of himself – in his capacity as Prime
Minister of the uk and one of the world’s leaders – as the one who must act,
while others may “err on the side of caution” (Speech 4). In defence of his de-
cision to go to war in Iraq, Blair argues that it is the task of leadership to ex-
pose and fight the global threat of terrorism. He acknowledges that the
invasion in Iraq stirs “bitter emotions” in his own country and may be “ill-
fitting the pre-occupations of the man and woman on the street” (ibid.). This
does not, however, prevent him from taking the measures he deems necessary,
building on his own judgment. By taking the decision to participate in Iraq’s
invasion, Blair puts an end to a potential endless deliberation in an authori-
tarian and authoritative manner:
Prime Ministers don’t have the luxury of maintaining both sides of the argument.
They can see both sides. But, ultimately, leadership is about deciding . . . Do we
5 In contrast to Bush (see Mral 2004, pp. 17–20), Blair rarely uses the expression “war” and
never speaks of a “war on terror”, but prefers seemingly softer notions like a “battle” or a
“fight” against terrorism.
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want to take the risk? That is the judgment. And my judgment then and now is
that the risk of this new global terrorism and its interaction with states or organisa-
tions or individuals proliferating wmd [Weapons of Mass Destruction], is one I
simply am not prepared to run. (ibid.)
In addition to appealing to his leadership and personal judgment as a last
resort (“ultimately”), Blair persistently tries to gain a broad support for his
decisions by using the discourse of normalcy. In defending his anti-terror
approach, he draws his main arguments from both shared ideals and shared
interests, in order to create “a happy marriage of conviction and Realpoli-
tik” (Speech 8). As a matter of fact, Blair states that “we” have a shared in-
terest in the world’s orderliness in particular for economic reasons: “All of
us have an interest in stability and a fear of chaos. That’s the impact of in-
terdependence,” (Speech 7C). Here, British self-interest collides with the
world’s general interest. Therefore, “we” have to fight terrorism collectively
on a global scale and take away the causes of its growth, such as poverty
and inequality. Moreover, as Blair would argue soon after 9/11 (Speech 1), it
is “our” “moral duty” to fight for the values in which “we” believe, espe-
cially freedom and justice: “So I believe this is a fight for freedom. And I
want to make it a fight for justice too. Justice not only to punish the guilty;
but justice to bring those same values of democracy and freedom to people
round the world”. In a communitarian vein,6 Blair argues that the “power
of community” should be combined with justice in order to become a
“moral power”. In his view, justice consists of “fairness and people of equal
worth . . . but also reason and tolerance”. These values are not specifically
Western as some opponents have claimed, but are endorsed by the whole of
humanity: “Ours are not Western values, they are universal values of the
human spirit. And anywhere . . . the choice is the same: freedom not
tyranny; democracy, not dictatorship; the rule of law; not the secret police”
(Speech 3). The best way to defend “our” security is to spread these univer-
sal values all over the world (Speech 4). “The only way to win is: (...) to de-
feat it by values and ideas set in opposition to those of the terrorists” (Speech
7A). In other words:
6 Whether New Labour under Blair really reflected, or was influenced by, communitarian
thought is debatable (see MacMillan 2007).
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To win, we have to win the battle of values, as much as arms. We have to show
these are not Western still less American or Anglo-Saxon values but values in the
common ownership of humanity, universal values that should be the right of the
global citizen. (Speech 7B)
The quotation above marks the transition from the moral to the legal sphere:
universal values, such as freedom and justice, should be “the right of the global
citizen” (italics added). By using a normative phrase (“should be”), Blair ac-
knowledges explicitly that citizens worldwide are not, or not yet, legally en-
titled to these fundamental values. In other passages, however, he makes it
appear as if these values are already law: “We are fighting for the inalienable
right of humankind – black or white, Christian or not, left, right or a million
different – to be free (...)” (Speech 3). Particularly in his defence of the inva-
sion of Iraq, Blair displays an ambivalent stance towards the law. On the one
hand, he claims that the invasion is in full accordance with the right of self-
defence, as granted by international law: 
The best defence of our security lies in the spread of our values. But we cannot ad-
vance these values except within a framework that recognizes their universality. If it
is a global threat, it needs a global response, based on global rules. The essence of a
community is common rights and responsibilities. If we are threatened, we have a
right to act. And we do not accept in a community that others have a right to op-
press and brutalise their people. We value the freedom and dignity of the human
race and each individual in it. (...) Emphatically I am not saying that every situa-
tion leads to military action. But we surely have a duty and a right to prevent the
threat materialising; and we surely have a responsibility to act when a nation’s peo-
ple are subjected to a regime such as Saddam’s. (Speech 4)
Blair further argues that Iraq contravened un resolution no. 1441. It was,
therefore, the uk’s duty to intervene: “We had to force conformity with in-
ternational obligations that for years had been breached with the world turn-
ing a blind eye” (ibid.). “Our primary purpose was to enforce un resolutions
over Iraq and wmd” (ibid.). 
On the other hand, Blair pleas for amending the existing international
law in order to provide for a legal justification of interventions like this. He
claims that “the rule book of international politics has been torn up”:
[  3 1 4 ]
LUP Bending Opinion Boek_Layout 2  27-01-11  14:46  Pagina 314
symbolic power:  political rhetoric in a  state of exception
Interdependence – the fact of a crisis somewhere becoming a crisis everywhere –
makes a mockery of traditional views of national interest. (...) [These challenges]
can only be effectively tackled together. And they require a pre-emptive and not
simply reactive response. (...) What is more such action will often require interven-
tion, far beyond our own boundaries. (...) What this means is that we have to act,
not react; we have to do so on the basis of prediction not certainty (...). And what
all that means is: that this can’t be done easily unless it is done on an agreed basis of
principle, of values that are shared and fair. (Speech 7C)
According to Blair, the basic problem of existing international law is that it
does not sanction a pre-emptive response:
It may well be that under international law as presently constituted, a regime can
systematically brutalise and oppress its people and there is nothing anyone can do,
when dialogue, diplomacy and even sanctions fail, unless it comes within the defi-
nition of a humanitarian catastrophe (though the 300,000 remains in mass graves
already found in Iraq might be thought by some to be something of a catastrophe).
This may be the law, but should it be? (Speech 4; italics added.) 
In his view, therefore, the United Nations has to be reformed: “It means
reforming the un so its Security Council represents 21st century reality; and
giving the un the capability to act effectively as well as debate” (ibid.). “The
Security Council should be reformed. We need a new international regime
on the non-proliferation of wmd” (Speech 3).
When confronted with legal objections to his course of action, Blair
responds by referring to the allegedly political bias of his critics: “The
lawyers continue to divide over it – with their legal opinions bearing a re-
markable similarity to their political view of the war” (Speech 4). The cause
seems to justify the means: “It is a cause that has none of the debatable na-
ture of the decisions to go for regime change; it is an entirely noble one –
to help people in need of our help in pursuit of liberty; and a self-interested
one, since in their salvation lies our own security” (Speech 7). Here we find
again (as earlier in this section) an allusion to “a happy marriage of convic-
tion and Realpolitik”: by liberating other people, “we” protect “our” own
security.
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16.3 Zapatero’s rhetoric of normalcy 
In contrast to Blair, Zapatero was not in charge when the 9/11 terrorist attacks
took place. At that time he was leader of the Partido Socialista Obrero Es-
pañol (psoe), the main party of the opposition, while José María Aznar was
Prime Minister of the Spanish government. Zapatero took office after (and
to some extent because of ) the terrorist attacks in 2004. He benefited from
his promise of ending Spain’s support for Bush’s “war on terror” and with-
drawing Spanish troops from Iraq.
Like Blair, Zapatero often makes use of inclusive speech. He uses a col-
lective “we” to refer to the government over which he presides: the people of
Spain, the democratic western citizens, all the civilized people (in contrast to
terrorist and terrorist supporters). When addressing the Spanish people, Za-
patero portrays his government as one in which “no one feels excluded”: 
[A government that] listens to and pays attention to [citizens]; that always explains
the reason of every decision adopted. It will be a Government who respects citizens,
listens to their voices and criticisms no matter how hard they are. (Speech 13) 
This openness to dialogue exists only among “us”, the Spanish society, “a tol-
erant, non-clerical, educated and developed society as it should be ours”
(ibid.). Whereas “we” are “civilized”, “they”, the terrorists, represent the nega-
tion of everything we stand for: 
[T]errorism is, in my opinion, the negation of democracy, terrorism is the negation
of progress, terrorism is the negation of freedom, terrorism is the negation of
speech which has made human beings, society and civilization stronger. (Speech 14)
Terrorists are thus excluded from the “we”, as it is not possible to reach a con-
sensus with “them”. “They” are not rational: 
[T]here is no reason in terrorism; there is no sense in terrorism; there is no politics
in terrorism. There is only terror, death, blackmail. There is only the will to con-
trol, to subjugate, to destroy the morality of men, to eliminate their convictions.
(Speech 13) 
The open dialogue for which Zapatero pleads is meant to take place only
among “us”, the democratic people seeking unity. According to him, “the
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unity of democrats is the fundamental element in the fight against terrorism”
(ibid.). As a member of the opposition, he tried to achieve this when he pro-
posed the “Pact of freedoms and against terrorism” on the following ground:
“United, we can beat terrorism. And that union is one of the most efficient
weapons for achieving that goal” (Speech 17).
From the very beginning, Zapatero has tried to face international ter-
rorist issues with this strategy of dialogue. Zapatero’s “major” project was thus
the “Alliance of Civilizations”: a “forum” inside the un structure to promote
a dialogue among different civilizations opposed to the “clash of civilizations”
announced by some American intellectuals. This forum allowed drawing a
new line between the “civilized” Arab world and Islamic terrorist groups (e.g.,
Al Qaeda) and governments who supported them. According to Zapatero,
these terrorist groups represent “international” instead of “Islamic terrorism”.
He considers it to be a “great mistake” towards people of the Muslim faith
that the adjective “Islamic” is used to refer to a kind of terrorism (Speech 14).
Terrorist groups “do neither deserve to be recognized as followers of either a
religion (...), a nation or the people” (ibid.). They are nothing but a group of
“fanatics who are prepared to kill in order to impose their madness through
force, ready to disseminate the seed of evil” (Speech 15).
Despite his exclusionary rhetoric, Zapatero did occasionally open the
dialogue with the armed Basque separatist movement eta. From the very be-
ginning of his presidency he was engaged in an ambivalent process of negoti-
ation. While the Spanish judiciary power had banned several political parties,
ngos and other social organizations that had ties with the Basque Separatists,
a group of international negotiators tried to reach a peaceful solution with
Zapatero’s approval. After eta broke the cease-fire period in December 2006,
however, Zapatero declared that “there will be no dialogue” (Speech 20), thus
definitively excluding eta from the possibility of becoming a part of “us”.
After having won the elections in 2004, Zapatero offered a speech of
rational dialogue in reaction against his predecessor Aznar, who had sup-
ported Bush’s military interventions. Zapatero argued for counter-terrorism
policies with respect for the Rule of Law and human rights. This respect is un-
conditional because:
no democratic conviction will be put under question by terrorism actions, nor
democratic law will be changed because of terrorist actions, no democratic practice
will be altered because we are in combat against terrorism. (Speech 14)
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In the international sphere this commitment to legality implies that 
Spain will assume the international obligations that correspond to it in the defence
of peace and security. Spain will always have one simple requirement: a previous de-
cision of the United Nations or from any other organisation with multinational
character. (Speech 13) 
Despite his retirement of Spanish troops from Iraq, Zapatero has kept Span-
ish troops in Afghanistan, and he has even increased the amount of military
power.
In the domestic sphere, Basque terrorism is being fought through “the
activity of State Security Forces and Justice and (…) by the loss of social sup-
port to violence” (Speech 20). An important consequence of this strategy is
that since 2002 five Basque political parties – supposed to be linked with eta
– have been banned.7
One major feature of Zapatero’s anti-terrorism policy is his belief in
its legal foundation. He points out that “the response can come only from the
law; that is to say, the response can come only from democracy” (Speech 14).
However, despite Zapatero’s repeated references to the Rule of Law in Spain,
denouncements of human-rights violations in the fight against terrorism have
been launched by Basque human rights ngos as well as by such prestigious
international ngos as Amnesty International8 and Human Rights Watch,9 in
addition to the United Nations Special Rapporteurs on Torture, Theo Van
Boven and Manfred Nowak.10
7 These parties represent 15% of the electorate, with approximately 150,000 votes. If the as-
sumption that those parties “are” part of eta is correct, this organization has an important
base of support among the Basque population.
8 See Amnesty International Report 2008 available at: http://thereport.amnesty.org/
document/101.
9 Human Rights Watch report “Setting an Example? Counter-Terrorism Measures in
Spain”, available at: http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2005/01/26/setting-example.
10 United Nations Special Report on Torture after visiting Spain in October 2003, available
at: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/G04/107/16/pdf/G0410716.pdf?Open
Element. Follow-up report 2006 by Special Rapporteur Manfred Nowak, available at:
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/G06/119/12/pdf/G0611912.pdf?Open
Element.
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At first glance, Zapatero’s claim to act in accordance with the Rule of
Law seems to contradict the reports on human rights violations by the Span-
ish government. In addition to recognizing the state of exception as most
constitutions do, however, the Spanish Constitution also regulates a perma-
nent exception with regard to terrorism issues in Article 55 II. This article
regulates limitations to fundamental rights (e.g., longer periods of arrest, in-
communicado detentions, the possibility of intercepting a suspect’s corre-
spondence or any other communication and entering in any building without
a search warrant in the prosecution of individuals in relation to investigations
of terrorist crimes). From the very beginning of its democracy, Spain made
provisions that allowed for exceptional measures and these constitutional re-
strictions were regulated in special anti-terrorism acts. In the process of nor-
malizing the exception in 1988, anti-terrorism acts were promulgated and
their provisions were included in the “normal” legislation, the Criminal Code
and Procedure Criminal Law. The rulings of judges applying legal norms
which were originally exceptional measures are now regarded as “normal”. 
Furthermore, the exception is institutionalized by the modification of
the law and its interpretation. A paradigmatic example is the banning of
political parties linked with terrorist organization eta. The Spanish Con-
stitution allows the banning of organizations – and political parties fall into
this category – only when they are catalysts of criminal activities. So, the law
which regulated political parties required a criminal sentence previous to
the banning. Since 1998, there was an ongoing criminal investigation on
the links between Batasuna – a Basque radical separatist political party – and
eta. However, the investigation advanced slowly. As a consequence of Za-
patero’s Pact of freedoms and against terrorism (see above), a new Act for reg-
ulating political parties was accepted. The Act introduced several new
grounds on which political parties could be banned. It contravened the
Spanish constitution, because it made it possible to ban a political party on
the sheer basis of a “suspicion” that the party at hand supports terrorist
groups. The Act also introduced a new procedure for the banning of polit-
ical parties with fewer legal safeguards. For instance, a previous criminal
sentence was no longer required. 
In 2002, after the promulgation of the Act, the judge responsible for
the old ongoing criminal investigation finally decided to suspend all Bata-
suna activities. This clearly demonstrates the political dimension of law en-
forcement. About this process of banning Basque political parties, Zapatero
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says that “[t]he prosecutors present their accusations based on their opin-
ion, their legal understanding and their professionalism” (Speech 18). More-
over, he claims that his government is only responsible to “appoint the State
General Prosecutor and to indicate a criminal policy to follow. What are
the basic objectives of that criminal policy? Evidently: to fight against ter-
rorism” (ibid.). Although Zapatero tried to present counter-terrorism meas-
ures as objective law enforcement with a minimum of political influence,
under his leadership legislation has been introduced that contravenes fun-
damental constitutional rights. Consequently, even when formal rule of law
is maintained, the substance of law is modified or re-interpreted according
to political needs. 
Zapatero’s rhetoric based on the rule of law is reinforced with militant
arguments based on democracy. As a result, it is not only the rule of law but
in fact democracy itself what is at stake in the fight against terrorism:
“[N]obody in a democracy can engage in the political life and the institu-
tions representing acronyms [implying eta] that imply a lack of respect to
democratic values”(Speech 21). And people who do not respect that are
banned “in defence of a democratically ordered system of values such as free-
dom and security” (ibid.).
Another example that shows the underlying political interests of Za-
patero’s “legal” strategy is his response to the criticism he received due to the
treatment of a former Basque terrorist leader De Juana Chaos. De Juana
Chaos was found guilty of various terrorist crimes and condemned to prison.
According to the Spanish Prison Law, in 2006 he had the right to finish the
rest of his sentence under the regime of parole. However, a powerful ngo,
named Asociación Víctimas del Terrorismo (Terrorism Victims Association),
and the Partido Popular (pp) pressured the government to keep De Juana
Chaos in prison on the ground that he had not publicly expressed repen-
tance. Pushed by public opinion, Zapatero’s government solved the prob-
lem by presenting new accusations against him in the same month he was
meant to leave prison on parole. The State prosecutor accused De Juana
Chaos of committing apology of terrorism in two articles which he had writ-
ten a month before in a Basque newspaper. Facing a possible new sentence
of 96 years of prison, De Juana Chaos started a hunger strike in protest
against these accusations. At that time, eta was under the cease-fire and in
negotiations with the Spanish Government. Within this political context
the accusation of the Prosecutor changed from 96 to 3 years. De Juana Chaos
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remained at the centre of the polemics between the government and the op-
position party, since his hunger strike forced the government to let him re-
cover in a hospital in the Basque Country against the policy of preventing
Basque terrorist criminals from serving their sentences in Basque territory. 
Zapatero was severely criticized because these measures were considered
a surrender to terrorist demands. He defended himself by saying that this was
just the “enforcement of the law”. However, being tired of the criticism he re-
ceived by the pp he said that during the “former Government they reduced
his sentence with one year for writing a book that glorifies terrorism” (Speech
18). During his government Zapatero nonetheless claims: “for writing one or
two articles where he does the same he receives three years of prison” (ibid.). 
As a result, Zapatero’s overall rhetorical strategy aims to portray the
fight against terrorism as nothing else than “just” law enforcement. However,
exceptional measures normalized in the Spanish Constitution including in-
communicado detentions, the banning of Basque political parties and the
treatment of De Juana Chaos’ hunger strike contradict Zapatero’s normalcy
portrayal of the Spanish fight against terrorism. 
16.4 Words don’t come easy
Both Spain and the uk have a long time experience with terror originating
from inside of their own political systems. Under Zapatero, however, Spain
took another route than the one taken by the British government under Blair.
Zapatero departed from Aznar’s and Blair’s course of following the United
States and their “coalition of the willing” in fighting international forms of
terrorism. In response to the growing criticism of the us anti-terrorism pol-
icy, Zapatero altered his stance and adapted his rhetoric accordingly, and he
became a “strong” defender of the Rule of Law. This obviously had to do
with the mandate that he received in the 2004 election. Apparently of even
greater importance is the change of perspective: Zapatero took the opportu-
nity to combine the problems of national and international terrorism and fo-
cused on the first. In this respect, he did not need to declare the “state of
exception” like Blair in order to execute special measures, simply because
Spain has preserved the exception in terrorist issues since the time of Franco. 
Whereas Blair used the rhetoric of exception sustained by moral and
political arguments in order to justify his policy while mobilizing consent
and support for it at the same time, Zapatero normalized the exception by
paying respect to internationally acknowledged standards of the Rule of
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Law. Both political leaders were masterful in managing the discourse of in-
clusive speech, albeit for different purposes: Blair tried to build a consen-
sus for a state of exception allowing the introduction of a just cause
reasoning into the international law. Zapatero used an existing consensus
(about the Rule of Law) to broaden the consensus for his way of dealing
with the problem of national terrorism in Spain. 
In hindsight, these rhetorical strategies ultimately proved unpersua-
sive: the British people were growing increasingly dissatisfied with Blair’s
agenda of supporting the United States in their fight against terrorism (as
clearly demonstrated by his steady decline in popularity),11 and there was a
increasing lack of support in Spain (with the exception of the Basque coun-
try) for re-opening negotiations with eta, after Zapatero’s earlier attempts
failed.12 These rhetorical failures were primarily due to the “logic” of sym-
bolic power. If the inclusive speech that both leaders used in the wake of ter-
rorist attacks is contradicted by an eroding consensus, the weakness of
symbolic power becomes apparent. To be sure, inclusive speech is an es-
sential element of political rhetoric in general. Its exploitation by Blair and
Zapatero was therefore nothing exceptional. Instead, it was the exception –
the exceptional threat of terrorism – that enabled both leaders to use the
anti-terror consent of the people for their own purposes, to fight terrorism
either on a global scale (Blair) or at home (Zapatero). Nonetheless, this
process of consensus-building proved fragile. Critics soon reclaimed the
stage and redefined the battle field: in Blair’s case they demanded a return
to a state of normalcy where the Rule of Law holds sway. In Zapatero’s case,
however, they dismantled his attempt to normalize the exception. It seems
that, whenever there is a critical auditorium, symbolic power based on in-
clusive speech is itself an exception. Although it may be persuasive for a
while, it will never last.
11 For some statistics, see The Long Decline: Tony Blair’s popularity, Guardian, 25 April
2007, http://politics. guardian.co.uk/flash/page/0,,2065152,00.html/. 
12 In February 2006 77% of the Spanish people supported negotiations with eta. See:
http://www.elpais.com/ elpaismedia/ultimahora/media/200602/20/espana/2006022
0pepunac_1_Pes_otr.mht. In March 2007, two months after the end of the cease fire by
eta and a month before the general elections only 48% of the Spanish people supported to
open new negotiations with eta. See: http://www.opina.es/web/pdfs/90070%2 0E.pdf.
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Appendix: Speeches, interviews, statements
Tony Blair
1. Speech delivered at the Labour Party Conference, 2 October 2001, 
available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2001/oct/02/
labourconference.labour6
2. Statement on military action in Afghanistan, 7 October 2001, 
available at: www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/07/afghanistan.
terrorism11
3. Speech delivered at the US Congress, 17 July 2003, available at:
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/US/07/17/blair.transcript/
4. Speech delivered in Blair’s Sedgefield constituency, 5 March 2004,  
available at: www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2004/mar/05/iraq.iraq
5. Statement to uk Parliament on the London bombings, 11 July 
2005, available at: www.number10.gov.uk/Page7903
6. Speech delivered at the Labour Party national conference, 16 July
2005, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4689363.stm
7. A: Foreign Policy Speech I, London, 21 March 2006, available at: 
http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9224
B: Foreign Policy Speech II, London, 27 March 2006, available at:
www.number10.gov.uk/Page9245
C: Foreign Policy Speech III, London, 26 May 2006, available at: 
www.number10.gov.uk/Page9549
8. Speech delivered at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet, London, 13
November 2006, available at: http://www.number10.gov.uk/
Page10407
José María Aznar
9. Delivered at Palacio de la Moncloa, 12 September 2001, available at:
http://www.maec.es/SiteCollectionDocuments/Fotos_Actualidad_
Prensa_y_Documentacion/pdf/revistas/2001/C2.pdf 8 (pp. 212-213)
José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero 
10. Congress of Deputies, 26 September 2001, available at:
http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L7/cong/ds/pl/pl_107.pdf
11. Congress of Deputies, 5 February 2003, available at: 
http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L7/cong/ds/pl/pl_222.pdf
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12. Congress of Deputies, 5 March 2003, available at:
http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L7/cong/ds/pl/pl_231.pdf
13. Assumption speech as President of the Government, Congress 
of Deputies, 15-04-2004, available at: http://www.congreso.es/
public_oficiales/L8/cong/ds/pl/pl_002.pdf
14. Speech delivered in a summer course on “The fight against terrorism 
and its limits” of the Complutense University at San Lorenzo del 
Escorial, 16 July 2004, available at: http://www.la-moncloa.es/
Presidente/Intervenciones/Discursos/p1607040.htm
15. Statement to the general debate of the United Nations General 
Assembly, 21 September 2004, available at: http://www.la-
moncloa.es/Presidente/Intervenciones/Discursos/p2109041.htm




17. Speech given at the Congress of Deputies, 15 January 2007, 
available at: http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L8/cong/ds/
pl/pl_227.pdf
18. Interview by Carlos Herrera from Onda Cero radio, 15 March 2007, 
available at: http://www.la-moncloa.es/Presidente/Intervenciones/
Entrevistas/pren20070315.htm
19. Statement to the press, Palacio de La Moncloa, 7 March 2008, 
available at: http://www.la-moncloa.es/Presidente/Intervenciones/
Discursos/prdi20080307.htm 
20. Interview by El Pais, 29 June 2008, available at: http://www.
psoe.es/ambito/saladeprensa/docs/index.do?action=View&id=203885
21. Press conference at the Congress of Deputies, 16 September 2008,
available at: http://www.la-moncloa.es/Presidente/Intervenciones/
ConferenciasdePrensa/ prrp20080916.htm
22. Statement to the press, Palacio de La Moncloa, 3 December 2008, 
available at: http://www.la-moncloa.es/Presidente/Intervenciones/
Otros/prot20081203.htm 
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17 Do New Parties Bring Personalization,
a Narrow Issue Agenda and Populist 
Rhetoric?
Evidence from Dutch Election 
Campaign Coverage from 1998 to 2006
janet takens,  anita van hoof,  jan
kleinnijenhuis  and wouter van atteveldt
17.1 Introduction
In Western Europe an increasing number of new political parties have re-
cently gained extensive popular support at the expense of established parties.
These parties employ a communication style that attracts media attention.
This chapter focuses on three of the characteristics of this communication
style, namely an emphasis on party leaders (personalization), a narrow issue
agenda, and the use of populist rhetoric. We study the rhetoric used by new
political parties, while taking into account who is voicing this rhetoric, and
which issues they are discussing. 
New parties use these three elements of this communication style to
persuade the public. Communication starts with an actor (a person or or-
ganization) who chooses to make a statement. In ancient times rhetoric was
perceived as an art that was practised by powerful political leaders (Witteveen
1988, p. 42). Nowadays political stances are voiced by a large number of politi-
cians. At the same time, political stances are often attributed to political in-
stitutions, such as political parties while new parties are usually personified
by their political leaders. 
The second element refers to the issues on which the public has to be
persuaded. Scholars of rhetoric focus on the use of language to persuade the
public, while limited attention is paid to the issues being talked about. How-
ever, the persuasive power of politicians does not only depend on their rhet-
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oric quality, but also on the issues they discuss. A discourse is easier to un-
derstand when a limited number of issues are adressed. New parties are often
founded to advocate a specific interest, which existing parties ignored ac-
cording to these parties, and they emphasise this unique selling point by re-
inforcing their stances with regard to these issues, while disregarding other
issues. 
The third element of new parties’ communication style regards the use
of populist rhetoric, consisting of criticism of the political elite, and positive
statements about “the people”. Populist rhetoric can be used as a rhetorical
technique to create sympathy for a party, and since new and unknown par-
ties lack a stable core of constituency, they will have a stronger incentive to
create sympathy. 
Political parties are constantly competing for media attention, since
for most voters the media are the most important source of political infor-
mation. Given that recently established parties are still unknown to the pub-
lic, media attention is even more important for new parties. We argue that the
three characteristics of the communication style of new political parties attract
media attention because they correspond to certain journalistic schemata.
Prime examples are the inclination to cover individual politicians rather than
political institutions (e.g., Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2003; Rahat and Schaefer
2007) and the tendency to cover negative news in general (e.g., Patterson
1993; Pfau et al. 1998; Semetko and Schönbach 2003) and conflict in partic-
ular (Kepplinger 2000; Paletz and Entman 1981). Furthermore, the media
aim to decrease the complexity of the news by paying attention to a limited
number of issues, and by covering the simple divide between “the people”
and the political elite. This study examines media coverage of different cate-
gories of political parties by focusing on the relative attention given to party
leaders, the breadth of the issue agenda, and the attention given to populist
rhetoric. The present study examines these three core concepts in the media
coverage of different party categories during four Dutch national election
campaigns between 1998 and 2006. 
17.2 Personalization, a narrow issue agenda and populist rhetoric 
This section elaborates on personalization, a narrow issue agenda, and pop-
ulist rhetoric as characteristics of the communication style of new parties.
Furthermore, we will address the question as to why new parties, other par-
ties, and the media might be attracted to these three core concepts.
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17.2.1 Personalization
In ancient times politics was conducted by powerful political leaders. Politi-
cal rhetoric was perceived as an art that was reserved for those powerful men
(Witteveen 1988, p. 42). In recent times, however, the prominence of indi-
vidual politicians, labelled personalization, has a rather negative connotation.
Personalization in politics is defined as “creating and using the prominence
of leaders” (Schönbach 1996, p. 94). New parties might employ a personal-
ized communication style, because they depend more strongly on their party
leader than established parties. They have no party history and lack a recog-
nisable party image. Since new parties cannot depend on the fame of ad-
ministrators representing their party, a new and unknown political party
needs an inspiring and well-known party leader to gain media attention and
to reach the voter (Van Stipdonk and Van Holsteyn 1996, p. 131). Conse-
quently, new parties will use the prominence of their party leaders to project
a distinctive image of the party.
The question arises then as to whether the use of the prominence of a
party leader is specific to new parties. All parties will try to project a distinc-
tive party image, and personalization has been found to be present in differ-
ent, interdependent contexts (Rahat and Schaefer 2007). In response to the
prominence of successful leaders of new parties, other parties might be in-
clined to push their party leaders to the fore. For this reason, we expect that
the coverage of established parties is more personalized in the years in which
new parties were most successful.
The present chapter focuses on personalization in the news, which is
defined as “a heightened focus on individual politicians and a diminished
focus on parties, organisations, and institutions” in the media (Rahat and
Sheafer 2007, p. 67). The media favour news about actors above issues (e.g.,
Kleinnijenhuis, et al. 2003). When covering political actors, the media pre-
fer news about individual politicians above abstract political institutions, such
as political parties (e.g., Rahat and Sheafer 2007). Wattenberg (1984, p. 91) ar-
gues that one of the main causes of the media’s preference for personalized
news is the changing role of the media from “the prime reinforcers of parti-
sanship”, covering parties and their stances, to more independent outlets
(Wattenberg 1984, p. 91). The introduction and distribution of television
news has accelerated this change “as acquaintance with personalities is much
easier to convey through the visual media than knowledge about abstractions
such as political parties” (Wattenberg 1984, p. 91). Stewart, Mazzoleni and
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Horsfield (2003, p. 227) showed that the expectation that media prefer per-
sonalized coverage especially holds true for new parties. In most of the eight
countries under study: “much of the media coverage of the neo-populist
movements was expressed via reporting on the person of the movement’s
leader(s)”.
Because new parties depend more strongly on their party leaders than
other parties, we test whether the party leaders of new parties receive rela-
tively more attention. We additionally study whether the salience of party
leaders is especially high in the news coverage of the elections in which new
parties made an upsurge.
H 1a: New parties are more often depicted as employing a personalized style 
than other parties.
H 1b: Party leaders are more often covered in the news in the elections in which 
new parties made an upsurge.
17.2.2 The breadth of the issue agenda 
A discourse containing a limited number of issues is less complex, and there-
fore more easily understandable, than a discourse containing a larger number
of issues. According to issue ownership theory, it is beneficial for political
parties if the issues that they “own” receive media attention (e.g., Budge and
Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996). Consequently, it is important that they reinforce
their stances on the issues they are associated with by the public. New parties
are often founded to advocate a certain interest (e.g., Krouwel and Lucardie
2008). Therefore, new parties often have a narrow issue agenda. One-issue
parties, such as anti-immigration parties and parties for the elderly, form the
clearest example. However, new parties that split from an established party
also did so because of disagreement on one or a limited number of issues. To
position themselves in the political field, new parties emphasize their unique
selling points, which results in a narrow issue agenda.
Then the question arises as to whether this narrow issue agenda of new
parties also affects the agenda of other parties. Existing parties usually have a
broad issue-agenda because they are expected to express their opinion on a
large number of issues in Parliament or Government. Previous studies have
shown that the political policy agenda consists of a stable set of issues, which
only changes under influence of certain events called “policy punctuations”
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Established parties are responsive to the agen-
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das of new parties when these new parties are doing well (Krouwel and Lu-
cardie 2008), which indicates that the upsurge of new parties can form a pol-
icy punctuating event: “When established parties face electoral decline they
tend to mimic new parties in issue emphasis patterns” (Krouwel and Lucardie
2008, p. 297). In other words, established parties narrow their issue agenda
when put under pressure by the popularity of successful new parties.
Politics and the media both have their own issue agenda, which are in-
terconnected according to agenda-setting theory (e.g., McCombs and Shaw
1972). The breadth of the media agenda refers to the number of issues that re-
ceive a substantial amount of attention in the news. Previous studies have
shown that during election campaigns the media focuses on a limited num-
ber of issues (e.g., Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2007), as a low number of different
issues makes the news easier to understand (Kleinnijenhuis 2003). The ten-
dency to cover a limited number of issues might be amplified by the upsurge
of new parties because of the news value of controversial issues introduced by
these parties. Stewart, Mazzoleni and Horsfield (2003, p. 226) state that “the
media, by virtue of their espousal of news values – such as timelines, prox-
imity, and prominence – tend to focus upon dramatic and transitory issues
rather than on a prolonged analysis of social or political phenomena”. When
the media intensively cover a limited number of controversial issues, the at-
tention given to other issues decreases and the issue agenda narrows.
Based on the assumption that new parties emphasize a limited num-
ber of controversial issues, new parties are expected to appear in the news
with a narrower issue agenda than existing parties. We additionally test
whether the depiction of the issue agenda of other parties in the news nar-
rowed in the years in which new parties made an upsurge.
H 2a: New parties are more often depicted as having a narrow issue agenda than
other parties.
H 2b: The issue agenda of established parties in the news is smaller in the election
years in which new parties made an upsurge.
17.2.3 Populist rhetoric 
Populism is an essentially contested concept (e.g., Taggart 2000; Canovan
1999). The discussion about populism centres on the question as to whether
populism is a political ideology or a communication style. Some scholars
argue that populist parties aspire to restoring the power of “the people”, while
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others argue that it is a “normal communication style” (e.g., Jagers and Wal-
grave 2007), which is used instrumentally to gain political power. Agreement
seems to exist on the defining elements of populist rhetoric: positive references
to “the people”, and criticism of the political elite (Jagers and Walgrave 2006).
The defining components of populist statements coincide with rhetorical
techniques to garner the public’s sympathy. One of the techniques to create
goodwill, distinguished by Andeweg and De Jong (2004, p. 54), is to discredit
opponents. Cicero argued that the arousal of aversion, jealousy or contempt
of opponents by a speaker would create sympathy for the speaker himself
(Andeweg and De Jong 2004, p. 54). This technique corresponds with criti-
cism of the political elite as a characteristic of populist rhetoric. A second
technique for creating goodwill, praising the public (Andeweg and De Jong
2004), corresponds with the second element of populist rhetoric; i.e., posi-
tive statements towards the public. In conclusion, although populism might
be an ideology, populist rhetoric can also be used as a technique to create
sympathy with the own party.
New parties might use populist rhetoric for both instrumental and ide-
ological reasons. Since new – and consequently unknown – parties lack sup-
porters who sympathise with them, populist rhetoric, i.e., criticism of their
opponents and praising the public, can be used to create sympathy. The use
of populist rhetoric also stems from the self-assigned role of new parties as the
defenders of neglected interests of the public. To emphasize that they defend
the interests of “the people”, they refer positively to the public, and to call at-
tention to those who should be blamed for the neglect of these issues they crit-
icise the political elite. Populist rhetoric could also serve an ideological goal.
Some new parties are formed because of their will to reform the political sys-
tem or culture (Krouwel and Lucardie 2008), and they can use populist rhet-
oric to support their argument that certain powers should shift from “the
corrupted political elite” to “the good people”. 
The question then arises as to whether populist rhetoric is employed
exclusively by new parties. Established parties might also use populist rheto-
ric to create sympathy. Since in democracies politicians are expected to rep-
resent “the people”, all politicians can be expected to refer positively to the
public to some degree. The use of populist rhetoric by existing parties might
increase under pressure of the electoral success of new parties, since the cre-
ation of sympathy becomes more urgent. Furthermore, it is inherent to pol-
itics that political parties disagree with each other, and therefore criticise other
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parties in general and governing parties in particular. Different scholars have
argued that politicians use criticism of other politicians instrumentally to in-
crease politicians’ media presence (Kepplinger, Brosius and Staab 1991; Ben-
nett 2007; Kepplinger 2000). The introduction of new and controversial
issues by new parties could catalyse the instrumental use of criticism on the
deliverers of these issues.
Populist rhetoric in the news also consists of references to “the people”
and criticism of the political elite, which either stem from journalists them-
selves or from sources like political or societal actors. Populist rhetoric corre-
sponds with different schemata that are used by the media to cover politics.
With its focus on the political elite and the public, populist rhetoric coin-
cides with the focus of the media on actors instead of issues (Kleinnijenhuis
et al. 2003, 2007). Contrasting opinions with regard to complex issues are
difficult to convey, while the simple clash between the political elite and “the
people” is much easier to get across. What is more, criticism of the elite is in
line with the inclination of the media to cover negativity in general (e.g., Pat-
terson 1993; Pfau et al. 1998; Semetko and Schönbach 2003) and conflict in
particular (Kepplinger 2000; Paletz and Entman 1981). Stewart, Mazzoleni
and Horsfield (2003) argue that in the insurgent phase of new parties, the
media are attracted by the novelty of their communication style. In the in-
surgent phase, “charismatic leaders stage events appealing to the news media,
engage in verbal extremism, and bluntly attack established parties and gov-
ernment policies”. Media are attracted by these “newsworthy realities” that
they “cover comprehensively in their pursuit of editorial goals” (Stewart, Maz-
zoleni and Horsfield 2003, p. 221). 
Because new parties are inclined to employ populist rhetoric, we test
whether the media covered populist rhetoric more frequently in the news
about new political parties than in the news about other parties. We addi-
tionally test whether populist rhetoric is in general used more often in the
years in which new parties made an upsurge.
H 3a: New parties are more often depicted as referring positively to “the people”
than other parties. 
H 3b: Positive references to “the people” are more often covered in the news in the 
election years in which new parties made an upsurge. 
H 4a: New parties are more often depicted as criticising the political elite than 
other parties. 
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H 4b: Criticism of the political elite is more often covered in the news in the
election years in which new parties made an upsurge. 
17.2.4 The Dutch case
Personalization, the breadth of the issue agenda and populist rhetoric will be
studied in the context of the coverage of four successive Dutch national elec-
tion campaigns held between 1998 and 2006. The Netherlands is an appeal-
ing context for studying personalization, the breadth of the issue agenda and
populist rhetoric because of the recent upsurge of new political parties in that
country. Since 1945, the Netherlands has witnessed an increase of electoral
support for structural opposition and new parties at the expense of estab-
lished parties. The success of new and structural opposition parties was most
pronounced in the last fifteen years.
figure 17.1  distribution of the vote 
 










Throughout this chapter we will make a distinction between governing par-
ties, non-governing established parties, structural opposition parties and
new parties.1 Figure 17.1 represents the percentage of votes that the four
party categories received in the last five elections. In the 1998 election, none
of the new parties was able to gain any parliamentary seats. In 2002, the new
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anti-immigration party lpf, whose leader Pim Fortuyn was assassinated a
few days before the election, made the largest upsurge ever witnessed in the
Netherlands. Out of nothing, the party gained 26 out of 150 parliamentary
seats. The party entered the coalition. The new conservative liberal party
Leefbaar Nederland also won two seats. In the 2003 election the lpf lost 18
seats. Of the four contending new anti-immigration parties in 2006 only the
anti-immigration party pvv of Geert Wilders was successful. The pvv gained
nine seats. The Party for Animals gained two parliamentary seats. We will
consider 2002 as the prime example of an election year in which new par-
ties made an upsurge (28 seats). 2006 is also an election year in which new
parties were successful (11 seats). Although in 2003 the new lpf was still
quite successful (8 seats), in comparison with 2002, new parties were un-
successful (-20 seats). In 1998, new parties were not successful at all (0 seats).
In short, we consider 2006 and especially 2002 as years in which new par-
ties made an upsurge. 
17.3 Method
For this study, election coverage of two Dutch news broadcasts (the prime
time news bulletins of public broadcaster NOS and commercial broadcaster
RTL) and all subscription-based national newspapers (De Telegraaf, de Volk-
skrant, NRC Handelsblad, Het Algemeen Dagblad and Trouw) in the three
months preceding the 1998, 2002, 2003 and 2006 Dutch national elections
were analyzed. All articles in which either a political actor or a political issue
was mentioned were included in the study.2 This resulted in 19,196 included
1 Governing parties are parties that governed at the time of the election. Established parties
are parties that have been part of the coalition at least twice in the last 8 years, but that are
currently not in Government. Structural opposition parties are parties that are represented
in Parliament and which participated in the elections for the first time over four years ago.
Finally, a new party is a party that is either not represented yet, or participated for the first
time in the elections less than four years ago. This category contains parties such as the
Party for Animals in 2003 and 2006, the anti-immigration party lpf in 2002 and 2003, and
the anti-immigration party pvv in 2006. 
2 We defined a political actor as a political party, a member of Government, a Member of
Parliament or a national political institution. A political issue is an article with one of the
predefined political issues as the main subject of the article (e.g., unemployment and state
finances). 
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articles and news items. The headline and lead of these newspaper articles,
and the television news items were manually coded by teams of intensively
trained coders using Semantic Network Analysis. 
17.3.1 Semantic Network Analysis
The content of political news coverage was analysed by means of Semantic
Network Analysis (sna). With sna, a network of relations between objects can
be extracted from a text. sna has important advantages over thematical content
analysis, which consists of unitising a message and coding each of the units on
one or more variables (Van Atteveldt 2008, p. 22). One of the main advantages
of sna is its flexibility. The method of analysis can be used to simultaneously
study different elements of media coverage, such as the breadth of the issue
agenda, populistic rhetoric and personalization. A second advantage is that sna
results in network representations that represent the text as closely as possible
(ibid. p.188). Due to the detailed coding, the coded units are semantically close
to the original news coverage, which makes sna a useful means of studying
subtle elements of texts, such as the use of populist rhetoric.3
The coding of the newspaper articles and news bulletins was conducted
using the Network of Evaluative Texts method (net method) (e.g., Krippen-
dorf 2008; Van Atteveldt 2008), a semantic network analysis method. The
net method divides a text into a number of so-called elementary statements
that describe the relations between objects such as actors and issues in the
form of source: subject / predicate / direction of the predicate / object. The sub-
ject refers to the actor or issue from which the energy in a sentence stems,
while the object is the actor or issue at which the energy is directed. The pred-
icate connects the subject and the object by association or disassociation. The
quality quantifies the connection, ranging from -1 (maximal disassociation)
3 Semantic Network Analysis could have been used to detect even more detailed character-
istics of a text. The coded network of relations enables an analysis of the chains of reason-
ing in a text, by analyzing the coded elementary statements in conjunction. sna also makes
it possible to detect the modalities of the relations in a text. However, in the current study
no distinction has been made between the modalities of the relations. Although news cov-
erage of actual actions taken in favour or against the public might have an even bigger im-
pact on the public than expressions of affection or disaffection, the exclusion of actions
would provide a measure of populist rhetoric that better conforms to populist rhetoric as a
rhetorical technique.
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to +1 (maximal association). For example, in “Pim Fortuyn ridicules the so-
cialist party”, the subject Pim Fortuyn is disassociated from the object social-
ist party. This results in the following elementary statement: Pim Fortuyn /
ridicules / -1 / socialist party. The coding starts from an ontology, a predefined
list of “knowledge objects”, from which coders draw the sources, objects, and
subjects. The term “knowledge objects” is used as an overarching concept for
political and societal actors and issues frequently found in the news. At the
aggregate level, the elementary statements form a network of relations from
which the presence of different elements of news coverage can be deduced. 
Personalization
Personalization in the news was measured by calculating the percentage of
statements in the news in which a political party or a politician representing
that party was mentioned containing a reference to the party leader. We com-
pared the number of occurrences of the party leader with the occurrence of
other individual politicians and the party itself. The number of occurrences
of political actors was measured by counting the number of elementary state-
ments with a political actor in the source, subject or object position.4
The breadth of the media agenda 
The breadth of the media agenda was measured by measuring the distribu-
tion of the attention paid to different main issues. We are interested in the dif-
ferences in the diversity of the issues with which the different party groups are
associated in the news. Therefore, we counted the number of relations in the
network of coded sentences in which a party group was associated with each
of the different main issues. We included all elementary statements contain-
ing an issue statement; i.e., statements in which a political party in the sub-
ject position was associated with an issue in the object position. All issues
that appeared in the news were categorized in thirteen issue categories.5 The
4 If an elementary statement contained a political actor on the source, object and the sub-
ject position, only the actor on the source position was included in this study. Likewise, if
the elementary statement only contains a political actor at the subject and object position,
the subject is included in this study. Notice that a sentence can contain more than one ele-
mentary sentence. The sentence “Party A disapproves of Party B’s support of measure C”,
for example, contains two elementary statements. Therefore both party A and party B
would be included in our analysis.
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breadth was measured by calculating the perplexity, a measure indicating the
number of issues which receive a substantive and equivalent amount of at-
tention (De Ridder 1984; Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2003).6
Populist rhetoric
Populist rhetoric consists of positive references to “the people” and criticism
of the political elite by a political party. The presence of populist rhetoric is
measured by calculating the percentage of all statements in the news in which
a political party in the object position is related to either “the people” or the
political elite (a political institution, a governing party or a politician repre-
senting a governing party) in the subject position. In other words, we meas-
ured the number of statements in which a political party or one of its
members associated or disassociated itself with either “the people” or the pub-
lic. No distinction has been made between different modalities of the relation;
i.e., both actions and affections are included in the analyses. Note that both
associating and disassociating statements are taken into account. The tone of
parties’ references to the public and the political elite was measured by cal-
culating the mean direction of the relations expressed in the statements. The
following examples illustrate the coding of populist rhetoric:
Examples of positive references to “the people”: 
“Geert Wilders claims to solve the problems of the people.” 
Geert Wilders / claims to solve problems / +1 / people
Example of criticism of the political elite: 
“Pim Fortuyn attacks political culture of the Cabinet.” 
Pim Fortuyn / attacks / -1 / Cabinet Kok II
5 The main issues are: Valence issues (e.g., the economy), financial issues, social security,
health care, education, crime and national security, environment, administrative reform,
infrastructure, Christian values, new left/progressive issues and European integration.
6 The perplexity can be calculated using the following formula: diversity = ∏ pi
-pi where pi
is the proportion of the attention devoted to an issue category in a certain news outlet. We
calculated the perplexity rather than the commonly used entropy (which can be derived by
taking the log of the perplexity) because the perplexity can be interpreted more intuitively.
It represents the number of issues which received a substantive and equivalent amount of
attention from a newspaper or broadcaster. 
iεissues
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17.4 Results 
Before we turn to personalization, the breadth of the issue agenda and pop-
ulist rhetoric, we will give a brief overview of the amount of attention given
to the four party types. Figure 17.2 shows the relative attention paid to the
four different party categories in the news coverage of the four elections under
study. Governing parties dominated the news, although the amount of at-
tention given to these parties strongly fluctuates. Both the established parties
and the structural opposition parties received relatively much attention dur-
ing the last two elections. New parties were almost absent in the coverage of
the 1998 elections (0.68%), whereas in 2002 they received almost one third
of all the attention (30.70%). Notwithstanding their electoral decline, new
parties still received a considerable amount of attention in 2003 (25.61%).
While in 2006 the new parties were successful in gaining votes, the attention
that the media paid to the new parties was relatively limited (5.94%). Since
in 1998 less than 50 statements of the new parties were covered in the news,
the coverage of new parties in 1998 is excluded from the analyses presented
in table 17.1, table 17.2, and table 17.3.











figure 17.2  attention for different party groups 
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17.4.1 Personalization 
Table 17.1 shows the relative attention given to party leaders in comparison
to the attention given to other individual politicians representing the same
party and the party itself. The percentages for the attention paid to indi-
vidual politicians and the name of the party itself (not represented in this
table) and the percentage of the attention given to party leaders would add
up to 100 percent (column percentages). Hypothesis 1a is confirmed by the
data represented in table 17.4. In the coverage of each of the elections under
study, new parties’ leaders appear the most often in the news (47.78%). The
party leaders of governing parties appear the least often in the news
(18.90%), which can be explained by the fact that many individual politi-
cians representing governing parties are Ministers, and therefore draw a lot
of attention. Hypothesis 1b also is confirmed. The election campaigns in
which new parties were the most successful, 2002 and 2006, were the most
personalized campaigns (respectively 27.13% and 27.12% attention paid to
party leaders). The high average attention given to party leaders in 2002 is,
however, exclusively caused by the prominence of new party leader Pim
Fortuyn (61.98%). The party leaders of all other party groups received rel-
atively less attention in 2002 than in other years. Especially governing par-
ties’ leaders were pushed to the background (11.00%). In 2006 the news
coverage was truly more personalized. The relative attention paid to party
leaders of all party groups was above average. 
table 17.1  relative attention given to party leaders compared with
other individual politicians and the party name 
1998 2002 2003 2006 Average
Governing parties 21,49 11,00 21,93 21,17 18,90
Established parties 18,27 23,77 27,24 35,35 26,16
Structural opposition parties 21,72 20,03 12,20 30,33 21,07
New parties 45,10 61,98 32,40 51,64 47,78
Average 21,43 27,13 20,74 27,12 24,10
Reading example: In 1998 the leaders of the governing parties received 21.49 percent of the
attention paid to governing parties in that year, implying that other individual politicians
and the party itself received 78.51 percent of the attention.
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17.4.2 The breadth of the issue agenda 
Table 17.2 shows the perplexity of the issue agenda, which represents the num-
ber of issues receiving a substantive and equivalent amount of attention in the
news. We make a distinction between general news about issues (all issue
news, top row), and issue statements of political actors (issue statements, bot-
tom rows). The data presented in table 17.1 confirm hypothesis 2a. In each of
the election years under study, new parties are represented as disseminating
stances on the smallest number of issues (averagely 8.63 issues). In 1998 – the
year in which new parties were the least successful – the overall media agenda
was the most diverse (12.09 issues), while in 2002, the year in which the new
anti-immigration party lpf made an upsurge, the media agenda was the least
diverse (10.6 issues). These results seem to confirm hypothesis 2b. However,
the breadth of the media agenda in 2003 was smaller than in 2006, while in
2003 new parties were less successful. Hence, these results are not in line with
hypothesis 2b. The number of issues that the established parties and espe-
cially the governing parties covered in 2002 was lower than in other election
years (respectively 9.79 and 9.82 issues). These results suggest that in 2002
the governing and established parties adjusted their issue agenda to the agenda
of new parties.
table 17.2  breadth of the policy agenda (perplexity) 
1998 2002 2003 2006 Average
All issue news Governing 12,09 10,60 11,12 11,53 11,33
parties
Governing 11,58 9,79 10,99 11,37 10,93
parties
Issue statements of Established 10,24 9,82 9,65 10,17 9,97
political parties parties
Structural oppo- 9,83 11,22 10,52 10,87 10,61
sition parties
New parties 8,49 9,04 8,37 8,63
Average 11,73 10,41 11,10 11,35 11,15
Reading example: The distribution of the attention given to different issues in 1998 corres-
pondents with a perplexity of 12.09, which means that 12.09 issues received a substantive
and equivalent amount of attention in the news in 1998.
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17.4.3 Populist rhetoric 
Table 17.3 shows the percentage of political parties’ statements containing the
first element of populist rhetoric – references to people – and the average
tone of these statements. References to “the people” only are an indication of
populist rhetoric if they are positive. In each of the election years, all parties
expressed themselves in a positive way about “the people” (+ 0.44). On aver-
age, the established parties referred the most often to “the people” (2.74%).
Hypothesis 3a, stating that new parties are depicted more often as referring
positively to “the people” than other parties, is confirmed only for 2002, the
year in which new parties were the most successful (3.28%). In the two sub-
sequent election years, all other party groups referred more often to “the peo-
ple” than did the new parties. Hypothesis 3b is not confirmed either.
Although the attention given to references to “the people” increased sharply
in 2002, when the new party lpf made an upsurge (2.86%), the salience of
references to “the people” was even higher in 2003, when the new party lpf
was far less successful (3.10%).
table 17.3  percentage of statements containing references to the
people
1998 2002 2003 2006 Average
% tone % tone % tone % tone % tone
Governing parties 0,57 0,60 3,02 0,51 2,98 0,04 2,15 0,21 2,18 0,34
Established parties 1,70 0,95 1,95 0,60 3,97 0,63 3,33 0,19 2,74 0,59
Structural opposition parties 0,38 1,00 1,45 0,78 3,20 0,47 1,44 0,40 1,62 0,66
New parties 3,28 0,41 2,49 0,44 0,94 0,40 2,24 0,42
Average 0,67 0,71 2,86 0,50 3,10 0,32 2,23 0,23 2,22 0,44
Reading example: In 1998 the governing parties referred in 0.57 percent of their state-
ments in the news to people. The average tone of these statements is + 0.60 on a scale
from -1 to +1.
The second element of populist rhetoric – criticism of the political elite – is
represented in table 17.4. The table contains the percentage of party state-
ments containing criticism of the political elite, and the average tone of these
statements. The established parties criticized the political elite the most often
(29.48%), while the structural opposition parties did so least often (17.70%).
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It is striking that the governing parties referred to the political elite in 25.82
percent of all their statements, and that they did so with a negative tone (-
0.10). The data represented in table 17.4 confirm hypothesis 4a, stating that
new parties criticized the political elite most often, only for 2003. In 2003,
more than half of the statements of new parties dealt with the political elite.
Hypothesis 4b is not confirmed. In the election year in which the new par-
ties were least successful, 1998, the news contained relatively the most refer-
ences to the political elite (32.23%), while in one of the election years in which
new parties were the most successful, 2006, the news contained relatively the
least criticism on the elite (20.52%). 
table 17.4  percentage of statements containing crticism of the po-
litical elite
1998 2002 2003 2006 Average
% tone % tone % tone % tone % tone
Governing parties 33,94 -0,22 31,17 -0,21 18,70 0,08 19,46 -0,06 25,82 -0,10
Established parties 32,60 -0,65 32,04 -0,25 23,42 -0,36 29,89 -0,60 29,48 -0,46
Structural opposition parties 18,90 -0,54 24,12 -0,40 13,42 -0,82 14,36 -0,61 17,70 -0,59
New parties 5,71 -1,00 26,67 -0,46 51,35 -0,20 12,22 -0,31 23,99 -0,49
Average 32,23 -0,28 29,77 -0,27 21,35 -0,17 20,52 -0,29 25,97 -0,25
Reading example: In 1998 the governing parties referred in 33.94 percent of their statements
to either the governing parties or political institutions. The average tone of these statements
is -0.22 on a scale from -1 to +1.
17.5 Conclusion 
This study analyzed the rhetoric of new parties in political news coverage.
We focused on the source of the rhetoric, the number of issues that were
adressed and the use of populist rhetoric. First, we tested whether new par-
ties used the prominence of their party leaders more frequently, whether they
had a narrower issue agenda than other parties and whether they employed
populist rhetoric more often than other parties. Second, we examined
whether the media covered these three elements of the communication style
of new parties more frequently in the election years in which new parties
made an upsurge.
[  3 4 3 ]
LUP Bending Opinion Boek_Layout 2  27-01-11  14:46  Pagina 343
takens,  van hoof,  kleinnijenhuis  and atteveldt
Two of the three hypotheses with regard to the use of this communi-
cation style in the coverage of new parties were confirmed. As expected, the
news about new parties was more personalized: the party leaders of new par-
ties appeared relatively more often in the news. New parties were also por-
trayed as having a narrower issue agenda than other parties. However, our
hypothesis with regard to the use of populist rhetoric by new parties was not
confirmed. Only in 2002 did new parties refer most often positively to the
public, and only in 2003 did they criticize the political elite most often. The
first outcome can be explained by the introduction of populist rhetoric by
Pim Fortuyn in 2006, and the latter by the criticism of the new lpf on its for-
mer coalition partners. We have to conclude that new parties use populist
rhetoric only in specific circumstances. 
Only some of our hypotheses with regard to the presence of the three
characteristics of new parties’ communication style in general news coverage
were confirmed. The campaigns in which new parties made an upsurge were
indeed the most personalized. Although the prominence of party leaders in
2002 can be explained by the omnipresence of Pim Fortuyn, in 2006 party
leaders of all party types received relatively much attention. As expected, the
general media agenda was the narrowest in 2002 and the broadest in 1998, but
our hypothesis with regard to the breadth of the issue agenda was not con-
firmed because of the unexpectedly narrow issue agenda in 2003 and the rel-
atively broad issue agenda in 2006. The relatively unsuccessful lpf was still
omnipresent in the news in 2003, while in 2006 the new parties received lit-
tle media attention in comparison with their electoral success. So, the mere
presence of new parties in the news seems a better explanation for a narrow
issue agenda than their electoral success. Our hypothesis with regard to pop-
ulist rhetoric was not confirmed. Although the coverage of positive references
to “the people”, the first characteristic of populist rhetoric, increased in 2002,
when the lpf made an upsurge, populist rhetoric remained present in the
subsequent campaigns, especially in the coverage of other parties. The intro-
duction of populist rhetoric by new parties appears to have legitimized the fu-
ture use of populist rhetoric by other parties as well.
The results suggest that political parties reacted to the entrance of new
parties in the political arena by adjusting to their communication style. The
communication style of the lpf had the most noticeable impact on the com-
munication style of other parties. Fortuyn managed to change political news
coverage by gaining extensive media attention, by directing attention towards
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a limited number of issues, and by introducing populist rhetoric. In 2002,
even the governing parties referred in three out of ten statements to the per-
formance of the political elite, with a mostly negative tone. This indicates
that the upsurge of the lpf caused internal turmoil within the governing par-
ties. Contrary to our expectations, they furthermore reacted by putting politi-
cians other than their party leaders to the fore. This reaction might be caused
by the failure of the heavily criticized political leaders to respond to the up-
surge of the lpf. Finally, other parties made statements about a smaller num-
ber of issues in those years in which new parties were most successful. It would
seem that the electoral success of new parties compels other parties to put
emphasis on new parties’ issues. The salience of new parties’ issues forces their
opponents to respond, making these issues even more salient.
Further research should answer the question as to whether parties ac-
tually did employ a communication style characterized by these elements or
whether the media portrayed them as doing so. Although the portrayal of pol-
itics arguably has a larger impact on political attitudes than politicians’ actual
political behaviour, it would be interesting to know where the communication
style originates. An analysis of political rhetoric during election campaigns in
other forums, such as party manifestos, by means of content analysis or in-
terviews with politicians, journalists and spokespersons could shed light on
this question. Furthermore, it would be interesting to examine whether the
media in other multi-party democracies in which new parties made an up-
surge, such as Austria and Belgium, also adjusted to the communication style
of new parties. Semantic Network Analysis enables an even more detailed
analysis of texts by taking the chains of reasoning and the modalities of rela-
tions into account. A more elaborate use of Semantic Network Analysis could
provide additional insights in the use of populist rhetoric.
In conclusion, this study indicates that the media depict new parties as
voicing rhetoric through their party leaders, while employing a narrow issue
agenda, and the established parties as adjusting to that communication style
when new parties gain popularity. A charismatic leader of a new party ap-
peared to be able to influence political news coverage.
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18 Parliamentary Debate and Political
Culture: The Dutch Case
ton van haaften
18.1 Introduction
Contrary to what one sees in, for example, the British or French parliaments,
the debate in the Dutch parliament can be characterized as a rather formal
and clinical discussion, which only uses rhetorical techniques in great moder-
ation. It can be argued that this way of debating, and the do’s and don’t’s of
it, originate from the shaping of the modern Dutch parliament during the
second half of the 19th century. Historical analyses of the origins and develop-
ment of the modern Dutch parliament, and its culture, have shown how much
their 19th-century liberal founding fathers, under the leadership of the much
respected politician J.R. Thorbecke, aimed at a dialectical ideal when shaping
the new parliament (Turpijn 2008; Te Velde 2003, 2010). In their ideal par-
liament, the members of the Chamber would attain the ‘truth’ via worthy, free
and rational debate (Turpijn 2008, p. 79). It is with this perspective in mind
that the formal and informal rules for the conduct of debate were shaped and
it has remained basically unchanged to this very day, notwithstanding the great
societal and political changes that have taken place since.
At several points in history, this dominant culture of Dutch parlia-
mentary debate has been challenged by left and right-wing political parties as
a whole, and by individual members of parliament. These parties, or indi-
vidual representatives, make a substantial and often purposive use of rhetor-
ical techniques and, in doing so, often exasperate and confuse many Dutch
members of parliament. Currently, for example, the dominant debate cul-
ture in the Dutch Parliament is undergoing a challenge from the Partij voor
de Vrijheid (pvv, Party for Freedom), a political party on the extreme right
which focuses on a single issue in its political program: the danger of the Is-
lamization of Dutch society. In the elections for the Dutch Parliament, held
on June 9th 2010, this political party was the big winner: it gained twenty four
of the hundred and fifty parliamentary seats and became the third largest po-
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litical party in the Netherlands. It is generally assumed that this enormous
election success is a direct consequence of the way in which the leader of this
party, Mr. Geert Wilders, conducts himself in Dutch parliamentary debates.
Mr. Wilders is not just well-known for what he says, he also attracts a lot of
attention because of the way he puts his message into words. On the one
hand, he is criticized for using words like “bonkers”, “insane” or “completely
nuts” to characterize his opponents in parliamentary debates but, on the
other, he is able to formulate his standpoints very clearly, illustrated, for ex-
ample, by the fact that he won a Plain Language Award in 2007 from the
Dutch National Youth Council.
So, the way that Mr. Wilders debates has aroused a lot of questions
and meta-political and meta-communicative discussions amongst citizens,
journalists, opinion makers and members of parliament, about the nature of
the debate in the Lower Chamber of Dutch Parliament, and about what con-
tributions to a parliamentary debate are admissible or reasonable in the very
broadest sense. These two questions are also central to the project which is
currently being undertaken by the Dutch political historian Henk te Velde
and myself: a project which investigates the development of the rules gov-
erning Dutch parliamentary debate since the middle of the 19th century from
both a rhetorical and argumentation-theoretical perspective, and a political-
historical perspective. 
The project focuses on the historical development of conventions and
norms which govern parliamentary debate, including those which govern
parliamentary language-use. As is the case with many other activities, a lot of
these rules and conventions are implicit and are not all articulated in, for ex-
ample, the Code of Order of the Dutch Parliament. Besides, these implicit
rules and conventions are often highly culturally biased and have been de-
veloped over a long period of time. This means that a long-term empirical and
praxeological analysis of parliamentary debates needs to be made to establish
what these rules and conventions are.
As this investigation continues to be a work in progress, concrete results
from the research will not be included in this chapter, but I will deal with
some of the basic argumentation-theoretical assumptions that the project
makes. More specifically I would like to discuss one fundamental aspect of
this project; namely, the characterization of Dutch parliamentary debate as a
“communicative activity type”, a concept recently discussed by Van Eemeren
(2010). I will do so on the basis of a case study.1
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18.2 A case study: A sub-discussion in Dutch parliament
In a speech during a debate on “Islamic activism” which was held in the
Dutch Lower Chamber on 6 September 2007, Mr. Wilders called for a ban
on the Koran and argued that what he described as “the Islamization of the
Netherlands” had to be stopped.2 The speech caused quite a stir, in particu-
lar, because Wilders called the current Minister of Integration and Social De-
mocrat, Ella Vogelaar, “crackers”, see the excerpt below: 
(1) Mr. Wilders (pvv):
Minister Vogelaar kwekt dat Nederland in de toekomst een joods-christelijke-
islamitische traditie zal kennen, en dat zij de islam wil helpen te wortelen in de Ne-
derlandse samenleving. Zij toont daarmee wat mij betreft aan dat zij knettergek is
geworden. Zij toont daarmee aan dat zij de Nederlandse cultuur verraadt. Zij toont
daarmee aan dat zij niet begrijpt dat veel Nederlanders de islamisering en de islami-
tische traditie niet willen. Ik vind dat verschrikkelijk, en ik vraag haar dan ook om
die woorden terug te nemen. Ik vraag haar, zich te verzetten tegen de islamisering
en terug te nemen dat Nederland, al is het over een aantal eeuwen, ook een islami-
tische traditie kent. Als zij dat niet doet – dat is haar goede recht – zullen wij het
vertrouwen in haar moeten opzeggen.
Minister Vogelaar babbles on about the Netherlands having a Jewish-Christian-
Islamic tradition in the future, and that she wants to help Islam take root in Dutch
society. She thus shows, for me, that she is going crackers. She thus shows that she
is betraying Dutch culture. She thus shows that she does not understand that a lot
of Dutch people do not want the Islamization (of the Netherlands) and the Islamic
tradition. I find this terrible and so I ask her now to take back these words. I ask
her to oppose Islamization and to retract her statement that the Netherlands will
have an Islamic tradition, albeit within a few centuries. If she does not comply with
this – which is her right – we will be obliged to withdraw our confidence in her.
1 I would like to thank Henrike Jansen and Henk te Velde for their valuable comments on
an earlier version of this chapter.
2 The excerpts (1) – (14) are taken from this debate; see: Handelingen voor de Tweede
Kamer (Proceedings of the Lower Chamber), 6 September 2007 (tk 93-5268) [translation
TvH].
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The speech is quite representative of the way in which Wilders presents him-
self in his addresses and for the way in which he operates in a parliamentary
debate: adopting radical standpoints, breaking through political etiquette and
using language which can impressionistically be described as “clear” (see Van
Leeuwen 2009).
After his speech, a sub-discussion or, as others would say, “a meta-dis-
cussion” (see Van Eemeren 2010, pp. 257-261), was initiated by some of his fel-
low-representatives; this is illustrative of the unease that his style of debating
had created. The participants in this sub-discussion, besides Mr. Wilders,
were: Mr. Slob, a member of the Christen Unie (cu, the Christian Union), a
small, more progressive Christian party; Mr. Van der Staaij, a member of the
Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (sgp, the Calvinist Party), a small conserva-
tive Christian party, and Mr. De Wit, a member of the Socialistische Partij (sp,
the Socialist Party), a left-wing party. This sub-discussion went as follows: 
(2) Mr. Slob (cu):
U heeft het over waarden en normen. U wilt hier een debat voeren en dat zet u
scherp in. Dat is uw goed recht. Dat moeten wij als parlementariërs ook doen,
maar dat doen wij wel met respect voor anderen. Wij proberen altijd het goede en
de vrede te zoeken in de samenleving en in onze onderlinge verhoudingen. In dat
opzicht vind ik het zeer ongepast dat u “aan de verstandelijke vermogens van de
minister twijfelt”, terwijl u met haar over de inhoud moet spreken. Dat geldt ook
voor alles wat u zegt tegen de islamieten. U legt bij tijd en wijle de vinger op
gevoelige plekken. Dat mag, maar wij moeten er altijd voor zorgen dat wij de Ne-
derlandse samenleving bij elkaar houden in al haar diversiteit. Wij moeten het
goede zoeken voor de samenleving. Dat zijn waarden en normen. Daar wil ik u op
aanspreken. De wijze waarop u opereert, zich tot collega’s verhoudt – u noemt ons
lafaards – en zich op de samenleving richt, werkt alleen maar splijtend. Dan schie-
ten wij ons doel voorbij.
You are talking about values and norms. You want to lead a debate and start off in a
very acute manner. That is your right. It is our duty as representatives to do this,
but when we do it, we are supposed to show respect for others. We should always
strive for goodness and peace in society, as well as in our mutual relationships. It is
in this respect that I consider it very inappropriate of you “to contest the intellec-
tual capacities of the minister”, instead of discussing the contents with her. This ap-
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plies to everything you say to Islamic people as well. You do sometimes point out
sensitive issues. One may do this, but one always has to make sure that we keep
Dutch society together in all its diversity. We ought to strive for the good things for
society. These are the values and norms. This is what I want you to account for.
The way you operate, the way you relate to colleagues – you call us cowards – and
your attitude to society, only results in division. This is overshooting the goal.
(3) Mr. Wilders (pvv): 
Ik werk niet splijtend. Ik zeg gewoon de waarheid. Als ik vind dat hier veel lafaards
zitten omdat zij het niet aandurven als ik vanwege een inhoudelijke voorstel vind
dat een minister knettergek is geworden, dan zeg ik dat gewoon. Dat heeft niks met
splijten te maken. Zeiden maar meer mensen wat zij op hun hart hadden. Zeiden
maar meer mensen dat zij het spuugzat zijn dat het kabinet iedere keer de andere
kant op kijkt als zich problemen voordoen met moslims en de islam. Zeiden maar
meer mensen dat de grenzen eindelijk een keer dicht moeten omdat het immi-
gratiebeleid er al sinds de jaren zestig voor zorgt dat Nederland Nederland niet
meer blijft. Zeiden maar meer mensen dat!
I am not being divisive. I am simply saying the truth. If I want to say a lot of you
are cowards because you daren’t say that the minister has gone crackers because of
the contents of a proposal, then I will say so. It’s nothing to do with creating divi-
sions. If only more people would say what bothers them. If only more people
would say that they are fed up with the cabinet looking in the other direction when
problems arise with Muslims and Islam. If only more people would say that the
borders have to finally be closed because immigration policy, since the sixties, is re-
sponsible for the fact that the Netherlands has not stayed the Netherlands. More
people should say that!
(4) Mr. Van der Staaij (sgp):
Ik heb u positieve opmerkingen horen maken over de joods-christelijke traditie.
Dat is een goede zaak, maar volgens de joods-christelijke traditie, in welke interpre-
tatie dan ook, staat het volgens mij buiten kijf dat wij een minister nooit maar dan
ook nooit, en zeker niet in een parlementair debat, voor knettergek uitmaken. Wilt
u terugkeren naar de fatsoensnormen uit de joods-christelijke traditie en die kwali-
ficatie terugnemen?
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I have heard you make positive comments about the Jewish-Christian tradition. That
is a good thing but, according to the Jewish-Christian tradition, in whatever interpre-
tation, it is obvious that one should never, ever characterize a minister as having gone
crackers, and certainly not in a parliamentary debate. Would you go back to the
norms of decency of the Jewish-Christian tradition and retract that characterization?
(5) Mr. Wilders (pvv):
Traditie of geen traditie, de minister is in mijn ogen, doordat zij praat over een
toekomstige christelijke, joodse en islamitische traditie knettergek geworden. Ik ga
het niet terugnemen, ik ga het nog herhalen.
Tradition or not, the minister has, in my view, by mentioning a future Christian,
Jewish and Islamic tradition, gone crackers. I am not going to take that back, I am
going to repeat it.
(6) Speaker:
U hebt dat punt nu gemaakt. (…) U handhaaft dit woord. Dat hebben wij nu een
aantal malen gehoord. U hebt de reactie van de collega’s daarop gehoord en ik stel
voor dat u dit woord niet verder gebruikt.
You have made that point. (…) You are standing by that word. We have heard it
several times now. You have listened to the reactions of your colleagues, and I pro-
pose that you do not use this word anymore.
(7) Mr. Wilders (pvv):
Als ik erom word gevraagd, noem ik het, zo simpel is het.
When I’m asked, I speak as I find, it’s as simple as that.
(8) Speaker:
Dat hebt u nu een aantal keren gedaan.
You have done so a number of times now.
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(9) Mr. De Wit (sp):
Wat denkt de heer Wilders dat het effect is van zijn toespraak tot nu toe in de
samenleving? Hij maakt zich net als ik druk over de tegenstellingen in de gewone
buurten en wijken, waar wij allemaal mee te maken hebben. Wat is het effect van
zijn toespraak en de kwalificaties die hij allemaal gebruikt over de islam?
What does Mr. Wilders think the effect of his speech on society will be?
Like me, he is concerned by the divisions affecting ordinary neighbourhoods and
districts which we are all familiar with. What is the effect of his speech and the
characterizations he uses when he addresses Islam?
(10) Mr. Wilders (pvv):
Ik hoop dat ik hier het geluid vertolk, en dat weet ik eigenlijk wel zeker, van heel
veel Nederlanders, die vinden dat het genoeg is met de islam in Nederland, die vin-
den dat wij genoeg problemen hebben met moslims in Nederland, die vinden dat
het niet onder het tapijt moet worden geschoven en dat je bijna voor racist wordt
uitgemaakt, als je daar wat over durft te zeggen. Mijnheer De Wit, die mensen zijn
geen racisten, het zijn nette, keurige mensen, die problemen hebben, dat zij in
elkaar worden geslagen op straat, dat zij zien dat hun land hun land niet meer is,
dat hun wijk hun wijk niet meer is, dat hun straat hun straat niet meer is. Ik ben er
trots op om dat geluid en de ergernis van die mensen hier te mogen vertolken.
I hope that I express the opinion here, and in fact I am quite sure of it, of very
many Dutch people, who feel that we have had enough Islam in the Netherlands,
who feel that we have enough problems with Islam in the Netherlands, who feel
that we should not brush these problems aside, and that one is almost called a racist
when one dares to comment on this. Mr. de Wit, these people are not racists, they
are decent, good people who find it a problem to be beaten up on the streets, who
find it a problem that their country isn’t their country anymore, that their neigh-
bourhood isn’t their neighbourhood anymore, that their street isn’t their street any-
more. I am proud to express this view and to interpret the anger of these people
here.
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(11) Mr. De Wit (sp):
Ik onderken het probleem dat u schetst, dat heb ik daarnet ook gezegd, maar het
gaat mij om het effect van uw toespraak en van de kwalificaties die u geeft over de
islam en over al die mensen die dit geloof aanhangen. Daarbij maakt u wel onder-
scheid tussen gematigd en niet-gematigd, maar in de praktijk blijkt uit uw verhaal
dat dit toch een heel moeilijk probleem is. Al die mensen hebt u in het diepst van
hun hart gegriefd. Denkt u dat wordt bevorderd dat de problemen in die buurten,
die ik nogmaals erken, door uw toespraak en door uw kwalificaties worden opgelost
of enigszins worden verbeterd? Zou het niet zo zijn dat dit juist tegen al die mensen
werkt? Het leidt tot een verharding van de tegenstellingen, waardoor mensen inder-
daad nog meer radicaliseren, onder invloed van uw woorden.
I recognize the problem that you outline, I said so just now, but I am concerned
about the effect of your speech and the way that you characterize Islam and all the
people who follow this religion. You do make a distinction between moderate and
not-moderate, but in practice your story seems to illustrate just how difficult a
problem this is. You have hurt these people to the bottom of their hearts. Do you
think that the problems in these neighbourhoods, which I do recognize – again –
will be solved in any way, or even partially, by your speech or your characteriza-
tions? It will lead to a hardening of the divisions, causing people to become even
more radicalized under the influence of your words.
(12) Mr. Wilders (pvv):
De bedoeling is dat mensen na gaan denken en dat ook moslims na gaan denken.
Verdorie, wat is dat met die Koran? Klopt dat inderdaad? Wat staat erin? Wat wordt
er gezegd? Hoe gaan wij daarmee om? Het heeft zeker effect als u en anderen mijn
voorstel zouden steunen om de Koran te verbieden en te zeggen dat er allerlei ver-
schrikkelijke dingen in staan. Ik weet zeker dat de heer De Wit die ook af-
schuwelijk vindt. Dat moet gewoon niet meer bespreekbaar zijn als het woord van
God en als iets wat men dus moet gaan doen; oproepen tot moord, aanzetten tot
haat. Als je daarvoor strijd[t] en daarvoor je best doet, kan dat toch alleen maar een
positief effect hebben? Mocht dat niet zo zijn, dan toont dat eens te meer aan
hoezeer sommige mensen daar niet deugen.
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The purpose is that people are going to think and that Muslims as well are going to
think: Darn it, what is it with the Koran? Does it make sense? What’s in it? What’s
being said in it? How do we deal with it? It would definitely help if you and others
would support my proposal to ban the Koran and assert that horrible things are
said in it. I am quite sure that Mr. De Wit finds these things awful too. So these
things should not be open to discussion as if they were the word of God and as pos-
sible incentives for action, calling for murder, inciting hatred. If one fights against
these things, and does one’s best, this can only have a very positive effect. If this
weren’t the case, then it shows once again the extent to which people there are in
the wrong.
(13) Mr. De Wit (sp):
U weet dat u te maken hebt met een grote groep van mensen die juist aan het radi-
caliseren zijn en die ook door dit soort toespraken van u nog verder aangezet wor-
den om een verkeerde weg te volgen. Dat zou tot nadenken moeten stemmen over
de toon die u aanslaat in het debat en over de manier waarop u iedereen kwali-
ficeert.
You know that you are also dealing with a large group of people who are turning to
radicalism and who will be incited by this type of speech to follow the wrong
course. That should make you reflect on the tone that you use in debate and on the
way that you characterize everyone.
(14) Mr. Wilders (pvv):
Voorzitter. Ik heb een fantastische toon, dus ik ga daar niets aan veranderen.
Speaker, I do have a fantastic tone, so I will do nothing to alter it.
From Mr. Wilder’s quotations, it is clear that he is making use of discussion
strategies such as3: (a) putting pressure on an opponent by threatening sanctions,
3 In the Pragma-Dialectical Argumentation Theory these discussion strategies are analyzed
as potentially fallacious; see Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, pp. 107-217) for an
overview of these types of discussion strategies. See Tonnard (2009) for a pragma-dialectical
analysis of some of the discussion strategies used by Mr. Wilders.
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see especially excerpt (1); (b) attacking the other party in the debate directly and
personally, see excerpts (1), (3) and (5); (c) distorting the other party’s standpoint
by taking utterances out of context, oversimplification or exaggeration, see ex-
cerpts (1) and (10); (d) presenting a premise as self-evident, see especially ex-
cerpts (3) and (12); (e) parading one’s own qualities, see excerpts (3), (10) and
(14); (f ) polarising the difference of opinion, see especially, of course, excerpt (1)
although this strategy is employed in almost all the quoted contributions that
Mr. Wilders made to this debate.
It is not only his abundant use of these discussion strategies which is
remarkable, but it is the way Mr. Wilders puts his message into words that at-
tracts such attention. He often, for example, uses verbs, nouns, adjectives and
adverbs which denote an endpoint on a semantic scale: going crackers, betray,
terrible, to oppose, excerpt (1); simply, the truth, are fed up, to be closed, finally,
excerpt (3); as simple as that, excerpt (7); very many, had enough, racists, beaten
up, the anger, excerpt (10); horrible, quite sure, awful, fight, very positive, excerpt
(12); fantastic, excerpt (14). In this sense Mr. Wilders often makes use of hy-
perbole, especially when he wants to amplify the danger of the Islamization
of Dutch society and the lax attitude of the political elite in the face of it.
Using all kinds of parallelisms and figures of repetition, which give his con-
tributions to the debate a clear structure, is also characteristic of Mr. Wilders’
speeches, see excerpts (1), (3), (10) and (12), as is his use of exclamation, see
excerpts (1) and (3).4
The way in which Mr. Slob, Mr. van der Staaij and Mr. de Wit react to
the statements of Mr Wilders in this sub-discussion makes clear that they con-
sider his way of debating to be at odds with the norms and conventions which
hold for Dutch parliamentary debate in general. In large part, their critique
seems to address his purposive use of discussion strategies and rhetorical tech-
niques. But then one could ask: what norms and conventions do they believe
are being violated in the specific context of Dutch parliamentary debate?
18.3 Parliamentary debate as a communicative activity type
The framework adopted here, the Extended Pragma-Dialectical Argumenta-
tion Theory (see Van Eemeren 2010), assumes that people who are engaged
in argumentative discourse are maneuvering strategically. ‘Strategic maneu-
4 See Kuitenbrouwer (2010) and Van Leeuwen (2009) for specific analyses of Mr. Wilders’
language-use in political debates.
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vering’ refers to the efforts that arguers make in argumentative discourse to
reconcile rhetorical effectiveness with the maintenance of dialectical stan-
dards of reasonableness. To prevent one objective from prevailing over an-
other, the parties try to strike a balance between them at every stage of
resolving their differences of opinion. Strategic maneuvering manifests itself
in argumentative discourse in: (a) the choices that are made from the topical
potential available at a certain stage in the discourse; (b) the audience-di-
rected framing of argumentative moves; and (c) the purposive use of presen-
tational devices. Although these three aspects of strategic manoeuvring can be
distinguished analytically, in actual argumentative practice they will usually
be hard to disentangle (Van Eemeren 2010, pp. 93-127).
In this chapter, it is assumed that, in most cases, a parliamentary de-
bate is an example of an argumentative discourse, and that the members of
parliament who are engaged in such a debate are maneuvering strategically.
In this sense then, in the sub-discussion described above, we could say that
the critique of the statements made by Mr. Wilders which Mr. Slob, Mr. Van
der Staaij and Mr. De Wit put forward, seems to address a lot of the choices
which Mr Wilders makes from the topical potential and his audience-directed
framing of argumentative moves but, most of all, they address his (purpo-
sive) use of presentational devices. According to these critics, the strategic
choices that Mr. Wilders makes in his contributions to the debate are not ad-
missible. 
As Van Eemeren (2010) points out, in practice, argumentative discourse
takes place in different kinds of communicative activity types which are, to a
greater or lesser degree, institutionalized so that certain practices have be-
come conventionalized. The concept ‘communicative activity type’ is in-
tended to contribute to a better grasp of argumentative reality in the analysis
of argumentative discourse. In the various communicative activity types that
can be distinguished in argumentative practice, the conventional precondi-
tions for argumentative discourse differ to some extent, and these differences
have an effect on the strategic maneuvering that is admissible.
So, in order to answer the question: What strategic choices are admissi-
ble in a debate in Dutch parliament? it is necessary to determine what the char-
acteristics of this specific communicative activity are. To do that, we will first
have to discover what the specific institutional goal, or goals, of a parlia-
mentary debate are. This specific institutional goal affects the participant’s
pursuit of both dialectical and rhetorical aims in a communicative activity
[  3 5 9 ]
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type by imposing constraints but also by providing opportunities for them to
be effective – to win the discussion – while maintaining certain standards of
reasonableness (see Mohammed 2008).
Crucial to the characterization of Dutch parliamentary debate as a
communicative activity type, is the concept of representative or indirect democ-
racy, a form of government in which the population chooses representatives
to execute political ideas. The aim of indirect democracy is to achieve com-
promises between several civil groups which have opposing interests. In this
system, the majority will be able to impose its views, but not without taking
good care of the interests of the minorities. It is generally assumed in politi-
cal theory that (free) representation consists of two layers: one of them being
the representative’s responsibility or autonomy, the other the formulation of
problems which exist in society. In this sense, a parliament of representatives
can be characterized in one way as an organization with rules and rituals
which enable its members to formulate civil questions in a way which is ac-
ceptable to the public and, in another way, as a public discussion arena which
opens up opportunities for engaging with the public and bridging the gap be-
tween themselves and the voters (Te Velde 2003, p. 18). This involves repre-
sentatives having to keep a balance between their independence (but not
isolation), and their focus on the public (but not surrendering to them) (Te
Velde 2003, p. 28). This duality inherent in representation affects the insti-
tutional goals of parliamentary debate in a representative democracy: such a
debate does not only strive to reach decisions independently within the pre-
vailing rules and procedures, an aim that is connected with the autonomous
position of the representative, but it also strives to give an account to the pub-
lic, to legitimize politics and formulate the civil or societal problems which
deserve political priority, goals which are linked to the representative’s rela-
tionship with the public or the voters (Te Velde 2003, pp. 26-27), see (15).
(15) Institutional goals of parliamentary debate:
(a) reaching decisions within the prevailing rules and procedures (the goal 
connected to the autonomous position of the representative);
(b) being accountable to the public, legitimizing politics, formulating and select-
ing civil problems which deserve political priority (the goals connected to the 
representative’s relationship with society or voters).
[  3 6 0 ]
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Following the sociological analysis of the political field completed by the
French sociologist Bourdieu (1991), one could say that a representative plays
a “double game”: the representative is simultaneously playing a game against
the government or his fellow representatives in the political field of the par-
liament, and a game in which he represents his electorate in the social field.
Developing this line of reasoning a little further, one could argue that the du-
alistic institutional goal of parliamentary debate in a representative democ-
racy, and the ensuing role and task of a representative, means that when he
is participating in such a debate, he will always have to deal with two audi-
ences at the same time: parliament, which he is a part of himself, and soci-
ety, which he represents. It may be assumed that this duality is reflected in the
strategic design of his argumentative moves – that is: in the choices he makes
from the topical potential, in his audience-directed framing of argumentative
moves, and in his purposive use of presentational devices.5
Following this line of reasoning, one might say that, in a parliamentary
debate, the orientation to reaching a decision, goal (15a), represents the di-
alectical aspect of the debate, while the orientation to society, goal (15b), rep-
resents the rhetorical aspect of the debate. If one looks at it this way, strategic
manoeuvring in the context of a parliamentary debate boils down to keeping
a balance between one’s independence, on the one hand, and one’s focus on
the public, on the other. A representative who focuses too much on his rela-
tionship with society or his voters, goal (15b), in his contribution to a parlia-
mentary debate risks losing sight of his role in parliament and, concomitantly,
the reasonableness of the debate, while a representative who is fully focused
on achieving results with his fellow representatives in a parliamentary debate,
risks committing a rhetorical blunder. 
This approach, however, as an analysis of parliamentary debate seems
to me to be too simple; it considers the discussion with fellow representatives
as too dialectical, and the one with society as too rhetorical. What would be
more in the spirit of the theory of strategic manoeuvring, so it seems to me,
5 In the literature about political language in general, it is usually assumed that a politician
is always dealing with a complex audience (see, e.g., Zarefsky 2008). What is meant by this
is that the public targeted by the politician is very heterogeneous in their social and reli-
gious opinions, value systems, social status, level of education, etcetera. That is not the sort
of heterogeneity that I have in mind here but, rather, two functionally distinct types of pub-
lic, each of which can be of a very heterogeneous composition.
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would be an approach in which a representative, in the strategic design of his
argumentative moves, has to take the requirements of reasonableness as well
as considerations of effectiveness into account, both as regards his orienta-
tion to his fellow representatives and in his orientation to society and his vot-
ers. Or, to borrow from Bourdieu’s game terminology: in both games which
the representative is playing, he must try to maintain the balance between
the effectiveness and reasonableness of his argumentative moves.6
This line of reasoning implies that a participant in a parliamentary de-
bate has to maneuver strategically in a more complex way than a participant
does in most of the other communicative activity types; he should not only
make efforts to reconcile his aim for rhetorical effectiveness while maintain-
ing dialectical standards of reasonableness in each game he has to play, but he
should also perform this, given the functional complexity of his public, while
sharply observing his own double task and role, the latter being perceived as
a specific constraint within this communicative activity type. In principle
then, a representative can lose his balance in a contribution to a debate in
two possible ways: he can disturb the balance between the dialectical stan-
dards of reasonableness and the rhetorical effectiveness, and the balance be-
tween his independence and his public focus in either game. This means that
parliamentary debate contributions, in general, can derail in a more complex
way than contributions to another kind of communicative activity type.7
18.4 Dutch parliamentary culture
The general characterization of parliamentary debate as a communicative
activity type in a representative democracy given in the preceding section,
6 In a very interesting paper on ‘Legitimation and Strategic Maneuvering in the Political
Field’ Ietcu-Fairclough relates the theory of Bourdieu to the theory about strategic maneu-
vering. According to her, there is a “homology” between the two games of Bourdieu, in the
sense that a (un)successful move in one game is also a (un)successful move in the other
game. For example: if a politician allows himself to be discredited by a political opponent,
he is at the same time doing a disservice to his own electorate (Ietcu-Fairclough 2008, p.
411). I am not sure that this homology always holds, but it is a thought which is worthy of
further research, in my opinion.
7 Because the purpose of this chapter is to give a general characterization of parliamentary de-
bate, I am abstracting here from the differences which exist between various types of parlia-
mentary debate. But such differences should be investigated in any further research, of course.
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also applies to the Dutch parliamentary debate, needless to say. And the
sub-discussion between Mr. Wilders and his fellow representatives quoted
above shows that they are well aware of the dual institutional goals of par-
liamentary debate described under (15) and of the constraints on parlia-
mentary argumentative discourse that are associated with them. The core of
the reproach made against Mr. Wilders seems to be that his strategic choices
in parliamentary debates, in general, have negative consequences for soci-
ety as a whole. In this line of reasoning, stating that Minister Vogelaar is
going crackers, for example, is not only a personal attack on an opponent
in a specific speech event, but it is also an attack on the wellbeing of soci-
ety as a whole.8 According to his fellow representatives, by using this lan-
guage, Mr. Wilders threatens the parliamentary goal of arriving at socially
acceptable solutions and the goal of achieving stability in society. This be-
comes clear, in particular, in the following contributions to the sub-discus-
sion referred to above.
(2) Mr. Slob (cu):
You are talking about values and norms. You want to lead a debate and start off in a
very acute manner. That is your right. It is our duty as representatives to do this,
but when we do it, we are supposed to show respect for others. We should always
strive for goodness and peace in society, as well as in our mutual relationships. It is
in this respect that I consider it very inappropriate of you “to contest the intellec-
tual capacities of the minister”, instead of discussing the contents with her. This ap-
plies to everything you say to Islamic people as well. You do sometimes point out
sensitive issues. One may do this, but one always has to make sure that we keep
Dutch society together in all its diversity. We ought to strive for the good things for
society. These are the values and norms. This is what I want you to account for.
The way you operate, the way you relate to colleagues – you call us cowards – and
your attitude to society, only results in division. This is overshooting the goal.
(9) Mr. De Wit (sp):
What does Mr. Wilders think the effect of his speech on society will be?
Like me, he is concerned by the divisions affecting ordinary neighbourhoods and
8 See Plug (2010) on ad hominem argument in parliamentary debates in general.
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districts which we are all familiar with. What is the effect of his speech and the
characterizations he uses when he addresses Islam?
(11) Mr. De Wit (sp):
I recognize the problem that you outline, I said so just now, but I am concerned
about the effect of your speech and the way that you characterize Islam and all the
people who follow this religion. You do make a distinction between moderate and
not-moderate, but in practice your story seems to illustrate just how difficult a
problem this is. You have hurt these people to the bottom of their hearts. Do you
think that the problems in these neighbourhoods, which I do recognize – again –
will be solved in any way, or even partially, by your speech or your characteriza-
tions? It will lead to a hardening of the divisions, causing people to become even
more radicalized under the influence of your words.
(13) Mr. De Wit (sp):
You know that you are also dealing with a large group of people who are turning to
radicalism and who will be incited by this type of speech to follow the wrong
course. That should make you reflect on the tone that you use in debate and on the
way that you characterize everyone.
According to his fellow representatives, Mr. Wilders’ contributions to the de-
bate are not admissible because they endanger both the objectives of a par-
liamentary debate and violate the constraints which are associated with them.9
In this sense, excerpts (2), (9), (11) and (13) seem to support the general char-
acterization of parliamentary debate as a communicative activity type in a
representative democracy, as described above.
But these excerpts also give us an insight into the opinion within the
dominant Dutch political culture about how parliamentary debate should be
conducted, that is, as a reasoned and temperate discussion, as that is also best
for society. This opinion about parliamentary debate dates back to the 19th
century – as shown by Te Velde (2010, pp. 97-121) – and essentially has not
changed since. Te Velde writes: 
9 Note that this view seems to agree strongly with the idea of homology developed by
Ietcu-Fairclough (2008), see Footnote 6. 
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Generally, Dutch parliaments had little regard for attempts to impress the members
by emotional or grandiloquent language. Many of the orators who were held in
high esteem in Great Britain or France would not have made much of an impres-
sion in the Dutch Lower Chamber. There, what counted (...) was the force of legal
arguments and authority based on restrained superiority. When great orators made
their appearance in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, it was not in the
houses of parliament but at party assemblies held in meeting halls or in the open
air. A phenomenon such as William Gladstone, who could captivate the public in
Great Britain at mass meetings, as well as in the House of Commons, was unthink-
able in the Netherlands. The Lower Chamber of Parliament was a place for doing
business, preferably with a minimum of fuss. This attitude continued in the twenti-
eth century. (Te Velde 2010, p. 108 [translation TvH]) 
In Dutch political culture, the emphasis in parliamentary debate on argu-
mentation and persuasion rather than rhetorical effectiveness is, therefore,
based on a preference for pragmatism, but Te Velde (2010, pp. 111-112) points
out that other cultural factors also play a role. In the 19th century this was,
above all, decency: one ought to conduct oneself with restraint and politeness
in debate. During the Interbellum period, when communists and national so-
cialists made their appearance in parliament and wanted to make propaganda
for their causes by behaving raucously and over-stepping the rules, an overly
rhetorical presentation was considered to be anti-parliamentary and uncivi-
lized and, after the Second World War, it was particularly associated with
having an undemocratic attitude. For this reason, making an overly rhetori-
cal presentation was usually taboo. The underlying idea was that it was in-
compatible with the dignity of parliament. The importance attached to the
dignity of parliament within the dominant political culture, therefore, also de-
termines to a large extent the way in which a representative is supposed to ma-
neuver strategically within a Dutch parliamentary debate.10
It is clear from the case study that Mr. Wilders and his fellow-repre-
sentatives have a difference of opinion about how the two games should be
played. According to the dominant norms, a moderate discussion in parlia-
ment is best if one wants to achieve the two objectives of a parliamentary de-
bate, whereas Mr. Wilders seeks polarization, both in parliament and society.
10 We also see this in the case study, in particular, in the contribution of Mr. Van der Staaij
(sgp), see excerpt (4).
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In this sense, Mr. Wilders seems to challenge the dominant debating culture
in Dutch parliament; i.e., the norms and conventions for Dutch parliamen-
tary debate held valid by the majority of the representatives.11
18.5 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, on the basis of a case study, I have characterized Dutch par-
liamentary debate as a culturally determined, specific type of communicative
activity and I have done this in two stages. 
In the first place, I have pointed out the two institutional goals of a par-
liamentary debate in a representative democracy in general: such a debate
does not only attempt to reach decisions independently according to pre-
vailing rules and procedures, an aim which is connected to the autonomous
position of the representative, but it also attempts to give an account to the
public, to legitimize politics and formulate which civil or societal problems
deserve political priority, goals which are linked to the representative’s rela-
tionship to the public or the voters. This involves a participant in a parlia-
mentary debate having to strategically maneuver in a more complex way than
a participant would in most other communicative activity types: a represen-
tative in a parliamentary debate should ideally not only make efforts to rec-
oncile the attempt to be rhetorically effective whilst maintaining dialectical
standards of reasonableness in the two games, but should also perform this,
given the complexity of his public, while keenly observing his own two tasks
and roles.
11 For this majority, however, it is more or less impossible to sanction Mr. Wilders for vio-
lating these norms. Because of a representative’s relationship with his voters and his obliga-
tions to them, it is very difficult to forbid him the choice of his own topics, or his ways of
adapting to his audience or the ways he chooses his words within a parliamentary debate.
The detached way in which the speaker reacts to Mr. Wilders’ argumentative strategies, il-
lustrates this, see the excerpts under (6) and (8) in the main text. The Code of Order of the
Dutch Parliament gives the Speaker the formal authority to interrupt the debate and to
sanction a politician if he or she uses offensive language. But nowadays the Speaker in the
Dutch parliament seldom uses this authority. And – as Plug (2010, p. 313) correctly points
out – from a study of the contributions made to parliamentary debates which were consid-
ered inadmissible by the Speaker over the period 1934-2001 (see Bootsma and Hoetink
2006), it is clear that there are no unambiguous norms indicating what should be consid-
ered offensive or un-parliamentary language.
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In the second place, I have tried to demonstrate that the opinions about
the way in which a parliamentary debate ought to be conducted and, in par-
ticular, what the ideal relationship should be between the argumentative-di-
alectical and the rhetorical-effective strategies in a parliamentary debate is
determined to a high degree by the dominant political culture. Further re-
search has to prove whether this is a fruitful approach for the analysis of
Dutch parliamentary debates and the use of political language.
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19 Talking about Sustainability:
Responses to Frames in Persuasive
Messages about Sustainable
Agriculture and Food
baldwin van gorp and margot van der goot
19.1 Introduction
Sustainability refers to the solution for a range of issues relating to the impact
of human activity on the environment. In 1987, the UN’s World Commission
on the Environment and Development published the report Our Common
Future, also known as the Brundtland Report. Ever since, the notion of ‘sus-
tainable development’ is steadily in use in public speech: sustainable tourism,
sustainable entrepreneurship, sustainable agriculture, etc. The Brundtland
Report defined sustainable development as “development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations
to meet their own needs.” According to Elkington (1997), sustainability is es-
sentially a matter of the present generation striving for a balance between so-
cial justice, economic progress and ecological interests. Almost any stake-
holder, such as policy makers, various industries and interest groups, adheres
to these basic assumptions. However, it remains subject for debate which path
one should take to move towards a sustainable society.
Consequently, the notion of sustainability gives rise to contradictions
and debate. As an example: proponents of organic farming claim that this
way of farming ties in most closely with the notion of sustainability, for in-
stance because all genetically modified organisms (gmos) are banned. On the
other hand, producers of gmos in farming claim that precisely gmos offer
sustainable solutions to current issues in agriculture (e.g., www.monsanto.
com). Thus sustainability is an abstract, complex and even contradictory no-
tion that does not clearly result in one particular type of agriculture or food
production. 
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Because there is no practical link between sustainability and certain ways of
agriculture or food production, stakeholders in the field have room to claim
that particularly their methods are contributing to sustainable development.
Consequently, they need to look for the most effective arguments to com-
municate to their target groups and the general public that their ways of grow-
ing or making food are sustainable. To communicate this conclusion, they
need to select a topos, or line of argument (e.g., Herrick 2005). Rhetoric stud-
ies these argumentative schemes, and how they contribute to the acceptance
of the conclusion. In the present study, we make use of the framing perspec-
tive, because frames could be seen as rhetorical devices that can activate spe-
cific images in the receivers’ minds, increase salience of an argument, or, more
in general, increase the appealing power of a message (Pan and Kosicki 1993). 
Frames can be defined as “organizing principles that are socially shared
and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure
the social world” (Reese 2001, p. 11). We situate frames at the cultural level and
conceptualize frames as a “tool kit” from which people select to communicate
about issues (cf. Gamson 1992; Swidler 1986) and which help people to un-
derstand topics. Simply put, stakeholders can use frames, embedded in a cul-
ture, to communicate about the complex and abstract topic of sustainability
and the audience subsequently responds to these messages based on their own
stock of knowledge. 
In the present chapter, we focus on how citizens respond to persuasive
messages about sustainable food and agriculture. Because sustainability is a so-
cial construction we opt for a research design that allows for social interaction
and debate. In an earlier study (Van Gorp and Van der Goot 2009), we de-
scribed frames that stakeholders in the farming and food industry use to com-
municate about sustainability. In the current study we asked the audience
how they perceive such messages, in order to gain insight in how these frames
work in communicating such complex topics to the general public. 
19.2 Framing and the construction of reality
19.2.1 How framing works
The theoretical approach we use is framing from a constructionist perspec-
tive, because especially the constructionist school of thought within fram-
ing research devotes attention to how frames can contribute to defining a
given situation (Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Van Gorp 2007; for an
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overview of approaches see D’Angelo 2002). Social constructionism deals
with the interactive process in which individuals and groups actively con-
struct social reality by means of a variety of information sources, such as
the mass media (Neuman, Just and Crigler 1992; Price, Nir and Cappella
2005; Wicks 2005). 
Bateson (1955, 1972) was the first to argue that each frame functions
as a meta-communicative message that guides the audience interpretation of
a message to a particular definition of a situation. Consequently, frames are
underlying meaning structures in communications that imply to the receiver
how the message possibly could be understood. The main functions of fram-
ing are defining problems, diagnosing causes and consequences, making
moral judgments and suggesting solutions (Entman 1993). This line of rea-
soning, however, does not need to be explicitly included in a message. One
of the main assumptions of framing theory is that the receivers come up with
a chain of causal inferences when they follow the suggestion to make an as-
sociation between the discussion at hand and the applied frame. 
The specificity of the approach applied here is the perceived location
of frames, that is, at the macro level. Each culture possesses a repertoire of pos-
sible frames for its members to use in attributing meaning to the various
events and issues with which they are confronted. When an author ‘frames’
a message, the topic discussed is connected with a notion that is already pres-
ent within the culture and hence is familiar to its members. In order to em-
phasize the dynamics unfolding between culturally embedded frames and
individual cognitive constructs, frames are considered to exist beyond people’s
minds, precisely as culture is not just in the individual’s head (cf. Polletta
2004). Mental constructs are individual, specific and subject to constant
change as they are reviewed and adjusted on the basis of experiences and
newly acquired knowledge (Van Gorp 2007). Frames are much more stable,
and perhaps also more persistent, than such individual schemata.
Because culturally embedded frames are ideas the receiver is already fa-
miliar with, they can be easily introduced in communication. In sum, frames
form universally understood codes that implicitly influence the receiver’s mes-
sage interpretation, and lend coherence, meaning and ready explanations for
complex issues. If receivers define and interpret an issue in correspondence
with the preferences of the sender, they follow the preferred meaning (Hall
1980). In the end, however, the framing process is interactive, vulnerable and
in all its phases prone to counter-framing, since the audience actively inter-
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prets messages. That is why frames can have effects that are hard to predict
(Scheufele 1999).
19.2.2 Frame packages 
In framing research, in the constructionist tradition, content analysis is often
conducted to reconstruct the frames that are used in mediated messages (Van
Gorp 2007). As frames constitute a latent meaning structure in a message, an-
alyzing them is not straightforward (Van Gorp 2009). However, by accept-
ing the heuristic principle that a series of manifest variables can represent a
latent concept, it is possible to follow an inductive approach to reconstruct
an inventory of frames. One can start with the analysis of a strategically cho-
sen set of texts, and determine for each text which elements possess persua-
sive power; as formulated in Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric (Garver 1994).
Then, the frame analyst can identify the logical chains of elements across the
separate texts. In accordance with the principle of constant comparison, the
most representative devices can be identified and, finally, integrated in frame
packages that are presented in a frame matrix. Therefore, the main result of
an inductive framing analysis is an overview of frame packages (cf. Gamson
and Modigliani 1992; Gamson and Lasch 1983; Van den Bulck, Simons and
Van Gorp 2008; Van Gorp 2005). 
Each frame package is an integrated structure of a core frame, framing
devices, and reasoning devices. The core frame is the implicit cultural phe-
nomenon that defines the package as a whole. The framing devices are man-
ifest elements in a message that form the rhetorical structure of the message,
such as lexical choices, catchphrases, depictions, figures of speech, and visual
images (Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Kitzinger 2007; Pan and Kosicki 1993,
pp. 61-62; Plett 2001; Tankard 2001). As such, the framing devices function
as the demonstrable indicators of the frame. Reasoning devices on the other
hand refer to the frame’s capacity to define issues. They form a route of causal
reasoning which may be evoked when, in this case, food production and con-
sumption are associated with a particular culturally embedded frame. The
most important difference between framing devices and reasoning devices is
that the reasoning devices do not need to be explicitly included in a mediated
message. During the interpretation of the message, when a mental connec-
tion is made between the message, the cultural frame, and individual
schemata, the receiver may come up with causal inferences that are in line
with the reasoning devices.
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19.3 Communicating about sustainable agriculture and food
In an earlier study (Van Gorp and Van der Goot 2009) we conducted an in-
ductive framing analysis to investigate which frames principal stakeholders use
in their public communications about sustainable food and agriculture. We
analyzed a diverse sample of communications (n=578) including advertize-
ments, and brochures of farming federations, the food industry, consumer
organizations and interest groups in Flanders and French-speaking Belgium.
The analysis resulted in an inventory of six frame packages, each with a core
frame, the framing devices and the reasoning devices. In that study we also
analyzed the relations between the frames. Here we only briefly summarize
the six frames in order to provide background information for the reception
study as presented in this chapter.
Responsibility. The first frame ties in with the notion of legacy (Frame-
works Institute, 2009) and the value that humans are responsible for chil-
dren, and finally for all living creatures on earth. The prominent framing
devices are vulnerability and accountability. Children, who represent future
generations, are vulnerable, while their parents, representing the present gen-
eration, are accountable. Social justice towards those future generations is the
central reasoning device.
Undermining-of-foundations. The second frame relies on the metaphor
of supporting walls that are gradually destabilized (Aubrun and Grady 2006;
Jaspaert, Geeraerts and Feyaerts 2008). The effectiveness of the frame relies
on the image of the structural soundness of a building being undermined, so
that it is in danger of collapsing. It suggests that the underlying structure of
the global ecosystem is gradually and stealthily being compromised. Textual
framing devices are “(delicate) balance”, “foundations”, “base” and any ex-
pression of the “intricate relationships” within the ecosystem.
Frankenstein. The third frame stresses the urgency of sustainable food
production, even more so than in the undermining-of-foundations frame,
making ample use of superlatives. There obviously is the link with the story
of Doctor Frankenstein, whose creature turned out to be an uncontrollable,
unwieldy abomination. This frame has many variants, all of which have in
common that they refer to a series of related narratives that are generally
founded on (the Christian) faith, such as Judgment Day, the Apocalypse or
Doomsday. Characteristic for this frame is that messages in which the frame
has been applied contain direct references to the underlying narratives, for in-
stance “Frankenfood”. The vocabulary refers to “risks”, “pollution”, “poison-
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ing” and “contamination” on the one hand and to irreversibility on the other:
“the fences are down”, “there is no way back” or “the snowball is rolling” (De
Morgen, 8 April 2005). 
Natural goodness. A dominant frame in the material studied is con-
structed around the myth that nature is inherently good. Natural products are
attributed exceptional properties: they are by definition good for you, they
taste better, and they are pure and authentic. By contrast, anything produced
by humans is presented as artificial and therefore lacking these essential qual-
ities. The apparent relationship between “biological” and “logical” and be-
tween “nature” and “naturally” are conducive to puns that suggest that the
choice for organic is self-evident. 
Progress. The myth of progress provides a fifth frame for communicat-
ing about sustainable agriculture and food. The underlying notion is that the
constant quest for technological and scientific progress in food production
must on no account be impeded. While the Frankenstein frame assumes un-
controlled scientific progress will inevitably result in the demise of hu-
mankind, the myth of progress suggests that life on Earth has a purpose,
namely to strive for the ultimate good through modernization and progress
(Troester Nunez 2008). 
The Good Mother. The archetype of the feeding and caring mother sug-
gests that the young child should be grateful for the food that its mother un-
selfishly provides, which is seen as a sign of love, sacrifice and service (Aubrun,
Brown and Grady 2006; Lule 2005). This sixth frame is the most ambiguous
of all. On the one hand, the frame is combinable with the natural goodness
frame: “Mother Earth” and “Mother Nature” are well-established mythical
symbols of fertility and creative force. On the other hand, the frame can also
be used to argue that sustainable food production is unnecessary, because
food is available in the stores in unlimited supplies and in an unprecedented
range of varieties. In this case, stores and shopping malls are presented as
good mothers that feed their children. The public is then addressed as con-
sumers who should be thankful, whereas in most of the other frames the re-
ceivers are addressed as responsible citizens. 
In order to explore how these frames work, we studied how the gen-
eral audience responds to these frames. Therefore the research question in
the present chapter is: How do citizens respond to and appreciate messages
that use these six frames to communicate about sustainable food and agri-
culture? 
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19.4 Method
We conducted four focus groups, because focus groups are useful for stimu-
lating new ideas and learning about how respondents talk about the phe-
nomenon of interest. Moreover, the open response format of a focus group
provides an opportunity to obtain large and rich amounts of data in respon-
dents’ own words (Stewart, Shamdasani and Rook 2007, pp. 41-42). Two
focus groups were held in Flanders and two in French-speaking Belgium, be-
cause cultural differences may play a part in people’s responses to messages
about sustainability. Stakeholders in the French-speaking part of Belgium
tend to argue more in favor of organic food and against genetically modified
organisms than stakeholders in Flanders (Van Gorp and Van der Goot 2009).
Also, two groups consisted of persons from the lower middle-class (8 men
and 8 women; average age = 36) and two groups contained persons from the
higher middle-class (7 men and 8 women; average age = 38), because social
class may influence how people respond to a complex and abstract issue such
as sustainable agriculture. Each focus group was composed of seven or eight
unrelated people that were selected on the basis of sex, age, place of residents
and profession. Each group discussion lasted two hours.
Central in the group discussions were six texts that we constructed to
represent as clearly as possible the six frames that we had found in our in-
ductive frame analysis (table 19.1). Each text consisted of about 125 words,
divided in a few paragraphs without a title or image, and was printed on a
plain white page. Because many studies demonstrated that ethos, the receiver’s
assessment of the moral character and competence of the source of commu-
nication, has a significant effect upon the persuasiveness of messages (e.g.,
McCroskey 2006; O’Keefe 2002), we decided not to mention explicitly who
the source of the arguments was. Prior to the actual focus groups, six lay-per-
sons and nine experts were asked to respond to the six texts in order to en-
sure the texts were as understandable and as univocal as possible.
After a short introductory round, each group discussion started with
the moderator reading the first text out loud and participants were invited to
read the text on paper at the same time. They were asked to write down their
thoughts individually and to indicate on five-point scales how understandable
they thought the text was and the extent to which they agreed with the text.
The group discussion started with open-ended questions; participants were
asked about their reactions to the text. After that, the group read the text sen-
tence by sentence in order to invoke even more remarks. Participants were en-
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couraged to express spontaneous reactions, to talk about their experiences,
and to discuss the issues with each other. In this manner the six texts were dis-
cussed, in every group in the same order. At the end of the sessions, partici-
pants were asked to rank the six texts in terms of their persuasiveness. 
We conducted the analysis on the basis of the transcripts, the video
recordings of the discussions, and the individual rankings. We derived guide-
lines for the analysis from methodological literature on qualitative analysis
table 19.1  summary of the six texts used in the focus groups
Frame Problem definition Cause Solution
1. Frankenstein Malpractices in Humans acting Looking for alterna-
agriculture and the as God tives for practices 
food industry lead such as gmos and 
the world to doom hormone injections
2. Responsibility Current generations Human beings Producing food while 
pass on problems to see the earth as taking responsibility
future generations their property for future generations
3. The Good Mother Biological food is Limited spending Going to super-
only affordable for a power of average markets that provide
imited part of the consumer a rich supply of 
population and there affordable products
is not enough for
everyone
4. Undermining of The fragile eco- There is a mosaic Avoiding practices
foundations system is about of problems, such that disturb the 
to collapse as the intensive use ecological equilibrium
of pesticides, that
harms the eco-system
5. Natural goodness Large-scale and Humans lost their Respecting nature,
intensive forms of connection with consuming local
agriculture are harm- nature and seasonal products
ful for nature
6. Progress It is ridiculous to There are ever more Believing in scientific
slow down scientific mouths to be fed progress, because it
progress helps to produce
more and better food
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(e.g., Charmaz 2006; Strauss and Corbin 1998). Next, we conducted open cod-
ing (Strauss and Corbin 1998) or initial coding (Charmaz 2006), which means
that we read the transcripts line-by-line, being open to respondents’ interpre-
tations, and making notes about our observations. We focused on what was
salient in how the participants responded to the texts, and on what this said
about the six frames, in order to identify the underlying mechanisms that offer
insight into how framed messages are conceived in an interactive context. 
19.5 Findings
19.5.1 Simplification 
The first of five findings is that frames are useful as simplifying models. The
focus groups suggest that the use of frames helped to make the complex issue
of sustainable agriculture and food simpler and better understandable. Ear-
lier focus groups around these themes were held in 2005, and there it turned
out that especially the group discussion with people from the lower middle
class was extremely difficult (King Baudouin Foundation 2005, p. 6). There
were long silences, and the moderator had to probe intensively in order to get
useful answers. In the current focus groups on the other hand, there were no
long silences and the answers came easily. The group discussions were lively,
and a large share of the participants turned out to be interested in the topic.
The frames stimulated the discussion because they connected the topic with
images and values that participants were familiar with. For instance, the par-
ticipants understood the notions of the monster of Frankenstein (text 1) or re-
sponsibility for children and grandchildren (text 2). Thus the frames provided
images that people recognized and that made it possible for them to talk
about this topic; the frames enabled dialogue and debate. 
With respect to the mechanism of simplification it is also relevant to
note that the participants saw the texts as understandable. They gave scores
from 4.2 to 4.6 on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 = absolutely not understandable, 5 = ab-
solutely understandable). Only a few times the discussion showed that certain
terms, such as ‘intensive agriculture’, were misunderstood. In the four groups,
there was one person who indicated that she was not interested in the topic
and that she did not understand notions such as ‘sustainability’ and ‘ecosys-
tem’. In other words, the inherent complexity and the abstract character of
the notion of sustainability imply that also the use of simplifying models is
not sufficient to make to the topic understandable for everyone. 
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Although the use of frames as simplifying models turned out to be use-
ful, some respondents thought it went too far to reduce a complex topic to
such simplified images. 
They warned of oversimplification. They did not appreciate certain
texts, because they saw them as too one-sided and simplistic. In other words,
a danger of using a frame as a simplifying model is that it is conceived as a
biased portrayal of a more complex issue, as illustrated in the next discussion
of the text with the Frankenstein frame (taken from the higher middle class
group in the French-speaking part of Belgium): 
“The text is rather childish. It is good for twelve-year–old children, but not for
adults, except when they are not that smart [laughs].” (Participant 6, female, 50
years old, small business owner)
Moderator: “What is the main message?”
“One has to be careful with what they are doing, otherwise the evil will turn against
humanity.” (Participant 3, male, 42 years old, accountant) 
“Well, first you see a man, the creator, and then you recognize Frankenstein’s mon-
ster. So, I think it is like they play in a children’s movie.” (Participant 1, male, 39
years old, photographer)
“[…] It is a little bit simplistic.” (Participant 6)
19.5.2 Figurative analogy
Figurative analogy (e.g., McCroskey 2006) refers to the idea that drawing a
relationship between a complex issue (sustainability in the context of agri-
culture and food) and a culturally shared idea (e.g., Frankenstein) helps to
clarify the meaning of the issue. Once integrated in the vocabulary a newly
constructed term such as “Frankenfood” can immediately evoke a thrilling
doom scenario. 
Interesting is that at first glance the frame and the issue may not be re-
lated. However, one aspect that connects the frame with the issue can be suf-
ficient to suggest that many more aspects are alike. For instance, most people
agree that Dr. Frankenstein and the scientist involved in genetic engineering
have in common that they try to create new forms of life. By making this as-
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sociation, more connections are suggested, such as that when scientists start
to play God, bad things will happen. 
The focus groups showed that figurative analogy helped the partici-
pants to incorporate the frames into their vocabulary and to use them to ex-
press their point of view. We saw that some respondents used framing devices
that were presented in earlier texts later on during the discussion of other
texts. Other participants, however, experienced difficulties in seeing the fig-
urative analogies. An example comes from a metaphor we included in one of
the texts: the metaphor of a “mosaic of related problems that slowly destroy
the foundations of the complex ecological structure” (text 4). Some partici-
pants were immediately able to use the image of a mosaic, whereas others did
not find it a useful image in the beginning. This following fragment was part
of the discussion of text 4, in the lower middle class group in Flanders, and
illustrates the inability to work with the metaphor:
“I find the text rather negative and dramatic. Yeah, such big words. ‘A mosaic of 
related problems,’ what does that mean? I have mosaic tiles in my bathroom; that is
my mosaic. ‘A mosaic of related problems’ and the text indeed points the finger
very negatively at citizens, but I think that we all, at this table, understand that it is
the people in Brussels who have to decide. I think they have to search for solutions
that the people are satisfied with as well. The text presents it as if it is our fault and
that those people in Brussels are innocent.” (Participant 8, male, 30 years old, po-
liceman) 
Although this participant was not able to work with the metaphor of a mo-
saic, another participant in the same group used that notion later when dis-
cussing the text about progress (text 6). This fragment illustrates how
simplifying models work. First, a certain image has to become part of the dis-
course regarding sustainable agriculture, and when it has acquired a shared
meaning for the participants, they can use it to clarify their own points of
view in the discussion: 
“It seems, especially in the third paragraph, that we all need to contribute. But not
as individuals, because that would not work out. It seems useless if you want to do
something about it as an individual, but the point of a mosaic is that it works when
everybody does their part.” (Participant 4, female, 39 years old, worker) 
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19.5.3 Causation 
A next step in the potential persuasiveness of frames is that the figurative
analogy between, on the one hand, the issue of agriculture and food produc-
tion and, on the other hand, the frame as a simplifying model leads to a causal
relation which is specific for the applied frame. When frames are used, only
some reasoning devices are explicit. The idea is that the receiver of the mes-
sage completes this line of reasoning. For example, when food is connected
to the notion of Frankenstein, the audience is supposed to infer that con-
suming such food can have disastrous consequences.
The focus groups indicated that frames stimulated thoughts about re-
lations, in some cases causal ones, and contributed to a better understanding
of the mutual relations within an ecosystem. An excerpt from the discussion
(in the lower middle class group in Flanders) following the text about progress
(text 6) shows how a participant points at the consequences of certain ac-
tions. It seems plausible that this participant would not have pointed specif-
ically at the consequences, if she had not discussed the other five texts
beforehand. 
“It does not take into account the consequences. Here [in the Western world] we
indeed have food for everybody, but what consequences does it have for our world,
all those chemicals, for example to grow fresh potatoes? I don’t know. That is not
the solution. You always have to take into account the consequences of what you
are doing.” (Participant 7, female, 25 years old, employee) 
For persuasive communication about sustainability, an essential element is
whether individuals hold themselves or somebody else responsible. The focus
groups show two positions on this matter. The first is a fatalistic attitude, in
which case participants claimed that it is impossible for individuals to change
the system. They argued that it is all about money and making profit, and that
the government should help, but neglects to do so. Moreover, they said that
it does not help when individuals in, for example, Belgium take initiatives to
improve the environment, because the actions of countries such as India and
China have much more influence. This stance is visible in the following in-
teraction (in the lower middle class group in Flanders): 
“In Hoboken [in Flanders] there are children with toxic lead in their blood. The
company that caused all this is summoned to get rid of that polluted ground,
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which costs a lot of money, and they start with that. But when you see that in India
for example, they just burn ships, children need to work there, and for dozens of
kilometers that sea is polluted. […] Then I say: Several thousands kilometers from
here they burn anything you can imagine, while here they have to clean the
ground. As long as they do not do anything there, cleaning that ground here does
not make much sense.” (Participant 3, male, 42 years old, clerk)
“When everybody reasons like that, nothing will get better.” (Participant 2, female,
42 years old, worker/decorator)
“Here we need to do the best we can, and over there they have to do the best they
can too.” (Participant 7, female, 25 years old, clerk)
“But well, those people do not have a brain. You can not beat some sense into
them. They are a different type.” (Participant 2)
The second position is a hurt attitude. In this case participants were prepared
to take responsibility, but they felt that someone pointed a finger at them. In-
dividuals can contribute, they said, even it consists of just small things. They
sorted out their garbage, used low-energy light bulbs, looked at where veg-
etables and fruits originated from, but they never heard what the results were
of these small efforts. They thought the texts were too negative, and they
missed a positive note or a perspective of action, particularly regarding their
own efforts. 
19.5.4 Cultural resonance
In order to find out whether some of the defined frames would only be ef-
fective in a specific culture, we made a comparison between the French-speak-
ing and the Dutch-speaking groups, and a comparison between the lower
middle class and the higher middle class group. Yet we did not find any clear
differences between the Dutch-speaking groups and the groups in French-
speaking Belgium. It seemed that the defined frames, such as Frankenstein,
responsibility and progress resonated across the different cultural groups in
the study. There were, however, some differences between the lower and the
higher middle class groups in how they dealt with the frames. 
First, participants from the lower middle class group related the topic
more to personal experiences in their everyday lives. They made a connection
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between the topic and their occupation, family situation, health, travel ex-
periences, etc. They also frequently referred to media content, such as televi-
sion programs and newspaper articles. The constructionist approach to
framing sees this media influence predominantly in terms of the media pro-
viding information, arguments and frames that the audience actively inter-
prets on the basis of their own stock of knowledge. 
Second, the higher middle class group talked about the topic with
more distance, and members of this social stratum were also more capable
of taking the underlying system into account when discussing agriculture
and food. This could be the reason why they saw the undermining of the
foundations frame as more persuasive than the lower class group did. Their
ways of arguing, taking the underlying system into account, also made them
stress that it is important to present both pros and cons. Their discussions
included meta-communication: they discussed how the text was structured
and formulated. By taking a distant approach they were even able to rec-
ognize that certain frames were used in the line of reasoning. For instance,
they tried to assess who the source of the message was. The following cita-
tions, from the higher middle class group in Flanders, show how partici-
pants critically assessed the texts.
“[…] The text [text 1] could be rephrased so it would be less extreme. For instance:
What will happen if men play with nature?” (Participant 8, female, 37 years old, in-
dependent translator)
“One loses sight of one aspect here [in text 4]: One criticizes agriculture and the
way agriculture works, but at the same time we should not forget that there is still
not enough food for everyone. That is not mentioned here, but it is of course the
other side of the coin. To produce a lot of food, which is necessary, we need the up-
to-date techniques. I mean, with cultivating biologically we will not be able to feed
everybody.” (Participant 4, male, 47 years old, middle management)
“[…] It is a fluently written text, but I think it is a bit idyllic and a bit unrealistic.
Someone who argued radically against all these things wrote text 1, and this author
[of text 5] argues radically against organic food.” (Participant 1, male, 26 years old,
middle management pharmaceutical company) 
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19.5.5 Ranking the frames
After the discussion participants were asked to individually rank the six texts
in order of persuasiveness. We present an overview of the ranking, in order
to give an illustration of how the respondents perceived the messages. In these
four focus groups, two texts were seen as most persuasive: the text about the
foundations of the ecosystem (text 4) and the text that refers to the respon-
sibility for children and grandchildren (text 2). The text about the founda-
tions (text 4) was appreciated because it presented a real and complex problem
in a clear way. What participants did not like about this text was that it used
rather difficult terminology, and that its tone was pessimistic. The text that
focused on responsibility for children and grandchildren (text 2) was seen as
persuasive because it presented a tangible and understandable explanation of
what ‘sustainability’ is. A flaw of the text was that some participants who did
make efforts felt that they were accused of not doing anything and they
missed a perspective on what they were supposed to do. Possibly, people with-
out children find a text using this frame less appealing. 
Two texts took a middle position: the text that described that all good
comes from nature (text 5) and the text that presented supermarkets as ulti-
mate Good Mothers (text 3). Strong points of the text about nature were that
it was positively formulated and presented tangible solutions. Participants
also agreed that natural products taste better. However, participants did not
like the woolly language, and they pointed out that nature does not give
enough to provide food for everybody. The text that presented supermarkets
as Good Mothers was appreciated because it came across as a balanced story
that included both positive and negative elements. 
The two texts that were seen as least persuasive were the text about
Frankenstein food (text 1) and especially the one that presented the progress
frame (text 6). Participants saw the text about Frankenstein food as too pes-
simistic and too simplistic. Referring to Frankenstein and to God made the
text less trustworthy. The text seemed to aim to invoke guild and fear, but did
not present solutions. And the text about progress was not seen as persuasive
because it suggested that individuals do not need to do anything, because sci-
ence will solve all problems. 
19.6 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to investigate how citizens respond to persuasive
messages about sustainability. Sustainable agriculture and food production
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present a complex field in which stakeholders need to look for the most ef-
fective arguments to communicate that especially their ways of agriculture
or food production are sustainable. It is of both scholarly and societal inter-
est to study the argumentative schemes used regarding this hotly debated
topic, and we studied this persuasive communication by using framing the-
ory from a constructionist perspective. In a previous study we identified six
frames that are used in communication about sustainable food and agricul-
ture (Van Gorp and Van der Goot 2009), and the current focus group study
helps to identify how these frames contribute to communicating such ab-
stract issue. The analysis leads to four main findings about how frames work
with respect to the issue of sustainability in the agriculture and food system:
simplification, figurative analogy, causation and cultural resonance.
First, frames can reduce a complex, abstract, and probably even chaotic
issue to something simple. In this simplified version of our agricultural and
food system it is easier to draw conclusions that seem logical, natural and ob-
vious. As such, frames are simplifying models (Aubrun, Brown and Grady
2006; Nall, Bales and O’Neil 2008). For instance, the focus groups show that
the use of the monster of Frankenstein makes it simpler to talk about the
issue of genetically modified food. 
Second, framing draws on figurative analogy by making a connection
between a complex issue such as sustainable agriculture and food, and a cul-
turally shared idea. The focus groups show that because of the figurative anal-
ogy a frame indirectly can cause an effect in that receivers pick up a frame as
a simplifying model and use it in the discussion as mental shortcuts. This ob-
servation does not mean that the texts affect the audience in the sense of
changing their attitudes. Our research design was not meant to measure fram-
ing effects. What we saw is that the participants had their opinions, defended
their positions when necessary, and listened to other participants, without
copying these other opinions, and that during this process they adopted the
presented frames in their vocabulary.
Third, focus groups indicate that the framed messages help people to
understand relations within an ecosystem and to stimulate their thoughts
about relations, including causal ones. The frame’s capacity to define and to
suggest causal relations is an important one, because these lines of reasoning
do not have to be included explicitly in a text. It is, however, difficult to pre-
dict whether the individual holds oneself responsible for achieving a more
sustainable society. 
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Fourth, we presume that cultural resonance is the conditio sine qua non
in the framing process as sketched here. The defined frames are imbedded in
a culture and that is why they would resonate with the individual cognitive
schemes. Although cultural differences between the Dutch-speaking and the
French-speaking parts of Belgium may be expected, we did not find differ-
ences between these cultures. There were, however, some differences between
the lower and the higher middle class groups. Participants from the lower
middle class tend to refer more frequently to their private lives, whereas par-
ticipants of the higher middle class discussed the topic with more distance. 
The research design indicates that in framing research it is insightful to
extend an analysis of media content with a reception study. The ‘art’ of fram-
ing is to identify cultural phenomena that are appropriate to get a grip on new
challenges society is confronted with. And although content analysis is help-
ful in identifying the frames that stakeholders use in their communications,
reception research is necessary in order to see how these frames work with an
actual audience. For instance, the focus groups lead to a nuanced view on
how simplifying models work. Although some people point out that simpli-
fying models make a text appear biased and untrustworthy, these models ap-
pear to be useful in making a complex and abstract topic tangible. In
addition, we saw that frames stimulate thinking in terms of relationships and
cause and effect. Moreover, more than a content analysis alone, reception re-
search is able to generate practical recommendations for stakeholders. The
findings about simplification, figurative analogy, causation and cultural res-
onance are useful in that respect. 
All in all, the present focus group study provides a glimpse into how
frames work in communicating about such a debated and chaotic topic as
sustainable agriculture and food. The study, however, has some limitations. 
First, we developed the texts ourselves; they were meant to represent six
persuasive messages each relying on one of the six frames. Logically, the group
discussions did not focus only on the content of the texts, but also on the use
of particular phrases and words. One recommendation for future research is
to deliberately make use of rhetorical insights in constructing the texts. An-
other way of generating material for future reception research is to employ ac-
tual material as developed by the stakeholders, especially material that
includes both verbal and visual information. For example, responses to the
Frankenstein-frame will probably alter when visual fear appeals are included.
Second, we organized only four focus groups. This is sufficient to ob-
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tain some input for theory development about how frames work, but espe-
cially the findings about cultural differences and the ranking should be in-
terpreted with restraint and as only an indication. To gain more insight into
the differences between groups, large-scale research needs to be conducted.
Especially research into cultural differences is promising, because culture is
such a central element in this line of framing research. The current small-
scale study did not show differences between Dutch-speaking and French-
speaking cultures, but other research (Debomy 2005) suggests that there are
profound differences between cultures. For example, inhabitants from East-
ern European countries perceive the economic dimensions of sustainable food
largely from the perspective of keeping traditions and the rural fabric alive,
whereas inhabitants from countries with a culinary tradition such as Belgium,
France and the Mediterranean countries stress the hedonistic and affective
dimension of sustainable food. In sum, both quantitative and qualitative au-
dience research is needed to study how frames resonate differently with peo-
ple from different cultures and different social classes. 
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20 Responding to Expert Arguments
Emerging Lay Topoi in Focus Group
Interviews on gm Crops
anders horsbøl
20.1 Introduction
An important feature of modern societies is the exchange between academic
expert and lay knowledge, the “interface between science and society” as
Horst puts it (Horst 2005, p. 197). Since the equation between scientific de-
velopment and societal progress has been problematized, the exchange be-
tween scientific expertise and everyday knowledge has led to several
controversies. A recent controversy is the debate on genetically modified or-
ganisms (gmo) and their potential use within agriculture. In Europe, in par-
ticular, the introduction of gmo in agriculture has been met with widespread
public scepticism and protest actions from ngos (see Bauer and Gaskell 2002
and Scholderer 2005 for an overview). 
The Eurobarometer study of public opinion in different European
countries concludes that “[t]here is widespread support for medical [...] and
industrial [...] biotechnologies, but apparently significant opposition to agri-
cultural [...] biotechnologies in all but a few countries” (Eurobarometer sur-
vey 244b, 2006). Within studies of consumer behaviour, Scholderer
humorously suggests that “[...] attitudes towards gm foods appear to be utterly
resistant to persuasion. Not a single study reported in the literature has ever
been able to change consumer attitudes through communication” (Scholderer
2005, p. 270). The term “communication” in the above quote refers to medi-
ated communication, not to face-to-face or interpersonal communication.
The current study differs from the above mentioned by being a qualita-
tive study based on focus group interviews. As such, it resembles interview
studies of opinions on gm crops held by laypersons (Myers 2004) or by scien-
tific gm experts (Cook 2004). Furthermore, and in line with Myers’ study, the
object of analysis is not opinions per se, but opinions as they emerge within a
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situation; i.e., “how opinions are generated and negotiated in interaction with
other people” (Myers 2004). It is important to add, however, that the current
study differs from the studies of Myers and Cook by focusing on exchange be-
tween lay and expert knowledge in interpersonal communication, in this case
between biotech experts and laypersons (with respect to biotechnology).
In order to analyse the interpersonal exchange between lay and expert
knowledge, a series of focus group interviews were carried out. Each interview
included two biotech experts and four or five ‘ordinary citizens’ (with respect
to knowledge on biotechnology). The interviews were led by two modera-
tors, drawing on an interview guide. The participants had been chosen ac-
cording to criteria of demographic stratification and had agreed to join a
focus group interview on food in general. Each interview lasted two to two
and a half hours. 
The following analysis will concentrate on two of these interviews and
will focus on one aspect of the interactional dynamic of the discussion;
namely, on the laypersons, responses to (persuasive) utterances from biotech-
nologists, who are mainly in favour of the use of gm crops and argue their case
during the interview. I shall ask how, in the course of the interaction, the lay
participants refer back to and make relevant earlier expert utterances, and
how they reconstruct and respond to the expert talk. Of particular relevance
is the way in which the lay participants try to manage the obvious knowl-
edge gap between them and the experts without restraining from making ar-
gumentative contributions to the discussion. In that sense, the lay responses
are not seen as simply reactive, but as rhetorically inventive contributions in
an already populated argumentative space (Billig 1996). For this aim, I shall
employ the concept of topos and analyse the different topoi which are put
forward by the lay participants as they respond to the (persuasive) utterances
from the biotechnologists. 
Topoi are ‘places’ of arguments, i.e., places from which something can
be argued. A topos may be understood formally as a certain argumentative
form or structure, such as argumentation by definition, contrast, comparison,
causality or authority (which are all listed as general or “koinoi” topoi by Ar-
istotle in his Rhetorics, Aristotle 2007). Or, on a lower level of abstraction, a
topos may be understood materially as the premises on which a concrete ar-
gument is based. Crossing the distinction between formal and material, a
topos may be (rather) field dependent, as in scientific argumentation, or
(rather) common-sensical, as in lay argumentation. In line with the latter
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meaning, a topos may take the form of a commonplace (literally a translation
of the Latin “loci communes”, Cicero 1981), thereby being reduced to a
rhetorical cliché. In all cases, a topos has a certain level of generality, making
it applicable in different concrete situations, a characteristic termed “poten-
tiality” by Bornscheuer (German: “Potentialität”, Bornscheuer 1976, p. 99).
At the same time, the available topoi represent a culturally specific reservoir
of argumentation (ibid. p. 34), in which arguments for specific situations and
problems may be sought (Kienpointer 1997; Gabrielsen 2009). This cultur-
ally specific reservoir is often not harmonious, but “composed of contraries”,
as argued by Billig (Billig 1996, p. 235). 
In the following analysis, I shall take a material approach to the con-
cept of topos and analyze, in the laypersons’ responses, the general principles
according to which controversial gm food issues are ‘located’ argumentatively.
Some of the topoi in the laypersons’ responses are modifications of topoi used
by the experts earlier in the interview, whereas other topoi have not been pre-
viously employed in the interview.
20.2 Analysis
The use of topoi in the laypersons’ responses to expert arguments has been
summed up in table 20.1. For means of clarity, the list is divided into ap-
proaching and distancing responses, where the former leans towards agree-
ment with the expert argument, and the latter leans towards disagreement.
The list points to the diverse and multiple argumentative resources of ‘ordi-
nary citizens’, which is often overlooked in media representations, where em-
phasis tends to be on pronounced views with clear conflicts.
table 20.1  overview of topoi in the lay responses
Approaching responses Distancing responses 
Topos of utility Topos of contrast between impartiality and bias 
Topos of security Topos of (self-) contradiction
Topos of moral necessity Topos of ability 
Topos of contrast between feelings and facts Topos of risk and preciousness 
Topos of personal authority Topos of the natural
In the following, I shall give examples and elaborate on the employed topoi
individually, commenting also on their placement in the interaction and their
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relation to the preceding expert arguments. The analysis starts with the ap-
proaching responses and then moves on to the distancing responses. 
20.2.1 Approaching responses
(1) Topos of utility: Well, I didn’t know very much before, but I have found out in this
focus group that sort of for environmental reasons, it could possibly be an advantage.1
(Speaker 2) 
A reoccurring topos in the focus group interviews is the topos of utility, as
represented in the example above. In this example, the lay speaker explicitly
states her own lack of knowledge prior to the interview, and acknowledges
the contributions by the experts as valid and relevant new knowledge. She
points to the benefit for the common good, in particular the environment,
as a possible advantage of gm foods. This is done in a very low modality
(“could possibly be”), which is a change in ‘tone’ from the expert utterances
to which she is referring. In that sense, the lay speaker does not simply du-
plicate an expert argument, but represents it as a legitimate argument wor-
thy of consideration.
(2) Topos of security and (3) topos of moral necessity: Yes, that he said that it took
place in a closed environment, I hadn’t really thought about that, or that it is being said
that this is the only way to produce superior insulin […]
Interviewer: You mean, what Carsten said about saving human lives?
Yes, exactly. So in that way I am influenced by the things I hear, but I still don’t like it.
(Speaker 22)
Whereas the topos of utility makes the argument for a positive impact of
gm crops, the topos of security makes the argument that a potentially neg-
ative impact of gm crops can be prevented. As such, it is a defensive rhetoric
which counters the topos of risk, which generally has been highly prevalent
in the debate on gm crops. In the example above, the topos of security is not
applied to gm crops as such, but only to gm crops grown under certain cir-
cumstances, more precisely in a “closed environment”. Thus, it is based on a
1 The quotations are all my own translations from Danish into English. They have been
checked and corrected by a speaker with excellent competence in both English and Danish.
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distinction which leaves most uses of gm crops as insecure. This application
of the topos of security had been put forward in passing by one of the biotech
experts earlier in the discussion, and in this passage the lay speaker makes it
relevant as an example of a new distinction which has influenced her during
the discussion. However, she does not represent the new information as lead-
ing to a complete change in her view on gm crops, not even on those gm
crops which can be sealed off. Instead, she represents the new distinction as
putting her in a dilemma where she is influenced by the expert utterance but
still does not like the whole thing. The outcome of that dilemma is not set-
tled in the discussion. 
In the same quoted passage, the lay speaker employs what may be
termed a topos of moral necessity. In referring to an expert utterance about
gmo as “the only way to produce superior insulin”, the speaker indicates that if
a potentially lifesaving process can be achieved only through gmo, it may be
acceptable. As with the topos of security, this application of the topos of moral
necessity represents an exception to the layperson’s general non-acceptance of
gmo. And, similarly, saying that she is influenced by the expert argumenta-
tion does not imply that the lay speaker says she is convinced by it, only that
she finds it worthy of consideration, and apparently has moved from a rather
unitary to a more dilemmatic attitude towards certain forms of gmo.
(4) Topos of facts vs. feelings: It is quite clear that what we get to know, the facts we
get, that is what we just happen to hear when we watch television or read about it. The
facts we get are many times represented in an emotional way [....] And it is the same
with the debate on dairies. Many people buy Hirtshals Milk [small diary in Northern
Jutland] because they want to support the small dairy. But it hasn’t anything to do with
the quality, right, it’s attitude value and sympathy and such things. (Speaker 1)
In the above example, the lay speaker represents the knowledge of the layper-
sons (the first “we”) as accidental, mass media based, and, due to the media
representation, mainly emotional. This is later elaborated and said to be
equivalent with the speaker’s own example, the popular support for a small
local diary, where the emotionality is implied to be equivalent to “attitude
value” and “sympathy” as opposed to the “quality” (of the milk). The speaker
thus picks up and elaborates on the topos of factual vs. emotional argumen-
tation, which had been put forward by one of the experts earlier in the dis-
cussion. And, importantly, the speaker applies the topos to the knowledge
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base of the laypersons in general, thereby writing them off any substantial ar-
gumentative legitimacy.2
(5) Topos of personal authority: It does [make a difference] every time Marianne
[one of the biotech experts] says something. I don’t know why, but she seems very trust-
worthy to me. And it’s being said in a way so that I can follow many of the things she
says. (Speaker 21)
Asked about whether the discussion has changed her mind, the lay speaker
employs a topos of personal authority, referring to the credible and under-
standable way of arguing by one the biotech experts in the discussion. It is
worth noticing, though, that this is not the classical topos of authority of the
expert as such, but a topos of an authority which is achieved and performed
by a specific individual in a specific situation. 
20.2.2  Distancing responses
(6) Topos of risk & preciousness: It could of course be that in 10-15 years time when
this area has been researched a bit more and the information has reached a higher level,
maybe then I may acknowledge that it [GM crops] can be used in some areas. But as it
looks now, no, we only have the very same earth and the same environment, and then I
do not dare to run the risk. (Speaker 25)
Moving to the distancing responses, the topos of risk plays an important role
in the focus group interviews. In the example above, where the speaker sums
up his view on gm crops after a good deal of the discussion, the topos of risk
is linked to a topos of preciousness. By asserting the fact that “we only have
the very same earth and the same environment” the speaker indicates at the
same time the global reach (“earth”), and the preciousness (“only the very
same”) of what is at stake. This assertion, though, is preceded by a concession
with regard to future knowledge. The speaker rejects gm crops for the pres-
ent time, but explicitly opens a possibility of partial acceptance in the fu-
ture – though highly modalized (“maybe then I may”) – depending on the
2 This use of the topos of facts vs. feelings resonates with Cook’s studies on attitudes among
scientist on the gmo debate, where the attitude that “scientists think” whereas “the public
feels” is reported to be widespread (Cook 2004).
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development in knowledge about gm crops. As such, the response is not only
a distancing response, but also has an approaching quality.
(7) Topos of naturalness: I also have a lot of respect for the things you [the experts] are
saying, right, because you are a bit different from us, because you have another back-
ground, right. But the one with the tomatoes, I won’t go for that one, because I still
think it is disgusting, that it should be that way because they should be able to last
longer. I still think it is chemical, in my world it will remain so, but I have a lot of re-
spect for it, and I also listen a lot to what you are saying, and I think much of it sounds
sensible, but you haven’t convinced me. And then you can call me stubborn or whatever
I am, I don’t know. (Speaker 24) 
The topos of nature or naturalness also occurs several times in the focus group
interviews. In the example above, the natural is assumed to be the positive al-
ternative to the “chemical” quality of the long-life gm tomato. The speaker
stresses his own subjectivity by the frequent use of “I”, especially in combina-
tion with mental processes such as “I think”, and uses the emotional term “dis-
gusting” to underline his rejection of gm crops. But, on the other hand, the
rejection is framed by a lot of defensive and interpersonal rhetorical (face) work,
where the speaker takes great pains to express his respect for the experts pres-
ent in the discussion, and even anticipates self-criticism at the end of his turn. 
(8) Topos of impartiality vs. bias: That’s the problem, it’s when do you have a trustwor-
thy expert? What is his agenda? That’s where the problem is, right, because experts who
are employed by Novo Nordisk [Danish medical company] I may doubt, but an expert
within a public institution I will probably side with a bit more. (Speaker 25)
Whereas the topoi of risk and naturalness both address the content or issue
qualities of gm crops, the topos of impartiality vs. bias addresses qualities of
the debate, more precisely the conditions of the debate. Without mentioning
the specific experts in the focus group, the lay speaker challenges the credi-
bility of experts in general. He does so by raising the question of cui bono
(“What is his agenda?”); also experts may be led by interests which are not
purely scientific. This question is followed by a distinction between privately
and publicly employed experts, the latter being described as more trustwor-
thy, though in a modalized form expressing uncertainty or caution. 
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(9) Topos of (self-) contradiction: I read all the time that now it’s healthy to eat some-
thing, and then suddenly you find out, then, suddenly, some experts find out that it’s not
healthy after all. And then, suddenly, some experts find out that it is healthy after all.
You get so much misleading information. (Speaker 24) 
Another topos which addresses the quality of the debate and indirectly the
credibility of expert utterances is the topos of (self-)contradiction. Here, the
lay speaker points to contradictory expert information on healthy food, which
by analogy may question expert information on gm foods as well. As with the
topos of impartiality, the topos of (self-)contradiction denies the application
of the classical topos of authority in relation to experts on foods.
(10) Topos of ability: I can easily understand what you’re saying, but I try to see it from
the other side as well. I also think, just how much reflection are you allowed to have
when you live on less than a dollar a day? How much room is there to reflect on what
you put into your mouth? There’s probably not very much room for that. (Speaker 2)
Finally, the topos of ability in the above example also addresses the condi-
tions of the debate, but now in relation to the attitudes of poor inhabitants
in developing countries where gm crops may be used – and welcomed – to
remedy famine. After having expressed full understanding for the view put
forward by one of the participating experts (that one should give developing
countries the choice of using gm crops), the lay speaker claims to add “the
other said”; i.e., the perspective of distant others, to the debate. She prob-
lematizes whether the willingness to use gm crops by people living at a sub-
sistence level can be seen as a true approval, given the limited “reflection”
which can be expected in such cases of necessity. The speaker does not, in
the example or elsewhere in the focus group interview, state exactly how this
problematization should affect the stance on gm crops in developing coun-
tries. Her contribution adds a new perspective, rather than presents a definite
attitude.
20.3 Discussion and conclusion
The analysis clearly shows that the laypersons in the interviews do not dismiss
the expert arguments straightaway but reflect upon and ‘negotiate’ several of
these. In that sense, the laypersons’ views on gm crops do not appear to be “re-
sistant to persuasion” as Scholderer (2005) has suggested. Since Scholderer’s
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suggestion was based on a review of the literature on how mediated commu-
nication may change attitudes on gm crops, the striking difference between
the results in the current study and in the studies referred to by Scholderer
suggests significant differences between the persuasive influence of mediated
communication on the one hand and interpersonal communication on the
other, at least in settings similar to the lengthy focus group interviews in the
current study. This is not a new finding to communication studies, at least
since Katz and Lazersfeld formulated their “two-step flow” theory based on the
role of “opinion leaders” (Katz/Lazersfeld 1955), but it is worth noticing that
the current study indicates that also interpersonal communication with
strangers, in this case academic experts, may be influential. It is an open ques-
tion how this applies to contexts other than the focus group interviews here
examined. 
Equally important, the analysis shows that the laypersons typically do
not change their views in the sense that they simply take over the expert view.
Instead, a wide variety of modifications can be observed. The laypersons ex-
press interest in arguments or information put forward by the experts, they
recognize an expert style of communicating, or articulate dilemmas between
different perspectives. Related to this, the use of modality, which expresses
doubt, reservations or caution, is quite frequent in the laypersons’ responses.
Differentiations between different kinds of gm crops also play an important
role, especially in the approaching responses. Again, these differentiations do
not simply imply acceptance of certain forms gm crops, rather they imply an
acceptance that certain arguments are worthy of consideration.
Several of the topoi in the lay responses, especially among the distanc-
ing responses, concern the conditions for discussing gm crops rather than the
issue itself. Far from appearing as flat refusals to accept expert arguments,
these meta-communicative topoi are inventive contributions to the interview
discussion which display a reflexive relation to expert argumentation in soci-
ety. The use of these topoi also represent a strategy which lay persons may em-
ploy in order to simultaneously appear as rational individuals and recognize
the gap of field-specific knowledge between them and the experts. 
This strategy enacts one of the predominant situational identities (Bil-
lig 1996, p. 264) which can be observed among the lay persons in the focus
groups. It is an identity as a critical or reflective citizen, who questions the
scope of scientific expertise and the role of science in the societal deliberation.
Another predominant identity enacted by the laypersons, is the learning citi-
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zen, who positions herself as being educated by science. Thirdly, a less pre-
dominant situational identity is the stubborn or isolated citizen, who positions
himself as essentially unaffected by science, insisting on keeping his own view,
though not insisting on it as the view for anybody else. When the laypersons
in the focus groups enact one of these identities, and they may enact more
than one in the course of events, they all appear to be concerned about show-
ing open-mindedness and recognizing the value of scientific knowledge, also
in the case of disagreement and problematization. Whether this is the case in
more informal and backstage interactions would make an interesting study.
Finally, a word on the absent topoi in the focus group interviews. Although
a major point of the current chapter has been to give an impression of the di-
versity of everyday argumentation in dealing with complex issues and expert
argumentation, this diversity is not unlimited. An interesting absence, in my
view, is that topoi of pleasure, personal convenience and aesthetics play almost
no role in the discussion. These topoi do indeed play a role in the discourses
surrounding many other technologies and knowledge saturated products, and
they form part of everyday dilemmas for many users when it comes to con-
sidering for example personal convenience against environmental concerns.
However, they do not, as yet, seem to be associated with gm crops. 
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21 Speaking of Terror: Challenging 




Rhetorical citizenship as an area of research includes inquiries into social and
institutional deliberative practices and norms and issues of access, scope and
strength of individual or group discursive initiatives in the public realm. The
notion is new. It was created as a frame for examining the role of rhetoric on
a societal plane, based on an understanding of rhetoric as not just a tool for
individuals to wield, but rather as a medium for, or a mode of, being a citi-
zen. Theoretically, the concept of rhetorical citizenship springs from two par-
ticular strands of research: deliberative democracy and rhetorical agency. There
is already an established body of literature on deliberative democracy which
deals with the challenges of citizen participation in the political life of repre-
sentative democracies, e.g., discussing in what ways actual deliberation among
the citizenry constitutes a more valuable form of participation than merely
voting and how this could be realized and brought to bear on lawmakers
(Rawls 1987; Gutman and Johnson 2004; Dryzek 2002; Benhabib 1996). The
concept of rhetorical agency is newer and still subject to definitional variation
(Geisler 2004; Hauser 2004; Lundberg and Gunn 2005; Rand 2008). 
My case material – public political commentaries on statements made
by two individuals in reaction to a terrorist attack against a Danish embassy
– serves to illustrate the connection between theory on deliberative democ-
racy and the concept of rhetorical agency. It illustrates how notions of rhetor-
ical citizenship are informed by implicit social and discursive norms: the
statements were interpreted not “merely” as discursive acts but also as breaches
of proper civic responsibility. One way to analyze the interaction between the
two statements and the reactions to them is to regard the episode as a case of
negotiating rhetorical agency and the norms that are seen as appropriate as
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guidelines in this context. A brief overview on scholarship on rhetorical
agency is therefore in order. 
21.2 Rhetorical agency
In recent years, the concept of rhetorical agency has inspired scholars from a
range of theoretical backgrounds. A 2004 special issue of the journal Philos-
ophy and Rhetoric illustrates the diversity of scholarly interest in the concept,
and while the editor does not offer a definition of the concept in his foreword,
he does point to the dual concerns associated with it: on the one hand,
rhetoric’s constitutive powers as implicated “in the ongoing construction of
a human world and the consequences of symbolic choice, or questions of re-
sponsibility” and, on the other, the way the concept of agency “raises ques-
tions of voice, power, and rights”, which places the concept “at the centre of
this era’s major social, political, economic, and cultural issues” (Hauser 2004,
p. 183). The notion thus concerns the fact that we cannot account for rhetor-
ical action merely by referring to the rhetor’s intention, but neither can we
completely abandon the significance of the individual in particular rhetori-
cal utterances. The concept of rhetorical agency provides a vocabulary for de-
scribing the ways in which rhetors are both makers of rhetoric (through skill,
inventio, etc.) and made by rhetoric (as well as by circumstance, position in
society and other institutional or social conditions) as they address audiences. 
Cheryl Geisler identifies the core of the concept to be concerned with
the capacity to act. She traces three main strands of research stemming from
this: one concerned with critique of the ideology of agency, that is, the link
between rhetorical action and social change, one concerned with the more in-
strumental aspect of rhetoric understood as the rhetor’s skill and ability to
respond to shifting circumstances and finally, one which is concerned with the
conditions for agency, in other words, studying the means or resources char-
acterizing the conditions under which a rhetor is able to act, and not least, the
accessibility of such a position: who even gets a chance to be heard? (Geisler
2004, p. 12-14) The approach here is most akin to the discussion of the alleged
illusion of agency. But, whereas this discussion is inspired by what Gaonkar
(1997) labelled the “ideology of agency” and focuses on what Gunn and Lund-
berg (2005) might call the vain (“ontotheological”) notion that rhetors can
both will and do things with their words, this chapter deals more with the ide-
ological underpinnings of the general, public expectations vis-à-vis rhetorical
agency in a particular context. 
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Several significant contributions to current theory on rhetorical agency have
given special attention to the opportunities and means that marginalized or
otherwise underrepresented groups have to enter and influence public polit-
ical debate (Asen and Brouwer 2001; Welsh 2002; Asen 2004). This scholarly
work is highly important and promises to yield new and constructive per-
spectives on nurturing a more inclusive and constructive political culture.
However, the case in question here seems to suggest that rhetorical agency can
be contested even when it concerns individuals and institutions that are usu-
ally considered ‘mainstream’. In fact, the speakers in question belong to the
elite: one, Margrethe Vestager, is an elected member of the Danish Parlia-
ment and a party leader, and the other, Niels Due Jensen, is a ceo. In spite
of their otherwise privileged positions in society in general and as commen-
tators on public affairs, both found their individual rhetorical agencies im-
pugned when commenting in unexpected ways on a controversial matter. It
therefore seems that issues of rhetorical citizenship can be contested even for
members of society who ordinarily enjoy easy access to the media and whose
opinions on current politics are normally considered relevant. The case also
illustrates how deeply conceptions of rhetorical agency are caught up in ide-
ological assumptions that are highly contextual in nature. In my interpreta-
tion of the controversy, it seems that expectations of rhetorical agency in this
context are informed by unexamined and unchallenged norms informed in
turn by a dichotomous and, in Kenneth Burke’s terminology, “tragic” frame
of debate. 
21.3 Background: The attack in Islamabad and initial reactions
On June 2, 2008 the Danish Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan was the target
of a terrorist attack. A car loaded with explosives slammed into the front wall
of the embassy, killing between four and six people and wounding 20 to 30
others. No one took responsibility for the attack immediately afterwards, and
the reason for the attack remained a matter of speculation for some time.1
The attack was, however, generally assumed to be a response to either the so-
called “cartoon crisis” of 2005 and the more recent reprinting of the Mo-
hammed cartoons in the spring of 2008. Another interpretation was that it
1 In July 2008, a representative of Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attack and said it
was an answer to the reprinting of Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten’s Mohammed cartoons
in February 2006 and the presence of Danish troops in Afghanistan.
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was a protest against Denmark’s participation in the war in Iraq and its cur-
rent military presence in Afghanistan.2
As was to be expected, the event called for a response from Danish
politicians about the interpretation and proper reaction to this violent act.
The attack on the Danish embassy clearly represented a crisis of some signif-
icance - regardless of whether one subscribed to the Prime minister’s view
that it constituted “an attack on Denmark” or held a more limited view of it
as a despicable, but isolated terrorist attack on Danish property, or ‘simply’
as a criminal act calling for police investigation and prosecution of the guilty
individuals. Since there was no immediate indication as to who was respon-
sible for the attack in Islamabad or what the reason for it was, comments by
Danish politicians initially focused on denouncing the act and expressing sor-
row over the loss of innocent human lives and the many injuries.
After the immediate expressions of shock, anger and empathy with the
victims and their families, several political commentaries broached the ques-
tion of how Denmark ought to react to the situation in order to prevent or de-
fend itself from similar attacks in the future. The dominant reaction was to call
for an investigation of the incident and a commitment to uphold Denmark’s
diplomatic and military presence in the Middle East and thus to continue the
country’s foreign policy and diplomatic procedures in general. In other words,
the general view was that it was crucial to “stick to our guns”, in order to sig-
nal Denmark’s determination and commitment to the principles of free speech
and democracy. Alternatives to this reaction were either ignored or denounced
as “giving in” to the terrorists out of fear. There emerged, therefore, what
seemed to be only two discursive options: either to show loyalty to Denmark
by expressing steadfastness on the political and military fronts or be seen as dis-
loyal to Denmark by not supporting the official policy.3
2 Because Denmark, to many people in the world, is a country that is indistinguishable
from other countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands some also speculated that the at-
tack was a misdirected reaction to the Dutch anti-Islamic film Fitna which was released on
the internet in March 2008.
3 The discursive space was, in many ways, similar to the one characterizing the US during
the aftermath of the events of Sept. 11, 2001 when former us President George W. Bush
gave succinct expression to a bifocal political and ethical logic when he declared: “Either
you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” in his address to a joint session of Congress
and the American People, Sept. 20, 2001.
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21.4 Two non-conforming reactions
In this rather restrictive discursive space, there were, however, two notable
exceptions. One came from the leader of the Danish Social Liberal Party,
Margrethe Vestager. In her first statements on June 2, she condemned the at-
tack as inexcusable and “totally unacceptable” and expressed her “deepest
sympathy”4 with the wounded and their relatives.5 Later that day, in a tv in-
terview with tv2 News, she stated that she thought the incident would lead
to a discussion of Denmark’s foreign policy line. Denmark ought to be more
involved in solving conflicts, she added.6
In response to this statement, Vestager was met with aggressive criti-
cism from a broad range of politicians for giving in to terror and for not dis-
playing enough loyalty to Denmark at a moment of crisis. In reaction to
Vestager’s comment, the Prime Minister said that he was dismayed and con-
sidered Vestager’s thinking to be “very, very dangerous” at the same time as he
denied that terrorists would be allowed to determine Danish foreign policy.7
The Social Democratic leader, Helle Thorning-Schmidt, commented that a
terrorist attack is an “infinitely ill-suited background against which to discuss
changes in our foreign policy and our internal discussions at home such as the
one about freedom of expression”. Thorning-Schmidt concluded, “it is wrong
to link a terror attack and our foreign policy”.8The Leader of the Danish Peo-
ple’s Party, Pia Kjærsgaard, called Vestager’s comment “pathetic”, and also
steered the problem toward domestic politics when she opined that Vestager
was “abusing the situation to create division and – to put it nicely – [trying]
to shift the blame to the parties supporting the foreign policy”. Kjærsgaard
thus saw Vestager’s comment as primarily “an attempt at domestic politicking
and trying to set people up against each other”.9Perhaps the most pointed cri-
4 All translations of statements by politicians and Niels Due Jensen are the author’s own.
5 “Vestager: Totalt uacceptabelt” Ritzau’s Bureau, June 2, 2008.
6 Vestager later explained that this comment was offered in response to a comparison be-
tween Denmark and Israel made by her political opponent, the Danish People’s Party, call-
ing Denmark “The Israel of the North” – the implication presumably being that both
nations are surrounded by Islamic enemies to be combated at any price in order to secure
survival.
7 “Sprækker i borgfreden” Jyllands-Posten, June 3, 2008.
8 “Hård kritik af Vestager” Politiken, June 3, 2008.
9 “Hård kritik af Vestager” Politiken, June 3, 2008.
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tique of Vestager came from various members of the governing Liberal Party.
The party’s political spokesperson, Inger Støjberg regretted on her blog that
Vestager was getting “weak at the knees”10 and “giving in to the terrorists”.11
Both she and the Prime Minister were quoted several times charging Vestager
with “playing into the terrorists’ hands”.12 A few days later, on June 10, the
Liberal Secretary of Taxation, Kristian Jensen, criticized Vestager for yielding
to the terrorists and deemed her statements “a dangerous signal” to terrorists,
calling her and her party “unfit” to become a member of government. This
opinion was backed later that day by the Prime Minister who said that one
should never give terrorists the impression that one can be pressured. 
Four days after the attack, on June 6, 2008, another critical voice –
that of Niels Due Jensen, ceo of the Grundfos Corporation (a large pump
manufacturer) – also drew heavy criticism. In an interview in the financial
newspaper Børsen he expressed concern over the current aggressive foreign
policy. He saw it as inviting confrontation and as an unfortunate escalation
in the relations between Denmark and the Muslim world. He also stated that
he found this policy to be detrimental to Danish business interests and con-
cluded that it certainly was detrimental to his own company’s interests.13
Like Vestager’s, Jensen’s comments were also met with heavy criticism
and he was all but accused of being a traitor to his country by several mem-
bers of the Danish Parliament. Conservative party political spokesperson,
Henriette Kjær, suggested that Jensen “think in a larger perspective than next
year’s bottom line for Grundfos”. Naser Khader, leader of the libertarian party
New Alliance, called Jensen’s view a “disgrace” and speculated that he might
feel more comfortable living under a dictatorship. Khader also dismissed what
he called Jensen’s “huckster attitude” and looked forward to the day when
10 I will leave the sexual and sexist connotations of this comment unexamined but merely
mention that Støjberg seems to merge two Danish idioms here: blive “blød om hjertet” og
“svag i knæene” both of which are used to describe a particularly female version of infatua-
tion and emotional weakness. In fairness, Danish also has at least one idiom about power
issues mentioning the knees (“falde på knæene for”). Støjberg’s neologism seems to connote
a reaction based on emotional/sentimental and power-related submissiveness.
11 “Vestager bliver blød i knæene” Inger Støjberg’s blog, June 3, 2008.
12 Støjberg later said she had been misquoted as leaving out the word “involuntarily” in this
context. “Er vi selv ude om det?” Jyllandsposten, June 3, 2008
13 “Topchef træt af dansk udenrigspolitik” Viborg Folkeblad, June 5, 2008.
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Jensen chose to criticize the dictatorships that his corporation traded with
instead of criticizing his own country.14 Representatives from both the Dan-
ish Liberal Party and the Danish People’s Party compared Due Jensen to the
infamous so-called collaborators (businesspeople who during the wwii Nazi
occupation of Denmark traded with the Germans and profited from it), and
Tom Behnke, the Conservative Party’s spokesperson on matters of national
defense, compared Jensen with a character from a popular Danish television
series who was a collaborator. Søren Espersen (Danish People’s Party) summed
up his comparison of Jensen with the collaborators saying that Jensen “has
chosen the wrong country to live in. It is a tragedy when businesspeople think
like that”.15 Behnke (who two days earlier, on Denmark’s Constitution Day
June 5, had spoken in praise of the nation’s constitutionally sanctioned free-
dom of expression) explained: 
It is sad that Niels Due Jensen questions the policy when we are under attack. Be-
cause it showcases that we do not stand together in Denmark, and that will make
the terrorists applaud with their chubby little hands.16
Behnke also called Jensen “double dumb” because not only did he say con-
troversial things, but also did so at a bad time. In fairness, Benkhe did recog-
nize Jensen’s right to say whatever he liked, but explained that the problem was
the timing. Said Behnke: “It encourages the terrorists to more acts of terror.”17
Behnke, of course, had a point, at least concerning the issue of timing.
A key principle in rhetorical theory is that of kairos, saying the right thing at
the right time. Clearly, the case could be made that the statements by Vestager
and Jensen were ill-timed. When people are in a state of shock and fear, they
are rarely as ready to engage in critical discussion as when things have settled
down, so especially Vestager’s comments could be said to be premature in so
far as the Prime Minister’s definition of the event in Islamabad as “an attack
on Denmark” was accepted as correct. Obvious, too, is the presence of ad-
14 “Khader raser over erhvervsboss” Jyllandsposten, June 6, 2008.
15 “Profeten og profitten” Jyllandsposten, June 7, 2008.
16 For reasons of space I have to leave the condescending and chauvinist nature of this state-
ment uncommented upon. 
17 “Holdkæftbolsjet: Tom Behnke: Grundfos’ Niels Due er vor tids Viggo Skjold Hansen”
Information June 7, 2008.
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hominem attacks and the general lack of sound argumentation in the various
statements condemning Vestager and Due Jensen. However, setting these ob-
servations and more traditional rhetorical criticism of the statements, their
background, and effect aside, the aim here is not to pronounce a verdict on
the respective validity of the statements in the debate, but to examine the
controversy from the viewpoint of rhetorical citizenship. The question here
is what to make of Vestager’s and Due Jensen’s enactment of their rhetorical
agency. I will argue that concepts of rhetorical agency and deliberative democ-
racy facilitate an understanding of this particular case that speaks to the con-
ditions of contemporary Danish political debate, forms a constructive ground
for rhetorical criticism, and proves useful for theorizing further about public
deliberation and debate.
21.5 Challenged notions of rhetorical citizenship 
Viewing this case as an example of how citizenship can be enacted and how
that enactment turns out to be controversial is in line with recent calls to make
a change in scholarly focus from deciding what counts or doesn’t count as cit-
izenship to a concern with how people enact it. While seemingly narrow in
scope and ephemeral in political significance, this type of quotidian political
polemic is, by virtue of its “knee-jerk” quality, extremely telling of common
political practice and the norms that inform it. A similar view of what con-
stitutes rhetorically relevant case material can be found in research on public
sphere issues and the theoretical and methodological assumptions that inform
the scholarship on citizenship in his work (Asen and Brouwer 2001; Asen
2004). Asen asserts that whether optimistic or pessimistic about the health of
civic life, commentators tend to regard citizenship as being “constituted in
specific acts” even though the types of activities that are recognized as ways of
engaging in citizenship differ. He argues that we must broaden our view of
what constitutes civic engagement and recognize the significance of more fluid
and quotidian forms of enactment of citizenship (Asen 2004, p. 190). Among
the implications of Asen’s suggestions is that it recognizes enactment of citi-
zenship in non-traditional because such modes may serve to unsettle the taken-
for-granted and challenge norms of propriety. Here, the focus is on public
statements that apparently challenged norms of discursive propriety. Reac-
tions to them were strong enough to suggest that they not only hit against
notions of proper timing, but were essentially perceived as provocative in their
alleged disregard for implicit norms of prudence and national solidarity.
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Thinking of citizenship in terms of mode highlights the manner by
which something is done from what is done and it highlights agency (Asen
2005, p. 194). Placing manner and deed in relation to each other allows for
consideration of intention and consequently for interpretation as well (ibid. p.
195). The focus here will be that the statements were interpreted not merely as
discursive acts but also as manifestations or performances of proper civic re-
sponsibility (or rather: lack thereof ). As a result, the real issue in the debate
turns out to be not what Denmark’s foreign policy should be, or when and
how it should be discussed, but how a public person should properly perform
his or her rhetorical citizenship. The case thus illustrates the highly symbolic
significance associated with speaking publicly on matters of collective concern. 
As an opposition party leader, Vestager was a natural choice to be among the
first individuals given the opportunity to comment on the terrorist attack in
the media, and her right to speak on this issue went unquestioned. In her
case, the issue of rhetorical agency is interesting in relation to the content of
her statements and particularly with the reception of them. Rather than con-
straining herself to an expression of her immediate emotional and political re-
action to the attack, she predicted a reconsideration of Denmark’s foreign
policy. As we have already seen, by so doing, she provoked a large number of
negative reactions from politicians representing most of the spectrum.18
Vestager’s political competence and even her patriotism were severely ques-
tioned because she was believed to be suggesting that the country’s foreign
policy itself might have led to the attack and that this policy perhaps needed
to be re-examined in light of Denmark’s overall foreign policy aims. This was
interpreted as a criticism, even disavowal, of the current foreign policy and as
a wish to change it in order to make it less offensive to militant Islamists and
thus prevent future attacks against Danish citizens or property.
The vehemence and stridency of these reactions suggest that Vestager
not only hit a nerve, but also challenged prevailing communicative norms. I
read the attacks on Vestager as an indication that her realization of rhetorical
agency in this case was deemed both inappropriate and dangerous, and I want
to suggest that this reaction was informed by a particular climate of political
debate that I will explore further in a moment. In the eyes of many politicians
and the public, Vestager’s rhetorical act of questioning current policies jeop-
ardized her performance of political citizenship and national values. Robert-
18 Excluding the two parties furthest to the left: Enhedslisten and sf.
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Millers discusses the rhetorical power of naïve realism and in-group identity
and states: “Naïve realists […] tend to see calls for deliberation, further re-
search, more complicated descriptions, or scepticism as intentional attempts
to obfuscate a situation that is clear to all right-thinking people”. Since nu-
anced public debate is difficult, people tend to ground their response to po-
litical issues on group identification and, by the same logic, make an
essentializing move that marginalizes people with differing view to an out-
group (Roberts-Miller 2009, p. 180). Vestager’s statements challenged the dom-
inant, rather simplified, perception of reality (the attack was a criminal act, not
an act of war against Denmark; discussing means and end of the country’s
foreign policy at moments of crisis does not equal giving in to terrorists, much
less treason) and were therefore associated with out-group viewpoints. The
fact that she disagreed in turn led to the conclusion that she was being disloyal
to her country. By questioning the government’s foreign policy, this essential-
izing argumentative move resulted in the view that she was potentially putting
the country at risk. She was, in other words, regarded as betraying her rhetor-
ical citizenship: at a time when many people stuck to an in-group logic of not
questioning a dichotomous position of being either against or with terrorists,
Vestager, in their eyes, cast serious doubts on her patriotism and abused her
rhetorical agency by not saying what they thought to be appropriate. 
According to Hauser and Benoit-Barne, agency amplifies the element
of risk inherent in any social interaction and, therefore, the need for trust
emerges (Hauser and Benoit-Barne 2002, p. 271). The reactions to Vestager
illustrate the fragility of social, political trust in times of crisis. Vestager’s po-
litical agency was questioned by her political opponents, partly by citing dis-
trust of her judgment in foreign policy matters, partly by referring to her call
for a discussion of contemporary Danish foreign policy, and partly by “guilt-
by-association”, citing the foreign policy endorsed by her party during the
1940s as evidence against her. 
Much the same can be said about the reactions to Due Jensen’s state-
ments – the main difference being that, as a business leader, his own vested
interests in the matter were more palpable rendering him more immediately
subject to suspicion. He was almost universally criticized for feathering his
own nest. Space does not permit me to develop this line of argument, but
there is an interesting issue of rhetorical agency here. While statements re-
garding current policy made by leading industry spokespeople are usually
readily used as warrants in political debate, especially by two of the Danish
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government parties, we see here an attempt to undermine Jensen’s rhetorical
agency by an unusual dichotomization of economy and politics.
One of the problems besetting the current discussion of deliberative
democracy is that it is usually based on the interests of the individual. A richer
understanding would re-conceive political relations as deliberation-based
(Hauser and Benoit-Barne 2002, p. 263). Vestager’s case brought to the fore
some of the challenges inherent in the predominant understanding of polit-
ical debate as being interest-based instead of being oriented toward inclusion
and actual exchange of views and reasons. While Vestager did employ the
language of serving one’s political interests, her statement, nevertheless, might
serve as an example of a different kind of political discourse, one more in line
with Hauser and Benoit-Barne’s ideal of deliberative democracy. From a
rhetorical theory point of view, we might regard Vestager’s statements as an
attempt to translate “ordinary” speaking access to rhetorical agency. Her com-
ments were not intended to provoke but to initiate a controversial discussion
of Denmark’s foreign policy. She was using her access to the media to bring
to the public’s attention a topic that, in her opinion, is too often ignored. 
Assuming that Vestager’s position is one that favours deliberate and de-
liberative formation of public opinion, we might see in it an alignment with
Aristotelian thinking on phronesis: the cultivation and practice of (sound) po-
litical judgment. Hauser and Benoit-Barne contrast the concept of phronesis
with the concept of doxa, stating that whereas the former springs out of a
rhetorically-based conception of political deliberation, the latter is the as-
sumed basis of conventional interest-based understanding of political action.
Democratic participation […] is a vehicle for moving the ‘will of the people’ past
its status as doxa (a strongly held but weakly grounded preference), as reflected in
opinion polls, and return it to the status of civil judgment envisioned by Aristotle
in the Rhetoric. (Hauser and Benoit-Barne 2002, p. 264) 
Clearly such a move toward reflection and critical examination of the means
and ends of Danish foreign policy felt like a threat in many political circles
and was deemed unwise and almost treacherous to the nation’s safety. 19
19 Later, as other politicians and media commentators reflected on it and found her state-
ments to be in fact both legitimate and reasonable, the criticism was moderated to calling the
statements ill-timed.
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21.6 Deliberative democracy and rhetorical theory 
Drawing on the abundant literature on deliberative democracy, several
rhetorical scholars have pointed to the dearth of a rhetorical perspective in
this body of theory (e.g., Keith, Hauser and Benoit-Barne, Asen). In the
article “Rhetorical Deliberation and Democratic Politics in the Here and
Now”, Robert Ivie makes the case for understanding democratic delibera-
tion as primarily rhetorical. Unlike theorists of deliberative democracy such
as Chantal Mouffe and Iris Young, the latter of whom suggests that an ad-
equate understanding of political deliberation must include rhetoric, Ivie in
other words turns the tables and claims that championing rhetoric as the
basic principle holds more promise (Ivie 2002, p. 277). Ivie’s point is that
the rhetorical tradition offers constructive ways of understanding and deal-
ing with disagreement both procedurally and substantively because it “pro-
motes democratic practice immediately” (rather than postponing it to an
ideal future where diversity and passionate disagreement have been replaced
by consensus and universal reason). It also takes dissension as a natural con-
dition not to be combated but rather embraced as a source of critique and
thus potential improvement of the debate. Using the Burkean distinction
between tragic and comic frames, Ivie points to the fundamentally comic
nature of a rhetorical conception of democratic deliberation in virtue which
puts into play … 
a potentially positive expectation of a political advocacy, dissent, and disagreement,
conduct that otherwise is easily interpreted as a dysfunctional exercise in political
wrangling that is wasteful, misguided, corrupt, and far removed from the daily lives
of citizens
and thus displays attitudes of tolerance and contemplation (Ivie 2002, p. 278).
Says Ivie:
[b]y maintaining a productive tension between cooperation and competition and
not privileging any single perspective to the exclusion of all others, ‘rowdy’ rhetori-
cal deliberation increases the potential of preventing adversaries from being trans-
formed into scapegoats and enemies. Moreover, such robust give-and-take helps to
overturn the debilitating assumption that democracy is inherently fragile, and thus
risky in the here and now. (Ivie 2002, p. 279) 
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While neither Vestager’s nor Due Jensen’s public statements could be con-
sidered unruly, the reactions to them clearly reflected an understanding of
the statements as being improper and in violation of the norms of public
commentary, both with regard to timing and message. Nothing indicates that
they intended to unsettle or discount notions of propriety, but the reactions
suggest that this was the effect. So in a sense, Vestager and Due Jensen were
both chastised for bad behaviour, and Vestager – by calling into question the
timeless wisdom of the nation’s foreign policy – was perceived by many as
calling into question, or rather, ignoring, common notions of propriety. Con-
tent, so to speak, spilled over onto procedure.
21.7 Conclusion
The uncritical adoption of the simplistic language of war which was invoked
by the Danish Prime Minister’s labelling of the violent incident in Islamabad
as “an attack on Denmark” adopted by the political establishment and the
media effectively framed the political commentary which immediately fol-
lowed the event as dichotomous, intolerant of questioning or hesitation re-
garding what a wise reaction would be. The result was a debate climate that
in Ivie’s words added up to “an exclusionary aim for consensus and unity” as
witnessed by reactions that reduced difference to total otherness (Ivie 2002,
p. 278). The reactions to Vestager are illustrative of some of the problems be-
setting contemporary Danish public political culture: the criticism of
Vestager’s call for a reconsideration of Danish foreign policy at was perceived
to be threatening, even destabilizing, to the credibility and security of Den-
mark at a time perceived by some to be a crisis. 
The argument was that initiating a discussion of Denmark’s foreign
policy at that time was not in its interest because it would be perceived as a
sign of weakness by the terrorists. In times of crisis, the underlying assump-
tion went, the nation must stand together and not show any signs of inter-
nal disagreement or division. In a manner of speaking, the crisis –
paradoxically – closed the space for political deliberation, even for this lead-
ing politician. The reactions, in effect, curbed the possibility of testing com-
peting interpretations and common perspectives of the events in Islamabad,
as well as those of Danish foreign policy in the Middle East in general. It is
especially remarkable that this was done in a manner that in Ivie’s words “ef-
fortlessly and absolutely reduced [this issue] to a patriotic battle between the
forces of good and evil”. 
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I have examined the controversy from the perspective of rhetorical cit-
izenship primarily using theory on rhetorical agency and public deliberation.
We have seen how unexamined norms of how a citizen may properly act
rhetorically in public lead to strong personal attacks on individuals whose
statements fall outside of a narrow frame of acceptable reactions. In this read-
ing we observe an a-rhetorical debate culture where disagreement is troubling
and deliberation dangerous. A more productive, and genuinely rhetorical,
conception would embrace difference as a fact to be dealt with constructively.
In the words of Hauser and Benoit-Barne: 
A rhetorical reading of civil society returns us to its structure as a web of rhetorical
arenas in which strangers encounter difference, learn of the other’s interest, develop
understanding of where there are common goals, and where they may develop the
levels of trust necessary for them to function in a world of mutual dependency.
(Hauser and Benoit-Barne 2002, p. 271)
I suggest that cases such as this invite us to continue examining the norms –
spoken as well as unspoken – underlying notions of rhetorical citizenship in
a given national or cultural context.
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22 Strategic Maneuvering with Linguistic




Participants in a legal process often use linguistic arguments to support their
claim. In a linguistic argument it is shown that the proposed interpretation
of a rule is based on the meaning of the words used in the rule in ordinary or
technical language. The reason why a linguistic argument is chosen as a sup-
port for a legal claim is that linguistic arguments are considered to have a
preferred status in justifying a legal decision, and for this reason, in rhetori-
cal terms, constitute a topos in legal discourse. However, this preferred sta-
tus can also be ‘misused’ for rhetorical reasons. A particular reading of the
rule can be presented as the accepted standard reading, although other inter-
pretations of the rule might be presented from a legal perspective. In addition,
reference to the presupposed standard meaning of the rule can be presented
as a sufficient justification, although it is not possible to establish the mean-
ing on the basis of the formulation of the rule alone, because other consid-
erations must also be taken into account. In such cases, if linguistic arguments
as topoi are used incorrectly, higher judges criticize the linguistic argument.
In the first case because it is based on “a disputable literal reading of statute
law” and in the second case because it is based on “a misunderstanding of the
law as the legislator had in mind when enacting it”. 
Although higher judges often give a negative evaluation of certain uses
of linguistic arguments, in the literature on legal interpretation and the jus-
tification of legal decisions, no clear norms for the use of linguistic arguments
are specified. The aim of my contribution is to develop an instrument to an-
alyze and assess the use of linguistic arguments in legal discussions about the
application of a legal rule from the perspective of the pragma-dialectical
norms for the use of arguments in a critical discussion. I analyze the use of
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linguistic arguments in terms of the strategic maneuvering in the context of
a critical discussion. I establish when the strategic maneuvering with linguis-
tic arguments is acceptable from this perspective and when it derails.
In the analysis of the strategic maneuvering I make use of the insights
developed by Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2006) about
strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse. I consider strategic ma-
neuvering with linguistic arguments as an attempt to convince a legal audi-
ence by showing that the decision is in accordance with accepted legal starting
points without openly violating the dialectical norms of reasonableness. The
strategic maneuvering implies that the parties try to reconcile two, often con-
flicting goals, the rhetorical reasonableness norm of convincing the audience
and the dialectical reasonableness norm of resolving the difference of opin-
ion in a critical discussion. The strategic maneuvering derails when the rhetor-
ical norm to convince prevails over the dialectical reasonableness norm. If the
dialectical reasonableness norm is violated, in pragma-dialectical terms the
party commits a fallacy.
To be able to assess the strategic maneuvering with linguistic arguments
first, in section 22.2, I specify the dialectical norms for the use of linguistic ar-
gumentation in the context of a critical legal discussion. I do this by specify-
ing the conditions under which linguistic argumentation forms an adequate
means of justifying a legal decision about the application of a legal rule in a
concrete case. Then, in section 22.3, I analyze and evaluate a form of strate-
gic maneuvering with linguistic arguments that often occurs in discussions
about the application of legal rules, and I explain on the basis of the norms
specified in section 22.2 how the strategic maneuvering derails. I explain that
the strategic maneuvering with linguistic arguments in these cases consists of
a complex form of strategic maneuvering that constitutes a combination of
two maneuvers.
22.2 Norms for the use of linguistic argumentation in a critical legal
discussion
If we look at the discussion about the use of linguistic arguments in the jus-
tification of legal decisions we find, generally speaking, a consensus about
the functional use of linguistic arguments. In clear cases in which there is
no difference of opinion about the interpretation of a legal rule, linguistic
argumentation can function as a justification of the decision, although a
justification is not necessary in such cases because there is no difference of
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opinion.1 In hard cases in which there is a difference of opinion about the
correct interpretation of the rule, a linguistic argument cannot function as
a decisive argument because there are different views with respect to the
exact meaning of the rule.2
The reason why a linguistic argument may suffice as a justification in
an easy case is that, from the perspective of legal certainty, in principle refer-
ence to the clear intention of the legislator as it appears from the wordings of
the law, must be taken as the starting point for the application of the law. In
hard cases in which there is a difference of opinion about the meaning of the
law for the concrete case because the intention of the legislator cannot be de-
duced from the wordings, other sources are necessary to establish the inten-
tion of the legislator. Linguistic arguments can have a ‘demarcating’ function
by showing that the judge has remained within the latitude for interpretation
he has on the basis of the formulation of the rule.3
The problem with the strategic use of linguistic arguments is that par-
ties to a legal process often present a case as an easy case in which a linguis-
tic argument suffices to justify the decision because a linguistic argument is
supposed to have a ‘presumptive’ status from the perspective of legal certainty.
However, if the case is a hard case such a presentation is misleading because
other arguments based on the legal system, the intention of the legislator, the
goal of the rule, etc. are required to give an adequate justification. If these ar-
guments are not given, the justification is not sufficient and the party evades
the burden of proof by not mentioning and substantiating these other con-
siderations.4
Given the different functions of linguistic arguments in different legal
discussion contexts, the question arises which uses of linguistic arguments
can be distinguished and which norms apply for an acceptable use of lin-
guistic arguments in the context of these clear and hard cases from the per-
spective of a rational critical legal discussion.
1 Cf. Groenewegen (2007), Soeteman (2007) and Van den Hoven (2007).
2 Ibid.
3 Judges often refer to linguistic arguments when they balance the requirements of legal
certainty and the requirements of justice and fairness in a concrete case. See also Feteris
(2005 and 2008a) on the balancing of legal certainty and fairness.
4 See also Vranken (2004) about the technique of  “veiling argumentation” in legal deci-
sions and the comments given by Feteris (2004).
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From an argumentative perspective we can distinguish between three
forms of using linguistic arguments, based on the relationship between the
linguistic argument and the standpoint. In what I call the first form, a lin-
guistic argument is presented as an independent justification. In the second
form, a linguistic argument is supplemented with other arguments. And in
the third form, a linguistic argument is overruled by another argument.
To establish the norms for an acceptable use of linguistic arguments
in these three forms, from a pragma-dialectical perspective a distinction can
be made between two types of norms. The first type of norm concerns the
adequacy of linguistic argumentation as a means to justify a legal decision:
whether linguistic argumentation can, in a particular discussion context,
constitute an adequate and sufficient justification. The second type of norm
concerns the correctness of the application in the case at hand: whether the
linguistic interpretation of the rule in a concrete case is correct.
For each form I specify under which conditions the linguistic argu-
ment is an adequate justification (condition a) and is used correctly (con-
dition b).
(1) A linguistic argument is presented as an independent justification of the 
application of a legal rule
From a legal perspective, in an easy case where there is no difference of opin-
ion about the interpretation of the rule and if the formulation of the rule
can give a clear and uncontested indication for establishing the meaning of
the rule in a concrete case, single argumentation consisting of a linguistic
argument can constitute an independently sufficient justification. In such
a case it is not necessary to mention that other arguments, such as a sys-
tematic arguments or teleological arguments, do not point to a different
solution.
When a linguistic argument is presented as an independent justifi-
cation it is acceptable if:
(1a) The argumentation is put forward in a context of an easy case in which
there is no difference of opinion with respect to the interpretation of the rule in 
relation to the facts of the concrete case
(1b) The linguistic argumentation refers to the accepted standard meaning of 
(a term used in) the rule
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Norm (1a) concerns the adequacy of linguistic argumentation as an inde-
pendently sufficient argumentation in a legal context and (1b) concerns the
acceptability of the propositional content of the argumentation.
This form of using linguistic argumentation does not occur very often
in legal practice because judges do not tend to justify their interpretation if
it concerns a clear and uncontested case. If it is used, judges tend to do this
for strategic reasons to anticipate doubt that might arise with respect to the
acceptability of the decision and use linguistic argumentation for rhetorical
reasons to convince the audience that the decision is coherent with common
legal starting points; i.e., the linguistic meaning of (a particular expression
in) the rule. Sometimes a linguistic argument is supported with subordina-
tive argumentation referring to the “common understanding of the term” or
reference to the description in the dictionary.
Sometimes, for rhetorical reasons, the linguistic argumentation is sup-
plemented with coordinative arguments such as systematic or teleological ar-
guments to show that the decision is also in line with other rules of the
relevant part of the legal system and/or the intention of the legislator.5
(2) A linguistic argument is presented as a supplementary argument in addition 
to other argumentation
In hard cases where there is a difference of opinion about the correct mean-
ing of the rule and the formulation of the rule does not give a clear and un-
contested indication for establishing the meaning of the rule in relation to the
concrete case, linguistic argumentation cannot constitute a sufficient justifi-
cation and must be supplemented by other forms of argumentation. In such
cases systematic argumentation or teleological argumentation must form a
necessary part of the argumentation, while linguistic argumentation can only
function as a supplementary coordinative or subordinate argument.
5 Van den Hoven (2007) considers this form of using linguistic arguments as the “positive
form” of linguistic argumentation. In his view, by using linguistic argumentation in this way
judges claim that no adaptations of the legal system are necessary to include the decision in a
concrete case. From the perspective of strategic maneuvering you could say that in this form
of using linguistic argumentation the judge puts forward the linguistic argument and some-
times supplementary arguments to take away doubt that might arise with respect to the ac-
ceptability of the decision from the perspective of the starting points of the legal system.
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When a linguistic argument is presented as a supplementary argument
it is only acceptable if:
(2a) The linguistic argument constitutes a support for the same interpretation of 
(the term used in) the rule as the other arguments that are put forward as a 
justification
(2b) The linguistic argument is not inconsistent with the meaning of (a term used
in) the rule
We find this form of using linguistic argumentation in cases where the legal
rule contains a vague or evaluative term so that the rule must be interpreted
to establish the meaning of the rule for the concrete case. In such a case lin-
guistic argumentation can never constitute an independent justification be-
cause it is not possible to establish in abstracto what the meaning is by
checking the literal meaning or the technical meaning of the term. The mean-
ing will have to be established by looking at the legal system and/or goal of
the rule. Systematic or teleological argumentation then forms a necessary part
of the argumentation and the linguistic argumentation can only have the
function as supplementary coordinative argumentation. Linguistic argu-
mentation of this form is often presented in the form of a statement that the
formulation of the rule also supports this interpretation or that the formula-
tion of the rule does not form an objection to application in the proposed in-
terpretation.6.7
Since linguistic arguments have a ‘preferred’ status, judges tend to use
this form of argumentation as supplementary argumentation for rhetorical
6 For example, if a judge argues for an a contrario application of a rule, he will put forward
a linguistic argument if the formulation of the rule contains a verbal indicator that gives an
uncontested indication that the rule is meant as a limitative enumeration of the conditions
for applying the rule.
7 This form of linguistic argumentation may occur also in cases in which there is no discus-
sion about the interpretation of a vague or evaluative term but there is still a difference of
opinion about the exact interpretation that must be given of a rule on the basis of the ques-
tion whether in the context of a specific case (and similar cases) a particular formulation used
in the rule must be given a particular meaning or not. In such cases the same applies as in the
case of a vague of evaluative term: the meaning must be established on the basis of systematic
or teleological argumentation and cannot be based on linguistic considerations alone.
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reasons to increase the acceptability of their decision for the legal audience.
The linguistic argument must increase the acceptability by showing that on
other grounds it can also be asserted that the decision is coherent with com-
mon starting points.8
(3) A linguistic argument is presented in a context in which it is overruled by 
another argument
In hard cases linguistic arguments can be used also in a context in which it is
asserted that the rule must not be applied in the literal meaning because such
an application would be unacceptable from the perspective of the goal of the
rule as intended by the legislator.9 In such a context the linguistic argument
is used to show that the linguistic argument has been considered and could
be an acceptable justification, but it is argued that this argument must be
“overruled” by other arguments such as systematic arguments, teleological
arguments, or arguments from reasonableness. These arguments are a neces-
sary part of the argumentation as pro-arguments to justify that the rule must
be applied in a broader or more restricted meaning in a particular case. Nor-
mally, if there would be no reason to question the applicability because the
concrete case belongs to the standard range of application of the rule, the ar-
gumentation could consist of linguistic argumentation of (1). However, for
the concrete case the judge may argue that there are overriding reasons not to
apply the rule in the strict literal meaning but in another meaning including
an exception for the concrete case.
When a linguistic argument is presented in a context in which it is
overruled by another argument it is acceptable if:
8 In terms of Van den Hoven (2007) who calls this use of linguistic arguments the “nega-
tive use” of linguistic argumentation the strategic maneuvering implies that the judge
tries to show that it is not necessary to change the legal system for the concrete case but
that the concrete decision was already (implicitly) included in the legal system.
9 In Dutch civil law this use of linguistic arguments in a context in which the linguistic ar-
gument is overruled by other arguments often occurs when it is argued that a “billijkheid-
scorrectie”, an exception for the concrete case on the basis of fairness, is necessary. See
Feteris (2007). 
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(3a) The linguistic argument is put forward in the context of a case in which there 
are other arguments that overrule the linguistic argument on the basis of the 
weight attached to them
(3b) The linguistic argumentation refers to the accepted standard meaning of 
(a term used in) the rule
This form of linguistic argumentation is often used when someone argues
in favor of an exception to a rule about which there is no discussion about
the correct interpretation of the rule, but where it is argued that on the basis
of the unacceptable consequences of a literal interpretation from the per-
spective of justice and fairness an exception to the rule must be made for the
concrete case.10
22.3 Analysis and evaluation of strategic maneuvering with linguis-
tic arguments
In this section I discuss two examples of strategic maneuvering with linguis-
tic arguments from Dutch civil law on the basis of the distinction between the
different forms of using linguistic arguments in the different discussion con-
texts and the norms for an acceptable use.11 In these cases the Supreme Court,
in pragma-dialectical terms, gave a negative evaluation of the strategic ma-
neuvering of one of the parties with linguistic argumentation.12 I specify how
the examples can be analyzed in terms of the first and second form of using
linguistic argumentation and I explain how the norms specified in section
22.2 can be used to determine when the strategic maneuvering with linguis-
tic argumentation is acceptable and when it derails. I do this by explaining
how the evaluation of the Supreme Court can be translated in terms of de-
railing strategic maneuvering.
Parties in a legal dispute often present a linguistic argument as an in-
dependently sufficient justification. As we have seen, in easy cases if the con-
ditions for the first form are met, it is a perfectly sound way of justifying a
legal decision. However, the strategic maneuvering with linguistic argumen-
tation may derail because one or more of the conditions for an acceptable
10 For a discussion of this form of complex argumentation see Feteris (2005, 2008).
11 For the text of these examples in the original version in Dutch and in an English transla-
tion see the texts attached at the end of this chapter.
12 Both examples are given by Smith (2007).
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use of a specific form of using linguistic argumentation is not met. Some-
times parties in a legal dispute present a particular interpretation of the rule
as the accepted standard interpretation of the rule although this is not the
case and condition (1b) of the first form is not met. In such a case the strate-
gic maneuvering derails because in doing so the party violates the starting
point rule because a particular meaning of the rule is wrongly presented as a
common starting point in the legal community.
Starting with presenting a particular interpretation as the accepted
standard interpretation, a party may claim that the linguistic argumentation
based on the formulation of the rule may serve as an independent justifi-
cation. As we have seen, in cases in which the conditions of the first form
are met, this is a perfectly sound way of justifying a legal standpoint. How-
ever, if the interpretation of the formulation of the rule is not the accepted
standard interpretation, the linguistic argumentation can never function as
an independent justification and other arguments are required to justify the
application of the rule. In such cases a linguistic argument cannot consti-
tute an independently sufficient argument. For this reason, if a party or a
judge presents the formulation of the rule as an independent justification
in a case that does not meet condition (1a) for the first form, the strategic
maneuvering derails. In such a case the ‘preferred’ status of linguistic argu-
mentation is misused by presenting the argumentation as an adequate jus-
tification whereas it does not meet condition (1a) of the first form but must
be reconstructed as argumentation of the second form which would have
been the correct form. By doing so, someone evades the burden of proof for
the necessary supplementing coordinative argumentation referring to the
legal system and/or goal of the rule (that form a necessary supplement of the
linguistic argumentation of the second form) and the strategic maneuver-
ing constitutes a violation of the burden of proof rule.
In what follows I discuss two examples of this complex form of strate-
gic maneuvering that both consist of a combination of these two forms of
strategic maneuvering that both derail because two discussion rules are vi-
olated.
The first example is from a discussion in Dutch law about the correct
interpretation of the term “finding”. In the case of Hoge Raad 25 oktober
1996, RvdW 1996, 207, the discussion was about the question whether the
activities of a professional car hunter who had found a stolen car, entitled
him to a reward for finding the car and to compensation for the costs he had
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incurred in taking care of the car on the basis of the legal regulation for find-
ing lost and unattended objects of clause 5:5 of the Dutch Civil Code.
In this case the plaintiff, the owner of the car, denies the right of the
defendant, the car hunter, to compensation for the costs he has made. The
plaintiff is of the opinion that the rule does not apply to this case because the
acts of the defendant cannot be considered as “finding”. In his view, the term
finding must be interpreted in the narrow sense, that is, excluding the activ-
ities of a professional car hunter. Here the plaintiff presents linguistic argu-
mentation referring to the meaning of the word “finding” as independently
sufficient justification.
However, the District Court, the High Court and the Supreme Court
are of the opinion that the rule is applicable to the concrete case in the
broad meaning of “finding”. This broad meaning includes also the activi-
ties of a professional car hunter who has been looking for the car. The
Supreme Court is of the opinion that the interpretation of the word “find-
ing” must be based on a combination of teleological argumentation (sup-
ported by argumentation based on the discussion about the rule in
parliament) and linguistic argumentation. The Supreme Court is of the
opinion that the meaning of the rule (which is of a relative recent origin)
must be established on the basis of the purpose, the legal ratio, of the rule
that can be found in the parliamentary documents: “The purport of clause
5:5 ff., as becomes clear from the history of the enactment of the rule, can
be summarized as follows: the intention of the legislator was to promote
that someone who has lost an object will, as much as possible, be capable
of finding the object, and in case the person who has lost the object does
not show up, to provide a solution that makes it possible to bring the ob-
ject into circulation within the not too distant future or make it possible
that the object can be used again” (see the text of the decision attached at
the end of this chapter). The purpose was to promote that a lost object is
returned to its rightful owner as soon as possible, in any case is brought
back as soon as possible into circulation or is used again. According to the
annotator, hjs, the idea of the Supreme Court is that the ratio of this rule
is served by such a broad interpretation that is also linguistically correct.
So, in this case, according to the Supreme Court the ratio of the rule must
be considered as the main argument in support of the decision to apply the
rule (in the broad meaning of “finding”) in the case at hand. This argument
is supplemented by the consideration that the linguistic meaning of find-
[  4 3 2 ]
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ing does not form a counter-argument against application in this broad
sense.
From our perspective this decision forms an example of a case in which
the strategic maneuvering by the party derails. First, it constitutes an instan-
tiation of derailing strategic maneuvering because condition (1b) is not met.
The proposed literal meaning of “finding” in a narrow interpretation is
wrongly presented as the accepted standard meaning of the term “finding” in
clause 5:5, because the term must be interpreted in a broader sense that in-
cludes also the activities of a professional car hunter. Second, it constitutes an
instantiation of derailing strategic maneuvering because condition (1a) is not
fulfilled. The linguistic argument in favor of a narrow interpretation of the
term “finding” cannot constitute an independently sufficient justification.
The Supreme Court argues that also the intention of the legislator (which
supports a broad interpretation of “finding”) must be taken into account. In
the view of the Supreme Court the teleological argument referring to the goal
of the rule constitutes a necessary element of the argumentation. The Court
points to the fact that the intention of the legislator to promote that the ob-
ject is brought back into circulation is also in accordance with the meaning
of the term “finding” in the broad sense as used in the rule.
The second example of strategic maneuvering with linguistic argu-
mentation can be found in the discussion in Dutch law in a case called “Same-
sex marriage” about the application of the old article 1:33 of the Dutch Civil
Code, that says that: “A man can, at the same time, be married only to one
woman and a woman can, at the same time, be married only to one man” (in
the Dutch text the expression “one” can mean “a” as well as “one”, which is
the basis of the discussion in this case). In this case a civil servant refused to
marry a female homosexual couple on the basis of this article. However, the
plaintiffs state that the text of this article does not forbid a marriage between
two women because it only says that one man can only marry one woman
with the stress on the formulation “a” interpreted as “one” and hence must be
interpreted as a prohibition of polygamy. The judge of first instance, the judge
in appeal and the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad 19 oktober 1990, RvdW
1990, 176) decide that “the claim departs from a reading of various articles that
is in itself already wrong and it ignores the purpose of the law the legislator
had in mind when formulating the rules of Book 1 of the Civil Code, also in
light of the preceding legislation” (see the text of the decision attached at the
end of this chapter).13
[  4 3 3 ]
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From our perspective it is an interesting example of a case in which
the strategic maneuvering by the party derails. First, as in the previous ex-
ample, it constitutes an instantiation of derailing strategic maneuvering be-
cause condition (1b) is not fulfilled. The proposed literal reading of “a man”
and “a woman” in clause 1:33 is wrongly presented as the only possible read-
ing because there is also another reading; i.e., the accepted standard reading.
The Supreme Court states that the other reading implies that the article must
be read in the standard reading as forbidding a same-sex marriage so that the
given interpretation is incorrect. Furthermore, it constitutes an instantiation
of derailing strategic maneuvering because condition (1a) is not fulfilled. The
linguistic argument can never be the only argument because, according to
the Supreme Court, in establishing the meaning of a rule the legislative his-
tory of the rule and the goal of the rule as intended by the legislator must also
be taken into account, so the argument could never serve as an independent
justification. With the formulation “miskent de strekking van de wet” (ig-
nores the purpose of the rule) the Supreme Court indicates that the purpose
of the rule as it is based on the legislative history is a necessary element of a
justification of the interpretation of the meaning of a rule.
In both examples the combination of the violation of the starting point
rule and the violation of the burden of proof rule can be considered as a spe-
cific form of derailing strategic maneuvering. The derailment consists of a
combination of two violations. The first violation implies that a particular in-
terpretation of the meaning of the rule is wrongly presented as the only cor-
rect interpretation. Starting from this incorrect interpretation the second
violation implies that certain information (the goal of the rule as intended by
the legislator) is wrongly ignored and is not included in the argumentation
13 In this case the lower judges and the Supreme Court put forward also additional argu-
mentation in which they react to other arguments put forward by the plaintiff in which
they discuss the argument by the plaintiff that the views in society about same-sex relations
have changed since the enactment of the law. The courts make clear that in certain matters,
such as the present one that concerns the public sphere where legal certainty plays an im-
portant role, it is not the task of the judge to change the meaning of a rule by departing
from the goal of the rule as intended by the legislator on the basis of changing views in so-
ciety. The Supreme Court argues that it is not the task of the judge to decide against the
clear meaning of the rule about marriage, since abolition of the prohibition to marry for
same-sex couples would have far-reaching consequences.
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so that the burden of proof for this information is evaded. In the evaluation
of the Supreme Court we see that both mistakes are assessed individually as
mistakes in the context of a rational discussion about the application of legal
rules. The violation of the starting point rule is characterized as departing
from a “disputable literal reading of statute law” (gaat uit van een aanvecht-
bare letterlijke lezing). The violation of the burden of proof rule is charac-
terized as a “misunderstanding of the law as the legislator had in mind when
enacting it” (miskent de strekking van de wet zoals men die bij haar tot-
standkoming voor ogen heeft gehad).14 The combination of the two forms of
strategic maneuvering can be considered as a complex form of strategic ma-
neuvering in which the second builds on the first form so that the combina-
tion can be considered as subordinate.
22.4 Conclusion
In my contribution I have made a first attempt to reconstruct the strategic
maneuvering with linguistic arguments in a discussion about the application
of a legal rule in a concrete case in the context of a court of law. I have ex-
plained how the legal norms can be translated in pragma-dialectical terms to
explain why certain forms of strategic maneuvering with linguistic arguments
in this activity type are acceptable and when the strategic maneuvering derails.
By distinguishing three forms of the use of linguistic argumentation
I have tried to give a systematic and precise description of the various ways
in which linguistic argumentation can be used and on the basis of the trans-
lation of the norms I have shown how it can be explained why certain forms
of strategic maneuvering with a particular use are acceptable and other
forms derail.
In the analysis of some examples from Dutch law I have demonstrated
how the framework for evaluating the soundness of strategic maneuvering
[  4 3 5 ]
14 In the discussion about “finding” the Supreme Court claims that the High Court has not
departed from a wrong conception of law (“heeft niet blijk gegeven van een onjuiste rechts-
opvatting”). This is a specific legal expression used to indicate that a lower court has made
a mistake in giving a wrong interpretation of the law. In this context the Supreme Court
refers to this kind of mistake because the party that has asked the Supreme Court to correct
the decision has put forward as a reason for the necessity of correcting the decision (the
mistake presented as the “cassatiegrond”) that the Court has departed from a wrong con-
ception of the law in giving a broad interpretation of the term “finding”.
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can be used in explaining why certain ways of using linguistic argumenta-
tion in a particular context are unacceptable and constitute a derailment of
strategic maneuvering. I have explained that the strategic maneuvering with
linguistic argumentation often takes the form of a complex of strategic ma-
neuvers that are mutually dependent and each form a violation of a discus-
sion rule.
Example 1
Hoge Raad 25 oktober 1996, no. 16074 RvdW 1996, 207
(...) 3.3.1 Bij de beoordeling van onderdeel 1, dat de vraag aan de orde stelt wat
moet worden verstaan onder “vinden” in art. 5:5 moet het volgende worden
vooropgesteld. De strekking van art. 5:5 e.v., zoals deze uit de geschiedenis van de
totstandkoming van deze bepalingen naar voren komt, laat zich aldus samenvatten
dat daarmee beoogd is te bevorderen dat degene die de zaak verloren heeft, haar zo
veel mogelijk zal kunnen terugvinden, en voor het geval de verliezer niet meer komt
opdagen een oplossing te geven, welke mogelijk maakt dat de zaak binnen afzien-
bare tijd weer in het rechtsverkeer wordt gebracht of in gebruik genomen (Par.
Gesch. Boek 5, Inv. 3, 5 en 6, p. 1008). Met die strekking strookt het begrip vinden
in art. 5:5 in overeenstemming met zijn taalkundige betekenis, in ruime zin uit te
leggen. Daarmee zou slecht te verenigen zijn dat zou moeten worden aangenomen
dat niet van vinden sprake is, indien de zaak niet bij toeval is ontdekt, maar daar-
naar is gezocht en handelingen zijn verricht die als het opsporen daarvan kunnen
worden beschouwd. (...)
English translation:
Supreme Court of the Netherlands October 25, 1996, no. 16074 RvdW 1996,
207
(...) In the evaluation of part 1, which introduces the question of the exact meaning
of “finding” in clause 5:5, the following must be assumed. The purport of clause 5:5
ff., as becomes clear from the history of the enactment of the rule, can be summa-
rized as follows: the intention of the legislator was to promote that someone who
has lost an object will, as much as possible, be capable of finding the object, and in
case the person who has lost the object does not show up, to provide a solution that
makes it possible to bring the object into circulation within the not too distant fu-
[  4 3 6 ]
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ture or make it possible that the object can be used again (Parliamentary History,
Book 5, 3, 5, 6, p. 1008). It is consistent with this purport to interpret the concept
of finding in clause 5:5, in accordance with its linguistic meaning, in the broad
sense. It would be inconsistent with this purport to assume that the rule would not
be applicable if the object would not be discovered by accident, but when the per-
son who has found the object would have been looking for it and would have de-
veloped actions which can be considered as tracing/hunting the object. (...)
Example 2
Hoge Raad 19 oktober 1990, no. 7649 NJ 1992/129
(...) Die stelling (de stelling dat de tekst van de Nederlandse wet een huwelijk
tussen twee vrouwen niet verbiedt en dat die tekst in het licht van de maatschap-
pelijke ontwikkelingen zo moet worden uitgelegd dat zo’n huwelijk toelaatbaar is
EF) kan niet als juist worden aanvaard. Zij gaat uit van een reeds op zichzelf aan-
vechtbare letterlijke lezing van een aantal wetsartikelen en miskent de strekking van
de wet zoals men deze bij de totstandkoming van Boek 1 BW, mede in het licht van
de daaraan voorafgaande wetgeving, voor ogen heeft gehad. Ook indien latere
maatschappelijke ontwikkelingen steun zouden geven aan de opvatting dat het niet
openstaan van de mogelijkheid van een wettelijk huwelijk tussen twee vrouwen of
twee mannen niet langer gerechtvaardigd is, zou dit niet een van de onmiskenbare
strekking van de wet afwijkende wetsuitlegging wettigen, te meer niet nu het hier
gaat om een onderwerp dat de openbare orde raakt en waarbij de rechtszekerheid
een belangrijke rol speelt. (...)
English translation:
Supreme Court of the Netherlands October 19, 1990, no. 7649 NJ 1992/129
(...) This claim (the claim that the text of the Dutch law does not forbid a marriage
between two women and that this text must be interpreted in the light of the devel-
opments in society that would support the view that such a marriage is allowed (ef)
cannot be accepted as correct. This claim departs from a reading of various articles
that is in itself already wrong and it ignores the purpose of the law the legislator
had in mind when formulating the rules of Book 1 of the Civil Code, also in the
light of the preceding legislation. If later developments in society would also sup-
port the opinion that the impossibility for two women or two men to marry is no
[  4 3 7 ]
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longer justified, this would not justify an interpretation of the law that departs
from the clear purpose of the law, because it concerns also a subject matter that
concerns the public order where legal certainty plays an important role. (...)
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